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Summary
Heiner Müller has often been interpreted as a political writer. This thesis seeks to argue 
that the profoundly political import of Müller's work can best be understood if one 
understands Müller as writing about and for a community. This community is 
heterogeneous, finite, non-totalitarian and transgressive. It is constituted by alterity, thus 
making its complete realisation impossible. As such, this community can only with the 
greatest of difficulty be understood in Marxist-Leninist terms, that is, in that ideology 
under which Müller spent most of his writing life.
Müller's later plays, which are far more well-known and more often produced, 
have often been described as fitting uneasily into the conventional aesthetics of the 
GDR. This thesis argues that traces of such a non-totalitarian community are to be found 
in his early work. On the other hand, they bear only limited testimony to the 
heterogeneous community. The conditions under which he had to write accorded him 
only restricted means in allowing such a community to come to expression. In addition, 
Müller himself pulls back from carrying this heterogeneous impulse through to its 
radical conclusion.
It is only when he develops his drama -  a development which takes the form of 
engagement with the dramatic tradition -  that he begins to do justice to the notion of 
community which is present only in nascent form in his early texts. Furthermore, as 
time goes on, the manner in which Müller wrote and produced texts for the theatre can 
itself be seen as an expression of this non-totalisable, complex and manifold 
community. As such, the reasons for the change in Müller's writing can be found in his 
early work. It is this which the thesis sets out to examine.
The expression of community in the manner of Müller's writing might best be 
explained through the notion of signature. By emphasising the finitude in the 
relationship between himself and his texts, Müller further radicalises his work. This is 
primarily achieved through the use of allegory which in turn proves to be a form of 
writing which engenders remembrance -  itself an important constitutive moment in the 
community.
Müller's work, in seeking to express community through its radically finite 
nature raises a number of questions about the relationship between author, text and the 
role of literary criticism. The thesis thus attempts to examine these questions and take 
up the challenge to literary criticism which they represent.
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Introduction
Brecht gebrauchen, ohne ihn zu kritisieren, ist Verrat.'
This most famous of quotes from Müller has seen much use itself this year. From 
posters announcing Brecht festivals to the last anecdote of the day in the Tagesthemen, 
Müller's name has been dropped as the dramatist who took over Brecht's mantle of 
composing German political theatre. Müller is seen by a number of critics as a socialist 
writer who, in spite of his problematic relationship with the authorities, broadly 
supported the aims of the GDR state.2 The quote from Fatzer ±  Keuner, however, itself 
demonstrates how careful the critic must be in according Müller a place in the Brechtian 
or socialist realist pantheon.
Müller makes clear in just this one quip two attitudes to theatre which will be of 
fundamental importance to this thesis. Firstly, that he engages with theatrical tradition; 
and secondly that he does so not simply because he regards Brecht's writing as the acme 
in any history of drama, but rather because he seeks to provide for the future of the 
theatre. Broadly speaking Müller might be described as sharing similar political aims to 
Brecht, but this thesis seeks to argue that the radical attitude of Müller's work can best 
be understood if one sees him as writing about and for a community.
Müller's better-known later work has proved to be happy hunting ground for 
critics seeking obviously progressive and radical political content in his plays. Müller's 
early works, however, have proved to be more difficult. While they might be dismissed 
as socialist realism by some, this thesis seeks to argue that these early works -  Die
' Heiner Müller, Fatzer ±  Keuner, Rotwelsch, p. 149. For full details of works referred to, see 
bibliography.
Umsiedlerin, Der Lohndrücker, Philoktet and Der Horatier -  provide the critic of 
Müller with the means to understand why and how the later drama -  such as 
Hamletmaschine -  came to be written.
This is, therefore, the reason why this thesis concentrates on early plays of 
Müller. The reasons for the development of Müller's drama are to be found in 
examination of the early work: in the manner in which it allows community to show 
itself but equally in the way it retreats into the arms of the GDR state. In other words, 
one of the most profound acts of heterogeneity in the community -  the particular subject 
writing literature- is betrayed for the totalising force of the regime.
Many of these ideas and concepts are taken for granted by literary 
criticism. What could be more obvious than a statement such as "Müller wrote in the 
GDR"? Yet it is precisely such self-evidence and comfort which Müller undermines in 
his writing and by writing itself. Few critics have attempted to carry through the radical 
consequences for literary criticism of such writing which expresses community through 
the singularity and fmitude of the writing subject. By including himself or 
autobiographical elements into so many of his plays, it becomes painfully clear who 
wrote Müller's work, but it is precisely in the particular nature of this relationship of 
Heiner Müller to his texts, I will argue, where once more the work of community is to 
be seen. This will be especially clear in the way in which he, as man, addresses a 
particular other which is woman. Indeed it will be seen that the gendered other in 
Müller's writing of community plays a constitutive role.
The first chapter of the thesis, before looking closely at any of Müller's dramatic 
work, seeks to lay the theoretical foundations for an examination of Müller's writing. It 2
2 See discussion of other interpretations of Muller throughout the thesis.
will argue that Miiller's relationship to his work throws up problems of an absolutely 
fundamental nature for literary criticism. The chapter then attempts to go on and address 
these problems. Simply put, Chapter One seeks to investigate what is involved in the act 
of literary criticism on a writer whose signature was so pronounced in his work. This 
will lead to a consideration of the profoundly finite nature of the structure of that 
relationship, a finitude that is in the end defined by the witnessing of the death of 
someone else, a particular "other". In order to do this, Chapter One contains an extended 
discussion of those philosophers, writers and theorists (Derrida, Benjamin, Heidegger 
and Nancy) whose work is essential to grasp the issues which spring forth from Miiller's 
writing and from Müller writing. Such an understanding of what is involved in his 
writing brings us back to the definition of community with which this thesis will work, 
for it will be defined in a remarkably similar way.
One of the aspects of the relationships examined in the thesis -those between 
Müller and (variously) his writing, the community, the other, his death -  is that it will 
be impossible to define absolutely. This impossibility should not be understood or 
experienced as a defeat but as an aporia which is liberating for the community in that it 
provides a future for the latter. Once again, this aporia will be seen to be treated by 
Müller in his work as well but it must also be examined for what it means for literary 
criticism. Vital for this stage of the argument will be a reading of Walter Benjamin's 
Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, an exceedingly difficult but profoundly important essay 
which examines the finitude of the work of art, its consequences for literary criticism 
and the manner in which the latter regards the author as such.
To this end, and throughout the thesis, I have chosen to illuminate, contradict or 
confirm points of my argument through quotes from interviews given by Müller on
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politics and his work. Sometimes of course, this gives weight to that argument, other 
times it will be seen that Müller saw things differently. The aim of these quotations is 
also, however, to illustrate the precarious nature of the relationship between Müller, his 
writing and literary criticism which is also the subject of this thesis and especially what 
concerns Chapter One.
Having established this theoretical framework, I then turn to a detailed and close 
reading of Die Umsiedlerin. In so doing, it will become clear that the glimpses of the 
community which Müller allows to peek through the text need further explanation in 
order to understand fully their import. This is addressed through the nature of 
transgressive behaviour, something which finds its expression in Die Umsiedlerin 
through the comedy of the piece. The introduction of a theoretical understanding of such 
issues in this and the following chapter is thus an attempt to understand the effects of 
Müller's writing, even if he had only a cursory knowledge or understanding of such 
theory.
A shorter reading of Der Lohndrücker seeks to ground the argument of Chapter 
Two more fully while providing the link to Philoktet in Chapter Three, which I suggest 
represents a certain tum in Müller's writing. Once more, the issues at stake in the latter 
play can only be adequately examined by reference to particular theory, in this case, the 
nature of myth and allegory which will bring us back to the work of Walter Benjamin, 
in particular Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels.
It is Philoktet and Der Horatier, I suggest, where Müller's engagement with 
theatrical tradition can be clearly seen for the first time, but this concern is undertaken 
for the future of a theatre which might not be political in the conventional (or perhaps, 
Brechtian) sense of the term, but which is made politically. Finally, and regrettably in
8
all too brief a fashion, I discuss through Hamletmaschine what such a political theatre, 
made and written politically for a heterogeneous community, might look like and, once 
again, what this means for literary criticism.
Indeed, this is intended to be the guiding thread of the thesis: I hope to examine 
how one might understand Midler's expression of a heterogeneous community, but also, 
and equally importantly, to examine what allows this particular author, as literary critic, 
to make such assertions about Müller, and what a writer like Müller means for literary 
criticism itself.
9

Heiner Müller and the Stasi
If literary criticism has a task, it is to resist the transformation of author into hero. In the 
case of Heiner Müller, this should not be too difficult. The revelation of his contacts 
with the Stasi over a long period of time leading up to the dissolution of the GDR, 
although presented in a remarkably sensationalist fashion by some elements of the 
German media, serves in this regard as a trenchant reminder of the fallibility not only of 
authors, but, in a manner to be discussed in this introduction, of authorship itself.
Rumours had been circulating for some time through the community of 
Feuilleton readers in recently unified Germany that Heiner Müller, erstwhile radical, 
pure communist of the Rosa Luxemburg school, whose work had always been 
interpreted as critical of the Stalinist regime, had been registered for some time as an 
Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter (IM) of the state security service (Stasi). A number of prominent 
public figures, notably Lothar de Maiziere and Manfred Stolpe from the political 
classes, and Sascha Anderson and Christa Wolf from the country's literary elite had 
either been proven to be, or were accused of being in the Stasi's employ. The 
accusations surrounding Müller seemed to originate from a little known, and even less 
published writer Dieter Schulze, who circulated leaflets at a number of social or public 
occasions in the latter half of 1992, accusing Müller of having co-operated with the 
Stasi and of having effectively approved Schulze's expulsion from the GDR.1 On
1 Heiner Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 431. For full details of works referred to, see bibliography. See 
also pp. 484-5: "[Schulze] bekam ein Strafverfahren, ich hatte ihm einen Verteidiger besorgt.[...] Dann 
haben wir, das heißt Christa Wolf, Fühmann und ich, Briefe an Hager und Honecker geschrieben. 
Daraufhin wurde das Urteil vom obersten Gerichtshof kassiert, und dann war Schulze wieder frei. Nun 
war er ein schwer berechenbarer Faktor, und irgendwann drohte ihm ein neuer Prozeß. Und da fragte 
mich Girod ganz direkt: Es gibt nur eine Alternative. Zuchthaus oder Ausweisung. Und da habe ich zur 
Ausweisung geraten. Das kann man mir übel nehmen, aber ich hielt ein DDR-Zuchthaus nicht für eine 
Dichterakademie."
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January 5th of the following year Schulze faxed a press release to scores of editorial 
offices across the country revealing the fruits of his research into Müller's activities to 
which he had been guided by an anonymous phone call.2 On the basis of "sechs 
Monaten Arbeit und viel Geld",3 Schulze claimed to have discovered a IM code name 
("Heiner"), a registration number and the address of a flat where conspiratorial meetings 
were said to have taken place.
The following Sunday (10.1.93) the news magazine programme Spiegel TV ran 
an interview with Müller where he admitted to having had regular contacts with the 
Stasi.4 Throughout the interview Müller admits freely to having spoken to Stasi, indeed 
he claims it is unthinkable that a figure with such a high profile as himself would not 
have done so.
[E]s ist ganz schwer in dieser Gift-geschwollenen Atmosphäre, überhaupt 
darüber zu reden. [...] Ich weiß nicht, mit wievielen hundert Mitarbeitern ich 
gesprochen habe, ohne zu wissen, daß sie Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheit waren. 
In jeder Theaterkantine saß da einer, mindestens einer, und es gab auch direkte 
Gespräche. Ich wußte, ich rede nicht mit der Heilsarmee. Ich mußte immer 
wissen, was ich sage und was ich sagen kann. Und ich mußte auch immer 
wissen, wenn ich lügen muß. Das gehört zu solchen Gesprächen.5
Müller goes on to justify his actions by claiming that he tried "zu beraten und Einfluß zu
nehmen auf Dinge, weil es war ab einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt ab [sic] nicht mehr
möglich, mit Parteifunktionären vernünftig zu reden, gerade in den letzten Jahren."6 As
to whether, four years after the wall came down, Müller suffered any pangs of guilt, he
2 "[ein] anonyme[r] Hinweis", ibid., cf. Robin Detje, Die Zeit. Nr. 3, 15.1.93, p. 49: "Die Quelle: ein 
anonymer Anruf. Der Absender: ein sichtlich überreizter Mensch."
3 ibid.
4 "Der Dramatiker Heiner Müller ("Die Hamletmaschine") hat regelmäßig Kontakte zu Offizieren des 
Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit zugegeben." Spiegel TV press release, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 435.
5 ibid.
6 ibid., p. 436.
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goes on to say, "Das war die Situation. Ich habe da überhaupt nie ein moralisches
Problem drin gesehen, sehe ich auch heute nicht."7
Four days later, and one day before the first commentary on the affair appeared
in Die Zeit, Müller's lawyer released an affidavit, stating,
Ich kann versichern und beeiden, daß ich im Zusammenhang mit der 
Staatssicherheit kein Papier unterschrieben und kein Wort schriftlich formuliert 
habe. Ich war naiv genug, nicht zu wissen, daß Gespräche mit Mitarbeitern der 
Staatssicherheit als "IM-Tätigkeit" registriert wurden. Schon der Begriff "IM" 
war mir und meinen Freunden in der DDR-Zeit unbekannt. Was in mir 
unbekannten Akten steht oder stehen kann, ist Stasiliteratur.8 *10
Despite such assurances, and despite the fact that the only material which came to light
was the existence of a card file, whose contents were published, the suspicion deepened,
at least on the part of the Feuilleton editors, that Müller was more deeply involved.
Schulze had originally attested that "belegbares Matieral wurde in Aussicht gestellt"5
which was then presumed to be evidence of further, more incriminating files. Müller
himself seems to confirm the possibility by suggesting, "Vielleicht sind Akten im
Handel.'"0 This supposition became in the following weeks so firmly established that on
22nd January, Iris Radisch felt able to write in Die Zeit,
Auf dem Tisch liegen Karteikarten, Vorgangshefte und Quittungen, die 
beweisen, daß die Staatssicherheit Heiner Müller zehn Jahre lang als 
Inoffiziellen Mitarbeiter "Heiner" geführt hat. Die Akte ist verschwunden, wie 
damals im Fall Sascha Anderson. Den Vorgangsheften ist zu entnehmen, daß es 
neben dem üblichen Personalband einen Aktenteil des Mitarbeiters gegeben 
haben muß."
The next few weeks saw a heated debate between the Feuilleton editors of a number of 
national publications, most notably Die Zeit and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ).
7 ibid.
8 ibid., p. 438.
5 Detje, op. cit., and Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 431.
10 Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 438.
11 Iris Radisch, Die Zeit. Nr. 4, 22-1-93, p. 47.
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Finally, Müller gave an interview to the Frankfurter Rundschau on 22nd May which 
discussed the accusations as well as the media event earlier in the year.
The four articles by four different authors in successive editions of Die Zeit are 
all to a greater or lesser extent critical of Müller and range from cynicism or outright 
condemnation (Robin Detje on 15th January and Fritz Raddatz on 29th January) to 
seeing the affair as symptom of a wider problem between East and West Germany (Iris 
Radisch on 22nd January and Ulrich Greiner on 5th February). The accusations in all 
four articles, however, can be divided into two forms. Firstly: excoriation for any 
suggestion of contact with the Stasi for whatever reason, in whatever context; secondly: 
censure for the betrayal by such surreptitious acts of Müller's theatre, itself regarded as 
radical and political in its opposition to the GDR regime. The two accusations are, 
however, intimately linked in the argumentative logic in the four newspaper articles. It 
is because Müller is an artist, and furthermore one who produced pieces of resistance, 
that his contacts with the Stasi are to be particularly strongly condemned. The works of 
art which Müller produced are seen morally to disqualify him from anti-social behaviour 
in the wider political arena. I hope to show in the brief discussion following that such an 
identification of life and work brought about precisely that state of affairs which 
prevented Müller from making any response which might have been seen as adequate to 
the accusations made in the Feuilleton. Or further - and this is the problem that will 
guide the thesis as a whole - that Müller's texts themselves operate against such a 
symbolic identification, even though they seem to be distinctly personal to him, and that 
this itself is a profoundly political attitude of Müller's work.
14
The argument of Fritz Raddatz's article can hardly be clearer from its title, "Von 
der Beschädigung der Literatur durch ihre Urheber".12 Raddatz begins with an unsourced 
quote from Thomas Mann ("Ein Künstler ohne Lebenssittlichkeit ist nicht möglich; der 
Werkinstinkt selbst ist ihr Ausdruck, ist "Tüchtigkeit", ist Sozialität, und zeitige er das 
lebensabgewandteste Werk") and accordingly goes on to argue that both Müller and 
Christa Wolf "haben nicht nur ihrer Biographie geschadet; sie haben ihr Werk 
beschädigt. Sie haben uns verraten; nicht im Sinne von "angezeigt", sondern in einem 
viel tieferen Sinne[.]" This is because the artist owes his/her audience "Ernsthaftigkeit" 
and the work of art itself, as social act, demands social responsibility and fundamental 
human decency on the side of the artist or author: "Das ist nicht wahr, daß Kunst nichts 
zu tun habe mit Gesittung [...]: ohne Humanum keine Kunst.'"3 At the end of the article, 
in a personal entreaty to his erstwhile acquaintances, Raddatz pleads, "keine 
Mogelpackungen und Placebos mehr. Halten Sie der Würde Ihres Werkes die Treue. 
Erklären Sie." 14 15
Müller has often been quoted as questioning the transparent link between the act 
of writing or producing art and morality. Detje interprets Müller as saying, "Ein Dichter 
[...] steht jenseits aller Moral: 'Kunst hat und braucht eine blutige Wurzel. Das 
Einverständnis mit dem Terror gehört zur Beschreibung.""5 It is this moral atrophy 
which Raddatz seeks to oppose, for if the work of art is in its core essentially innocent 
and humanitarian, then the artist must do this justice by acting in such a manner away 
from the work's composition or performance. Artist and work are seen as symbols of
12 Fritz J. Raddatz, Die Zeit. Nr. 5, 29-1-93, pp. 51-2.
13 ibid., p. 51.
14 ibid., p. 52.
15 Detje, op. cit., quoting Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 290. For further references in interviews with 
Müller on this subject, see below.
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each other and moreover symbols that hardly undergo time. It is thus that Raddatz can
write with incredulity on pieces written in 1961 and 1977 respectively,
"Heiner Muller's Arbeit - ob 'Philoktet' oder 'Hamletmaschine' - ist bohrende 
Parabel von Macht und Verrat, Lüge und Erniedrigung. Wie kann man das 
ausbreiten - also: sich häuten - und zugleich dickfellig mit den Häschern 
plaudern?'"6
It is this mythic identification of past and present, or rather as this introduction will go
on to argue, this mythic suppression of finitude, which is associated elsewhere in the
series of articles with the position of Müller and Wolf, explaining their inability to utter
a satisfactory response to the probing of West German intellectuals.
Ulrich Greiner notes after weeks of debate that the argument over artists' links
with the Stasi "nicht der Aufklärung dient, sondern der Verwirrung, nicht der Vernunft,
sondern der Legendenbildung.'"7 Greiner is more careful than Raddatz not to argue for a
direct contradiction between the moral probity of particular works of art and the
turpitude of their authors, seeking instead to pin down Wolf and Müller through their
role in the GDR as public figures with an equally public responsibility.
Denn neben dem Werk, das der Kritik und der Diskussion offensteht, und neben 
der privaten Existenz des Autors, die ebenso wie die anderer Menschen ein 
Recht auf Unversehrtheit besitzt, gibt es ein Drittes: die öffentliche Person, die 
moralische Instanz. Wenn und insofern der Schriftsteller eine öffentliche Person 
ist, dann darf er in dieser Rolle befragt und kritisiert werden.16 78
This may or may not be a general truth, but Greiner sees it as being especially
applicable with regard to the GDR.
Weil es in der DDR eine demokratische Öffentlichkeit nicht gab, übernahm der 
Schriftsteller öffentliche Aufgaben. [...] Insofern der Schriftsteller diese Rolle 
akzeptierte, geriet er unweigerlich in die Rolle einer moralischen Instanz mit
16 Raddatz, op. cit., p. 51.
17 Ulrich Greiner, Die Zeit. Nr. 6, 5-2-93, p. 60.
18 ibid.
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sinngebender, gewissensentlastender und vorbildhafter Funktion, auch und
gerade dann, wenn er mit den Direktiven der Partei nicht konform ging.19
Greiner thus makes it clear that it is not simply the fact that societies turn artists into 
public figures (for reasons perhaps of adoration, commerce, religion or ideology) which 
confers upon them moral responsibility, but rather also due to the role of the artwork in 
a particular society. He argues that the social practices in the GDR were structured in 
such a way as to make the work of art itself an important method of communication. 
What is however not clear is how these practices then make their authors "moralische 
Instanzen" in day-to-day life even if this is "public life". Indeed, Greiner can only come 
to this conclusion if he, like Raddatz, affirms a symbolic identity of the life and work of 
the artist. The work must, according to this logic, continue to belong to the artist, be 
proper to him or her, and his or her actions accordingly remain a faithful or perfidious 
symbol of the work.
Greiner notes that Wolf and Müller have only been able to respond to their 
critics through recourse to a mythical notion of the GDR, that is, one which continues to 
see particular virtues incorporated within that society as not having been subject to the 
decay which befell the rest of the state, and which are worthy of defence even now. The 
primary quality of the GDR is apparently seen by Müller and Wolf as the maintenance 
of the anti-fascist tradition.20 This defence, however, takes the form of silence, of 
refusing to have written about contacts with the Stasi for fear of besmirching the 
redeemable elements of GDR society.
19 ibid.
20 Müller discussed the legacy of anti-fascism at length in interviews. See in particular Müller, Jenseits 
der Nation, p. 74: "Die einzige Legitimation der DDR kam aus dem Antifaschismus, aus den Toten, aus 
den Opfern. Das war eine Zeitlang ehrbar, aber an einem gewissen Punkt fing es an, zu Lasten der 
Lebenden zu gehen." See also my discussion on the treatment of death by the community later in this 
chapter.
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Das Feuilleton hat Fragen gestellt. Die Befragten sahen darin einen Angriff. Sie 
parierten ihn mit der Verteidigung des Mythos. Über den Mythos aber läßt sich 
nicht diskutieren. Man kann ihn nur zur Kenntnis nehmen. Deshalb ist die 
Debatte über die Vergangenheit der DDR gescheitert.21
Iris Radisch two weeks earlier was more forthcoming.
Der Fall Heiner Müller zeigt, wie tief selbst die klügsten Ostköpfe inzwischen 
im Sand stecken. Sie träumen von einer post festum ideologisch gesäuberten 
DDR und verteidigen ihren Traum, ihre Wahrheit furios gegen die Wirklichkeit. 
Es kann doch nicht alles umsonst gewesen sein! Die Denkfalle [...] besteht in 
dem wackeren Pioniersglauben, nach dem jeder, der den Sozialismus kritisiert, 
den Kapitalismus stärkt. Das Schweigen über die Stasi mutiert in dieser aparten 
Dialektik zum Angriff auf Kohl. Die klamme Verteidigung der DDR zur 
feurigen Attacke auf die westliche Wirtschaft.22 23
This adherence to a mythic view of the GDR is, however, only the result of an
analogous belief on behalf of the four Feuilleton critics in Die Zeit. It is demanded of
Müller that he respond in a non-mythical manner to the charge that he has "betrayed"
his works on the basis of symbolic identification of his works with his life. This is itself,
as I hope to demonstrate in the course of this thesis, primarily that mythic relationship
between art, politics and community which Müller attempts to transgress.
Müller elsewhere demonstrates his distance from these critics by rejecting the
idea that one can indulge in remembrance of the GDR's past on the basis of historical
consensus. East and West will not be able to have dealt with the legacy of the GDR,
according to Greiner and Radisch unless there is agreement on the terms of
remembrance.
Niemand kann in dieser Debatte recht haben, solange es für dieses Recht keinen 
Grundlagenvertrag gibt, solange jede Tatsache nur so viel wiegt wie ihre 
wechselnde politische Bedeutung, solange Ostmensch und Westmensch keine 
gemeinsame Sprache sprechen.22
21 Greiner, op. cit., p. 60.
22 Radisch, op. cit. p. 52
23 ibid.
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Greiner then explains exactly what this consensus must consist of; "daß erstens der 
Sozialismus verdientermaßen gescheitert ist und daß zweitens die reale DDR nichts war, 
dem man ein längeres Leben hätte wünschen dürfen."24 In other words, the very pre­
conditions for the debate in the first place - the differing views and understandings of 
the legacy of the GDR - should cease to exist in order for the debate to take place. It is 
perhaps as potent an example of Vergangenheitsbewältigung as could be conceived: the 
past must be seen as being overcome in order for a debate to take place (whose 
conclusion is preordained). Ironically, Greiner claims to be avoiding precisely that when 
he writes,
Mehrfach und mit Recht ist die Häßlichkeit solcher Begriffe wie 
"Vergangenheits-bewältigung" oder "Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit" bemerkt 
worden. Versuchen wir es mit dem Begriff Erinnerung.25
However, Greiner imagines that such remembering can only be achieved by a present
consensus at the cost of a particular past's understanding of itself; in other words, the
past has to be infused, overcome, bewältigt by the present. Memory and remembering
must surely, however, involve a constellation of the past and present, a becoming
present again, a repetition of the past as past which undermines the presence to itself of
the present. Remembering must take into account the passing of time, the structure of
finitude which inhabits time.
Such a structure might thus be seen as inimical to a community identical to 
itself, or to consensus. Indeed, this thesis will hope to show that it is precisely a 
community riven by splits, struggles and its essentially heterogeneous nature, that is, a 
community fissured and structured by politics, which is the only basis for memory and
24 Greiner, op. cit., p. 60.
25 ibid.
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remembrance of the past. Furthermore, this political community is the lifeblood of 
MUller's work. The work speaks community, be it in writing, watching, reading, or in 
criticism.
One problem remains, however. Why did Müller remain silent on his contacts 
with the Stasi until 1993? Was not the long silence on the matter, as well as the much 
publicised excision of passages relating to the Stasi in the first edition of his 
autobiography Krieg Ohne Schlacht almost bound to symbolise the refusal of East 
German intellectuals to come to terms with their role in the maintenance of a totalitarian 
regime?“
It must be emphasised once more that Müller should not have been expected to 
explain his actions simply because his plays were seen as in opposition to the regime. 
Accusations of hypocrisy based on the symbolic identity of work and life have no place 
here, as will be explained later. Simply as a public figure, that is one with a degree of 
influence, one might however expect some form o f response. It is also perhaps 
questionable whether MUller's contacts for the Stasi are the proper subject for a work of 
literary criticism. Indeed, as will be argued later, the task of robbing Müller of any 
heroic stature takes the form of a differentiated approach to the relationship of life and 
work rather than investigating his activities away from the theatre in the GDR. However 
it is perhaps still of interest to examine the accusations upon which a literary critical 
stance was based in order to discover whether these accusations, at least, have any basis 
in fact.
“  Cf. Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer 111. p. 127: "Die Schuld der Intellektuellen in der DDR, zu denen ich 
gehöre, besteht darin, daß sie Privilegien akzeptiert haben; die meisten wissend, daß die Privilegien sie 
von der Bevölkerung trennten und damit im Sinn des Regimes unschädlich machten."
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Müller's explanation for his reticence after 1989 is threefold. Firstly, that his 
contacts with the Stasi were innocuous;27 secondly, that he did not see himself as having 
the right to retreat from a position of influence when he could achieve a number of small 
victories;28 and thirdly, that the West German press misrepresented such activities,29 301and 
any justification of them, by insisting on a simple schema for opposition to the regime - 
either one was against, in which case no contacts should have been entered into, or one 
supported the regime, possibly becoming an informant for the Stasi.50
Müller's silence on his activities is thus perhaps best accounted for by distinctly 
unheroic attributes: naivety, cowardice and opportunism, all of which he admits or even 
affirms.3' In the heated atmosphere of the time, some might find it reasonable not to 
want to run the risk of denunciation and pillory for activities which Müller saw rather as 
helping the victims of the regime as well as ensuring that his work was performed as 
much as possible. That Western commentators regarded all contacts with the Stasi as 
equal -  someone who spoke about world politics being placed on the same level as the
27 "Ich habe das einigen erzählt, weil ich es nicht so ernst genommen habe. Aber es galt für die Stasi als 
konspirativ. [...] Man hat über Kulturpolitik gesprochen. Das kann man mir zum Vorwurf machen. Aber 
warum sollte ich nicht versuchen, Einfluß zu nehmen, wenn ich dazu die Möglichkeit hatte?" Müller, 
Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 484.
28 "Ich war nicht erpreßbar. Ich habe es bewußt getan. Ich dachte, da kann ich etwas erreichen in 
konkreten Dingen, wenn es um ein Visum geht oder um die Verhinderung einer Verhaftung." ibid., p. 
488.
29 "Was mich verblüfft hat, war die Geschwindigkeit und Selbstverständlichkeit, mit der Journalisten, 
gerade in der Zeit, annahmen, ich hätte Leute observiert oder denunziert und dafür noch Geld gekriegt." 
ibid., pp. 477-8.
30 "Ich weiß, daß alle meine Freunde ihre Opferakten durchgesehen haben wegen dieses Spitzelvorwurfs. 
Keiner hat etwas entdeckt, und keiner kann auch etwas entdecken. Das beruht einfach auf dem Klischee, 
wer mit der Staatsicherheit redet, ist ein Verräter, ein Schwein" ibid., pp. 483-4. See Detje, op. cit.:"Ist 
der Dichter ein Schwein? Ist Heiner Müller ein Sascha Anderson im Großformat? Müller ist in die 
StolpeKantAndersonmaschine geraten. Und es sieht nicht so aus, als käme er unten unbeschädigt wieder 
heraus." p. 49.
31 "Es gibt ein Menschenrecht auf'Feigheit vor dem Feind’, von dem habe ich Gebrauch gemacht in der 
Situation, in der Atmosphäre damals. [...] Denn eines habe ich bei der Umsiedlerin-Affäre deutlich erlebt: 
Wie schwer das ist, als einzelner gegenüber einer Masse von Andersdenkenden kein ungutes Gefühl zu 
haben, wenn man bei seinem Standpunkt bleibt. Das ist nicht leicht." Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, pp. 
488-9. See also Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer 111. p. 149: "Ich habe mich aber gelegentlich verhalten wie 
jemand, der im Besitz der Wahrheit ist. Der Kernpunkt ist vielleicht: Opportunismus."
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informer -  is also clearly seen in the press coverage of the Müller-Stasi affair. Whether 
the discourse as a whole would have been so structured to the disadvantage of those 
with differing contacts of a singular nature to the Stasi had these persons revealed earlier 
the nature of their own singular intercourse is another matter. The silence of Heiner 
Müller prevented a real debate from taking place in that the presumptions of Western 
commentators remained unchallenged. We must, given the strictures against 
identification of author and work mentioned above, leave the following observation at 
the level of wry irony: that Müller's works produce and promote debate and the promise 
of future interpretation and debate, as will be argued, precisely because they are 
singular, can only have been written by, and are signed by Müller himself.
Finally, and although these observations are once more to be seen as marginal to 
a work of literary criticism, it should also be pointed out that Müller was vindicated of 
being an IM (though not, it must be emphasised, of naivety, cowardice and 
opportunism) in the following months by the research of Andreas Schreier and Malte 
Daniljuk for the magazine Horch und Guck.*2 They point out, with some cyncism, that 
the debate over Müller lasted just over three weeks, "dann war der Ofen aus. IMS 
"Heiner" hatte seinen Marktwert verloren. Das Merkwürdige an der Sache war nur: Es 
tauchten keine Beweise auf, die Heiner Müller unmittelbar belasten konnten."” Müller 
had been the object of Stasi surveillance since the Umsiedlerin affair in 196132 4 and after 
protesting about the expulsion of Wolf Biermann in 1976 had been registered under 
"Operativen Personenkontrolle" (OPK), with the codename "Zement". As had already 
been explained in the FAZ of 21st January this was "die stärkste Form der Überwachung
32 Cf. Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, pp. 433-4.
33 ibid., p. 471.
34 See Chapter Two.
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durch die Stasi."35 and meant that "Müller über viele Jahre zu der Gruppe 'Feindlich 
negativer Schriftsteller' mit höchster Priorität gezählt wurde."36 Two years later nothing 
more had been undertaken, primarily because the Stasi officer, Oberleutnant Holm, 
responsible for Müller's file admired his work and did not regard him as a political 
threat. In 1978, however, Müller was threatened with criminal proceedings for having 
written a reference for Thomas Brasch for the Suhrkamp publishing house in the Federal 
Republic, for which he was to be charged with currency offences. Holm, instead of 
handing Müller over to the authorities, turned the file into an "IM Vorlauf', thus 
protecting him from any action brought by any other arm of the state on the basis of 
preparatory proceedings being undertaken to gain Müller as IM. In order to legitimate 
such proceedings, some form of conversation had to be recorded with the object as well 
as possible uses, from the point of view of the appropriate Stasi officer, for the potential 
IM in the future. These appeared in the Stasi files revealed in early 1993, described by 
Müller as "Pläne und Wunschzettel"37 and "Stasiliteratur"38 One year later, after the 
deadline for securing the services of an IM had been passed, the IM-Vorlauf was 
converted into a full-blown IM. There was never any evidence for anything other than 
conversations initiated from the side of the Stasi, perhaps misguidedly understood by 
Müller as an opportunity to exert influence. Indeed as Schreier and Daniljuk point out, 
"[a]lle diese Informationen wären der Öffentlichkeit jederzeit zugänglich gewesen. Es 
bleibt die Frage, warum erhobene Anschuldigungen so unkritisch wiedergegeben 
werden."39
35 FAZ. 21-1-93. p. 27.
36 ibid.
37 Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 477
38 ibid., p. 438
39 ibid., p. 476.
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One might speculate on the economics of the media industry, the increasingly 
swift commodification of news "stories", or, like Schreier and Daniljuk, to a perceived 
inferiority complex of West German intellectuals over and against their East German 
counterparts40 as explanation for the manner in which the debate on Müller progressed in 
the Feuilleton pages of the Bundesrepublik. It is, however, incontrovertible that the 
initial interest in Müller and the subsequent urge to condemn him issued from the 
supposed contradiction between the political, progressive content of his work and the 
self-serving, reactionary act of conversing with the Stasi. In other words, the 
interpretation of Müller's work as political led to a symbolic identification of that work 
with his life.
The argument of this chapter is the exact inverse. It is rather that the nature of 
the relationship between life and work can be characterised by signature - undermining 
any simple symbolic relationship of propriety or ownership - and it is this which must 
be understood as political. I will go on to consider how the nature of the identity of 
writer, signature and work of art forbids any simple association of the three, but also 
that Müller's writing itself (that is, in both senses - the text and the act of writing per se) 
seeks to display this problematic as the political response of the work of art.
The Imperative o f Writing
The political bravery of Heiner Müller, as writer, was that he never claimed to be a hero. 
The hero dissident of Western eyes who remains untainted by the machinations of 
totalitarianism remains utterly unassimilable to Müller. In response to an accusatory
40 ibid.
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Statement that he accepted literary prizes and honours from the state, he replies, "Und
das Geld. Geld nehme ich immer. Geld verschafft Freiheit."'11 But this seemingly
egoistic stance is revealed as no less so than some other alternatives. The self-
centeredness of political purity, of non-compromise, of not compromising oneself was
usually not something which Müller felt he could cling to:
Warum macht man sich da die Hände schmutzig? Ich habe nie behauptet, daß ich 
ein "reiner" Anarchist bin. Ich rede mit jedem, wenn ich es für notwendig und 
für praktisch halte.41 2
Das war eigentlich für mich meine Rechtfertigung auch für die Kontakte mit der 
Staatssicherheit: Ich habe nicht das Recht, rein zu bleiben in einer schmutzigen 
Welt.43
This agenda of personal political intervention (whereby its effectiveness in the context 
of the GDR, together with the self-delusionary belief in this efficacy might deserve 
some hard questioning) makes the silence post Wende about such actions all the more 
surprising. There is perhaps no better example of the confusion into which Müller had 
fallen than the following comparison to a German thinker whose political history is 
nothing but obscene.
Deswegen verstehe ich so gut, warum Heidegger über seinen Abgrund nicht 
gesprochen hat. Denn jedes Gespräch führt zu neuen Mißverständnissen, das ist 
nicht auszuräumen.44
41 Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer III, p. 130.
42 Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 488.
45 ibid., p. 497.
44 ibid., p. 489. There are a number of errors, misjudgements and absurdities in MitUer's interviews which 
display variously the fallibility of Müller; the problematic status of the interview, especially in a 
totalitarian environment (see also Chapter Three); or simply the different status of the written work and 
the oral extemporisation. One example on Adorno's criticism of lyric poetry which Müller evidently 
understands as a censoring of poetry rather than a particular lyric tradition: "Adornos These ist völlig 
kapitulantenhaft. Das Gegenteil ist richtig -  nach Auschwitz nur noch Gedichte." (Jenseits der Nation, p. 
43.) See also Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer. p. 157: "Wenn ich dann über die Stücke geredet habe, habe 
ich oft stark schematisiert. Das hatte oft auch taktische Gründe. Oder ich hinkte mit meinen Gedanken 
hinter meinen Texten her, auch möglich. Ich habe mit meinen Kommentaren nie das Niveau meiner 
Stücke erreicht."
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Thus it might be more accurate to state that Miiller's political bravery consisted not so
much of not claiming to be a hero, but rather of claiming and affirming the fact of not
being a hero. The difference between the two lies in the act of silence or acquiesence of
the first possibility. The "cowardice in the face of the enemy" was a reaction to the
Western press' demand for Müller to act as a hero adequate to his writing, the silence
being effectively a statement of denial: "I never said I was a hero". Compare, however,
how the affirmation of non-heroism on Müller's part is inextricably linked with the
demand to write and the problems of signature:
Ich bin kein Held, das ist nicht mein Job. Ich meinte: Es gibt einfach Prioritäten. 
Ich bin Schriftsteller zuallererst. Das Wesentliche ist, die Möglichkeit zu finden, 
das zu schreiben, was ich schreiben will und was nur ich schreiben kann.45
Müller's first and only moral priority was to write. This led to acts of surrender to the
regime if such cowardice allowed him to continue writing. On being forced to write a
statement of self-criticism after the first performance of Die Umsiedlerin, Müller
remembers,
Ich wußte ja auch, daß zum Beispiel Eisenstein immer Selbstkritik geübt hatte.
Er hat als Künstler dadurch überlebt. Dann war sicher auch Angst vor dem 
Gefängnis mit im Spiel. Mir war das Schreiben wichtiger als meine Moral.46
In that sense, the only moral sense of writing consists in the act of writing itself, in
writing as well as one possibly can, that is, in expressing as far as possible the
singularity of the work of art:
Man kann als Künstler nur eine Moral haben, nämlich die, seine Arbeit so gut zu 
machen, wie man kann. Denn was ich mache, kann nur ich machen. Also muß 
ich es so gut wie möglich machen.47
45 Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer 111. pp. 130-1.
46 Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 180.
47 Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer III. p. 167.
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This would express what some would regard as writing's immorality, its 
separation from everyday moral concerns, but Müller makes clear that he understands 
his imperative as that of writing. Hence he can say on the one hand, "[ajußerdem bin ich 
nie konsequent gewesen, außer beim Schreiben, denn das ist eine andere Existenz"48 and 
on the other that the text and the work of art itself cannot answer to any notion of 
integrity from the moral realm: "Kein Mensch ist integer. In keinem guten Stück."4’ 
Indeed as will be seen in this thesis, Müller regards, this culpability as the writer's 
privilege: "Die Privilegien waren eine wichtige Arbeitsbedingung. Mir ist nur wichtig, 
was ich schreibe und was von mir übrig bleibt. Meine Person ist da sekundär."50
The work of art or literary text demands to be written, not simply in the sense of 
being produced, but demands that which might be regarded as the condition of 
possibility of writing: the singularity and finitude of the writing subject, his/her 
signature. Writing is thus a singular and particular occupation, its effects and results 
cannot, for Müller, be subscribed under a universal morality. The demand for writing 
itself, however, is that which the literary work demands of the author and (given a 
certain understanding of the dynamics of writing and signature) is a quasi-universal 
demand on the writer. To express this in other terminology would be simply to write 
that the work of art is autonomous.
It is for these reasons that Müller has occasionally found the third person 
repulsive for the purposes of writing.
48 ibid., p. 129, my emphasis.
45 ibid., p. 189.
50 ibid., p. 136. See also Miiller, Der Schrecken die erste Erscheinung des Neuen: Zu einer Diskussion 
über Postmodernismus in New York in Rotwelsch, p. 94: "Schreiben unter Bedingungen, in denen das 
Bewußtsein von der Asozialität des Schreibens nicht mehr verdrängt werden kann. Schon Talent ist ein 
Privileg, Privilegien müssen bezahlt werden: der Eigenbetrag zu seiner Enteignung gehört zu den 
Kriterien des Talents."
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[...] I was writing a short prose text dealing with the suicide of my former wife.51 
(She killed herself in 1966). First I wrote in the third person: "He came home 
and he saw..." Then I realized that this was the attitude of a coward so I switched 
to the 'I'.52 *
The imperative appears to writing which carries its signature, no matter how shocking or 
morally reprehensible. Ten years later, Muller remembers the scene of writing once 
more.
[Pjlötzlich schreibe ich: "Ich erstach ihn." Das war ein Schock, eine ganz andere 
Erfahrung. Ich hatte angefangen, das in der dritten Person zu schreiben, dann 
habe ich gemerkt, das ist kein Ausweg. Daher die abschreckende Wirkung auf 
viele, auch auf mich. Ich war erschrocken über das, was ich da schreibe, aber das 
gab mir nicht das Recht, es nicht zu schreiben.55
If Müller does write, if his texts can only come from him and only his signature appears
at the foot of the text and between every line, then he is also quite clear on the question
whose property the text remains.
Die Intentionen fürs Schreiben werden beim Schreiben verheizt. Dann entsteht 
was, was man nicht kennt. Oder jedenfalls etwas, an das man nicht gedacht hat. 
[...] Das gilt für jede Kunst. Wenn man es vorher weiß, kann man's lassen. [...] 
Was ich meine, ist ganz konkret. Man geht mit konkretem Material um: mit der 
Sprache. Die Sprache setzt sich letztlich durch gegen den Autor. Gegen die 
Intention des Autors.54
Müller insists that it is precisely the signature of the author, so long as this author does 
sign his/her "name" that the text becomes autonomous. In other words, in autonomous, 
or perhaps simply "good," "meaningful," "authentic", art, other considerations are not 
relevant, be they moral, commercial or ideological. Replying to a suggestion that 
authors are generally regarded as authorities, Müller says, "Die Autorität ist der Text, 
nicht der Autor. [...] Nur wenn [uei Schriftsteller] schreibt, kann er nicht lügen."55
51 Müller, Todesanzeige in Germania Tod in Berlin, pp. 31-4.
52 Müller, Walls in Rotwelsch, p. 34. See also the discussion of Todesanzeige in Chapter Three.
55 Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 211.
54 Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer 111, pp. 158-9.
55 ibid., p. 161.
28
Thus we return to the propriety of writing. The demand for moral writing, 
symbolic identification of the morality of the author with that of the text and finally the 
question of ownership of that text are all closely interlinked. The demand that life 
should not contradict the work or that the work should reflect a moral life (the former 
was the case in the Stasi debate, whereas the latter was dominant within the cultural 
politics of the GDR) demonstates that propriety itself is seen as proper to the 
relationship of life and work; furthermore it can only operate on the basis of the work of 
art belonging to the author, its being his/her property.56 In other words, at least as far as 
the specific economy of literary or artistic production is concerned, the moral question 
of ownership of the literary text is treated in a similar way in the liberal capitalist 
context as in that of the former totalitarian command economy. The vociferous 
liberalism of the writers in Die Zeit does not succeed in distancing itself from that which 
it proclaims as having been overcome or superceded (the GDR) thanks to the demand to 
treat the relationship of artist, text, aesthetic or critical act as one determined 
fundamentally by propriety. The fact that Muller fell foul of such moral stricture before 
and after the dissolution of the GDR demonstrates that the political nature of his texts 
cannot so easily be pigeonholed as anti-Stalinist or anti-Western polemic. It is rather the 
case that the import of his works bears witness to a radical conception of politics and 
community which is always to come, always yet to arrive and that his work of art itself 
bears within it an imperative - stemming from his particular signature through the work 
- which almost does justice to such a conception of community.
56 See discussion of Derrida and signature below.
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The Time of Writing, the Time o f Criticism
Most commentators on Müller have remarked upon the way in which events, names and 
material from Müller's life reappear in his literary and theatrical texts. Most often 
commented upon has been his writing himself into the text of Hamletmaschine31 but 
Müller's signature - the claim and confirmation that he wrote the piece being read or 
performed - can be seen and read in texts which appeared throughout his productive life. 
Obvious examples of autobiographically influenced texts include Bericht vom 
Grossvater38 and Todesanzeigebut certain events in Müller's life occur repeatedly -  
especially in the later texts -  most poignantly the suicide of his wife Inge, but also the 
arrest of Müller's father by the SA. It is not, however, the aim of this thesis to point out 
autobiographical elements in Müller's work, not least because Müller has pointed these 
out himself, most thoroughly in the series of interviews which go to make up his 
"autobiography", Krieg Ohne Schlacht. The thesis seeks rather to investigate the 
political effect o f Müller's signature, extending the understanding of signature beyond 
inclusion of such autobiographical details. (One would, for example, in the context of 
Heiner Müller, have to mention the constant re-working, re-writing or re-translation of 
dramatic texts - be they his or of other writers - as inscribing the singular signature on 
the dramatic tradition.)57 *60 Or again, the concept of signature could also be usefully 
employed to understand the development of Müller, especially after 1989, into a media 
figure whose primary form of expression took the form of the public, published 
interview (almost always on the subject of himself) as opposed to further works of
57 See discussion in Chapter Three.
” in Müller, Geschichten aus der Produktion, pp. 7-10.
”  in Müller, Germania Tod in Berlin, pp. 31-34.
60 See Chapter Three for the discussion on this point.
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dramatic art.61 The political significance of emphasising the process of writing a literary 
text will be seen to go beyond the simple but very real risk of being a dissident element 
in totalitarian society. In excess of this risk I hope to show that the deeper political, 
communitarian stance of MUller's work resides in the expression of a radical sense of 
finitude and singularity which one might term a political understanding of time and 
subjectivity within the work of art. The finite and singular nature of the signature must 
thus be investigated more deeply in order to reach an understanding of the community 
which I claim Müller is writing or signing.
Clearly, any signature, be it concrete or implied, dates and signs the text which it 
signs - a text was written at a particular time by a particular author. However, as argued 
above, it is the very singularity of a signature which opens up considerations concerning 
who a literary text belongs to. The remainder of this chapter will thus attempt to 
describe a particular literary critique which responds to the challenge of the work of art 
which is signed in this political way, and which in so doing, demonstrates its distance 
from a more philosophical attitude to the literary text. In order to do so, however, 
literary criticism in its theoretical guise must engage itself in philosophy, as all theory 
must. The argument of this chapter is that the practice of literary criticism must 
differentiate itself from this theoretical moment as well as from philosophical use of 
literary material for the latter’s own philosophical ends.
61 This tendency reached its peak with the publication of a book by the Berlin publishing house 
Schwarzkopf und Schwarzkopf of pictures and "aphorisms", simply quotes from interviews, in coffee- 
table format: Heiner Müller, Bilder eines Lebens, Berlin, 1996.
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The Signature
The preceding comments on signature and the literary text have been informed primarily
by the work of Jacques Derrida, in particular his essays and papers Signature Event
Context,61 Signsponge, Shibboleth: For Paul Celan and The Law o f  Genre63 as well as
his discussion of signification and repetition in O f Grammatology. In Signsponge
Derrida seeks to differentiate between three different understandings or "modalities" of
signature. The first is that usage most generally understood: a proper name which has
been represented in writing, not merely printed out in block capitals, but rather
authenticating the relationship of writer and written, "the fact that it is indeed he who
writes: here is my name, I refer to myself, named as I am, and I do so, therefore, in my
name. I, the undersigned, I affirm (yes, on my honor)."62 *4 The second form of signature is
described as those marks which are left "by accident or intention" in a real signature
itself, or analogically, in any text or object produced by the signing subject, which help
to emphasise the singularity of that text, the subject and their particular relation.
These marks would have no essential link with the form of the proper name as 
articulated or read 'in' a language. [...] We sometimes call this the style, the 
inimitable idiom of a writer, sculptor, painter, or orator.65
Finally, Derrida describes the third modality as "general signature" that is the manner in
which writing points to itself as writing, and indeed, to itself as having been written by
someone, somewhere, sometime.
[T]he work of writing designates, describes, and inscribes itself as act (action 
and archive), signs itself before the end by affording us the opportunity to read: I
62 in Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, pp. 307-330.
43 Collected in Derrida, ed. Attridge, Acts of Literature, pp. 344-369, 370-413, 221-252, with 
introductions by the editor. Quotes are taken from this editon.
64 ibid., p. 362.
“  ibid.
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refer to myself, this is writing, /  am a writing, this is writing - which excludes 
nothing
Thus when I refer to Miiller's signature, I seek to emphasise the particularity of Muller's 
writing, that certain characteristics of his writing draw attention to the singularity of its 
production, that is, by Heiner Müller at a particular time, but also, to follow Derrida, 
that this is a general condition of writing itself.
What one might term the singularity of the signing event can only attain such a 
status if it can be repeated. This seeming contradiction - that an event is singular and 
repeatable, indeed, only singular if repeatable, only repeatable i f  singular is at the very 
core of Derrida's thought. I can only affirm that I am right here, right now if my 
signature can be reproduced in the future (thereby allowing for the possibility of forgery 
or copying). Any signature that is too whimsical, capricious, or too playful is not 
recognised as a signature. Thus, "I will have failed to affirm the uniqueness and 
genuineness of my attestation by, paradoxically, attending too fully to the singularity of 
the event."6 7 In other words, it is the very possibility that a signature is not absolutely 
singular, confined to one event in space and time, which allows signature in the first 
place.
The effects of signature are the most ordinary thing in the world. The condition 
of possibility for these effects is simultaneously, once again, the condition of 
their impossibility, of the impossibility of their rigorous purity. In order to 
function, that is, in order to be legible, a signature must have a repeatable, 
iterable, imitable form; it must be able to detach itself from the present and 
singular intention of its production. It is its sameness which, in altering its 
identity and singularity, divides the seal.68
66 ibid., p. 363.
67 Attridge in introduction to Signsponge, p. 345.
68 Derrida, Signature Event Context, op. cit., pp. 328-9.
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It is vital to understand the "iterability"69 of a signature as constitutive. Anything which 
is meaningful has to have the ability to be repeated in order for it to be meaningful at all. 
However, since it will be repeated in a different context (if no other than simply a 
different temporal context) it cannot be said that it has been completely repeated, with 
some putative unchanged essence having been carried over into this new context. In 
other words, a meaningful item, such as a signature, must be originally repeatable or 
simply "iterable".
The fact that I and only I have signed my signature at a particular place and time 
does not mean that I must be present in order for this signature to remain legible. On the 
contrary, the logic of the signature demands that for it to belong to me, I must lose 
ownership over it.
To write is to produce a mark that will constitute a kind of machine that is in 
tum productive, that my future disappearance in principle will not prevent from 
functioning and from yielding, and yielding itself to, reading and writing. [...]
For the written to be the written, it must continue to "act" and to be legible even 
if what is called the author of the writing no longer answers for what he has 
written, for what he seems to have signed, whether he is provisionally absent, or 
if he is dead, or if in general he does not support, with his absolutely current and 
present intention or attention, the plenitude of his meaning, of that very thing 
which seems to be written "in his name."70
Derrida also insists within the context of the debate on speech act theory that writing 
must continue to function beyond the disappearance or death of the addressee in order to 
function as writing.
Iterability structures writing and communication as such, makes it possible, but 
also causes it to break down. Indeed, it is only because of the possibility of breakdown 
or representation in other countless contexts that language can communicate at all. Once
M "[l]ter, once again, comes from itara, other in Sanskrit, and everything that follows may be read as the 
exploitation of the logic which links repetition to alterity.” Derrida, ibid., p. 315.
™ ibid., p. 316.
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again, the iterability of a signature allows it to represent the singularity of an event but 
disallows it from representing that event as purely single, self-identical or present to 
itself. The second is a condition of the first.
How does then this signature, which lacks the authenticity of full self-identity, 
become in any way authenticated? Just as some documents demand the presence of a 
countersignature to authenticate the first, the logic of the signature calls upon others to 
confirm its iterable authenticity. A signature is only a signature if another signature can 
countersign it, indeed, the signature must be open to, and is structured by this otherness 
which dwells in the concept of iterability. But this countersignatory response also obeys 
the logic of the signature and itself then seeks the signature of the other, and so on ad 
infinitum. The other already inhabits the one who has signed, it is the other which makes 
signature possible at all:
The identity o f the same, of [...] the auto, is generated by the very thing - 
iterability, the power-to-be-repeated, which prohibits its stability and autonomy. 
[...] The mark of the auto is that which allows it to be altered or othered in 
repetition, and this is the very first guarantee of its "existence".71
The signature is thus thrown into a fury of other countersignatures, others
countersigning. Derrida calls this the mise-en-abyme to recall the heraldic practice of
representing or repeating the shield as a whole within the part of the same shield, thus
repeating it again and again. (The obvious pun is with abîme, an abyss "proper",
denoting its bottomless depths.) The term is also used to describe how the operations of
reading and writing are already placed within the text, already referring to itself, one
might say countersigning itself. But this only operates on the basis of the vital alterity of
the countersignature.
71 Smith, Derrida and Autobiography, p. 100.
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The structure of the placement in abyss [...] seems to me to repeat this scene 
every time: every time, but every time in a necessarily idiomatic fashion, the 
"differential quality" affecting the very form of the signature, this latter 
remaining the other's.11
In other words, even the most personal text, the most candid autobiography, the most
self-referential post-modern nightmare is placed into the abyss of the other. Indeed, it is
precisely those texts that seem to be most singular, such as those of Muller I will argue,
which demand more than any other the countersignature of the other reader, interpreter
or critic to affirm that not only did the signatory write, but that the signatory wrote. This
is perhaps what Derrida might mean when he writes, "It is therefore in the abyss of the
proper that we are going to try to recognise the impossible idiom of the signature.”72 3 It is
when writing shows and represents itself as writing, or, which amounts to much the
same thing, the act, date and author of writing is signed through the text, that the other is
most forcibly called upon. To repeat and continue a passage quoted earlier:
I refer to myself, this is writing, /  am a writing, this is writing- which excludes 
nothing since, when the placement in abyss succeeds, and is therefore 
decomposed and produces an event, it is the other, the thing as other, that signs.74
As noted before, however, writing can only function as such if it can operate in the
"radical absence" of the addressee or writer him/herself.
And this absence is not a continuous modification of presence; it is a break in 
presence, "death" or the possibility of the "death" of the addressee, inscribed in 
the structure of the mark. [...] What holds for the addressee holds also, for the 
same reasons, for the sender or the producer.75
Writing can only function, the signature can only be signed and countersigned because
of the possibility of its complete interruption - death: "The name is made to do without
72 Derrida, Signsponge, op. cit., p. 360.
73 ibid., p. 348.
74 ibid., p. 363.
75 Derrida, Signature Event Context, op. cit., p. 316.
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the life of the bearer and is therefore always somewhat the name of someone dead."76
That is, the more singular the signature, the greater is the engagement with the
inevitability of the end of the possibility of that signatory's writing.
[DJeath reveals the power of the name to the very extent that the name continues 
to name or to call what we call the bearer of the name, and who can no longer 
answer to or answer in and for his name. And since the possibility of this 
situation is revealed at death, we can infer that it does not wait for death, or that 
in it death does not wait for death [...], speaking and bearing his death each time 
it is pronounced in naming or calling, each time it is inscribed in a list, or a civil 
registry, or a signature.77
The literary text where the signature or style of the author is so displayed as to
emphasise the singularity of the act of writing and of the author itself expresses
similarly a strong sense of finitude - not only of the act of writing itself (that it is now
over) but also that of the author. In the knowledge that the end will come, the literary
text, which more than any other demands the signature of the author, is inhabited from
the very beginning by decay and de-composition. As such it differs from some other
discourses which seek to mask the date of their signature.
For what philosophy attempts, in its most fundamental mission, is a writing 
without a date, a writing that transcends the here-and-now of its coming-into- 
existence, and the heres-and-nows of the acts which confirm, extend, and renew 
that existence.78
The literary text, on the other hand, as a more openly signed and authored discourse, 
states the date of its inception, or alternatively the different dates of its origin through 
re-working. But in order to do so, the time of the signature must follow the same logic 
of iterability as the graphic flourish, as set out above. In order to proclaim a "now", the 
date must be able to be repeated. Once more, it is this iterability that allows re-working
76 Derrida, The Post Card: from Socrates to Freud and beyond, p. 39 quoted in Smith, Deni da and 
Autobiography, p. 72.
77 Denida, Mémoires: for Paul de Man, p. 49. (Also quoted in Smith, ibid.)
78 Abridge in introduction to Shibboleth: for Paul Celati in Denida, ed. Abridge; op. cit., p. 371
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of a text over time, that allows the "I" to write as "I" again. The future must be able to 
repeat or cite the date of writing - the moment of writing and signing can only display 
its relative moment of uniqueness by having that uniqueness undermined, not least in 
the alterity of the signature of the same author at an other time. The subversion of 
uniqueness is its condition of possibility. It is thus, and only thus, that the birthday of 
the text can be celebrated. It is only because of its anniversary (that is, its repetition) of 
the signature that we can reach back to the uniqueness of the historical event of writing.
The Dated Text
Derrida writes of the date and its singularity and of "the resistance which 'once' may
offer thought"79 and links it to the particularity of poetic discourse which more than any
other addresses the other, the reader across time who reads on the anniversary, as it
were, of the event of writing. The work o f art as a singular piece only becomes legible
as such if it allows this singularity to be undermined.
One must, while preserving its memory, speak of the date which already speaks 
of itself: the date, by its mere occurrence, by the inscription of a sign as 
memorandum, will have broken the silence of pure singularity. But to speak of 
it, one must also efface it, make it readable, audible, intelligible beyond the pure 
singularity of which it speaks.80
This legibility, the act of reading itself thus takes place not only in time (the time of
narrative) but across time. The poetic text, in simultaneously asserting and foregoing its
uniqueness, that is, by being dated, opens itself up for commemoration.
Assigning or consigning absolute singularity, they must mark themselves off 
simultaneously, at one and the same time, and from themselves, by the
79 ibid., p. 373.
80 ibid., p. 382.
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possibility of commemoration. In effect, they mark only insofar as their 
readability enunciates the possibility of a recurrence.81 823
But this takes place not just within any putative essence of poetry or a particular
singular poem, but rather because the poem across time opens itself up to a reader: "No
doubt that despite the date, in spite of its memory rooted in the singularity of an event,
the poem speaks; to all and in general, to the other first of all."“ The encounter with the
other reader is the possibility of remembrance or commemoration, remembrance not
only of the singularity of the work of art, but of the finitude of the act of writing and
even writing generally itself.
A date [...] effaces itself in its very readability. Effacement is not something 
which befalls it like an accident; it affects neither its meaning nor its readability; 
it merges, on the contrary, with reading's very access to that which a date may 
still signify. But if readability effaces the date, the very thing which it offers for 
reading, this strange process will have begun with the very inscription of the 
date. The date must conceal within itself some stigma of singularity if it is to last 
longer - and this lasting is the poem - than that which it commemorates. And so 
what must be commemorated, at once gathered together and repeated, is, at the 
same time, the date's annihilation, a kind of nothing, or ash.8)
This encounter with the date takes place of course in time on a date, an "effacement
faced with another date, the one to which it speaks, the date of an other strangely wed or
joined in the secrecy of an encounter with the same date."84 Just as the signature and
countersignature engage in a "coitus" of signing, so will the date call forth another date,
and another, each of which are reduced to "a kind of nothing, or ash".
Both the writing of the signature and its dating are thus structured by the
finitude, death or perhaps the ashes of those that write and read. Not only, as argued
above, does the singularity of the signature, the here and now of artistic composition
81 ibid., p. 394.
82 ibid., p. 381.
83 ibid., p. 396.
84 ibid., p. 382.
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express finitude as such, but the dating of the art work and the attendant possibility of 
reading it in the future can only be undertaken i f  time passes, that is, if death inhabits the 
very structure of writing and reading. In addition, as will be argued below, this death 
must be that of the other. As far as the work of art is concerned, its identity as such is 
promised in the future, in death, through the death of the other.
The Problem o f Time
If reading and writing are structured by a form of temporality where the finitude of 
those acts of reading and writing must be emphasised, then it would be equally 
important to assert that such an attitude to time goes fundamentally against the grain of 
historical thought or philosophy on the subject. Considering that one could characterise 
the history of philosophy as one long battle with the problem of time, any summary of 
that history can only be regarded as brutal and inadequate. It is, however, important to 
sketch very briefly the contours of the attempt to deal with the intractable problem of 
time which runs through modem (continental) philosophy, starting with Nietzsche and 
ending, for my purposes at least, with Derrida.
Ever since the Greeks, philosophers have been confronted with the enigma of the 
identity of time as every descriptive method chosen always seemed to present 
difficulties and contradictions. If the present moment existed then it also could not exist 
because it was immediately a past or future moment. Yet no other identity seemed to 
present itself which did not conform to an idea of a series of "nows" - single discrete 
moments - following one after the other, thus allowing for the universal human 
conception of "the present" as well as the passage of time, the unfolding of the series of
40
"nows". This is less a social structure than one deeply embedded in our thinking about 
and intercourse with the world around us and is reflected in the language which we use 
to signpost our way through time. The words "once", "then" and "now" refer to a 
moment that can be grasped as such, where the first two merely describe a past and 
future "now".85 Nothing can be conceived as being able to put a stop to this linear 
sequence of present moments, and hence the notion of infinitude takes shape, grounded 
in the privileging of the moment, the "now", which is present to the human subject. This 
basic concept of time might be organised into a number of oppositions 
(subjective/objective, existential/cosmic)86 but these are merely different forms of 
reference to an underlying unity, a fundamental value as regards time: that its essence is 
the present moment, or rather that time can best be conceived as being determined by 
presence itself.
Derrida points out, however, that such a conception of a series of nows following 
on from each other is contradictory.
But if the present now were not annulled by the following now, it would coexist 
with it, which is impossible. [...] A now cannot coexist, as a current and present 
now, with another now as such. Coexistence has meaning only in the unity of a 
single, same now. [...] Not to be able to coexist with an other (the same as itself), 
with an other now, is not a predicate of the now, but its essence as presence.87
That is, the now cannot exist at the same time as other nows, but must also do so in
order that the conception of time as a series of nows retains its coherence. This notion of
time is experienced as the "possibility of the impossible".
This impossibility implies in its essence, in order to be what it is, that the other 
now, with which a now cannot coexist, is also in a certain way the same, is also a
85 See David Wood's discussion on Heidegger's description of the "ordinary" concept of time in The 
Deconstruction of Time, pp. 236-240. The German equivalents of the three signpost words are dann, 
zuvor, and jetzt.
86 ibid., p. 13.
87 Derrida, Ousia and Gramme: Note on a Note from Being and Time, Margins of Philosophy, pp. 54-55.
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now as such, and that it coexists with that which cannot coexist with it. The 
impossibility of coexistence, of a certain simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous, in 
which the alterity and identity of the now are maintained together in the 
differentiated element of a certain same.88
The notion of co-implication of nows falls into contradiction, indeed this notion of time 
can only function on the basis of this form of contradiction. Derrida points out that it is 
not just a simple case of Aristotle or any other philosopher "getting it wrong". The fact 
is that any attempt to think time non-contradictorily can only be achieved on the basis of 
contradiction. Time is resistant to all human attempt to organise or conceive it, or in 
other words, time displays an excess over human organisation. As such, any attempt to 
conceive time will necessarily display itself as an aporia - the best endeavours of human 
judgement will find themselves exhausted.
Nietzsche made one of the first and most powerful moves to maintain and yet 
undermine the general and ordinary conception of time. In the idea of the eternal 
recurrence, where everything one does or undertakes is repeated eternally, the 
experience of nows and their succession can only be conceived as being structured by 
their ability to be, or rather necessity of being repeated. At least as far as the ethical 
demand of eternal recurrence is concerned, the now is only made possible by repetition. 
This is, of course, an argumentative move familiar to readers of Derrida. Just as in the 
case of the signature of the date, for any unit (be it phoneme, word, letter) to have 
meaning, it must be able to be repeated, but repetition is impossible without difference. 
Thus the possibility of the unit maintaining its identity, its "sameness" is dependent 
upon the fact of difference.
Absolute repetition is impossible in its possibility, for there can be no repetition 
without difference. The concepts of identity and difference form the precipitate
88 ibid., p. 55.
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of the metaphysical dissolution of an originary aporetic structure of repetition 
which Derrida calls "arche-writing" or the "trace".89
Any conception of time reveals an "impossible possibility", an aporia which is
intractable. Thinking about time can only involve the experience of this aporia, the
frustration of judgement, the finitude of that judgement and the signature with which it
was made.
The absolutely vital step, which Derrida then takes, is to insist the following: 
that aporia does not put an end to judgement; it rather makes renewed judgement 
possible. The experience of aporia should not be thought of as running up against a 
brick wall or the co-presence of two contradictory statements but rather as the condition 
of possiblity itself of judgment. When faced with the aporia of time, of law90 or of the 
literary text, one must judge.
An aporia demands decision, one cannot remain within it; at the same time its 
essential irreducibility to the cut of a decision makes the decision which one 
makes contingent, to be made again.91
When faced with the originary repetition of the signature in the aporia of time, that is, 
with the impossible possibility of finitude (where the finite is only possible if it can be 
repeated), the critic or philosopher must judge. The aporia is, once again, the condition 
of possibility of judgement, not its end. It is only because the judgement or 
interpretation fails (that is, it does not reach the status of a final word on the matter) that 
judgement or interpretation can take place at all. Interpretation can only claim to be 19
19 Beardsworth, Richard, Derrida & the Political, pp. 17-18.
90 The aporia of time and law, and time and law as aporia, govern the discussion and argument of 
Beardsworth's remarkable book. While he is concerned with attempting to define the "political" in 
Derrida as the recognition of the experience of aporia, this chapter deals more with the implications for 
literary criticism. That there might therefore be "political" implications (in the sense just described) for 
literary criticism should be clear.
91 Beardsworth, op. cit., p. 5.
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singular or original if it allows the possibility of repetition, otherwise it cannot be an act 
of judgement, dealing with that which makes possible the literary text - its signature.
In judging and interpreting, a certain amount of violence is always necessary. 
The judgement, in order to make any sense at all of the experience of aporia, or in order 
to say anything worth hearing, must exclude. Thus one can only do "justice" to the 
literary text, and to what is excluded in the act of critique, in the future and so the 
interpretation must always leave not only room for another interpretation, but more 
significantly, time for another. In sum, the reponse to the finitude of the literary text, 
(that is, to that which has been signed) is to produce the finite interpretation, itself dated 
and signed, proclaiming its relationship to the aporia of time and thus the future of 
interpretation itself.
This is the promise that interpretation of the literary text can give: that
interpretation will always return in the future. Richard Beardsworth, in assembling
Derrida's thoughts on this subject from across a whole range of his writings in the late
1980's and 1990's, summarises the promise as
the remainder of the necessary undecidability of thinking and action upon which 
any act of thought (or) language (philosophical, political, juridical, literary) will 
fall and fail to untie. This remainder is an absolute past (it cannot be recalled in 
any act, being this act's very possibility) which "gives” the "chance" of the 
future.”
The promise is thus, to a certain extent, a tribute to the undecidability of thinking which 
always leaves an excess upon which the future will feed. To put it another way, the 
interpretation must be originally repeatable and is thus always and already a 
commemoration of itself, not so much thanks to a circle of self-exclusivity, but because 
it allows the future commemoration to take place. This can only happen because each
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judgement or interpretation is finite, each is made at a particular time and place and 
because each can only decay.
The decay of the judgement, signed and dated, is thus the condition for the 
promise of interpretation, but accordingly also its undoing. Finitude as such inhabits all 
intercourse with the literary text and, to repeat a passage from Derrida quoted earlier, 
"since the possibility of this situation is revealed at death, we can infer that it does not 
wait for death, or that in it death does not wait for death."92 3 It is death itself, the most 
certain fact in my future, which makes possible the future itself. There is, however, an 
imperative corollary to this argument: the death which makes the future possible cannot 
be mine, since I cannot experience my death. The future of interpretation is guaranteed 
by the death of the other. This link of time and signature to death can be made more 
clear by examining the Heideggerian tradition in which Derrida is working when 
discussing the signature. This tradition will also prove to be important in any 
consideration of the link between signature and Jean-Luc Nancy's work on the 
community. We will then be closer to understanding the link in Muller's work between 
his signature and his writing of and in community.
Heidegger, Time and Death
Heidegger's thoughts on time and death as they are set out in Sein und Zeit, represent 
those which preoccupy Derrida and Nancy most of all in any discussion of signature and 
community.94 Heidegger seeks to lay out the structures of being without falling into the
92 ibid., p. 36.
93 see note 78 above.
94 This brief summary is partly indebted to Beardsworth and Wood, op. cit. as well as Hubert. L. Dreyfus' 
Being in the World.
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trap which has defined the history of philosophy. The being of an entity is not to be
found outside in some universal category or inside the entity in an essence, but rather its
relationship with the rest of the world as an entity. In other words, one might say that
the being of an entity is to be sought in the way in which it "behaves" in the world,
necessitating therefore an understanding of how all phenomena are articulated with each
other in their being - an existential phenomenology. This "as" structure -  an entity
always and already behaves "as" something in the world - is, however, only possible
given a particular understanding of time. Temporality is to be thought o f as "ecstasis",
that is, as originally coming out of itself in order that time may exist at all. Put simply,
temporality has a structure of anticipating and remembering which allows any
perception of the "present" to take place.
Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart zeigen die phänomenalen Charaktere des 
"Auf-sich-zu", des "Zurück auf', des "Begegnenlassens von". [...] Zeitlichkeit ist 
das ursprüngliche "Außer-sich " und fü r  sich selbst. Wir nennen daher die 
charakterisierten Phänomene Zukunft, Gewesenheit, Gegenwart die Ekstasen der 
Zeitlichkeit. Sie ist nicht vordem ein Seiendes, das erst aus sich heraustritt, 
sondern ihr Wesen ist Zeitigung in der Einheit der Ekstasen.”
The fact that we must constantly busy ourselves with objects which always operate as
something means that we are constantly engaged in a certain teleology as regards these
objects; they are, as it were, always a project and as such their "as-structure" can only be
realised in the future.
Bei der Aufzählung der Ekstasen haben wir immer die Zukunft an erster Stelle 
genannt. Das soll anzeigen, daß die Zukunft in der ekstatischen Einheit der 
ursprünglichen und eigentlichen Zeitlichkeit einen Vorrang hat [...]. Die 
ursprüngliche und eigentliche Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich aus der eigentlichen 
Zukunft, so zwar, daß sie zukünftig gewesen allererst die Gegenwart weckt. Das 
primäre Phänomen der ursprünglichen und eigentlichen Zeitlichkeit ist die 
Zukunft.'*'
,5 Heidegger, Martin, Sein und Zeit, pp. 328-9. 
% ibid., p. 329.
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Thus Heidegger can state with morbid clarity that our being concerned with objects with 
an "as-structure", termed Sorge (that is, the way in which we behave with all other 
objects in the world around us), is governed by that to which all projects lead, where all 
teleologies end: "Die Sorge ist Sein zum Tode. [...] Es [Das Seiende] hat nicht ein Ende, 
an dem es nur aufhört, sondern existiert endlich.'""
This is an argument of fundamental importance. Derrida's "inference" that 
because my name will exist after my death, then my name must be inhabited by death is 
perhaps a leap that demands a large dose of generosity on the reader's part (or a 
complicit knowledge of the tradition with which Derrida is working). Heidegger, 
however, expresses the idea more clearly. One should not think of the human entity 
(Dasein) as something which progresses through life only to have it cut short by 
something external to it. Dasein rather "existiert endlich", it exists finitely,97 8 9its whole 
existence is governed, structured and made conceivable by the fact that it will one day 
be no more, that it will die.
Death as the future unifies the ecstasies of temporality and if death is grasped
resolutely, that is, if the entity affirms and acts on the fact that it will die, the possibility
of Dasein existing authentically, of grasping its "place" in the world is allowed.
Die hinsichtlich ihres zeitlichen Sinnes charakterisierte Entschlossenheit 
repräsentiert eine eigentliche Erschlossenheit des Daseins. Diese konstituiert ein 
Seiendes dergestalt, daß es existierend sein "Da" selbst sein kann."
97 ibid.
91 Cf. Müller, Jenseits der Nation, p. 31: "Identität ist doch Fiktion, alles Lebendige verändert sich in jeder 
Sekunde. Die Verewigung des Augenblicks ist nach Lukäcs die Todsünde."Verweile doch, du bist so 
schön" ist seine Formel für Dekadenz. Es ist die Herausnahme des Augenblicks aus dem Zeitablauf, der 
wesentlich Zerstörung bedeutet. Wer mit sich identisch ist, der kann sich einsargen lassen, der existiert 
nicht mehr, ist nicht mehr in Bewegung."
99 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, p. 335.
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It is death which allows the present to have any temporal structure at all, but according 
to Heidegger Dasein must recognise and resolutely grasp its death as its absolute limit in 
order for this process of temporalisation to occur at all. For Heidegger, my death must 
be seen, by me, as my ownmost possibility, that which allows me to exist finitely. This 
seems to run into a contradiction, however. If my death is only my own, if only I 
undergo it, it must be absolutely singular, only occurring once. If that is the case then 
any attempt to represent my death to myself (to present it to myself more than once) in 
order to grasp it resolutely must be self-defeating. Neither can I experience my death as 
such, for I will be dead and thus obviously not able to experience anything. This would 
thus throw into doubt the ability of Dasein to regard death as its ownmost possibility; 
the very "as-structure" of death - that death can be seen as death is threatened and along 
with it the opportunity for Dasein to act authentically in relation to death and thus 
temporality.
Derrida sees Heidegger as having attempted to close the aporia of time and death
by allowing death to appear "as such".
Heidegger would thus say that for Dasein impossibility as death - the 
impossibility of death, the impossibility of the existence whose name is "death" - 
can appear as such and announce itself [...]. And it is only in the act of authentic, 
resolute, determinate, and decided assumption by which Dasein would take upon 
itself the possibility of this impossibility that the aporia as such would announce 
itself as such and purely to Dasein as its most proper possibility [...].100
This possibility of the aporia of death appearing as such (that is, representable as aporia
and thus not as aporia anymore at all) would mean that death appears as death to
Dasein. It has, however, already been established that my death cannot appear as such if
Derrida, Aporias. pp. 74-5.
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it is to be my death. The only deaths that can appear are those of others that I have 
witnessed or miterlebt.
[M]an as Daseitt, never has a relation to death as such, but only to perishing, to 
demising, and to the death of the other, who is not the other. The death of the 
other thus becomes again "first," always first. [...] The death of the other, this 
death of the other in "me", is fundamentally the only death that is named in the 
syntagm "my death," with all the consequences that one can draw from this.101
These consequences include the fact that that which would seem most improper to me -
someone else's death - is that which makes my death conceivable and which allows me
to live finitely, perceiving my existence as demise and decay: "From the most originary
inside of its possibility, the proper of Dasein becomes from then on contaminated,
parasited, and divided by the most improper."102 Similarly, that which seems only mine,
my death, cannot belong to me in any strict sense since it only has meaning through its
effect on, and interpretation by others.103
Nancy, Death and the Community
The fact that death must be seen as an irredeemable limit, but that also this death can 
only be recognised or experienced through the death of someone else leads Jean-Luc 
Nancy to investigate its political-philosophical consequences in The Inoperative 
Community. Nancy's work will provide the means to understand how Muller's texts are 
situated in the community through his signature as well as how that community is itself 
defined in a singular and finite way.
Working out from the failure of Eastern Bloc communism to live up to its own 
claims of representing historical progress, Nancy focuses on the idea of the "closure" of
l0' ibid., p. 76.
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philosophy and metaphysics first to be found in Heidegger and adopted by Derrida. The 
closure of philosophy does not mean its end, but rather that state where philosophy is in 
a constant state of closure, where the limit of traditional metaphysics has been reached 
and where one could only continue writing by transgressing that limit. However, 
because philosophy and thought itself are determined by that metaphysics, a complete 
transgression, a destruction of the limit, cannot bring about a "new" philosophy, but 
would rather make philosophical thought, as philosophy, impossible. Instead one must 
think on that limit, in the closure, transgressing the limit of metaphysics while 
remaining "merely" a transgression because of the necessity of returning within the 
limit. Similarly, a "new" philosophy and economics of progress and innovation has not 
been found to supplant the failure of the programme of Marxism-Leninism, (indeed any 
development of theory worked out in the closure of metaphysics would have to resist 
labelling itself as "new") and thus the social collective and any conception of its politics 
must be rethought away from any notion of transcendence (such as progress of the 
"new") and instead within the limits of finitude. Nancy attempts to do this by arguing 
that finitude can only be thought within a concept of community which does not present 
itself as goal, end o f history or archaic origin. This aporetic concept of community, on 
the other hand, simultaneously can only be experienced through the finitude, in the 
death, of the other.
The human subject, argues Nancy, cannot find its identity within itself. Death 
brings the subject out of itself; death makes the subject, like time in Heidegger, ecstatic.
Death irremediably exceeds the resources of a metaphysics of the subject, [...]
the phantasm of a dead man who says 'T am dead" -  ego sum mortuus. If the I 102*
102 ibid., p. 77.
I0, See discussion in Chapter Three on the death of Philoktet.
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cannot say that it is dead, if the /  disappears in effect in its death, in that death 
that is precisely what is most proper to it and most inalienably its own, it is 
because the 7 is something other than a subject.104 1056
As also argued by Derrida, Nancy insists that the only possibility of witnessing "my"
death is at the death-bed of the other, when it is not mine. The experience of my
fmitude, of my living finitely, that is, of what I am, is only effected by the other and
through the other. I am, in the only sense there is of "to be" only in the other." If it sees
its fellow-being die, a living being can subsist only outside itself"'05 Thus, when the
only possibility of representing my death, the limit of my existence, is through the other,
the possibility of self-presence and full self-consciousness is lost. Each person shares
the loss of this possibility with his/her other; but what is shared is a singularity and
finitude and an inability to be most immanent to what ought to be most proper to the
subject: his or her death. The basis of this sharing is the sundering of the human subject.
1 not only share the fact of being sundered (that is, the fact that my identity is to be
sought in the other) but sharing itself, the fact of having something in common with
others necessarily sunders me and makes me singular.'06 The sharing of which Nancy
writes is therefore not merely one of attributes but is also a dynamic which allows the
human subject to be thought of as a singular finite being whose identity must be thought
of as always being deferred onto an other.
These singular beings are themselves constituted by sharing, they are distributed 
and placed, or rather spaced, by the sharing that makes them others, [...] 
engulfed in the ecstasy of sharing.
104 Nancy, Jean-Luc, The Inoperative Community, p. 14.
105 Bataille, Georges, Oeuvre Complètes. 7:245-6, quoted in Nancy, ibid., p. 15
106 French, German and Welsh, amongst others, express this linguistic twist in partage, teilen, and rhannu 
respectively. In English, as Andrew Benjamin has suggested (in personal discussion), the 
interdependency of sharing and splitting/sundering can be expressed through the play of meaning in 
"apart” and "a part”.
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The similitude of the like-being is made in the encounter of "beings toward the 
end" that this end, their end, in each case "mine" (or "yours") assimilates and 
separates in the same limit, at which or on which they compear.107 *
The consciousness and communication of this "ecstasy", an ecstasy which is also loss
(of pure self-consciousness or alternatively the experience of loss through the death and
subsequent absence of the other), can only be thought and experienced in community.
Community is thus the condition of possibility of the human subject but simultaneously
undermines that subject’s claim to autonomy and ontological sovereignty over others.
"The relation (community) is, if it is, nothing other than what undoes, in its very
principle -  and at its closure or on its limit -  the autarchy of absolute immanence.'"08
Community ruptures the absolute subject who would be immanent to the world
and to itself in that the thought of the absolute betrays its own condition of possibility:
The absolute must be the absolute of its own absoluteness or not at all. In other 
words: to be absolutely alone, it is not enough that I be so; I must also be alone 
being alone -  and this is of course contradictory. The logic of the absolute 
violates the absolute. 100
If then we experience community through the "failure" of the absolute and the 
impossibility of immanence to the world and to others or of complete communion with 
them, then the concept of community itself shows a resistance to being held as an object 
of knowledge. For if the impossible possibility of community is revealed by the death of 
the other which remains an irredeemable excess, then it is equally impossible to produce 
a state of community which is equal and adequate to the death of the other. We can 
never put community "to work" or realise it in some future economy or imagine that it 
ever existed in some mythic past of nostalgia. It is always to come, always in decay.
107
108 
109
Nancy, Jean-Luc,, op. cit., pp. 25 & 33.
ibid., p. 4.
ibid.
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Perhaps we should not seek a work or concept for it, but rather recognize in the 
thought of community a theoretical excess (or more precisely, an excess in 
relation to the theoretical) that would oblige us to adopt another praxis of 
discourse and community."0
To answer to the demand of community, something other than theoretical discourse is 
needed, precisely because the experience of community is one of radical fmitude, or (as 
seen in Heidegger and Derrida) of time as aporia. Community can thus only be 
experienced in a manner which treats the aporia of community aporetically, unlike 
Heidegger's treatment of death. This involves, along with other problems, recognising 
that community "is" simply a sum and condition of a whole host of singular 
articulations which cannot be totalised into a whole and therefore community can only 
be experienced and accounted for in finite, singular moments in time and space. Thus 
while the death of the other might be described as the truth of community and vice versa 
in that both reveal themselves in each other, the radical finitude which inhabits both can 
only be experienced in their singular articulations or products. In other words, they can 
only be experienced finitely. When Nancy mentions in a footnote'" that the affirmation 
of community which he engages in through his work is not based in optimism but the 
truth of the experience of the limits of existence, he does not simply seek to postulate 
the irrevocability of his philosophy, but rather emphasise the problem that the truth of 
community will never be grasped and turned into a project. If the truth of community is 
fmitude, then this can only be experienced finitely — in a moment which passes and 
decays, and by subjects who affirm their own mortality, experienced through the death 
of the other. In order to raise the rigour of this argument to the next degree, it must then 10
110 ibid., p. 25-6.
111 "There is perhaps no better testimony to this essential, archi-essential resistance of the community -  
whose affirmation does not stem from any "optimism" but from truth and whose truth stems from the
be insisted upon that the experience of the death of the other is not be thought of as a
universal totalisable condition, but as the finite experience of the death of a particular
other. If community and the death of the other, as the non-grounding ground of human
culture must be experienced in order to understand and act (politically) upon that
culture, then this can only be accomplished by affirming this finite experience as an
infinite task, as one which can never reach its goal. The political community, for Nancy,
could then be woven from experiences which regard themselves as adequate to the trace
of the death of the other in that they see that death as non-totalisable, non-programmatic
and utterly excessive. In other words, adequacy to the problem of death is witnessed
through laying bare one's inadequacy in representing death itself.
A community [...] is the presentation of the finitude and the irredeemable excess 
that make up finite being: its death, but also its birth, and only the community 
can present me my birth, and along with it the impossibility of my reliving it, as 
well as the impossibility of my crossing over into my death."2
The attempt to redeem, sublate and use death is most often expressed in the
interpretation of a death as justified, be it in the interests of a state or in the service of a
past or future idea of community:
no dialectic, no salvation leads these deaths to any other immanence than that 
of...death (cessation, or decomposition, which forms only the parody or reverse 
of immanence)."3
History provides us with innumerable instances of citizens who have imagined, or been 
told, that their lives and deaths were the sacrifice either for the community that would 
come in the future or for the lost originary community that needs to be re-established. In 
the case of the latter, as Nancy himself points out, Nazi ideology provides the worst
experience of limits 
ibid., note 31, p. 158.
112 ibid., p. 15.
113 ibid., p. 13.
than Robert Anselme's account of his captivity in a Nazi concentration camp."
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example of a society where those who did not conform to the idea of pure, racially pre- 
lapsarian community of the past -  the Aryan nation -  were sacrificed as victims whose 
deaths were understood as a necessity, simply understood, for the establishment of a 
pure community which would not be structured by the loss and contradiction or racial 
and genetic impurity. In the Stalinist totalitarian states, on the other hand, where the 
legitimacy of those states was based upon the deaths that were the price for their 
existence (for example, those who died in the anti-fascist struggle in order to found the 
GDR) all deaths in the future are seen as tribute to those founding deaths for the benefit 
of the originary community to come, where humans are returned to their species-being. 
In their difference and disparate degrees of obscenity, such societies hold one thing in 
common — the community and death of the other are immanent to, that is, are present to 
the temporal present itself. Death as death is recaptured and each single death becomes 
simply the symbol of death as purposeful death. Singular deaths therefore do not and 
cannot undergo reinterpretation, they cannot be regarded finitely. Instead, death, the 
limit of finitude, becomes the very means for transcendence of the present moment, for 
interpretation in the future is deemed unnecessary or a betrayal of the incontrovertible 
meaning of death. The present is thus given precedence over the future through its 
capture of death (a problem that sheds light on the contradiction of Heidegger’s 
privileging of the future in the ecstasis of time and his insistence on the authenticity of 
Dasein grasping its death as death). Nancy, on the other hand, seeks to guarantee the 
future, perhaps to promise it, through the insistence on the opacity of mine and the 
other’s death to a final interpretation that would ground community. In other words, 
community demands a constant re-interpretation of itself through the recognition of the
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death of the other as singular."4 That singularity, according to Derrida, can only be 
understood as being so because of its iterability, its ability to be repeated and re­
interpreted in the future. The future is thus guaranteed by remembrance of the past, not 
as a homogenous block, but of particular victims from a time that has been, remembered 
from a particular time now. This form of remembrance will form the bedrock of Müller's 
later work (as discussed in Chapter Three): firstly of victims of social and economic 
conditions in the community, and secondly, of the victims of theatrical representation.
Community, for Nancy, is made up of finite, singular subjects -  who die. That 
they each die their own death means that a communion and unity of and in community 
is not possible, but that impossibility of communion is the very possibility of 
community itself. Some political systems seek to replace that loss by regarding deaths 
as the necessary sacrifice to regain communion, but as just argued, that loss is 
community in the first place. Thus, the sacrifice that is made in Nancy’s community is 
the particular death of the other that will be remembered in the future, rather than the 
sacrifice as the symbol of the one form of death that would re-establish communion. In 
the latter, the death of the other remains trapped in its identity with the present, in the 
former the death of the other provides and guarantees the future."5 What will 
increasingly concern Müller, in this respect, is theatre's culpability in this sacrifice.
As sketched out above, the communication of singularity and finitude, or the 
interpretation of community and the death of the other cannot take the form of 145
114 Cf. Müller, Jenseits der Nation., p. 31: "Was man braucht, ist Zukunft und nicht die Ewigkeit des 
Augenblicks. Man muß die Toten ausgraben, wieder und wieder, denn nur aus ihnen kann man Zukunft 
beziehen."
115 Cf Müller, ibid: "Nekrophilie ist Liebe zur Zukunft. Man muß die Anwesenheit der Toten als 
Dialogpartner oder Dialogstörer akzeptieren -  Zukunft entsteht allein aus dem Dialog mit den Toten."
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knowledge. They are, for Nancy as for Bataille,"6 communicated through a range of 
social practices which resist representing community as an object of a project, and 
indeed actively undermine such tendencies through their engagement with finitude and 
loss. These practices do not achieve anything in the sense of being useful, they are 
instead an exercise in an expenditure of energy for which no return is sought or gained. 
They re-enact and re-experience that loss which Nancy has already established to be at 
the heart of a community of split and sharing subjects."7 In past times, most of these 
practices were linked to religious and sacred ceremonies, whose purpose 
(retrospectively and anthropologically speaking) was to enact a particular theatre where 
the death of the other and the shared and sundered subject was experienced. While the 
external power represented in such ceremonies (usually a supernatural deity) was then 
accorded the position of ground of the community, the collapse and death of God 
succeeded only in transferring the ground of community from God to Man or Geist. 
With such a movement, a hint of the ineffable nature of that which "unworks" 
community -  in other words, of that which communicates the finitude of human 
existence -  is lost as the divine becomes human. Nancy, however, rethinks the nature of 
the divine as being what is,
only inasmuch as it is removed from immanence, or withdrawn from it [...]. 
Perhaps we will come to see that community, love, death, freedom, singularity 
are names for the "divine" not just because they substitute for it -  and neither 
sublate nor resuscitate it under another form -  but equally because this 
substitution is in no way anthropomorphic or anthropocentric and gives way to 
no becoming-human of the "divine". Community henceforth constitutes the limit 
of the human as well as of the divine.'" 1678
116 See Chapter Two for a fuller discussion on Bataille and the nature of transgression.
117 See note 105 above.
118 Nancy, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
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Such names are whispered in the sacred practices which communicate the "passion of
singularity", but remain only approximations to those arche-traces o f subjectivity whose
effects can only be witnessed and experienced rather than being discovered themselves.
Nancy goes on to mention explicitly literature as one of these practices where
such communication takes place."'’ References to the "passion" of singularity - of its
shared and sundered subjectivity -  emphasise its narrative nature, its finite quality
which can only be experienced in its singular articulations, that is, in particular passions.
Each passion is signed and dated and literature allows a certain correspondance with this
trace of finitude by being itself necessarily a signed, dated and written text. Ironically,
literature’s power to interrupt and undermine the homogeneity of communion has been
itself weakened by one of the most enduring myths of artistic creation, that author and
text are tied together in a symbolic relationship.* 120 As I have argued, Derrida’s writings
on signature aim to re-frame this relationship in such a way as to emphasise the
slackening grip of the author over his/her text precisely through the affirmation of that
author’s singularity. Nancy takes a similar step when describing a possible modus
inoperandi for what he terms "literary communism".
What is in fact involved is the following: that there is an inscription of the 
communitarian exposition, and that this exposition, as such, can only be 
inscribed, or can only be offered by way of an inscription. [...] While lover's 
speech seeks a duration for their joy that joy eludes, "writing", in this sense, 
would on the contrary inscribe the collective and social duration of time in the 
instant of communication, in the sharing. [...] But what is inscribed, and what 
passes to the limit in inscribing itself, exposes and communicates itself (instead 
of trying to accomplish a meaning, like speech): what is shared is the unworking 
of works.121
Cf. Müller, Jenseit der Nation, p. 23: "Die gesamte Geschichte und Politik reduziert sich auf die 
Verdrängung der Sterblichkeit. Kunst aber stammt aus und wurzelt in der Kommunikation mit dem Tod 
und den Toten. Es geht darum, daß die Toten einen Platz bekommen. Das ist eigentlich Kultur."
120 Cf. Müller, ibid., p. 24: "Gibt es diese Einheit, dann ist das das Ende der Kunst: Oder aber es geht 
darum, die Differenz von Kunst und Leben zu behaupten, zu artikulieren und auszubauen."
121 Nancy, op. cit., p. 39.
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Literature, like love, cannot be totalised without losing its literary or lovely quality. 
Both literature and love are moments of radical loss, over in a moment of ecstasy -  in 
both senses -  in that it is finite and exists finitely, and it brings the subject out of 
him/herself into community. This moment of ecstasy, of finite loss is what we share 
with others and what thereby makes us singular. Literature and love, finally, are 
moments where that singularity and sharing, where signature and community, most 
powerfully come to pass: in my reading the signature of a particular other, or in 
declaring "I love you" to the particular lover.
The Task o f Literary Critique
Community and signature thus demonstrate the same concerns, indeed the one cannot be 
thought without the other. Both are intimately concerned with the finitude of the human 
condition, but each can only be thought aporetically. There will never be a solution to 
the aporia of community and signature, grounded as both are in the aporia of time. Both 
signature and community are always to come, always return in the future, always 
promise themselves again: signature through its structure of originary repetition (it only 
is what it is if it can be repeated indefinitely in the future) and community through its 
similar inability to be realised. If both can only be thought aporetically then the only 
relationship one has to them is to "perishing, to demising, and to the death of the 
other".122 Both return judgement and in promising the future right to judge, promise also 
the maintenance of the political and the democratic, providing that they are thought 
aporetically.
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For literary critique'23 the judgement that it returns on a text is that of a signature 
in community, or a text which "writes" community, and given the concerns of both 
signature and community outlined above, it is through the judgement of this writing that 
the aporetic relationship to the other can be revealed. In other words, one of the defining 
constitutive relations of the human subject, and thus what especially concerns us here, 
of the writing subject as well, is to the death of the other. It is through this relation that 
the finitude of the human condition (that time passes and that one will die) can be 
experienced. However, this can only be experienced aporetically, that is, in community. 
Any attempt to represent the aporia or claim it as absolutely unrepresentable simply 
succeeds in destroying it, as indeed was the result of Heidegger's presentation of death 
as graspable by Dasein. The alterity of the other's death, even if it is constitutive of my 
possibility of conceiving my finitude, must remain other. Not only must the other who 
dies remain other, but its otherness itself must similarly be treated as resistant to 
subsumption by the ego. The other and its quality of otherness must remain 
impenetrable, otherwise the critic or philosopher is doomed to replace aporia with 
"piety”:
Just as one will lose the aporia if one recognizes it, so will one lose it if one 
does not recognize it. One's relation to aporia must consequently be itself 
aporetic, if the experience of aporia is to remain an impossible one. Otherwise 
one will end up as much in the piety of the "other" as in the piety of "being".'24 1234
122 See note 102 above.
123 As will become clear in the following discussion on Benjamin, there is perhaps a difference which can 
be drawn between commonplace notions of literary commentary and Benjamin's notion of critique. 
Although I have used criticism and critique interchangeably up until now, an incorporation of Benjamin 
into my argument might suggest the term "critique" as more suitable, from now on, in describing that 
operation which I argue literary criticism should become and whose characteristics I hope to set out in 
this chapter.
124 Beardsworth, op. cit., p. 104.
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The consequences of such thought for literary criticism are immense. In order to take 
seriously the problem of signature - that a work has been written at all - the critic must 
engage him/herself with the fmitude not only of the work of art, but of the work of 
criticism as well. This in turn would demand an engagement with the literary text which 
does not subsume the finitude of the life of the work (and its criticism) under a present 
critical act which produces a symbol of the essence of the text. It must instead, in simple 
terms, explain the effects of a text on the contemporary reader. In other words, criticism 
which takes into account the aporia of time will not be authored by an ego which 
attempts to write or critique without a signature. Instead, the excess of any critical 
judgement must remain its very condition of possibility, in turn undermining any claim 
that the critic might lay to an absolute judgement on what the work is "about". It will be 
my contention later in this introduction that philosophy itself, in its treatment of 
literature, sometimes falls into this trap. Literary critique, on the other hand, if it is to 
treat the work of art as signed writing must regard what is left over in its own judgement 
on the literary text as providing the space for the future of criticism. That the critic 
countersigns the work of art is only possible through the delay of this countersignature - 
it will only have any meaning when it can be countersigned in turn. This delay is the 
decay, and promise, of the work of art and of literary critique.
This demand on literary critique is made even more acute when faced with the 
work of art which attempts to open up judgement to itself, introducing the audience to 
the impossible experience of the work of art.125 In Muller, this endeavour to prevent a
125 This "opening-up" of the work of art or presentation of itself as signed ends up ironically in the 
realisation that such a work presents itself as "in closure" (see discussion of Nancy above), that is, 
constantly demanding re-interpretation, a transgression and re-establishment of its limits. This in turn 
reflects the simple fact that the closure of philosophy finds itself thus because of the inability o f the 
history of metaphysics to deal with the aporia of singularity and generality, once again of finitude and of
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homogenisation of judgement leads, in the early 1960's, to the introduction of allegory 
in his work in the form of reworkings of classical drama. It will be argued in Chapter 3 
that allegory is particularly well suited to any engagement with the problems of finitude 
and the aporia of time. Allegorical works are particularly subject to signature, they are 
particular acts of writing and thus subject to decay. The allegorisation of an object 
works much like signature, introducing that object to the work of narrative, history and 
decay.
In-his later works, in particular the avant-garde theatre of the 1970's and 1980's, 
Müller introduces autobiographical elements with abandon and any exercise in tracing 
the work of signature in these texts is thus immediately made a simpler task. As argued 
above, the allegorical works will also be seen to be structured by the operation of 
signature which opens up the reception of the play to the demands of fmitude. How can, 
however, the earlier works be seen as signed, other than through claiming, qua 
philosophy, that those works, as all works, are subject to the logic of signature? Clearly, 
if one agrees with Derrida, one can state that all writing is structured by this logic of 
signature. This thesis seeks to assert, however, that some writing opens itself up to such 
critique, with or without the intention of the author. The former is the object of 
philosophy, the latter the task of literary critique. Müller's early works demonstrate, I 
will argue, the work of signature as strongly as the later allegorical and avant-garde 
theatre, but in so doing, I will not attempt to make a straightforward continuity claim 
about the development of Müller's oeuvre. In fact, the signature so forcibly inscribed in
time. This in turn might lead us onto a discussion (for which there is no room here) on how far 
philosophy can remain philosophy (dealing with the problems of knowledge and existence) if it remains 
and writes like philosophy. For to do so would mean an avoidance of the philosophical problem of the 
epoch. Philosophy re-instates itself by transgressing its limits; literary critique is just one such 
transgression.
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the later works is only recognisable in their earlier counterparts through the passage of 
time, through the fact that these works are, in both senses, dated. Firstly, they are a child 
of their time, dealing with issues of topical relevance in the late 1950's, but they are also 
anachronistic in the sense that the Weltanschauung which emerges through these plays 
is, especially since the collapse of the Communist Bloc in 1989, increasingly abstruse 
and bewildering. Muller's later works in comparison offer themselves up to the critic as 
works of allegory in a reasonably straightforward way, despite their opacity. The earlier 
works, however, offer themselves up because of the passing of time between the 
moment of their writing and the moment of their critique.126
The critic could take these earlier plays as his/her object and proclaim them as 
demonstrating the undecideability of writing. Somehow, somewhere contradictions will 
be found in the text by Deconstruction which could be seen to undermine that text's 
pretence of unity. This would be, however, to make these plays an example or symbol of 
an economy of writing, thus reneging on the promise of signature, that is, its ability to 
return originally and eternally in the flurry of countersignatures. Instead, literary 
criticism must take as its object the decay of the work of art as seen from now, the 
present. If literary criticism is to deal with literature rather than a series o f distilled 
philosophical ideas it must itself write as signature. Each thesis must thus only be 
possible at the time of writing and this present work can be no exception. Literary 
criticism is a collision of a "then" of writing which undergoes a process of decay 
together with the "now" of reading which in turn will also become an object which can 
be allegorised, or understood as having taken place in time.
126 Cf. Müller, Verabschiedung des Lehrstücks, Material, p. 40: "Was bleibt: einsame Texte, die auf 
Geschichte warten."
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Benjam in an d  the Task o f  L itera ry  Critique
The dynamics of this situation -  of reading now the works signed by Muller -  can 
perhaps best be understood by reference to Walter Benjamin's work on the role and task 
of literary critique. Benjamin was concerned with this problem throughout his writing 
life, but the most cogent formulations of his developing ideas appear in Goethes 
Wahlverwandtschaften and Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, as well as in 
fragments of "Konvolut N" o f Passagenwerk and Uber den Begriff der Geschichte.
The first of these is a long and difficult essay, often overlooked in the English- 
speaking world due to its never having been translated until very recently.127 Benjamin’s 
intention in the piece is to debunk canonical notions of authorship, not least the 
mythical presentation of Goethe as demi-god and genius, but also to examine the 
thoroughly mythical status of Die Wahlverwandtschaften itself through its portrayal of 
marriage, guilt and fate. What is also discussed, however, is the nature of the critical 
activity itself and how true critique is seen to differ from mere commentary on a text.
Benjamin sets out in the very first paragraph the difference between critique and 
commentary: "Die Kritik sucht den Wahrheitsgehalt eines Kunstwerkes, der Kommentar 
seinen Sachgehalt."'28 The material content of the work of art might be described as that 
which ties and dates the work to a particular moment in the past. The work of art uses 
material and resources from its own time in order to produce the finished piece; the 
material content of the work thus represents the contemporary building blocks of the *12
127 Goethe's Elective Affinités in Walter Beniamin: Selected Writings. Vol.l ed. Marcus Bullock and 
Michael W. Jennings. Jennings' own book on Benjamin, together with Rainer Nägele's Theater. Theory, 
Speculation are exceptions to this dearth of analysis.
121 Benjamin, Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften in Gesammelte Schriften. 1,1, p. 125.
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work o f art -  die Realien. One might give as examples the interior decor and the familial
dynamics of the Jewish family home in Kafka's Die Verwandlung; the politics of 19th
century democratic nationalism and the incomplete Kölner Dom in Heine's
Deutschland, ein Wintermärchen; or the processes of collectivisation and nationalisation
in the early days of the GDR in Müller's Die Umsiedlerin. The truth content, on the
other hand, might be best described as that which shines through due to the work of the
critic. It is vital to note from the outset that the truth content of the work of art cannot be
presented or named as the result of the critical process for it always remains veiled
through the passage of time from the work's genesis.129
The material content of the work is bound together with the truth content at the
work’s inception. With the passage of time, however, the material content of a work
becomes clearer to the critic, the truth content more hidden.
Das Verhältnis der beiden bestimmt jenes Grundgesetz des Schrifttums, 
demzufolge der Wahrheitsgehalt eines Werkes, je bedeutender es ist, desto 
unscheinbarer und inniger an seinen Sachgehalt gebunden ist.130
It is this veiled nature of the truth content which allows its very existence to be posited -
the critic only knows of it because it is hidden. But the fact that it is veiled also means
that the truth content of a work can only be sought, or be experienced (it can never be
seen because this would involve the lifting of the veil thus destroying the essence of
truth as veiled) through the work of critique. If the truth content of the work, in the
"scintillation of a constellation'"31 bursts through at a particular time -  the time o f the
signature o f critique, then it is almost as if by accident. As Benjamin expresses it
elsewhere
129 Cf. Müller, Mich interessiert der Fall Althusser, Rotwelsch, p. 177: "ln gewisser Weise ist ja Kunst 
eine blinde Praxis. Ich sehe da eine Möglichkeit.”
130 Benjamin, Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, op. cit, p. 125.
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Jede Gegenwart ist durch diejenigen Bilder bestimmt, die mit ihr synchronistisch 
sind: jedes Jetzt ist das Jetzt einer bestimmten Erkennbarkeit. In ihm ist die 
Wahrheit mit Zeit bis zum Zerspringen geladen. (Dies Zerspringen, nichts 
anderes, ist der Tod der Intentio, der also mit der Geburt der echten historischen 
Zeit, der Zeit der Wahrheit, zusammenfällt.)'32
Benjamin had emphasied this idea o f truth as an intentionless state in his earlier works,
notably Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels:
Die Wahrheit, vergegenwärtigt im Reigen der dargestellten Ideen, entgeht jeder 
wie immer gearteten Projektion in den Erkenntnisbereich. Erkenntnis ist ein 
Haben. Ihr Gegenstand selbst bestimmt sich dadurch, daß er im Bewußtsein -  
und sei es tranzendental -  innegehabt werden muß. Ihm bleibt der 
Besitzcharakter. Diesem Besitztum ist Darstellung sekundär. Es existiert nicht 
bereits als ein Sich-Darstellendes. Gerade dies aber gilt von der Wahrheit. [...] 
Erkenntnis ist erfragbar, nicht aber die Wahrheit.13 233
Wahrheit tritt nie in eine Relation und insbesondere in keine intentionale. Der 
Gegenstand der Erkenntnis als ein in der Begriffsintention bestimmter ist nicht 
die Wahrheit. Die Wahrheit ist ein aus Ideen gebildetes intentionsloses Sein. Das 
ihr gemäße Verhalten ist demnach nicht ein Meinen im Erkennen, sondern ein in 
sie Eingehen und Verschwinden. Die Wahrheit ist der Tod der Intention.134
Truth, or rather the experience o f it, might thus be thought of as a transgression of
knowledge.135 The truth content o f the work is experienced only as the excess of a
transgressive moment of criticism. The moment of excess only comes to pass in the
constellation of signatures that is literary critique.
It is only the critic and historian in later years who, with the passing of time, are
able to achieve this moment. The separation of material and truth content cannot be
witnessed by the critic or artist who live at the same time as the genesis of the work of
Was der Dichter als seine Technik bewußt hat, was auch schon der 
zeitgenössischen Kritik grundsätzlich erkennbar als solche, berührt zwar die
131 Nägele op. cit., p. 204.
132 Benjamin, Passagen-Werk (Konvolut N) in Gesammelte Schriften V,1 & 2, p. 578.
133 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels in Gesammelte Schriften. 1,1, p. 209.
134 ibid., p. 216.
135 See also Chapter Two and the discussion on Georges Bataille’s use of the notion of transgression.
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Realien im Sachgehalt, bildet aber die Grenze gegen ihre Wahrheitsgehalt, der 
weder dem Dichter noch der Kritik seiner Tage restlos bewußt sein kann.156
It is thus the ßnitude o f the work of art which brings about the bifurcation of truth and
material content. United at their origin in a relationship akin to a symbol, where truth is
immersed in the subject matter, their departure from each other through time allows the
work of art to be seen as an allegorical object. The passing of time allows the critic to
establish whether the allegorisation of the work of art is due simply to the fact that all
works of art undergo time and thus can be used to express the fact of allegory or
whether the experience of the truth content of the work of art is such that a particular
allegorisation of the work of art is released. The difference expressed in these
alternatives is, once more, that of the philosophical and literary critical treatment of the
work of art. With the first, that truth content which can be experienced is dependent
upon the anachronism of the material content. The Realien stand out for the present-day
reader and the work o f critique will only be able to release such truth content as those
Realien allow, in other words the experience of the truth content of this particular work
of art will be little more than the experience of the anachronism of the material
content.157 The work o f art becomes little more than a historical curio, displaying certain
facts which can, years later, be allegorised, if so desired. The second possibility portrays
the work of art as allowing a form of experience of its material content thanks to the
importance of its truth content. The Realien only maintain any significance due to the
power of the truth content, which in its ability to "speak" to the readers of later
156 Benjamin, Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften op. cit., p. 145.
157 Michael Beddow (in personal discussion) has explained the difference by suggesting that the paradigm 
of such an anachronistic work is Ian Fleming's James Bond novels where any experience of the work of 
art is totally dependent on the communication of the Realien.
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generations, allows those readers to establish a connection, a "correspondance" to the
material content of the work of art. The basic critical question is thus, for Benjamin,
ob der Schein des Wahrheitsgehaltes dem Sachgehalt oder das Leben des 
Sachgehaltes, dem Wahrheitsgehalt zu verdanken sei. Denn indem sie im Werk 
auseinandertreten, entscheiden sie über seine Unsterblichkeit. In diesem Sinne 
bereitet die Geschichte der Werke ihre Kritik vor und daher vermehrt die 
historische Distanz deren Gewalt.138
Benjamin is thus setting out nothing less than the difference between great and less 
meaningful art. The challenge for literary critique is to respond in such a way that the 
experience of the truth content (the meeting of signatures of then and now) enlivens the 
material content. That this possibility exists is due to the history of reception of the 
work, but is also thanks to circumstances of its composition. The great work allows the 
context in which it was written to be communicated because it deals with more than just 
simply this communication of context.139 It is rather the intercourse of a particular artist 
with his/her environment -  and the fact that this particular intercourse itself becomes 
signed in the work -  that allows great art to produce experiences of thundering 
profundity. The statements of universal importance which great works of art have 
traditionally been seen as producing can only come to pass through the particular 
signature of the work and the meeting of this signature with that of the critic in later 
years. As such, one might say that it is the very finitude of the work of art, the mortality 
of its signature which allows it to live on. Those works which are nothing more than an 
immortal documentation will be the ones to sink into obscurity and the nothingness of 
not being read.
138 Benjamin, Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, op. cit., p., p. 125-6.
139 Cf. Müller, Jetzt sind eher die infernalischen Aspekte bei Benjamin wichtig, Aber ein Sturm weht von 
Paradies her: Texte zu Walter Benjamin, p. 356: "Je planer, verständlicher ein Text ist desto weniger 
erzählt er über die Gegenwart. Und je schwieriger, je dichter ein Text ist, desto mehr Information enthält 
er. Die muß man herausholen, nur dadurch wird es Erfahrung."
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The problem for the philosophical treatment of the work of art is whether it
automatically consigns literature or other art to this obscurity; whether by not dealing
with the fundamentally finite nature of the work of art philosophy seeks to symbolise a
work as either representing a particular idea or alternatively treats the work as
expressing the fact of allegorisation. For philosophy to consider the question as to
whether the work of art offers itself up - through its signature and history of reception -
might be to enter a realm that can be no use to the dominant tradition of philosophy at
all. Not only would it have to deal with the particularity of signature which authorship
consists of, but it would also be obliged to recognise that the work of art can only exist
through a series of critical acts through the ages, that is, through another host of
signatures. Philosophy would suddenly have to become finite.
The work of art, as signed and finite, already establishes an afterlife for itself,
providing a space in which the critic can work, and as discussed above the critic needs
to wonder what form this takes, be it that of the death of the "immortal" work, or the
eternal decay and return of its finite counterpart. This historical afterlife "is" the work
through the countless meetings with readers, historians and critics down the ages.
Geschichtliches "Verstehen" ist grundsätzlich als ein Nachleben des Verstandnen 
zu fassen und daher ist dasjenige was in der Analyse des "Nachlebens der 
Werke", des "Ruhmes" erkannt wurde, als die Grundlage der Geschichte 
überhaupt zu betrachten.140
The only way, however, that the critic can provide the conditions for the truth 
content of a work to shine through is by engaging with the material content, that which 
stands out as the years go by, or in other words by enacting firstly a commentary on the 
text. The truth content might then, unintentionally, shine through the critical text
140 Benjamin, Passagen-Werk, (Konvolut /V), op. cit., pp. 574-5.
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through the style o f  critique. Benjamin's own attempts themselves do not obviously 
demonstrate a method or a teleology of narrative which might provide the truth content 
as a conclusion. It is rather the case that the juxtaposition of commentary and critique 
and continued re-reading of such juxtaposition is supposed to produce an experience of 
the work of art where the signatures - of reading now and writing then - come together 
to illuminate each other in a mutual fashion. This style of critique takes the work of art 
apart in such a way through its commentary on its material content that what is left is 
only a ruin, where the critic has stripped away that which bound the work to its epoch of 
origin. What is left is not, it should be emphasised once more, the truth content of the 
work of art. Instead one could describe the truth content as the experience (.Erfahrung) 
of this particular ruination, perhaps of this particular de-construction, at the time of 
reading and critique.
The aim o f  such critical writing is to counter what Benjamin sees as mythic
forms of critique. His work hopes to stand in complete opposition to myth, precisely by
engaging in an aporetic way with the aporia of the truth content of the work o f art.
Dieses Verhältnis [zwischen Wahrheit und Mythos] ist das der gegenseitigen 
Ausschließung. Es gibt keine Wahrheit, denn es gibt keine Eindeutigkeit und 
also nicht einmal Irrtum im Mythos. Da es ebensowenig Wahrheit über ihn 
geben kann (denn es gibt Wahrheit nur in den Sachen, wie denn Sachlichkeit in 
der Wahrheit liegt) so gibt es, was den Geist des Mythos angeht, von ihm einzig 
und allein eine Erkenntnis. Und wo Gegenwart der Wahrheit möglich sein soll, 
kann sie das allein unter der Bedingung der Erkenntnis des Mythos, nämlich der 
Erkenntnis von seiner vernichtenden Indifferenz gegen die Wahrheit.141
In other words, it might not be enough to seek the truth, one is obliged also to recognise
that it cannot be presented as such, for to present it in such a way that it can be grasped
would be to lay it bare for knowledge. A simple statement of the truth content of a work
1,1 Benjamin, Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, op. cit., p. 162.
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of art, once again, making the outcome of critique a symbol of the essential, unchanging 
truth of a work would be accordingly a mythic presentation of truth, and thus not the 
truth at all. The truth content of a work of art is not only therefore finite and historical; it 
can also only be experienced finitely and historically, in the countersignature of the 
artist’s signature in the work.
The archetypical mythical criticism is seen by Benjamin as that which portrayed 
Goethe not only as genius, but as creator. The very idea of artistic creation implies for 
Benjamin a natural power of artistry which comes from within, so that the work of art is 
identified as part of the artist him/herself. Work and life merge so that critics of Goethe 
are able to produce
[d]as gedankenloseste Dogma des Goethekults, das blässeste Bekenntnis der 
Adepten: daß unter allen Goetheschen Werken das größte sein Leben sei -  [...] 
Goethes Leben wird demnach nicht von dem der Werke streng geschieden. 142
The relation of artist and work must, for Benjamin, be seen as one of the first giving
form to the second. The artist cannot create as such, s/he instead structures the work out
of the formless chaos of reality.
Und in der Tat ist der Künstler weniger der Urgrund oder Schöpfer als der 
Ursprung oder Bildner und sicherlich sein Werk um keinen Preis sein Geschöpf, 
vielmehr sein Gebilde. Zwar hat auch das Gebilde Leben, nicht das Geschöpf 
allein. Aber was den bestimmenden Unterschied zwischen beiden begründet: nur 
das Leben des Geschöpfes, niemals das des Gebildeten hat Anteil, 
hemmungslosen Anteil an der Intention der Erlösung.143
The work of art cannot redeem; only the creature (of God) can do so. The talk of
redemption is particularly characteristic of Benjamin and will be dealt with below, but
the significance of this passage is also to be discovered in the difference of Urgrund and
Ursprung. The author’s life is not to be regarded as the primal ground of interpretation
142 ibid., p. 160.
143 ibid., p. 159.
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or that to which all interpretation finally leads or upon which it depends. The author is 
rather the one who allows a certain content to become form, or who enables the 
continuum of life to be made artifice with the monogram o f the artist attached. As a 
result, for Benjamin, it is pointless to look for clues to the meaning of the work in the 
life of the artist, since "der einzige rationale Zusammenhang zwischen Schaffendem und 
Werk in dem Zeugnis besteht, das dieses von jenem ablegt."""' Such a search is the very 
essence of that criticism which seeks to identify absolutely the life and work of the 
author, presenting the latter in the form of a hero whose mythic status consists precisely 
in the symbolism of life and work.
Denn im Bereich des Mythos bilden in der Tat das Wesen, Werk und Leben jene 
Einheit, die ihnen sonst allein im Sinn des laxen Literators zukommt. [...] Dort 
hält es zugleich den Grund des Wesens in sich und den Inhalt des Lebens. Die 
kanonische Form des mythischen Lebens ist eben das des Heros. In ihm ist das 
Pragmatische zugleich symbolisch, in ihm allein mit andern Worten 
gleicherweise die Symbolgestalt und mit ihr der Symbolgestalt des menschlichen 
Lebens adäquat der Einsicht gegeben.14 45
If this were the case, however, it would be impossible for the critic to extract any 
meaning from the text which was not utterly dependent on the life and deeds of the 
author. The work of art, in other words, would not be autonomous, or more poignantly, 
would not live on past the death of the author. Because the critic is able to read and 
interpret the work of art after the passing of time, or once again, because the author, 
his/her signature and the work itself are inhabited by finitude, criticism can always do 
more than simply retell the story or pin down the work as symbol. Benjamin thus 
attempts to put as much distance as possible between himself and those attempts to 
identify Goethe’s life and work:
144 ibid., p. 155.
145 ibid., p. 157.
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Daher ist jede eingehende Betrachtung eines Goetheschen Werkes, ganz 
besonders aber die der Wahlverwandtschaften, von der Zurückweisung dieses 
Versuches abhängig. Mit ihr ist zugleich die Einsicht in einen Lichtkem des 
erlösenden Gehalts gewiesen, der jener Einstellung wie überall auch in den 
Wahlverwandtschaften entgangen ist.1“
Benjamin wants to destroy this notion of the identification of life and work not 
only because he objects to the ideology of the hero, but also because he has a quite 
different idea as to how the art work comes about in the first place. This in turn reflects 
his philosophy of language and of time, from which the obligation to redeem the truth 
content of the work of art is derived.* 147
The life from which the work of art emerges is not simply nothing but chaos, 
"bloße Schönheit, bloße Harmonie" which "muß erstarrt und wie in einem Augenblick 
gebannt erscheinen." 148 In order for it to be formed or represented, Benjamin suggests 
that the continuum of beauty and chaos must be interrupted - but by what he calls the 
inexpressive.
Was diesem Schein Einhalt gebietet, die Bewegung bannt und der Harmonie ins 
Wort fällt ist das Ausdruckslose. Jenes Leben gründet das Geheimnis, dies 
Erstarren den Gehalt im Werke. '*
The pure expressiveness of life is interrupted by the inexpressive caesura of 
signification. This caesura must thus be understood as the Primal Scene of the aesthetic. 
Life, in its flowing, ever onward decaying nature, must be petrified in order to make it 
art but Benjamin's purpose seems also here to be to react to ideas of Classical aesthetics 
which see art precisely as the expression of life, of the Idea, turning once more the 
artwork into a symbol of an eternal state. The inexpressive could be understood simply
ibid., p. 158.
147 The following brief summary is partly indebted to Nägele’s treatment of Goethes 
Wahlverwandtschaften in chapter 6 of Nägele's Theater Theory Speculation, op. cit.
148 Benjamin, Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, op. cit., p. 181.
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as just the power of mimesis which gives a certain finite, decaying permanence to
beauty by its destruction as pure beauty. The work of art thus automatically becomes
something completely other to the life which it interrupts, this alterity being exemplified
by the realm of the other par excellence, signification, the antithesis of pure self-
expression. The work of art becomes then nothing more than a fragment, riven from its
very inception by the inexpressible power of the alterity of signification.
Dieses [das Ausdruckslose] nämlich zerschlägt was in allem schönen Schein als 
die Erbschaft des Chaos noch überdauert: die falsche, irrende Totalität -  die 
absolute. Dieses erst vollendet das Werk, welches es zum Stückwerk zerschlägt, 
zum Fragmente der wahren Welt, zum Torso eines Symbols.150
The violence of art is expressed in a more suggestive but brutal way by Benjamin in the
following passage.
Wie die Unterbrechung durch das gebietende Wort es vermag aus der Ausflucht 
eines Weibes die Wahrheit gerad da herauszuholen, wo sie unterbricht, so zwingt 
das Ausdruckslose die zitternde Harmonie einzuhalten und verewigt durch 
seinen Einspruch ihr Beben.151
Language, for its part, is seen as having lost its power of pure expression since
the "Fall". Benjamin conceives the Adamic power of pure expression of the object as
being witnessed in the Name but since the Fall, language has degenerated into
signification and the close link of man and nature lost. The truth content of the work of
art, however, is only to be approached through some form of recapture of this power:
so ist abzuleiten der Gehalt der Sache weder aus der Einsicht in ihren Bestand, 
noch durch die Erkundung ihrer Bestimmung, noch selbst aus der Ahnung des 
Gehalts, sondern erfaßbar allein in der philosophischen Erfahrung ihres 
göttlichen Namens. Dergestalt fällt zuletzt die vollendete Einsicht in den 
Sachgehalt der beständigen Dinge mit derjenigen in ihren Wahrheitsgehalt 
zusammen.152
150 ibid.
,5' ibid.
152 ibid , p. 128.
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The truth content names the origin of the coming-into-being of the artwork. The origin
(Ursprung) is thus the leap out of the flux of time and beauty into petrification, decay
and history and is not to be thought of as the primal ground (Urgrund) of genesis.
Ursprung, wiewohl durchaus historische Kategorie, hat mit Entstehung dennoch 
nichts gemein. Im Ursprung wird kein Werden des Entsprungenen, vielmehr 
dem Werden und Vergehen Entspringendes gemeint. [...] Im nackten 
offenkundigen Bestand des Faktischen gibt das Ursprüngliche sich niemals zu 
erkennen, und einzig einer Doppeleinsicht steht seine Rhythmik offen. Sie will 
als Restauration, als Wiederherstellung einerseits, als eben darin Unvollendetes, 
Unabgeschlossenes andererseits erkannt sein.153
The incomplete nature of the origin, which can in any case only be constructed
retrospectively, prevents the critic from naming once and for all the truth content of the
work of art. Or rather, because the origin of the work of art is only thinkable through the
meeting of signatures of author and critic, its re-discovery or redemption is singular and
particular. As singular it therefore calls upon other critics to re-discover and redeem in a
similar manner ad infinitum.
The truth content names the origin of the work of art, an origin which, like the 
signature, is only original because it can be repeated. In capturing the historic specificity 
of a past age (as well as its specificity in relation to the epoch of the critic) the origin 
can provide the experience of that particular disposition of what is at stake in the 
meeting of author and critic. One could thus formulate the experience or demonstration 
of the effects of the origin as that of the arche-trace, the condition of possibility of a 
particular act of writing. The issue would therefore not present itself as simply the 
naming of the constituent forces of the economy of writing as a whole, but rather the 
particular disposition of these forces in the particular act of writing. For Benjamin, 
however, the emphasis must remain on the meeting of writing and reading across time,
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an encounter which allows the critic to free or redeem retrospectively the truth content 
of the work of art from the decayed ruin which it has become. As such, the work of the 
critic traces the particular effects of an arche-trace in history, not only in the sense of the 
contextualisation of past epochs, but equally importantly, of the present moment as 
well.
Philosophy and Literary Critique
Once again, the truth content cannot be seen or revealed. Just as the condition of 
possibility of writing (differance) and the aporia of time cannot be revealed and indeed 
may only be treated aporetically, the goal of the critic can never be grasped as an object 
of knowledge.
Niemals noch wurde ein wahres Kunstwerk erfaßt, denn wo es unausweichlich 
als Geheimnis sich darstellte. Nicht anders nämlich ist jener Gegenstand zu 
bezeichnen, dem im letzten die Hülle wesentlich ist.* 154
The beauty, the truth, which flowed through the chaos before being petrified into the
work of art only ever reveals itself as veiled. If it only is truth in so far as it is hidden
then the aim of criticism is to reveal in the constellation of writing and reading the
veiled nature of the truth content of the work of art. This in turn is its promise: the future
of criticism and thus the afterlife of the work of art -  and thus the work of art itself -  is
assured.
Also wird allem Schönen gegenüber die Idee der Enthüllung zu der der 
Unenthüllbarkeit. Sie ist die Idee der Kunstkritik. Die Kunstkritik hat nicht die 
Hülle zu heben, vielmehr durch deren genaueste Erkenntnis als Hülle erst zur 
wahren Anschauung des Schönen sich zu erheben.155
I5J Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, op. cit., p. 226.
154 Benjamin, Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, op. cit., p. 195.
155 ibid.
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The revelation (Offenbarung) of the truth content has thus a deliberately apocalyptic
tone in Benjamin. While such a revelation can only happen once, the uniqueness of the
event is precisely that which allows it to happen again and again. The metaphor which
Benjamin uses at different times to do justice to such an idea is that of the flame. In
Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, Benjamin describes the revelation of beauty thus:
[D]ie Schönheit [flieht] um ihres Scheines willen immer beide [...]: den 
Verständigen aus Furcht und aus Angst den Liebenden. Und nur dieser kann es 
bezeugen, daß Wahrheit nicht Enthüllung ist, die das Geheimnis vernichtet, 
sondern Offenbarung, die ihm gerecht wird. [...] Nicht aber tritt er [der 
Wahrheitsgehalt] zutage in der Enthüllung, vielmehr erweist er sich in einem 
Vorgang, den man gleichnisweise bezeichnen dürfte als das Aufflammen der in 
den Kreis der Ideen eintretenden Hülle, als eine Verbrennung des Werkes, in 
welcher seine Form zum Höhepunkt ihrer Leuchtkraft kommt.156
In the Wahlverwandtschaften essay, Benjamin compares the different approaches of the
critic and commentator to the work of art, described as a "burning funeral pyre", where
the former has the attitude of the alchemist in contrast to the chemist’s eye of the latter.
Wo jenem [dem Kommentator] Holz und Asche allein die Gegenstände seiner 
Analyse bleiben, bewahrt für diesen [den Kritiker] nur die Flamme selbst ein 
Rätsel: das des Lebendigen. So fragt der Kritiker nach der Wahrheit, deren 
lebendige Flamme fortbrennt über den schweren Scheitern des Gewesenen und 
der leichten Asche des Erlebten.157
The task of the critic is thus very much one of destruction or ruination of the work of 
art, and to investigate how it can still signify to succeeding generations. This ruin is, 
however, not the goal of the critic. Instead, it must be perceived as the means of 
releasing the truth content of the work of art or the attempt to name its origin. As has 
been emphasised a number of times, this critical gesture is intended to ensure further 
critical activity and thus cannot be thought of as the telos of literary critique. The latter 
can only be conceived -  at least if along the lines drawn by Benjamin -  as an eternal
Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, op. cit., p. 211.
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return or an originary repetition, thus marking itself off, if not from philosophy itself, 
then certainly philosophy’s use and abuse of literature and the work of art. For to the 
extent to which the signature of the written word is ignored or repressed -  the fact that it 
is writing, signed and dated by someone at a particular time and place -  as well as the 
extent to which the countersignature of reading is forgotten, philosophy turns literature 
from narrative, allegory and finitude into idea, symbol and death. As soon as the decay 
of the work of art is not seen as constitutive of its being read and re-written, that is, 
constitutive of its being, then it is no more mortal and able to return eternally but 
already immortal, already dead.
Benjamin, however, does seem to regard Kritik as an essentially philosophical 
task. Not only "[haben] alle echten Werke ihre Geschwister im Bereiche der 
Philosophie",157 58 159but also what critique shows in the work of art "ist die virtuelle 
Formulierbarkeit seines Wahrheitsgehalts als höchsten philosophischen Problems.'"59 It 
would thus seem that Benjamin himself seeks to use literature or the work of art for 
philosophical ends, in order to approach and do justice to the philosophical Idea. The 
goal of criticism would thus be the redemption of the truth content of the work of art as 
the expression or manifestation of the philosophical Idea. How then would this differ 
from the repression of signature which was criticised earlier as partly characterising 
philosophy’s treatment of literature?
It is important to note firstly that the task set by Benjamin in the writing of 
Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften is one for Kritik rather than philosophy. Critique in this 
sense is neither traditional literary criticism or traditional philosophical writing but a
157 Benjamin, "Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften”, op. cit., p. 126.
158 ibid., p. 172.
159 ibid., p. 173.
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practice somewhere between the two. As one translator of Benjamin notes: "the term 
'critique' (Kritik) usually designates a specific philosophically informed aspect of [art] 
criticism."1“ The difference between traditional art criticism, critique and philosophy 
lies in their attitude and relation to the truth content of the art work. While the first only 
enacts a commentary on the text, the latter two are concerned with approaching its truth 
content. Critique, however, behaves in such a way as if it seeks to maintain the 
possibility of the formulation of the truth content. "[W]ovor sie [die Kritik] aber, wie 
aus Ehrfurcht vor dem Werk, gleich sehr jedoch aus Achtung vor der Wahrheit innehält, 
das ist eben diese Formulierung selbst.'"61 In other words, critique desires to keep the 
possibility of formulation as possibility -  an impossible possibility - it treats the truth 
content of the work of art as aporia. As a concept, the Wahrheitsgehalt of the work of 
art in Benjamin’s writing is, just like that of time in Derrida’s works, an aporia. The 
condition of possibility of the truth content is its never realised possibility of being 
revealed and it is the responsibility of critique to step back from this caesura of 
formulation. This approach and hesitation before the work of art represents the aporetic 
relation to the aporia of the truth content of the work of art, it necessitates judgement not 
only in the present, but also guarantees it in the future. To attempt to formulate the 
expression of the Idea of the work of art would be to seek not truth but knowledge, and 
as discussed above the truth content cannot present itself as an object of knowledge or 
intention. Benjamin expresses this otherwise when he suggests that it will not answer to 
a question, but rather only respond to the demand of criticism.
Wäre doch jene Formulierbarkeit allein, wenn das System erfragbar wäre,
einzulösen und würde damit aus einer Erscheinung des Ideals sich in den nie 160
160 Translator’s (Rodney Livingstone’s) note, Walter Beniamin: Selected Writings. Vol.l op. cit., p. 219.
161 Benjamin, Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, op. cit., p. 173.
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gegebenen Bestand des Ideals selbst verwandeln. So aber sagt sie einzig, daß die 
Wahrheit in einem Werke zwar nicht als erfragt, doch als erfordert sich erkennen 
würde.162
Were the truth content of the work of art able to give an answer to the question of
philosophy, critique would only happen once. This might be the dream of philosophy,
where its date- and timelessness eschew the possibility of repetition:
For what philosophy attempts, in its most fundamental mission, is a writing 
without a date, a writing that transcends the here-and-now of its coming-into- 
existence, and the heres-and-nows of the acts which confirm, extend and renew 
that existence.1"
In principle, a philosophical text should not be signed. Its pretensions being 
toward universality any blot of specificity compromises it.164
Critique, however, in the sense used by Benjamin dares to demand of the work of art
that it bum up in the "scintillation of a constellation", a constellation of signatures of
author and critic that will happen again and again. Benjamin’s treatment of the aporia of
the truth content of the work of art is thus not only analogous to the aporia of time, it is
in fact a recognition of the aporetic structure of time within the encounter of critic and
truth content in the milieu of the work of art. Benjamin seems to insist on the radical
finitude of the critical act, distancing himself thus from that form of philosophy which
claims universality (and thus timelessness) not only for itself, but more relevantly for
this context, for its interpretation and use of the work of art.
This is not to say that philosophy is excluded from literary critique. Not only
does the theory of literary criticism have to find its home in the tradition of philosophy
(as will this chapter), but in Rodney Livingstone's phrase, literary critique must
understand itself as being "philosophically informed", that is, having philosophy rather
162 ibid.
Attridge in introduction to Shibboleth: for Paul Celati in Derrida, ed. Attridge, op. cit, p. 371.
Smith, Derrida and autobiography, op. cit., p. 35.
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than being it. Benjamin writes quite clearly in Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften that 
philosophy cannot approach literature or the work of art as philosophy, if it is to attempt 
to address the philosophical problem of that text. It must rather approach it as Kritik, the 
effects of which produce not simply knowledge which can be used and repeated in 
another philosophical text, but the experience of truth which can only be repeated 
eternally in further acts of Kritik. The truth o f the work o f  art is accordingly not truth as 
telos, but as writing. It is only in the narrative of critique, its originary repetition, that 
the decay of signatures, of author and reader, can be recognised. It is thus only in the 
signed and dated work of literary critique that philosophy can approach its object.
Thus in this search for the relations of signatures, the role of the life of the artist 
plays an especially important role. Benjamin, as quoted above, maintains that the only 
rational connection between work of art and creative artist is what the former can say 
about the latter. To assert the contrary would be to subscribe to the heroic view of art -  
that of symbolic identification of artist and work -  which this chapter set out at the very 
beginning to resist. There are, however, a number of modalities possible in the relation 
of philosophy and literary criticism and thus equally so in the relation of author and 
literary text. Just as philosophy can only approach the literary text as critique (as literary 
philosophical critique) so must literary criticism, if it is to take seriously the problem of 
the finitude of the work of art, approach it as philosophical literary critique. Just how far 
the latter has to deal with the life of the author will be discussed below, but it should for 
the moment suffice to point out that if the object of critique is to investigate the 
signature and countersignature that is the work of art, then the unavoidable 
consideration of the finitude inhabiting that structure leads us not only toward the death
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of the critic, but to the particular real death of the author as well and from there to
community.
The Dialectical Image
It is easy, when discussing the work of art or the act of criticism in Benjamin’s writings
to focus unduly on either one or the other, forgetting therefore that he insists primarily
on the meeting of both, or of the signatures of both, even though they emerge from
different times. The historical object, for Benjamin, can only be constructed by a "now"
and a "then", each being unthinkable without the other, in what he terms the
"dialektisches Bild". Much has been written about this concept in Benjamin, some of it
misleadingly giving the impression that in the dialectical image either the present
"breathes life" into the past, or the past "haunts" the present. In Konvolut N of the
Passagenwerk, however, it states explicitly:
Nicht so ist es, daß das Vergangene sein Licht auf das Gegenwärtige oder das 
Gegenwärtige sein Licht auf das Vergangene wirft, sondern Bild ist dasjenige, 
worin das Gewesene mit dem Jetzt blitzhaft zu einer Konstellation 
Zusammentritt.'65
A particular "then" (das Gewesene) comes together with a particular "now" (das Jetzt)
to form an image that is readable only at a particular time.165 66 In this sense, every image is
unique, and because the reader or critic has little control over their effects, success or
failure, intention dies away in them. To repeat a passage quoted earlier:
Der historische Index der Bilder sagt nämlich nicht nur, daß sie einer bestimmten 
Zeit angehören, er sagt vor allem, daß sie erst in einer bestimmten Zeit zur
165 Benjamin, Passagen-Werk op. cit., [N 2a,3] pp. 576-7.
166 Cf. Müller, Brief an den Regisseur der Bulgarischen Erstaufführung von Philoktet, Herzstück, p. 102: 
"Ich muß dir nicht sagen, daß Theater von Anachronismus lebt. Die Brechtsche Historisierung ist nur eine 
andre Benennung für die Kollision (das Drama) der Zeitebenen (des Materials des Autors der Darsteller 
und des Publikums), die seinen Lebensraum bestimmt."
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Lesbarkeit kommen. Und zwar ist dieses "zur Lesbarkeit" gelangen ein 
bestimmter kritischer Punkt der Bewegung in ihrem Innern [;...] jedes Jetzt ist 
das Jetzt einer bestimmten Erkennbarkeit. In ihm ist die Wahrheit mit Zeit bis 
zum Zerspringen geladen. (Dies Zerspringen, nichts anderes, als der Tod der 
Intentio, der also mit der Geburt der echten historischen Zeit, der Zeit der 
Wahrheit, zusammenfällt.167
There rests upon the critic or historian, therefore, a heavy responsibility. If each Jetzt is 
that of a specific recognisability, then each equally cries out to be brought into 
constellation with a particular instance of what has been (dem Gewesenen). S/he is 
compelled to engage in remembrance of the past, not simply in order to mourn what is 
no more, for the critic must also seek "die Gegenwart in eine kritische Lage zu 
bringen."168 With remembrance of the past through the dialectical image the nature o f the 
present is similarly brought to the fore. Indeed, the historian or literary critic engages in 
remembrance in order to consider the present environment, the political context, of 
his/her work. Equally, the politics of the present, infused as it by definition must be by 
the Jetzt, becomes a site of constant remembrance. Peter Osborne expresses succinctly 
this state of affairs.
Benjamin redefines the political, neither as a particular kind nor a particular 
sphere of action, but rather as a temporal mode o f experience', an action 
generating, as opposed to a contemplative, orientation towards the past.169
We thus begin to recognise the import of the structure of originary repetition involved in
Benjamin’s notion of Kritik. The dialectical image must be constructed in order to think
and act finitely, in other words in a particular temporal mode of experience that is
politics. While literary or historical Kritik remember the past, they can only do so on the
167 Benjamin, "Passagen-Werk" op. cit., [N 3,1], pp. 577-8.
168 ibid., [N 7a,5], p. 588.
169 Osborne, Peter, Small-scale Victories, Large-scale Defeats: Walter Benjamin s Politics o f Time in 
Walter Beniamin’s Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, ed. Benjamin & Osborne, p. 68.
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basis of an exposure to the present, becoming a continuously repeated exposure which 
forces critics to consider the political nature of the present from which they are working.
Part of this reconsideration o f the present is based on how the present can be 
thought historically. If that which has been can only be thought through an exposure to 
the present, then equally the latter must be understood in its relation to the past -  or 
within the context of the dialectical image, in its relation to a specific Then. The present 
is thus robbed of any particular mythic immediacy which might privilege it over and 
above that which has provided the conditions for it to be. For history to be conceived 
along the lines suggested by Benjamin, the role of the present, identical to itself as the 
next "stage" of history, has to be replaced by the Jetzt, an originally and eternally 
repeatable confrontation between itself and what has been: "Die Geschichte ist 
Gegenstand einer Konstruktion, deren Ort nicht die homogene und leere Zeit sondern 
die von Jetztzeit erfüllte bildet."170
This notion of the "now" stands in direct contrast to that concept which has been 
seen as the motor of history, namely the "new". The new seems to manifest change 
within history, one object or event replaces another which is outdated or superseded. As 
Peter Osborne states, "modernity antiquates to a hitherto unheard of extent."171 Such an 
economy of change can be regarded as having accelerated under modernity, or rather 
under the development of capitalism into a system where the exchange value of
170 Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte", in Gesammelte Schriften. I, 2, p. 701.
171 Osbome, op. cit., p. 83. See also Müller, Jenseits der Nation, p. 41: "Was abgebaut wird, ist Erfahrung. 
Jeder Idiot kann heutzutage fotografieren. Die Technisierung der Sinnlichkeit fuhrt dazu, daß man nicht 
mehr sehen muß. Das ist Benjamins Feststellung, daß das touristische Fotografieren das Gedächtnis 
auslöscht. Wer sich nicht erinnern kann, macht auch keine Erfahrung mehr."
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Commodities dominates their use value.'” The new is desired in the modem capitalist
economy (represented most obviously by the concept of fashion) simply because it is
new, providing a stimulus to demand. However, this very newness is precisely that
which prevents anything from really changing, the modem age becomes a never-
changing hell, one eternal moment of commodity exchange:
Das Moderne, die Zeit der Hölle. Die Höllenstrafen sind jeweils das Neueste, 
was es auf diesem Gebiete gibt. Es handelt sich nicht dämm, daß "immer wieder 
dasselbe" geschieht (a fortiori ist hier nicht von ewiger Wiederkunft die Rede) 
sondern dämm, daß das Gesicht der Welt, das übergroße Haupt, gerade in dem 
was das Neueste ist, sich nie verändert, daß dies "Neueste" in allen Stücken 
immer das nämliche bleibt. Das konstituiert die Ewigkeit der Hölle und die 
Neuemngslust des Sadisten. Die Totalität der Züge zu bestimmen, in denen dies 
"Moderne" sich ausprägt, heißt die Hölle darstellen.* 173
If the new needs as its condition the continual expression of commodity production,
then the social and economic conditions underlying that must remain the same. The new
is therefore simply a repetition of itself as the same in this sense as well as in a second:
in the modem repetition of the new, the event is repeated each time as present to itself.
History is thus represented as a series of new "presences". The new provides therefore
not only the condition for the stagnation of social conditions, but is similarly the sine
qua non for the enclosed identity of the present moment as repetition of the same
identity in the moment before.
The most powerful instance of such privileging of the present has been the 
concept of progress, an idea which sees the past as the heritage of the present, 
establishing a smooth continuity between the two. Benjamin’s main task is to rapture
Cf. Müller, Jenseits der Nation, p. 72: "Er [Der Kunstmarkt] macht Kunstwerke zu Kulturgütern und 
will sie sterilisieren, sie ungefährlich machen, indem er sie in die Zirkulation des Marktes einbringt. 
Kunstwerke brauchen Ruhe, um ihre destruktive Kraft auszuüben."
173 Benjamin, Passagen-Werk (Konvolut G°, 17), p. 1010-11.
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this homogenous continuity, replacing it with a temporality of remembrance, 
questioning and action.
Der Fortschrittsbegriff mußte von dem Augenblick an der kritischen Theorie der 
Geschichte zuwiderlaufen, da er nicht mehr als Maßstab an bestimmte 
historische Veränderungen herangebracht wurde, sondern die Spannung 
zwischen einem legendären Anfang und einem legendären Ende der Geschichte 
ermessen sollte. Mit andern Worten: sobald der Fortschritt zur Signatur des 
Geschichtsverlaufes im ganzen wird, tritt der Begriff von ihm im 
Zusammenhang einer unkritischen Hypostasierung statt in dem einer kritischen 
Fragestellung auf.174
Progress is thus only thinkable between two mythic points, one in the past, one in the 
future. The course of history becomes thus little more than the self-realisation of an idea 
of history and while events might occur, nothing in the Idea actually changes. Benjamin 
elsewhere describes this state as "catastrophe" (N 9a, 1) and declares that real political 
experience is completely free of things remaining the same (N 9,5). Real political 
experience, therefore, is finite.
The catastrophe of things staying the same, of homogenous time, affects the 
historical object in such a way as to transform it into merely the heritage {Erbe) of the 
present epoch. In the idea of heritage the present gathers up and subsumes the past into 
its own identity, thus disabling the power of discontinuity that das Gewesene holds. It is 
precisely because the historical object does not belong to the present (or more properly 
is only constructed by the present if the latter is thought of as Jetztzeit) that it is, in the 
dialectical image, able to bring the present into a moment of "danger", that is, a flash of 
historical truth which must be repeated over and over. Thus historical phenomena, 
including literary and artistic works, are rescued or redeemed (gerettet) from their
ibid., [N 13,1], pp. 598-9.
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incorporation into the present, through "die Aufweisung des Sprungs in ihnen'"75 and
through such a redemption, bring with them the chance to explode the whole
homogenous continuum of history. In a passage seldom quoted, Benjamin states:
Er [Der Kritiker] nimmt sie [eine Chance] wahr, um eine bestimmte Epoche aus 
dem homogenen Verlauf der Geschichte herauszusprengen; so sprengt er ein 
bestimmtes Leben aus der Epoche, so ein bestimmtes Werk aus dem 
Lebenswerk. Der Ertrag seines Verfahrens besteht darin, daß im Werk das 
Lebenswerk, im Lebenswerk die Epoche und in der Epoche der gesamte 
Geschichtsverlauf aufbewahrt ist und aufgehoben.175 76
The historical object must therefore be seen as being released from its position as one of
a series of new events and brought together with the now. As such, while it is redeemed
for the sake of a political experience of the present as now-time, it remains other to the
present. In the object -  described elsewhere by Benjamin as a "monad" -  the historian
and critic can locate the experience not only of an epoch, but the whole of history itself
in its discontinuity.
In this monad, therefore, history is brought to a standstill by its being flooded 
with the temporality of the now. In the lightning flash of recognisability a cessation of 
history is occasioned where the critic sees his/her own present not as a moment of 
transition, but one where time has come to a standstill.177 "Dieser Begriff definiert eben 
die Gegenwart, in der er [der historische Materialist] für seine Person Geschichte 
schreibt."178 Now-time is, therefore, a dated, unique and repeatable moment, which 
provides an equally unique and political experience with the past.1” This ability to think
175 ibid., [N 9,4], p. 591.
176 Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte", op. cit., p. 703.
1,7 Cf. Müller, Jenseits der Nation, p. 40: "Jeder Versuch zur totalen Beschleunigung erfährt in den 
Minderheiten den Hauptgegner. Denn die Minderheiten stellen immer etwas Autonomes dar, sie stehen 
der Beschleunigung im Weg. Minderheiten sind Bremsen. Daraus stammt der Drang, sie zu vernichten, 
denn sie beharren auf ihrer eigenen Geschwindigkeit."
178 Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte, op. cit., p. 702.
Cf. Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer 1. p. 168: "Es war also eigentlich nicht die Wiederkehr des Gleichen, 
sondern unter ganz anderen Umständen die Wiederkehr des Gleichen und dadurch auch die Wiederkehr
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in the Now and blast the object which has been (den Gewesenen) out of an ideology of 
progress in order to remember in a manner which is politically active on and in the 
present is what Benjamin terms "messianische Stillstellung".
The messianic power due to the critic which Benjamin describes is that of 
resurrection, of a limited ability to bring to life once more objects which had long been 
thought dead and buried. This might entail the dialectical imaging of the victims of 
history then and now,* 180 182or the recapture of the experience of reading a book now, 
written in a time which has been. While the real Messiah of Jewish theology will have 
the power to raise people from the dead, and thus whose coming, whenever that might 
be, will bring about the day of judgement, we on the other hand "sind auf der Erde 
erwartet worden. Dann ist uns wie jedem Geschlecht, das vor uns war, eine schwache 
messianische Kraft mitgegeben, an welche die Vergangenheit Anspruch hat.'"81 The 
exertion of the critic’s weak messianic power cannot bring about the end of historical 
time, it can only interrupt it with the intensity of Jetztzeit, the momentary, lightning 
shock of the dialectical image. As such, the critic must employ his/her powers again and 
again, "in infinitum, bis die ganze Vergangenheit in einer historischen Apokatastasis in 
die Gegenwart eingebracht ist.'"82 Once again, this never-ending process of attempted 
redemption must come about because that which is redeemed disappears immediately, 
thus calling on the critic to bring together yet another now, yet another then.
Das dialektische Bild ist ein aufblitzendes. So, als ein im Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit
aufblitzendes Bild, ist das Gewesene festzuhalten. Die Rettung, die dergestalt -
des Gleichen als eines Anderen. Das wäre eine Differenz. Mein Interesse an der Wiederkehr des Gleichen 
ist ein Interesse an der Sprengung des Kontinuums, auch an Literatur als Sprengsatz und Potential von 
Revolution."
180 Cf. Müller, Und vieles/ wie auf den Schultern eine/ Last von Scheitern ist/ zu behalten (Hölderlin), in 
Rotwelsch, p. 88: "Was für die Eliten Geschichte, ist für die Massen immer noch Arbeit gewesen."
181 Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte, op. cit., p. 694.
182 Benjamin, Passagen-Werk op. cit., [N la, 3], p. 573.
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und nur dergestalt -  vollzogen wird, läßt immer nur an dem, im nächsten
Augenblick schon unrettbar verlornen (sich) vollziehen.1'3
That the historical materialist critic feels bound to the task before him/her and that s/he 
carries an almost intolerably heavy burden of constant responsibility is made clear in the 
last sentence of Über den Begriff der Geschichte. Likening him/her to the Jews who 
must at all times expect the possibility of the return of the Messiah, Benjamin expects 
much of those who follow him: "Denn in ihr [der Zukunft] war jede Sekunde die kleine 
Pforte, durch die der Messias treten konnte."184 The Messiah comes to redeem the whole 
of humankind from a position outside history; when he comes we will exist no more in 
the time of history. The critic on the other hand must inaugurate splinters of Messianic 
time from within, over and over again.
The process of history which the critic then subscribes to and practises has little 
to do with dominant notions of progress. The remembrance of objects and persons that 
have been, their coming together momentarily with the now, is described by Benjamin 
as the "Grundbegriff [...der] Aktualisierung."185 The commemoration of persons and 
works of art now is a momentary actualisation of their possibility in the lightning flash 
of recognisability. It is because both das Jetzt and das Gewesene are particular dated 
moments that their fmitude allows them to meet in a constellation of signatures that is 
the dialectical image. The remembrance that the critic indulges in can thus be seen as a 
form of anniversary. Referring to the return of a date in the anniversary, Benjamin 
states:
I S3 
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is;
ibid., [N 9,7], pp. 591-2
Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte, op. cit., p. 704. 
Benjamin, Passagen-Werk op. cit., [N 2, 2], p. 574.
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[E]s ist im Grunde genommen derselbe Tag, der in Gestalt der Feiertage, die 
Tage des Eingedenkens sind, immer wiederkehrt. Die Kalender zählen die Zeit 
also nicht wie Uhren. Sie sind Monumente eines Geschichtsbewußtseins[.]'86
To recall what was mentioned earlier on the possibility of future readability of a text, it
was pointed out that Derrida argues for the singularity of the written word as being the
condition for its being repeated and commemorated in the future. "[Readability
enunciates the possibility o f a recurrence" so that "the poem speaks; to all and in
general, to the other first of all.""7 The anniversary and remembrance is thus always for
the other, but that which is remembered offers itself up for remembrance as such to the
extent that it is signed and dated. Therefore, those instances of writing whose signature
is particularly pronounced or (to recall Benjamin’s analogous formulation from the
Wahlverwandtschaften essay) whose material content relies on the veiled truth content
for its existence, call out to be objects of remembrance. If, in turn, the form of
Eingedenken encapsulated in the dialectical image aims at rupturing the bland continuity
of history* 18788 then those works of literature which display their singularity and finitude as
their very being will be those to blast apart empty homogenous time. The dialectical
image, in response, does nothing other than open up itself to the structure of signature
and thereby, in memory o f those who have been, to the other. Not only does the
materialist critique of Benjamin open itself up to the other, it does so to those histories
which have been forgotten by the dominant historical logos, those who have been the
victims of "progress". To complete a quote cited earlier:
l8<’ Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte, op. cit., pp. 701-2.
187 See above, note 82.
188 Cf. Müller, Jenseits der Nation, p. 70: "Angesichts der totalen Funktionalisierung des Subjekts durch 
die Technologie macht der schön naive Satz von Jean Paul: 'Die Erinnerung ist das einzige Paradies, aus 
dem uns niemand vertreiben kann' erst richtig Sinn." See also p. 71: "Vergessen ist konterrevolutionär, 
denn die ganze Technologie drängt auf Auslöschung von Erinnerung.”
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In dieser Struktur [der Monade] erkennt er [der Kritiker] das Zeichen einer 
messianischen Stillstellung des Geschehens, anders gesagt, einer revolutionären 
Chance im Kampfe für die unterdrückte Vergangenheit."9
If the literary text, signed and dated, opens itself up to rescue in the dialectical image, it
does so precisely on the basis of this signature. That is to say, the critic acts in order,
continuously and repeatedly, to blast a particular otherness out of the continuity of that
history which has forgotten this signature and finitude as such. The critic does so not to
recapture this other but precisely to redeem it aporetically as other.
How then is the critic supposed to form the dialectical image. What might it look
like? In her poignant and remarkable book, Susan Buck-Morss takes the invitation to
provide images literally in a series of juxtapositions of drawings, photographs and
illustrations demonstrating primarily the decay and allegorisation of the commodity
over the past two hundred years. Whilst undoubtedly helpful and explanatory, Buck-
Morss’ project stands in sharp relief to the lack of such graphic images in Benjamin’s
own texts. While he insisted that the theory behind the Passagen-Werk "hängt aufs
engste mit der der Montage zusammen",* 190 this evidently does not mean that this
montage takes the form of the juxtaposition of graphic images. The dialectical image is,
instead, itself a form of writing, a signature. Already in Ursprung des deutschen
Trauerspiels, Benjamin had suggested that Johann Wilhelm Ritter had understood the
essence of the allegorical attitude:
Mitten ins Zentrum allegorischer Anschauung trifft er mit seiner Lehre, alles 
Bild sei nur Schriftbild. Das Bild ist im Zusammenhänge der Allegorie nur 
Signatur, nur Monogramm des Wesens, nicht das Wesen in seiner Hülle.191
1,9 Benjamin, Über den Begriff der Geschichte, op. cit., p. 703.
190 Benjamin, Passagen-Werk op. cit., [N 1, 10], p. 572. See also [N la,
191 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, op. cit., p. 388.
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8]
Clearly, Benjamin is not using "signature" in this context in the same manner as 
Derrida. It is equally evident, however, that the consequence of the monogram of 
essence is that the image is signed and dated, displaying the same properties as writing. 
As such, images are to be read; they are narrative.
"Das gelesene Bild, will sagen das Bild im Jetzt der Erkennbarkeit trägt im höchsten 
Grade den Stempel des kritischen, gefährlichen Moments, welcher allem Lesen 
zugrunde liegt.'"92 Taking once more into consideration that Benjamin sought to rely 
solely on the written word to destroy the empty continuity of history, it thus seems that 
the construction of the dialectical image is a question of style. As Andrew Benjamin 
points out,
it is not that Benjaminian montage amounts to the sustained juxtaposition of 
chronologically separate images, it is rather that montage is a term that pertains 
to time. The importance of montage lies not in the chronologically disparate 
nature of the images but in the presence of the chronologically disparate being 
present.192 93
It is equally important to point out that the dialectical image cannot become the style 
itself, for that would be, for Benjamin, to rob it of its "historischer Index"; the images 
"sind durchaus abzugrenzen von den "geisteswissenschaftlichen" Kategorien, dem 
sogenannten Habitus, dem Stil."194 Literary critique must then be written in such a way 
so as to emphasise the constellation of signatures, blasting the continuity of "progress" 
open by engaging in a finite remembrance of the other and in a remembrance of 
finitude; and then, by leaving open the obligation to continue this restoration again and 
again.
192 Benjamin, Passagen-Werk op. cit., [N 3, 1], p. 578.
193 Benjamin, Andrew, Time and Task: Benjamin and Heidegger Showing the Present in Benjamin &
Osborne (eds.) op. cit., p. 242.
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D errida, N ancy, Benjam in a n d  C ritical W riting
The aim of the discussion on the three critics and philosophers mentioned in this chapter 
has been to show a certain correspondence in their writing, a certain common dynamic 
in their treatment of literature and their insistence on how literature’s defining qualities 
allow it to escape any attempt to treat it as a stable object which can be plundered for 
objective knowledge. Each insists that the conditions which make literature possible and 
which govern its identity over time — signature in Derrida, community in Nancy, the 
origin and truth content in Benjamin -  cannot be revealed as such, but can only be 
witnessed as effects in particular contexts and dispositions. As a result, the critique of 
literature is a never-ending practice, rather than the repetition of a set discipline. The 
result of literary critique will not be so much a philosophical statement as another 
narrative, which in turn will be read, judged and criticised.
These conditions of literature, which literary critique must then after all take into 
account if it is to treat literature as literature, and which are termed its arche-traces by 
Derrida, focus primarily on the finite nature of the work of art. The work of art was 
produced by a particular person or persons, at or over a particular time. The signature 
that they thus bear inscribes this finitude in the work of art itself. It is because the work 
of art is singular in this sense that it can be cited, quoted and critiqued in the future. Its 
originality is grounded in its ability to be repeated as citation or reading -  what Derrida 
calls its iterability. This chapter has then suggested that this quality of the literary text or 
other work o f art means that only insofar as it exists retrospectively -  nachträglich -  can 
it do so at all. *93
194 Benjamin, Passagen-Werk op. cit., [N 3, 1], p. 577.
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Benjamin’s critical demand represented in the dialectical image is thus 
principally an effect o f iterability. Critique and remembrance can only take place in a 
community, an arena of finitude, and that arena is defined by our witnessing the death of 
the other and by recognising that we share this finitude with others, thus sundering 
ourselves. To be a real narrative of remembrance, however, literary critique must do 
more than go through the motions of commemoration. Critique cannot simply locate 
pure play or the symbol of otherness in all literary texts, it must instead countersign 
each work in such a way as to present the truth content of the work of art in its own 
narrative, not as a conclusive goal, but as an effect of the meeting in time of signatures 
from then and now. To repeat an earlier statement: the truth content of the work of art is 
not an idea, but an experience of writing and consequently critique must be so written to 
allow such an experience. The veiled nature of the truth content of literature, at least as 
suggested by Benjamin and hinted at by Nancy, might thus be seen as adequate to the 
writing through which it is experienced in contrast to that objective epistemological 
truth which seeks to resist the finite economy of the writing in which it is expressed.
Being "simply" writing, an overtly signed and dated document, critique must be 
enacted over and over again. Critique exists in the future, its identity is thus fractured 
and shared by its radically finite nature and is correspondingly a practice that consists of 
an expenditure for which there is no adequate return. As a site of loss (investigating 
other sites of loss) critique communicates community.
I have contrasted a number of times the concepts of literature and its critique, as 
discussed by Derrida, Nancy and Benjamin, with a "philosophical" approach to the work 
of art which I have suggested, along with Benjamin, cannot hope to read (or in the sense 
of critique, "write") literature as literature unless it ceases to be philosophy. Such a
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sweeping statement needs some clarification, however. Derrida and Benjamin both seek
to read literature as literature, even if this is in the name of philosophy. In "Shibboleth"
Derrida hints at the possible misreading, or more properly, ««reading of Celan that
would take place if one were to read him solely with the purpose of extracting
philosophical data on the problem of the date.
Celan’s trenchant ellipsis requires more patience, it demands more discretion.
[...] It makes no sense, as you may well suppose, to dissociate in Celan’s 
writings those on the subject of the date, which name the theme of the date, from 
the poetic traces of dating. To rely on the division between a theoretical, 
philosophical, hermeneutic, or even technopoetic discourse concerning the 
phenomenon of the date, on the one hand and its poetic implementation, on the 
other, is to no longer read him.195
Derrida seeks here to resist a superficial plundering of the vocabulary of the date which 
might be used to make Celan a symbol of the economy of signature. Instead, he claims 
that all poetic writing is inhabited by such an economy and his interest in Celan stems 
from the manner in which the specificity of his writings open themselves up to a 
consideration of the temporal problem of poetic composition. It is thus in the finite 
signature of Celan that Derrida examines the problem of signature and finitude. Had 
Derrida simply been wanting to make a philosophical point on the necessary conditions 
of the production of the art work, he could evidently have chosen any piece in the 
canon, any work of art at all. Instead, he picks out one writer whose signature is 
especially inscribed in his work -  in order to discuss just this problem of inscription.
Thus if the critique of literature is to be anything more than a simple illustration 
of a philosophical problem, it must address the idiomatic nature of literature, that it is 
signed and that the unique signature is only so because it will be repeated, and iterated 
in future readings, if, that is, it is to be read as literature. Literary critique is always and
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already an engagement with firstly an other who signs from another time and secondly
those others in the community without whom I could not countersign the work of
literature in the work of critique. As such a finite countersignature it can only be
recognised as an act of loss (and thus once more a writing of community).
Derrida and Benjamin are examples of critics who transgress the boundaries of
philosophy in order for philosophy to enjoy the benefits of literature. In so doing, they
change philosophy itself into a practice that sees itself as having to transgress the
borders of knowledge and experience because of those critics’ position at the closure of
philosophy and metaphysics. As has already been pointed out, if literary critique is a
transgression of knowledge, if the truth content itself represents in its ineffable way just
such a momentary piercing o f limits, then it is equally vital to recognise that critique
must return within the limits of philosophical knowledge and be recaptured by
philosophy itself. Indeed as Derek Attridge points out, any idea that literature (and thus
literary critique) can present itself as avoiding such recapture has never really left the
clutches of philosophy in the first place.
[A]ny thought of expelling philosophy from the practices of writing in the name 
of literary "free play" or "textuality" is doomed: philosophy will always come in 
by the back door -  indeed, it will never have left the house. The very notion of 
literature as ungovemed rhetoricity, as a practice safely "outside" philosophy, is 
a philosophical notion par excellence.195 96
Literary critique should thus properly be regarded as a practice of philosophy which 
shows up all the more the inadequacy of some traditional and still dominant attitudes to 
the treatment of the literary text or the work of art in general which philosophers and 
critics such as Derrida and Benjamin have concerned themselves with undermining.
195 Derrida, Shibboleth: for Paul Celan, op. cit., p. 377.
196 Attridge, in the introduction to Acts of Literature, op. cit., p. 13.
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Literary critique must be able to draw the distinction between the philosophical 
Auswertung of the experience of the truth content of the work of art on the one hand, 
and the attempt, on the other hand, to find philosophical truth directly in the work of art, 
be it by the illustration of a philosophical idea or the symbolisation of a theory of 
writing. It is this homogeneity o f reception -  closely linked to a mythical notion of 
progress within philosophy -  out of which Benjamin seeks to blast the literary work. 
Accomplished through the dialectical image, the work of art will always appear 
different.
This finitude of writing and remembrance can only take place in the recognition 
of the finitude -  the ruin -  of the work of art. It is such a ruination which promises the 
return of judgement, critique and writing in the future while the singularity and freedom 
of critical writing, both now and in the future, is what we share and divides us in a 
community. It must be remembered however that critique engages with a particular 
practice in that community, one where the finite and sharing subject is offered up as 
such to the future. Literary critique interests itself therefore in the decay of the work of 
art, not simply as philosophical trope, but as the process of decay of the particular work 
of art.
The finitude of the work o f art and its signature, that it was written at a particular 
time and place, about which much has been said, can, however, revert easily to a 
generalised character o f the text, where instances of signature are merely illustrations of 
a general truth. As I have argued throughout this chapter, literary critique must focus on 
the singularity of that signature. In other words, it must take into account the simple fact 
that the finitude that signature displays is thanks to the mortality -  or perhaps the death 
already -  of one other in particular. It is because of the actual, or imminent death of the
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author that his/her finitude inhabits through the signature the writing itself. It is because 
the author has died or will die, because the author him/herself is subject to decay, that 
the signature is particularly deeply inscribed, thus preventing the author from having 
any control of the text that has been written. Thus, the actual death o f the author is an 
issue for literary critique. As has already been argued, the finitude o f the human subject 
governs the manner in which it lives; it lives finitely. As a result, as I hope to argue, the 
relationship of the life and decay of Heiner Müller and that of the Heiner-Müller-text are 
in a certain manner of interest to literary critique. Once again, it could be argued that if 
such an interest holds true for all literary critique, then the manner in which the life, 
decay and death inscribe themselves within the literary text would apply to all authors. 
It is, however, once more the case that the texts of Müller offer themselves up as such, 
thus enacting a double interest, a twofold constellation where the aim remains not to 
deny the mortality of Müller by redeeming him with his work, but to investigate that 
very finitude that makes redemption possible.
The Life, Death and Time o f Heiner Muller
The question of the actual death of the author and his/her signature throws one particular 
question into stark relief: what is the critical object when the trace of a particular 
finitude (as well as finitude in general) is the condition for the possibility of repetition of 
the literary text? Or to put it another way, if  the actual death of the author allows the text 
to be read in the future, how should the question of ownership and authority over a 
literary text be approached?
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It has been the contention of this chapter that the problem for literary studies of 
the object of literary critique has to be addressed through death. Not only is writing 
itself inhabited through and through by finitude; not only is the practice of literature 
within a community structured by loss and the death of the other, but the very fact that 
the literary texts which are the object of this thesis are signed by "Heiner Müller" means 
that their power of opening themselves up to be read is premised upon the death of 
Heiner Müller himself. The very appearance of the name of a subject, that of "Heiner 
Müller" is a reminder that the name is a sign of absence, of mortality and that it is 
perfectly capable of existing without him/her to which it refers. A thesis on Heiner 
Müller, or rather on a name or signature that appears in a collection of literary texts 
("Heiner Müller") therefore, must occupy itself not only with death as such (as for 
instance a theme in his work, or as an aesthetic problem exemplified by his work) but it 
must deal with the very death itself. In this sense, literary critique is a movement 
between the name within and without quotation marks, a judgement that must enact a 
never-ending transgression and re-inscription of itself in one or the other. As such, 
literary critique distances itself from two other possibilities, that of philosophical 
plunder and biographical inanity. Whilst the former claims only to deal with the text 
signed by a figure of no importance, the latter, especially when undertaken after the 
actual death of the subject, completes the life through summary enclosure. The moment 
of death is seen as the completion of life, bringing work and life into an identity with 
each other in that both are cut short by a death which finally brings meaning to both. 
Life and work are gathered together in the moment of death, providing thereby a death 
akin to that of the tragic hero. Literary critique on the other hand has as its task to 
establish the possibility of an after-life for the literary text, one whose condition is the
99
continual destruction of the author’s propriety over the text, with an attending renewal 
of that author’s belonging to it. The relationship could be envisaged as a never-ending 
process of dragging the work from the author’s clutches: the more the critic succeeds in 
wrenching the book to him/herself, the longer will be the scratch marks left on the text 
by the gnarled fingers of the author’s corpse.
Resistance to the Tragic Death
The tragic death is enjoyed by the heroes of history. Through analogy to the heroes of 
classical tragedy, such figures are cast in their lot of having their moment of death 
define their life, as if fate had from the very beginning decreed how and when the final 
chapter of their narrative would draw to a close. Indeed, the analogy to a literary 
character displays exactly what is at stake in such an identification. As Benjamin 
pointed out so forcefully in the essay Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, it allows the life 
and work of author to become symbolised by each other. Life, in other words, becomes 
an act of aesthetics. The literary critic, however, must consider whether such behaviour 
threatens the very possibility of aesthetic and critical judgement in the future.
Benjamin contrasts the tragic time of the death of the hero to that expressed 
through the baroque Trauerspiel. Some critics'97 have located in this difference that 
departure from a phenomenological, and specifically Heideggerian view of time and 
death which was discussed earlier in this chapter. Once again, the death of the tragic 
hero is bound closely to a notion of an authentic death where the past is gathered up into 
the present at the moment of death, thus completing and redeeming that present and the
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life itself. For Benjamin, however, as early as 1916, redemption of the past can only 
take place outside of historical time, that is, through a Messianic interruption of time 
itself.
Diese Idee der erfüllten Zeit heißt in der Bibel als deren beherrschende 
historische Idee: die messianische Zeit. In jedem Fall ist aber die Idee der 
erfüllten historischen Zeit nicht zugleich als Idee einer individuellen Zeit 
gedacht. Diese Bestimmung, welche den Sinn der Erfülltheit natürlich ganz 
verwandelt, ist es, die die tragische Zeit von der messianischen unterscheidet.
Die tragische Zeit verhält sich zur letzteren, wie die individuell erfüllte zur 
göttlich erfüllten Zeit.''”
It thus immediately becomes clear that the temporality of the tragic death, that of the 
hero, is based upon fulfilment and redemption taking place within a life, at the moment 
of death and that this redemption then becomes symbolic for the nation or community as 
a whole. Just as for Heidegger the subject must grasp his/her own death as the fulfilment 
of life in order to have an authentic relation to his/her existence, so must the death of 
any symbolic figure for the community be regarded as itself rounding off and defining 
that life. Death in the tragic schema is thus understood as individual destiny that does 
not lay itself open to re-interpretation and communication in the future. The works of 
the life can be seen only as an anticipation of their fulfilment in death; they become 
therefore immortalised in death, but it is precisely this which prevents an after-life for 
such works developing. Benjamin makes clear that the manner in which the death of the 
subject is treated is decisive. The manner in which the hero dies determines the 
relationship to his work.
In der Tragödie stirbt der Held, da in der erfüllten Zeit keiner zu leben vermag.
Er stirbt an Unsterblichkeit. Der Tod ist eine ironische Unsterblichkeit; das ist 
der Ursprung der tragischen Ironie. [...] Wenn auf unbegreifliche Weise die 
tragische Verwicklung plötzlich gegenwärtig ist, [...] so ist es jener
1,7 See especially Howard Caygill, Benjamin, Heidegger and Tradition in Walter Beniamin’s Philosophy, 
op. cit., pp. 1-31
”* Benjamin, Trauerspiel und Tragödie, Gesammelte Schriften. II, 1, pp. 134-5
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eigentümliche Einfluß, den die Zeit des Helden auf alles Geschehen ausübt, da in 
der erfüllten Zeit alles Geschehen deren Funktion ist. 159
In an essay written in the same year, Benjamin links the temporality of the tragic
death to its use of language, where speech and meaning arise and die simultaneously to
emphasise the privilege of the present moment. The meaning of the speeches and
actions of the tragic hero are self-contained, fulfilled in his/her own time and passed on
as fait accompli to succeeding generations.
In der Tragödie entspringen Wort und Tragik zugleich, simultan, jeweils am 
selben Ort. Jede Rede in der Tragödie ist tragisch entscheidend. Es ist das reine 
Wort das unmittelbar tragisch ist.19 200
No such certainty, no such immortality is to be found in the deaths represented in
the Trauerspiel. There an afterlife is established by the insistence on the finitude of life
and language whereas the tragic hero and his works are immortalised in stone by the
manner in which his death his interpreted. Death in the Trauerspiel, on the other hand,
is not simply a matter for the individual:
Es handelt sich nicht um eine Individuation, die mit Bezug auf den Menschen zu 
erfassen ist. Der Tod des Trauerspiels beruht nicht auf jener äußersten 
Determiniertheit, die die individuelle Zeit dem Geschehen erteilt. Er ist kein 
Abschluß[.]201
Death is to be understood as an yet another insignificant moment in a life without 
ultimate meaning, providing the establishment of an afterlife where the same play of 
events might continue.
Es gilt das Gesetz eines hohem Lebens in dem beschränkten Raum des 
Erdendaseins, und alle spielen, bis der Tod das Spiel beendet, um in einer andern 
Welt die größere Wiederholung des gleichen Spiels fortzutreiben. Die 
Wiederholung ist es, auf der das Gesetz des Trauerspiels beruht.202
199 ibid., p. 135
200 Benjamin, Die Bedeutung der Sprache in Trauerspiel und Tragödie, Gesammelte Schriften 11, 1, p. 
138.
201 Benjamin, Trauerspiel und Tragödie, op. cit., pp. 135-6.
202 ibid., p. 136
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The essential difference between death as tragedy and as moment for the community is 
to be found in the attitude to the finite nature of time for the individual. When time goes 
on, when the death of that individual is constantly remembered and reinterpreted, s/he 
cannot stand alone above community as symbol, but only belong as one other amongst 
others: "In dieses Spiel entrückt der Tod. Die Zeit des Trauerspiels ist nicht erfüllt und 
dennoch endlich. Sie ist unindividuell, ohne von historischer Allgemeinheit zu sein.1'203 
Meaning is thus not handed down intact, but always subject to change. In contrast to the 
pure word of tragedy which is incontrovertible due to the manner in which the hero 
redeems his life at his death,
besteht ein anderes [Wort], das sich verwandelt, von dem Orte seines Ursprungs 
nach einem andern, seiner Mündung gewandt. Das Wort in der Verwandlung ist 
das sprachliche Prinzip des Trauerspiels.204
The work of complete redemption, in the temporality that was displayed by the baroque 
Trauerspiel, cannot be achieved at the moment of death, or at any one moment unless 
that takes place outside of history in Messianic time. "Weak" redemption is achieved 
over and over again because the Trauerspiel offers itself up to repetition and Benjamin 
suggests that it can hardly be read in any other way: "Die Notwendigkeit der Erlösung 
macht das Spielhafte diese Kunstform aus."
Typically, in the death scene of the tragic hero, the latter can, in death, declaim 
the significance of his life through one final speech.205 This is perhaps the fullest 
presence that one can imagine: going to one’s own funeral, giving one’s own oration.
203 ibid.
204 Benjamin, Die Bedeutung der Sprache in Trauerspiel und Tragödie, op. cit., p. 138.
205 Cf. Müller, Jenseits der Nation, p. 71: "Im Normalfall taucht die gesamte Biographie erst in den letzten 
Sekunden des Lebens auf, im berühmten Sterbefilm. Erst dann weiß man, wer man ist. Das ist der erste 
klare Blick auf den eigenen genetischen Code; damit hat man dann seine Schuldigkeit getan und kann 
gehen."
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There is, however, as has been argued above, always an excess in death that prevents 
any final interpretation of its significance that would betray the finitude that dealt it. The 
same must then apply for Heiner Müller. Just as his work cannot explain adequately his 
death so does his death remain inadequate to the task of a narrative of his life. In the 
writing of community the texts cannot be worked to illuminate a tragic death, so neither 
can his death put the texts to work to create a body which is rounded off, an oeuvre 
without edges. The only body there is, the decaying corpse of Heiner Müller, stands out 
as the mocking remainder o f any attempt to make his work and life immanent to each 
other.
It should, on the other hand be admitted, that a certain degree of "signing-off 
did take place in the months before Müller’s death, as well as immediately after it, not 
least in the publishing activities of a number of German houses (see note 61 above). The 
actual death of Heiner Müller released that economy of obituary which demands a tragic 
death, one where the life and work can be fulfilled in death, in order to produce a 
commodity which sells itself as the final word or the tribute that lays him to rest. When 
the death of the author is treated in such a tragic manner, when death fulfils the life and 
work of the artist, the meaning of that life and work is carried over and handed down to 
the next generation. The tragic death forgets finitude (a contradiction in itself, of course) 
and puts in its place immortality. In this sense it becomes a death which is preserved and 
lifted (aufgehoben) into the next stage of history. In other words, the tragic death of the 
author takes place within a history where death is present to and fulfilled in itself for 
those who are labelled as heroes. The deaths of those whose life is not seen as being 
completed at their end, the victims, are implicitly forgotten.
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Thus is the heroic death of the author linked in a subtle way to the establishment 
of an idea of progress and homogenous time, for the establishment of a mythic origin 
and goal between which progress moves is only possible if the heroic death is brought 
forth at the cost of the forgotten deaths of others. Indeed, because the hero as such is a 
category which seeks to raise a particular class of subject (in this case the author) above 
others, the treatment of a death as heroic (for authors, where the life and work are seen 
as one and where death fulfils interpretation) is already a victimisation of the other. In 
other words, the heroic death is at the cost of the death of the other, the death of the 
other is forgotten, and we return once more to the constituent force of mythic thought, 
the individual as present to him/herself, at the very least finally in death.
The actual death of the author is thus a vital moment for literary critique in that 
it, like the Trauerspiel, must treat it as just another event. The only possibility of 
treating death as completion would be at the end of history, at and in the time of the 
Messiah. Until then the critic must work to provide an afterlife for the text in memory of 
the dead author. Only then can the constituent nature of the death of the particular other 
(here, the author) be fully grasped and the attempt to close off the work of signature in 
literature (that is, the finitude that makes literature possible in the first place) resisted. 
Such an attempt, as has already been argued, normally takes one of two forms, both of 
which produce what might be termed heroic criticism. The biographical literary 
commentary, such as that which Benjamin attacked so vigorously, treats the author as 
hero and accordingly turns literature and signature into tragedy and fate. Philosophical 
use of the literary text produces a different sort of hero: one which demands that the 
signature des Gewesenen be forgotten, in other words which tries to forget the actual 
death of the author as other. The author becomes victim, the philosopher the hero.
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In producing life as aesthetics, or work as philosophy these two forms of 
criticism thus ignore what is most literary about the work of literature — that it is signed, 
and that this signature is only possible given a structure of finitude which also throws up 
the actual death of the one who signs. There is therefore a relation between life and 
work which has to be investigated by literary critique, one which avoids their complete 
symbolic identification as well as complete immortalising separation.
The Participation o f Life and Work
It has been argued above that literary critique stands between philosophical use of 
literature and biographical commentary. The separation of Heiner Müller from the texts 
(Heiner Müller from "Heiner Müller") is an essentially philosophical task, whereas the 
myth of complete identity of text and author retold by literary commentary is sundered 
finally at the latter’s death. Literary critique, it has been suggested, examines the 
interplay of the two, the decay or transgression of one into the other, or, as will now be 
made clear, the participation of life and work. The aim is thus to retain an aporetic 
relation to the singular finitude of Heiner Müller and his signature, treating his life, 
work and death in a manner which understands his death as not a tragic moment, but as 
sign of the participation and difference -  perhaps the difference -  of life and work.
The critic of Müller is, however, immediately faced with a problem in the form 
of the large number of interviews that he gave on his work, theatre in general, politics, 
philosophy and cultural theory. Given that Müller felt forced sometimes to disseminate
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in these interviews,206 can they be regarded as critical crutch, helping to explain the more 
difficult aspects of his work, or as performance in themselves?
The interview as interview, or the commentary by Müller on his work as 
commentary is not art. While the interview might be re-written as a theatrical piece,207 
the critic’s, or rather this particular critic’s task remains to trace the specificity of 
Müller’s various utterances -  the work of art as work of art, the interview as interview 
in order primarily to investigate the trace of politics and community in the former. 
While the possibility o f interview merging into theatrical performance or extemporised 
writing can never be discounted, the critic must also acknowledge that the possibility of 
their merger is simultaneously the possibility of their being kept apart. Thus while any 
project of interpretation on Müller’s utterances as a whole might present itself, the 
danger of homogenisation of work and life is equally apparent. The result would thus be 
an effacement of that signature, that is, of that which makes the work of art possible in 
the first place, leading back once more to a mythical humanism or a philosophy of 
themes in Müller’s public utterances.
If literature might be defined by the signature that writes, then given the 
economy of the signature argued throughout this chapter, it can be affirmed likewise 
that art might be defined as that which solicits the non-identical, an experience of loss 
exemplified by the death of the other. The interview as interview, though also 
autobiographical, solicits determinate and not aesthetic judgement.208 Its worth therefore 
lies in its ability to provide information about the signature in the work of art, the
206 See Chapter Three for a fuller discussion on the example of Philoktet.
207 Cf. Der Heiner wollte nicht kommen: Statt eines Vorworts: ein Stück in zwei Aufzügen von Gabriele 
Goettle, Gesammelte Irrtümer III. pp 9-34.
208 Cf. Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer III. p. 162: "Das ist das ewige Mißverständnis gegenüber Literatur 
und Kunst: Sie behandeln Erfahrenes nicht Begriffenes."
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participation of life and work, but it is not the signature itself. This is all the more so 
when one considers that the signature cannot be grasped as such but only experienced in 
the reading of the literary text written im Gewesenen and read in the Jetztzeit.
This becomes clearer if one considers how the actual death of Müller came 
about. He suffered a long, slow, undoubtedly painful death from cancer, a writer in a 
body, or rather a writing body riven by decay, eaten up from within. Like all writers, 
indeed like all writing, Müller went the way of all flesh, and thus in living finitely, he 
lived and wrote in spite of and because of that body’s mortality. The finitude that 
inhabits writing is thus nothing other than its embodiment, and literature only comes to 
pass and decay thanks to the decay of the writing body. Any complete separation of life 
and work would thus at worst be a complete disembodiment of literature where it sinks 
into a trade of pure ideas between ideal forms; or at best, admits the embodiment of 
literature but only as an immediate representation of the body’s functioning at actual 
time of composition thus depicting writing as little more than a cardiogram. Instead 
literary critique can mark the writing of the embodied, decaying subject (in both senses, 
the act of writing itself and the inscription of the body in the text) by tracing the history 
of embodiment, the life itself. Once again, this would never mean that this history could 
explain the literary text, indeed it must necessarily emphasise the finitude of that 
embodiment’s participation not only through the mortality of the writing hand but in the 
equally finite critical moment. Furthermore, if the embodiment of literature, the 
participation of life in work is a characteristic of its finite character as writing, then as 
argued in this chapter, the embodied signature is only so through the participation of the
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finitude of the other -  its death -  in the author’s life.209 In order therefore to follow the
trace of community in the literary text (that is, following Benjamin, the manner in which 
the work articulates its particular origin in a particular community at a particular time) 
as one aim of literary critique, this can only be done by considering the signature of the 
author which countersigns the death of the other, in other words, through the history of 
the embodiment and finitude of the signature — the life.
At the same time, however, the conditions for this reference to life, if based in 
the aporetic relationship to the community and death of the other, only allow a similarly 
aporetic attitude to the relationship of work and life. The work o f art for critique bears 
the trace of signature only on the basis of that signature’s singularity and repeatability 
and thus on the basis of signature’s character of being simultaneously a condition for 
and subversion of identity. The primary identity of concern to literary critique in this 
regard is that of work and life. As argued above, while the complete identification of the 
two grounds humanist mythology (for example those critics in Die Zeit quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter), the absolute rupture of participation o f work and life in each 
other is the practice of pure philosophy.210 The aporetic relation o f work and life, which 
can only be experienced in the finitude o f the critical practice, may only be presented in 
a manner which respects that aporia. Just as with other arché-traces which the work of
209 Cf. Müller, ibid., p. 194: "Der Körper ist nun einmal die Realität des Theaters im Gegensatz zu den 
technischen Medien, und schon immer deswegen interessant. Der Körper ist immer ein Einspruch gegen 
Ideologien.”
210 The reason’s for Müller's low productivity after the Wende might be sought here. In the society of 
commodity production, where art and life come together in order precisely to produce the artistic 
commodity, the defering work of signature is repressed. Cf. Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer 111, p. 117: 
"Philip Roth [...] sagte: Im Osten kann man alles schreiben und nichts publizieren. Im Westen kann man 
alles publizieren und nichts schreiben. Weil es keine Erfahrung gibt. Hier gab's sehr viel Erfahrung, 
positive und negative." The demand to identify Müller with his text, the wait for the "new Heiner 
Müller", might be understood, together with his unfamiliarity with the environment ("Unter Kohl kann 
man gewiß [schreiben], bloß nicht über Kohl” ibid., p. 131.) as reasons why Müller turned to interviews 
and direction.
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literary critique attempts to bring to light in the constellation of then and now, this too 
can only be done if it remains as merely signature, merely performance then in the 
signed, performed critical act now. Literary theory or a theoretical chapter of a thesis 
cannot therefore produce a definitive statement on how Heiner Muller’s life participates 
in his work or vice versa. It is only thinkable as an undecidability in the present and past 
constellation of a moment that is literary critique.
I have argued through this chapter that literary critique should examine and 
address the finitude of the work of art, its being signed as writing, in order to treat 
literature as literature. Critique thus produces an afterlife for the text which allows it to 
exist as that afterlife, governed always by the fact of its finitude and of its decay. In so 
doing it prevents an attitude towards the author and text which would place them in a 
relationship of tragic hero and fateful deeds. This in turn is guaranteed by the singular 
treatment of life and work which exemplarises the singular finite work of critique itself. 
The literary critic can thus only read literature in a way in which it produces the promise 
of further critique by others and s/he can regard such singularity and repeatability of 
critique as the experience of the shared character of community. Critique, in finitude, is 
always and already for and through the other and seeks primarily to do justice to this 
obligation by remembering those others for and through whom literature was written.
Such is the universal claim of literature which has been so powerfully expressed 
in humanist terms. Literature's worth, which critique seeks to promise for the future in 
the continuation of an afterlife for the literary text, is to be found in the simple fact that 
it is writing. The singularity of signed writing only comes to be through the author’s 
shared and singular identity in community, that is, through a particular other whose 
death was witnessed. Literature can sometimes recognise this debt and literary critique
110
can help bring about its remembrance. That remembrance can only be accomplished, 
finally, by remembering the other as other and the fundamental alterity of the primal 
scene of literature can only be approached and retreated from as aporia. The approach of 
literary critique makes such remembrance possible, it is only the retreat into philosophy 
which can represent it.
The Failure o f the Thesis
Literary critique, if it is to do its job, must fail on at least two counts. Firstly, in 
producing images of the constellation des Gewesenen and des Jetzts, it can only do so 
momentarily if the finitude which is the condition of possibility of these images 
appearing is treated seriously, in other words, as finitude. In addition to this, literary 
critique’s necessary restoration of its philosophical foundations after the moment of 
transgression can only be achieved on the basis of exclusion. That which is excluded, in 
other words everything else that could have been said about the text as well as that 
which resists being formulated in the concepts and narrative of philosophy, allows a 
body of a book, essay or thesis to take form, but simultaneously disallows any claim to 
an absolute, transcendental judgement of the text at hand. The failure and decay of 
criticism might thus be regarded simply as another means of expressing its promise. In 
this schema all literature and all criticism affirms the future simply because its decay 
can always be traced (and deconstructed).
This chapter has argued, however, that the aim of literary critique is not simply 
to pick on any text, be it literary or critical, and display the inevitability of its collapse 
under the weight of its finitude and decay. Such an exercise would simply reintroduce a
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denial of that same finitude and decay in the critical act itself. Literary critique seeks 
instead the manner in which particular literary texts decay, how that decay affects the 
reader or spectator, and in the case of Heiner Muller’s works, how they offer themselves 
to decay. These works are organised around an aporia (of time and of the other through 
displaying themselves as writing and as signature) which produces a promise. The critic 
can only focus on this promise, however, if s/he handles the aporia delicately as aporia. 
This entails, finally, critical writing being expressed in a style in which it writes as 
promise.
It could, on the other hand, be argued that critical writing should not any more 
feel obliged to spout a Derridean mantra if it is to be understood as taking seriously the 
fissured identity of the text and the metaphysical tradition of criticism itself. In this 
sense, the rhetoric of deconstruction, its self-imposed compulsion to display the slippage 
of the signifier and signified, might once have been necessary to emphasise the 
philosophical content but is now increasingly redundant as the reception of Derrida and 
other theorists and philosophers inches towards critical doxa. We can take it for granted 
that the basics of such theory are understood so that it does not have to be continuously 
displayed and experienced. This may indeed be the case for philosophy (although it 
cannot be the intention of this thesis to lay down rules o f conduct for philosophical 
writing).
Literary critique, however, is doomed to consideration of its style if it is not to 
slip back into commentary or restore philosophy too early to its operation. While this 
might not necessarily mean following pun with quip, and neologism with hyphenated 
pre-fix, it does involve deliberation on the manner in which critique transgresses 
philosophy in order to enable that experience of the literary text which evades
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philosophical knowledge. This is, after all, what makes literature be read as literature 
and is why literary critique was called to life in the first place.
Critique aims to account for the effects of a work of art written in the past on the 
audience in future generations and the singularity and repeatability of critique is the 
manner in which the literary itself and the passing of time between then and now is 
addressed. As emphasised throughout the chapter, critique illuminates the present as 
much as the past, and the promise of future critique is simply an admission or 
affirmation of the present as a site of conflict, debate and politics, in other words of 
community. It would thus be self-defeating to enact the form of 
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung that was seen in the work of the writers in Die Zeit 
discussed at the very beginning. Instead critique is a remembrance that disturbs the 
present by confronting it now with the deaths of particular others from the past. It is thus 
not merely the case that community then is brought together with community now, but 
rather the community in a horizon of history and tradition is brought to light in an 
instant. It is the work of art which is, for those reasons argued in this chapter, best 
placed to authorise such a revelation precisely because it offers itself up as such in its 
enjoyment as art. Critique would then aim, following literature to enact not so much an 
overcoming of the past as its release and redemption from that temporal ideology which 
consigns it to a homogenous oblivion which forgets those others who have died. Instead 
critique indulges in acts of Vergangenheitsvergegenwartigung which remember that 
time is full of death and victimisation and that art is their primary witness.
If  the remembrance of the victims to which art gives witness might be described 
as the generalised aim of this work of literary critique, then the particular instances of it 
will only become clear in the passage of the thesis as a whole. In order to do so, each
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subsequent chapter moves from a close reading of the Müller text to a theoretical and 
philosophical explanation of some of the issues at stake in order to return to and repeat 
the critique of the text itself. As stated earlier in this chapter, the chronological treatment 
of the work does not reflect a straightforward continuity claim. While I am concerned 
on the one hand to display the complexity of Müller’s earlier work and its treatment of 
those problems for which his later pieces are more well-known and thus more often 
discussed, I am also concerned to demonstrate what such a claim entails. The earlier 
plays can only be redeemed from a simplistic label of socialist realism by an act of 
critique that lays the work bare as a ruin which might then display the similar concerns 
of early and later Müller work. Any putative continuity is thus on the basis of the critical 
act, of its being brought into constellation with the present and can hardly be said to 
represent an empirical development of an oeuvre over a period of decades which is 
rounded off by his death. An oeuvre which is given definition by the author's death -  the 
so-called "complete works" -  is in effect the denial of the after-life of the text. The sort 
of continuity which I hope to argue for, the form of development which takes place in 
Müller's drama, is thus only brought about by destroying the notion of an oeuvre in the 
first place by insisting on the existence of the after-life of a text. The simple fact that the 
critic can propose any development in Müller's writing is a sign of the finite nature of 
his work and life as well as of the critique which deals with both. Once again, this is, I 
will argue, a particular quality of Müller’s work: that because each work demands so 
forcibly the activity of the now (be it because of its avant-garde status or, as with the 
earlier work, the passing of epoch in the geo-political environment) the origin of the 
work of art which can be revealed (the manner in which the community and the other 
then and now is articulated) is always itself a particular constellation of then and now.
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Any continuity between Miiller’s earlier and later works is therefore premised on the 
explosion of those works out of that other homogenous continuity of artistic 
development and progress which implies that Miiller's death was the telos or the heroic 
fate to which his writing life was leading. Instead, reading Müller provides the demand 
to remember the other, and the opportunity that the critique (and theatrical performance) 
of Müller presents is precisely this singularity of remembrance, a remembrance that is 
signed. The other in Müller can always surprise, and it might finally be suggested that 
this Überraschungseffekt is at the heart of democracy itself,2" another instance in the 
attempt to prevent the transformation of author into hero.
Although it might therefore seem contradictory to signpost what sort of surprise 
is to come, it is perhaps not betraying the operation o f literary critique too much to point 
out where the next chapter will lead us. The origin of Müller’s work in the early 
adolescence of the GDR will focus upon the representation of transgression, excess, 
comedy and labour in Die Umsiedlerin and to a lesser extent Der Lohndrücker, thus 
setting the scene for an understanding of the general economy of the GDR and its 
relation to alterity as such.
211 Cf. Beardsworth, op. cit., p. 92: "Thus to go through the experience of the aporia of time, letting it 
inform one's judgements and inventions implies recognising [...] that the other will never be quite there 
where and when one expects. This surprise is what democratic politics is all about."
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Ermutigt durch die zielstrebige Agitation der KPD, machte sich eine wachsende 
Zahl werktätiger Bauern und Landarbeiter die Losung "Junkerland in 
Bauemhand!" zu eigen und forderte eine demokratische Bodenreform. KPD und 
SPD einigten sich über die Grundsätze einer revolutionären Umgestaltung der 
Landwirtschaft und gewannen auch Vertreter der bürgerlichen-demokratischen 
Parteien dafür. Reaktionäre Führungskräfte dieser Parteien, die gegen eine 
durchgreifende Bodenreform auftraten, isolierten sich und wurden von ihren 
Funktionen abgelöst.1
If Heiner Müller were not a problem, if the events surrounding the writing and 
production of Die Umsiedlerin did not tell quite a different story, then Heinz Heitzer's 
brutal summary of the process of land reform in the GDR would provide a sagacious 
overview of the themes and reception of the play. Evidently for Heitzer, history is a 
process of reflexive verbs, of conditions being drawn passively to their conclusion, 
where the particularity of singular subjects, of political agents, of acts of play are shaped 
to slot into a story - that of Marxism-Leninism - which has already been told. If Müller's 
work had fitted, there would have been no use in telling his story again. But as this 
chapter will show, Müller's plays could not be put to work in the GDR. The distance 
between Müller's portrayal of late 1940's Germany and that of the official histories of 
the GDR provides the space for this chapter, if not the whole thesis. Already in this 
early work, written in stages between 1956 and 1961, the immanence of the historical 
and philosophical doxa is being resisted, allowing the effects and demands of 
community and politics to shine through the texts. Contrary to some criticism of the 
play2 the particularity of the events and characters of Die Umsiedlerin preclude any 
substantial identification with other officially sanctioned art of the time.
' Heitzer, H., DDR - Geschichtlicher Überblick, p. 35.
2_See Girshausen, Theo. Realismus und Utopie: die Frühen Stücke Heiner Müllers and Fehervary, Helen: 
Enlightenment and Entanglement in Brecht and Heiner Müller New German Critique 8, 1976, pp. 80- 
109.
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The S u b je c t o f  (the) P lay
Had Miiller's work fitted into the Socialist Realist canon, it would claim to 
reflect the course of history, the dialectic which allowed culture and art to become just 
one more factor in the economic plan. "Künstler und Schriftsteller müssen zu 
Propagandisten in den Betrieben, in der Stadt und auf dem Lande werden."5 Art would 
reflect reality, and above all become an art for the people. The plot on stage would come 
to a close in order to allow any contradictions in the course of the play to be resolved, 
either to motivate the audience to act in the same way outside the theatre or to allow 
them to reflect upon the progress which has been made since the events portrayed in the 
play took place. As Die Umsiedlerin is set in the late 1940's in eastern Germany, the 
content of it is historical. The audience was given, when the play was shown for the first 
time in 1961, an opportunity to witness a series of historical conditions which lay in the 
past. The land reform had long since been completed, the process of collectivisation 
recently so. However, to judge by the reaction that the performance of the play 
provoked, the problems which it addressed had not been as easily overcome as was 
generally thought. The fact that Die Umsiedlerin was conceived as a comedy only 
complicated the situation. What, or whom, exactly were the audience laughing at?
The freedom from the strictures o f  GDR's cultural politics, not only in the 
subject matter of the play but in its treatment, affords Die Umsiedlerin an autonomy 
which lies at the very roots of the problems which surrounded the play. The story of
5 Schubbe, Elimar (ed.) Dokumente zur Kunst-, Literatur- und Kulturpolitik der SED, p. 92. Keller also 
quotes a passage (p. 50) explaining how art should "in erster Line den Arbeitsenthusiasmus enfalten", but 
the reference is incorrect.
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exclusion which runs through the play is, I will suggest, equal to the suppression of 
laughter and expression which the censorship and punishment of both Müller and the 
director (Tragelehn) represent. The fact that Müller's theatre is art, that it displays its 
autonomy from criteria of use, led to its exclusion from the theatre, just as in Die 
Umsiedlerin one character's uselessness results in his departure from the GDR. The task 
of this chapter is thus to examine the transgression of uselessness, firstly in the sense 
that uselessness is a violation of a Communist morality, but also that Müller's work can 
be seen as representing that heterogeneity which Georges Bataille saw as subversive to 
modem societies of production and accumulation. This heterogeneity, finally, will be 
seen to be constitutive of community itself.
The events of the play are presented in a series of scenes, fifteen in all, loosely 
connected but focussed upon the processes of the land reform of the late 1940's which 
led up to the drive to collectivisation some years later. Through the course of the play 
we meet Flint, the local party official who struggles to convince the peasant farmers of 
the efficacy of communist theory put into practice while he simultaneously falls far 
short of a new morality by his inability to be as equally principled in his personal life. 
He is frustrated by the local bureaucracy, especially by the Bürgermeister Beutler who 
is concerned only to line his pockets and retain his position of power and privilege. Flint 
comes across similar obstacles in the residue of feudal social structures, in the power 
and access to capital of the kulak, the land-owning peasant, who is still able to wield his 
influence and exploit his wealth to make the most of the new economic order. Finally, 
he is frustrated by the refusal of one particular character, Fondrak, to take up a 
smallholding and work for a living. Fondrak prefers to drink and live to excess, 
remaining as elemental as the nature surrounding him, while instead expending his
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energy in fathering a child by Niet, the refugee of the title, and flatly refusing to take 
any responsibility for his actions. Other characters move in and out of the play, 
presenting comic sketches in short scenes, all of which allow an impression of the social 
environment to accumulate rather than a coherent narrative. Despite the good intentions 
of rural proletariat, the "struggle for progress" is seen to be hindered by reactionary 
forces from the German past and the wider burden of a particular heritage that acts 
against the interest of the disempowered and disadvantaged in Germany. At the end of 
the first scene, in a grotesque tableau far more typical of Miiller's later work than the 
rest of this play, Flint is left alone on the stage and is joined by those figures from 
Germany's past who symbolise most powerfully the failure of the progressive forces in 
Germany:
Auftreten Hitler mit Eva-Braun-Brüsten, angebissenem Teppich und 
Benzinkanister, und Friedrich II von Preußen, der ihn verfolgt, zwischen den 
Beinen seinen Krückstock. Hitler springt auf den Rücken, Friedrich II springt 
Hitler auf den Rücken. Wiederholte Versuche Flints, sie abzuschütteln. Bei 
jedem Versuch fällt etwas anderes oder alles andre mit: das Fahrrad, die Fahne, 
das Schild, die Bücher.4
Although the characters of the play are pulled into the foreground, so that their 
conflict with their particular environment is emphasised, a number of recurrent motifs 
become clear in the process of the play. While the struggle for a meaningful land reform 
becomes the milieu of the action on stage, the confrontation of the old social order with 
the new, of city with the land, of the old and new means of production, of the new 
arrivals and the already established, and finally of newly emancipated women and men 
all shape the content of the play. This meeting of antiquated, almost feudal practice and
4 Die Bauern in Die Umsiedlerin oder das Leben auf dem Lande, p. 25, but referred to hereafter (as does 
Müller) as Die Umsiedlerin. All references are to the Rotbuch edition which has the slightly altered (and 
re-titled) version from 1964. This is the only version still available of the play, as its fate, discussed at the 
end of this chapter, makes clear.
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new imposed theory, which brings about the confrontations listed above, is much more 
dramatic than a similar encounter in the city. "Life on the land" throws the competing 
classes, ideas and habits into much sharper relief, and it was this comparative 
backwardness of rural social development which the land reform attempted to alleviate, 
just as it had done, in a pattern o f events too similar to ignore, in the Soviet Union just 
after the revolution.
The problem o f the land
Indeed, the parallel of land reform in the GDR and the Soviet Union was pre-shadowed
by an even more decisive link o f social and economic development earlier in the
century. Muller subscribes to that view of history (shared by Walter Benjamin and Leon
Trotsky amongst others) which sees failure of a proletarian uprising in Germany in 1923
as leading to the catastrophe of "Socialism in One Country" in the Soviet Union. This
policy of Stalin was itself a most radical shift from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy which
regarded the success of the revolution in an economically under-developed country such
as the Russian empire as utterly dependent upon a subsequent revolution in the Western
capitalist economies. This in turn led to the appeasement of the rural middle classes, the
postponement of land reform and a re-introduction of market economics. The rapid
collectivisation that followed only served to discourage the dominant rural classes from
production, leading to widespread inefficiencies and famine.
Retarding industrialisation and striking a blow at the general mass of the 
peasants, this policy of banking on the well-to-do farmer revealed unequivocally 
inside of two years, 1924-1926, its political consequences. It brought about an 
extraordinary increase of self-consciousness in the petty bourgeoisie of both city 
and village, a capture by them of many of the lower Soviets, an increase of the
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power and self-consciousness of the bureaucracy., a growing pressure on the 
workers, and the complete suppression of party and Soviet democracy.5
The support of the kulak, who would have been the only peasants capable of hiring
other peasants for their labour, is seen by Trotsky as the main cause of the increasing
autonomy of the bureaucracy. It ought to be added, however, that this argument, as
seductive as it is, serves principally his aim in defending the Bolshevik revolution itself
from any accusations of installing a state apparatus whose character was always heavily
bureaucratic. For Trotsky Leninist notions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, a state
apparatus whose very purpose was to prevent the growth of a bureaucracy, had been
perverted by the reliance on bourgeois economics and the entrenchment of class
structures of dominance in the peasant village. "Irresoluteness before the individual
peasant enterprises"6 - one of the most difficult problems facing the "progressive" forces
in Die Umsiedlerin is thus seen as the ground of Stalinist bureaucracy and dictatorship.
The Party was "no longer the vanguard of the proletariat, but the political organisation
of the bureaucracy."7 Lenin himself seemed to show somewhat more resignation in his
attitude to the peasant problem:
Der Bauer ist, wie er ist, und wird sich in nächster Zukunft nicht ändern. Bauern 
sind keine Sozialisten. Und Pläne machen, als ob sie Sozialisten wären, hieße auf 
Sand bauen. Die Verwandlung der bäuerlichen Psychologie und Gewohnheiten 
ist ein Ding, das Generationen braucht. Die Anwendung von Gewalt macht es 
auch nicht besser.8
Müller's play not only retraces, therefore, the problems that faced the Soviet 
Union in its attempt to reform "life on the land" but also ties in closely the fate of the 
German proletariat and peasantry to that of the Soviet Union. One could read the events
5 Trotsky, L., The Revolution Betrayed, p. 27.
6 ibid., p. 32
7 ibid., p. 138.
8 quoted in Keller, Andreas. Drama und Dramaturgie Heiner Müllers zwischen 1956 und 1988, p. 144.
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of the play as a metaphor for the crucial formative years of socialist economic 
experiment and note how the basic problems of land, labour, class and organisation 
apply across the whole range of command economies. But the failures and setbacks that 
one sees portrayed in the play must also be remembered as setting the framework for 
bureaucratisation, "Socialism in One Country" and thereafter the imposition of the 
Soviet system on eastern Germany after the war. Thus in Muller's historical chain of 
events, the failure of a German revolution leads on a circuitous path to the conquest 
through an "imperial" socialism at the end of the Second World War. The revolution 
fails twice over, in both cases the German working classes have proved incapable of 
overturning existing social structures by themselves. The consequence of this failure is 
the employment of a theory upon a set of circumstances and conditions which offer up 
resistance to such organisation and allow something to be left over, to be in excess, for 
which the theory can have no response other than to recuperate it, or expel it 
completely. This movement of excess and expulsion becomes not only the subject 
matter of Die Umsiedlerin but also tells the story of the production of the play itself.
Setting the scene
In the very first scene of the play Müller sets out the difficulties facing the 
proposed land reform. The kulaks still wield power contrary to the expressed aims of the 
party, the poorer peasants still see themselves as subordinate to them and it becomes 
clear that the only way to bring about the desired end will be to enact the authority and 
force of the state. As the curtain rises the audience are faced with a tableau of agitation: 
a banner proclaiming the campaign slogan "Junkerland in Bauemhand", as well as red
flags and the stones that will be used to mark out the borders of the smallholdings
expropriated from the land-owning classes. Music is being played on an accordion to
preface the ominous first words of the Bürgermeister and chief bureaucrat:
BEUTLER Mach die Musik aus. In 
Durchführung der Verordnung, die Enteignung 
Von Junker- und Großgrundbesitz betreffend 
Der mit dem heutigen Datum abgeführt wird 
In Bauemhand
BAUER MIT TRANSPARENT Red schneller, Bürgermeister1'
Immediately, that which is non-rational, heterogeneous to the profane programme of the 
Party, that which is excessive, aesthetic and joyful is silenced. Taking its place is 
polemic, state repetition o f dogma, a dry, instrumentalised language which concerns 
itself solely with enacting the law. The peasant-farmer with the banner, who will be 
directly affected by the realisation of the policy, betrays not only his impatience at the 
long-winded proceedings while his field is waiting to be tilled, but also frustration with 
the rhetoric of bureaucracy. Beutler's speech has not only censored the enjoyment of the 
moment through music but delays by its verbose style the work on the land that must be 
accomplished. There is thus a difference already being drawn by Müller between the 
work of the bureaucrat and that of the peasant. The former, as is witnessed by the tone 
and pace of his speech, is characterised by delay and displacement. The peasant's work, 
however, claims a degree o f immediacy in its negation of the environment which sets it 
apart from the shuffling o f the pen-pusher, but also to a degree from the work of the 
industrial proletariat. Throughout the play the audience is confronted by "life on the 
land" as possessing some elemental quality about it which sets it apart from work where 
the process of completion of the product is deferred to others (for example in the
Die Umsiedlerin, p. 19.
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factory) or where the end result of labour is displaced onto serving an idea (the Party or 
state) or some future goal (communism or unalienated man). The peasant, as 
characterised in Die Umsiedlerin, has a different relationship to technology (they are not 
so "alienated" from the end product of their work through the intervention of technology 
as is the factory worker) and modernity (the farmer who works for himself does not sell 
his labour but is more akin to the artisan). This qualitative difference between the 
peasant and other workers becomes the point of resistance in the play to the imposition 
of modem technological theory on to the land, an impediment which accounts partly for 
Lenin's admission quoted earlier. This is not to say that agricultural production can 
never be socialised or reformed, indeed, collectivisation is seen by the end of the play as 
just such a necessary reform, but Muller seeks simply to display what is left over and 
expunged by an ideology of progress at any cost.
The nature of the bureaucracy confronting the agricultural workers and of the 
characters who inhabit these positions of power within it is made yet clearer in Beutler's 
reply to the impatient farmer:
Eins nach dem andern. Vor dem Leib die Predigt.
Zum Bauern mit der Fahne.
Bück dich.
Den Bauern als Schreibtisch benutzend. [...]
BAUER MIT TRANSPARENT Der steckt in meiner Haut.
Und der erste Tag, daß ihm sein Fell paßt, ist heute.10
Beutler's words and actions, both heavily laced with symbolism, make the political 
environment in which the land reform is taking place perfectly clear. His rhetorical logic 
as well as his political reasoning are pregnant with the structure of instrumentalisation, 
that is, the employment of a way of thought which engineers objects as means toward a
10 ibid.
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particular end. The critique of this mode of reasoning becomes absolutely central to 
Muller's earlier plays, but it would be a mistake to suggest that he seeks simply to 
question all means-end rationality. Crucial to the disposition of instrumental reason is 
the degree to which the goal that has been set is one prescribed for all members of 
society and the extent of coercion that is involved in attainment of that goal. In the first 
scene of Die Umsiedlerin the laudable and economically vital goal o f  land reform can 
already be seen to be infected with the power relations of totalitarianism - where the 
members of the society are treated as one homogenous body and employed, put to work, 
as such a body for the accomplishment of that goal. The process of redistribution has to 
be carried out at the pace dictated by the bureaucrat in a series of stages laboriously 
prescribed beforehand. Beutler also makes clear that any satisfaction or fulfilment can 
only be attained by means of the bureaucracy, at its bidding and after its fashion. The 
ambiguous nature of "Vor dem Leib die Predigt" hints not only at the clerical character 
of the Party, its almost theocratic status, but also the delay of libidinal enjoyment and 
the sole possibility of it as being structured by the dictates and rhetoric of the Party. In a 
similar vein, one of the activists is forced to bend double and act as administrative serf, 
a foretaste of the exploitation of the peasant for bureaucratic ends - "den Bauern als 
Schreibtisch benutzend" - which will return time and time again throughout the course 
of the play.
The peasant farmer with the banner (Kaffka) relates the tricks and bribes that 
Beutler used to be elected to his position of power, but in a long speech that aims to set 
the tone for the audience's reaction to the typical peasant who has been landless up until 
this point, he emphasises his personal history of abuse and servitude to those forces who 
have been the ruin of Germany.
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Meine Haut ist international. Prügel in Deutschland, in Frankreich Läuse und in 
Rußland Frost. Durch zwei Kriege hab ich sie getragen, sie wurde nicht dünner 
dabei, aber dicker."
Not only has this ex-soldier been transported around the killing fields of German 
military adventurism, but suffered for his resistance ("Prügel in Deutschland") to the 
reactionary forces. He also announces his solidarity and shared identity with all who 
have suffered at the hand of power, with other representatives of the industrial and 
agricultural working classes. Beutler's words get under this internationalist skin, they are 
an affront to the ordinary workers across Europe, but in particular to those working 
under the yoke of a bureaucratic elite.
Some lines later Kaffka breaks into blank verse, a poetic capacity which stands 
in contrast to the rhetoric of the Bürgermeister in its grounding in the material 
conditions of the present. He rejects the deferral of reward to the afterlife, thereby 
implicitly criticising the ecclesiastical character of the Party's representatives 
personified by Beutler in his speech immediately before, but also any nostalgia for the 
immediacy of the non-political, symbolised by the safety of the mother's womb. In a 
speech that prefaces Müller's resolutely material, diesseitig worldview which comes 
more and more clearly to expression in his works, Kaffka begins by relating how he 
regarded his position in the world until he was enfranchised by the liberation of 
Germany after the war. From waiting for the world to come, or wishing he had been 
bom into another class, this peasant then goes on to assert the lot of the human subject 
as subject to laws greater than him/herself, to a process which is as elemental as the 
environment upon which the peasant works:
ibid.
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Ich sags wies ist: bis dato wär ich gern 
Aus meiner Haut gefahm in eine bessre.
In jeder Bibelstunde hab ich dem 
Er zeigt mit dem Daumen nach oben.
Im Ohr gelegen um ein feinres Startloch 
Oder daß meine Mutter mich zurücknähm.12 *
An image that is overdetermined in Muller's works, the retreat to the mother's womb 
retains in Die Umsiedlerin connotations of fecundity as well as signifying the 
irreversible opening of a life that is only brought to its closure by death. They are indeed 
inextricably intertwined, both pointing to a particular economy of human society, 
irreducibly materialist, which the ideology of unmitigated progress and homogenisation 
ignores. Progress is then at the cost of the expulsion of what is the condition for 
representation and theory - the material, the elemental itself. As Schulz lucidly points 
out in her discussion of Die Umsiedlerin,13 the influence on Müller of the Baroque is 
evident even as early as this play, although her description of him as a typical Baroque 
melancholic must be taken issue with. It is rather Muller's rejection of the contemplative 
stance of the melancholic which produces the thoroughgoing political nature of his 
texts.14
Kaffka, for his part, emphasises his particular subject position, after declaring 
once more the destiny of that subject's body in decay. However, he not only describes 
the process, but affirms it ("gut ists, daß so ist"). This attitude, however, which offers an 
opening for a politics that takes into account the particular as such and sees that 
particularity as being grounded in a thoroughly material environment, is suffocated by 
the concerns and temporality of the bureaucracy.
12 ibid., p. 20.
11 Schulz, pp. 46-47.
14 See discussion on Benjamin, the Baroque Trauerspiel and Miiller in Chapter Three.
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Aber es ist schon so: aus seiner Schale 
Hat keiner einen andern Ausgang als 
Nach unten, wo der Wurm den Menschen schält 
Und mit der Nabelschnur wird dir von Anfang 
Der Rückmarsch in die Mutter abgeschnitten.
Und heute sag ich, gut ists, daß es so ist 
Und meine Mutter war der richtige Eingang.
BEUTLER Kürz deine Sprüche, Kaffka. Du hältst die Bodenreform auf.15 
Here, it is Beutler who wants to get on with things, displaying that delay and deferral, or 
poetry and verse cannot be seen as indicative of the peasant or bureaucrat themselves. 
Beutler speaks elsewhere in some of the most accomplished verse of the play. Deferral 
or poetry have instead a meaning for the critic only in the context of the whole utterance 
which, Müller seems to suggest, must include the relation of the speaker to power and 
authority. For example, later in the same scene Beutler orders the music to start again in 
order to avoid discussion of the difficulties that are facing the village, in this case, the 
lack of horses. Similarly, whereas verse form spoken by the peasant might signify the 
effervescence of the present, in a figure such as Beutler, it betrays only privilege.16
Beutler's attempt to dominate through discourse meets resistance in Kaffka's 
proletarian credentials. Contrary to Beutler, who has worked his way up the greasy 
political pole from working previously as milkhand, Kaffka's role, and with it the hope 
for any meaningful progressive change, remains in the field. Full of optimism he 
proclaims:
Nämlich mir ist eine neue Zeit angebrochen zieht eine große Taschenuhr vor 
einer Minute. [...] Er wirft das Transparent weg und schleppt einen Grenzstein 
auf sein Feld.'’
Putting aside political agitation for the process that will bring about real change to the 
material conditions of the working classes, namely labour, Kaffka seems to embody the
15 Die Umsiedlerin, p. 20.
force that can offer effective opposition to the bureaucracy. However, the policy of land 
reform, which had been pronounced as the socialisation of the land, as the equitable 
distribution of the means of agricultural production, is based upon a number of peasant 
smallholders. Kaffka drags the stones marking out the plot for himself and family, but 
the audience who saw this in 1961 were only too aware that the plan of support for 
smallholders had turned, just as in the Soviet Union in the 1920's, into succour for the 
kulaks, as they were able to demand labour from other farmers in return for use of the 
scant agricultural technology. Kaffka's pride and diligence have therefore a somewhat 
more tragic touch to them, Beutler's question "Bist du jetzt fertig?",18 a cruel, ironic 
twist.
This refusal to shy away from the problems that the GDR faced throughout its 
history is given immediate emphasis in this first scene. We meet for the first time the 
Party official, Flint, whose job it is to oversee the successful transfer of land to the 
peasant farmers. He distinguishes himself from Beutler by his incorruptible honesty, a 
quality much needed for his political agitation, but which brings him misfortune in his 
private life. His honesty to his feelings (if one could put it so charitably) leads to his 
marital infidelity. He lacks, in any case, the guile and deceit of Beutler. His single- 
minded pursuit of a better future for all is shown, however, to have unpleasant 
repercussions. He has to order the peasants to take responsibility for themselves and 
their political futures, convinced that he is acting for their own good. This can lead in 
some instances to a ruthlessness that belies the claims of liberation and replays once 
more the dictatorship of the bureaucracy over the proletariat. While Beutler counters
16 Vitally, Muller counts himself as poet and playwright amongst these privileged.
17 Die Umsiedlerin, p. 20.
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questions to the shortage of horses with the defence that "Germany lost the war", 
betraying at the same time his residue nationalism, Flint argues:
Ihr habt den Krieg gewonnen. Merkt ihrs noch nicht?
Ein Jahr, dann fährst du deinen eignen Traktor
Du auch, und habt vergessen, was ein Pferd ist.19 20
While the line between political education and dictat is fluid, Flint's propaganda for a 
particular view of history rings hollow when the German and European proletariat were, 
almost by definition, the great losers of the events leading up to and including the 
Second World War. The simplistic reaction demanded of the peasants to the catastrophe 
of the previous fifteen years can hardly do justice to the complexity and suffering 
involved in the development of their material conditions.
The unflinching severity of Flint and the inflexibility of his view of the world is 
given voice immediately after. When one farmer protests that the five hectares offered 
to him will not suffice to feed himself and his descendants, Flint reacts with proletarian 
steel:
So nähm sie einen andern.
Zu Beutler Streich ihn aus.
BAUER MIT FAHNE Der Strich geht in den Magen.“
The same peasant, used to feudal customs and conditions takes off his cap, addresses
Flint and Beutler as "Herren", speaks to them in the most obsequious manner he can
muster and promises to show his gratitude for that to which he is in any case entitled.
FLINT brüllt:
Behalt die Mütze auf und laß den Herrn weg.
BAUER MIT FAHNE setzt die Mütze auf.
Jawohl.
FLINT Und wenn du wissen willst, wer hier
19 ibid., p. 22
20 ibid.
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Dein Herr ist, kauf dir einen Spiegel.
BAUER MIT FAHNE Jawohl.21
The farmer's fawning reaction explains far more about the authority structures still 
present, while the absurdity of ordering a halt to servitude seems to be wasted on Flint. 
When the farmer asks to stay, if it is permissible, Flint replies: "Gut, ich erlaubs dir, 
aber mit Bewährung"22.
Flint's continuation of dictatorial practices by other means might seem justified, 
however, when faced with the economic realities that are revealed immediately after. 
The kulak Rammler appears on stage, after having been spared expropriation by having 
three hectares too few (landowners with more than 100 hectares, as well as those 
convicted of Nazi war-crimes, were expropriated without compensation), and reveals his 
interest immediately. He reacts to Flint's threats of proletarian violence with the 
confidence and scorn of one who can work the system to his own advantage, due solely 
to his possession of capital:
Weiß ich, was ein Kulak ist? Ich bin Deutscher [...], ich bin CDU, ich 
halt die andre Backe auch noch hin aus Parteigeist. Dann kann ich sie beide 
herzeigen im Demokratischen Block.23
The necessity perceived by the Communist Party in the GDR, based itself on the 
experience of the Soviet Communist Party under the leadership of Stalin, of forming a 
movement across the political spectrum, led only to the protection of the kulak class 
from the demands of the peasants. In a political tactic analogous to the ill-fated 
"people's fronts" of the 1930's, the East German bureaucracy allowed those who already 
had access to power and capital to remain protected from further expropriation and 
indeed allowed them to build up constituencies in the bureaucracy itself. The essence of
21 ibid.
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their privilege is laid bare in this first scene. Rammler's power lies in the resources of 
capital that he possesses, enabling him to buy the labour of other peasants or lend 
machinery for the fruits of labour.
Ich borg dir einen Gaul 
Flüchtling. Du gibst mir eine halbe Ernte.
So gern ich dir helf, umsonst kann ichs nicht machen.
Mir hat der Krieg auch mitgespielt.2 34 25
His unashamed egoism is given further vent in an exchange with Kaffka, shortly after
the latter's ruminations on life, death and reproduction. Using the same image, Rammler
displays how different is his philosophy, confirming only Kaffka's assertion "Wir
kommen aus verschiednen Müttern". Once again, similar statements are given harshly
conflictual emphases on the basis of the particularity of the subject's social position.
RAMMLER Was willst du, Kaffka. Zum
Ausbeuter ist der Mensch gebom, du auch.
Das wäscht dir kein Regen ab, das ist Natur 
Der Herrgott hat dich so geschaffen, mach was.
Vor der Entbindung hast du deine Mutter 
Schon ausgenommen, Parasit und Blutsäufer 
Am Nabelschlauch [...].“
Rammler's apologies for exploitation are thus framed within a code of servility, not only 
to a perceived immutable social order but also to a god which is the origin and guarantor 
of that order. Communism, he adds, is a good idea but is no more than "was fur die 
Zeitung". What is at least laid bare in this first scene is the material condition for profit, 
that which the holder of capital appropriates from the value of the worker's labour. In 
this case, the value of the horse he offers bears no relation to that value of the harvest 
which he will gain. It seems clear that any basis for socialised conditions of labour on
22 ibid., p. 23
23 ibid., pp. 23-4.
24 ibid., p. 24.
25 ibid.
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the land can not be grounded upon the private enterprise of the kulak. Indeed, Rammler 
fears the next step of land reform: "Wenn die Katze aus dem Sack springt, heißt sie / 
Kolchose.”“
The results of such unequal access to capital and the state's acquiescence in the 
structures of domination which follow from this are put before us in the next scene. 
Another kulak, Treiber, comes to claim from Ketzer, a new peasant farmer, what he is 
owed for the horse that the latter has bought, in part-exchange for a cow whose purchase 
by Treiber has led to Ketzer not being able to fill the milk quota allotted to him by the 
state. In a double bind epitomising the impotence of the peasant, Ketzer cannot keep the 
cow without a horse to provide the feed for the cow: "Ohne Gaul könnt ich die Kuh 
nicht halten - [...] womit sollt ich ihn kaufen als mit der Kuh?”27 Treiber, with the 
support of Beutler - as representative of the law and state - demands his repayment. 
Ketzer reminds Beutler of his roots which he seems conveniently to have forgotten:
Du warst nicht immer Bürgermeister. Weißt du
Die Zeit noch? Melker warn wir, Kumpels, keiner
Mehr als der andre, einer für den andern.
[...] Und jetzt ists nicht gewesen und mich melkst du.2'
He refuses to believe the oft repeated promise of tractors for the village, seeing himself 
swindled by the state as he was under feudal conditions: "Tausend Jahre hat uns der 
Junker geritten. Kaum ist er abgesessen, sitzt der Kulak auf, dem Kulak der Staat, 
unsrer, beide unsereinem."29 Beutler meanwhile, in a display of sanctimony which the 
audience has already come to expect from him, speaks of his duty to act in accordance
26 ibid.
27 ibid., p 26. 
21 ibid., p. 28 
29 ibid., p. 26.
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with the law, even if  it acts in the interest of those who were officially declared class 
enemies.
Als Bürgermeister muß ich allen gleich 
Gerecht sein. Meine traurige Pflicht ist, daß ich 
Dem gegen dich zu seinem Recht verhelf jetzt.30
Ketzer, rather than hand over his horse, slaughters it with his knife, leaving Treiber to
exit the stage with an unconcerned air, complaining not o f the death o f the animal but of
the peasant's lack of "Verstand/ Für die Wirtschaft". It is indeed a senseless act,
wasteful, bereft of any logic of conventional economy. This impression is strengthened
in the speech immediately after where he bemoans his servility to his cattle and to the
land:
Die Hauptsache am Bauern ist das Vieh
Er ist kein Mensch ohne, er kann sich kopfstelln
Sein Feld sein Grab, mit seinen Knochen düngt ers
Und vor der Ernte erntet sein Feld ihn
Er feiert Kirmes zwischen den sechs Brettern.
Ein Vieh macht keinen Bauern ohne Knecht
Like his father and his father before him the only way out is suicide; a sign merely of 
his complete impotence in the face of the environment and the economy which works 
upon it. One could understand Ketzer's suicide and sacrifice of his horse as the final act 
of defiance, a desperate bid for power over the land and the work it demands. The 
imminent arrival o f the tractor, which finally does come to the village, might be seen as 
fulfilment of the faith in technology which would have made Ketzer's death 
unnecessary. However, Ketzer's desperation is the result not of a transcendental value 
attributed to the Land, but to the effect of a particular disposition of economy which 
attempts to organise and reproduce the land and environment. It is the material labour of
30 ibid., p. 28.
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those working the land, with or without technology, which provides possibilities of 
adequate social forms. Impotence over and against the land might, therefore, seem to be 
due to exploitative social structures where the fruits of labour are not returned to the 
peasant. Technology and land are not mere tools, but sites of struggle. That the human 
subject and his labour are treated as objects secondary to what serves as capital is then 
emphasised at the end of the scene.
ERSTER Trecker kommen, Ketzer. Tritt in die Kate. Der ist schon kalt.
ZWEITER holt das Messer: Schad um den Gaul.52
Finally, at the end of the first scene the origin of material wealth, be it collective 
or that which reproduces the privilege of capital, is emphasised once more. Flint 
prevents a farmer from removing books from the library of the Schloß nearby. The 
whole town, the peasant informs us, ’’wischt sich den Arsch mit der Schloßbücherei”. 
Flint insists, however, on the books' being returned, and on their relevance, indeed 
dependence, on the labour of the peasants. Culture relies in the last instance on the toil 
of those on the land:
SchillerundGöthe, wer hat ihm den
Bauch gefüllt? Homer, wer hat ihn angezogen?
Kein Buchstab ohne dich und kein Gedanke.
Dein krummer Buckel, deine krumme Hand.31 2 3
The books will be used for a "Kulturhaus" but this is not a possibility at present. The 
luxury o f culture can only be afforded tomorrow, once more delayed, once again 
deferred. While the emphasis on the revolution of the means of production is not 
surprising, the culture of excess is deemed unimportant in comparison to the demands of 
production. Culture remains in excess to instrumentalised production in two senses:
31 ibid., p. 29.
32 ibid.
33 ibid., p. 25.
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firstly, "a material excess is necessary in order that culture should grow, refine and 
complicate itself',34 but secondly it remains beyond the comprehension of utility. There 
is no use for culture as such in material reproduction of the environment. It is rather a 
luxury that can only be afforded given sufficient development of productive forces and 
exploitation of technology. What will be discussed later in this chapter is whether an 
economy always produces the excess upon which "culture" feeds and whether its 
deferral or expulsion actively represses the particularity of each human subject which 
was expressed so powerfully by Kaffka in this first scene.
The Bureaucracy - Macht macht weiche Hände
The events leading to Ketzer's death show Beutler, the highest ranking bureaucrat in the 
village, in his true light. While proclaiming the necessity o f socialism ("Die Revolution 
kennt keinen Aufenthalt"35), when out of the public eye he reveals himself as opportunist 
and crook. His revolutionary zeal remains merely a role to be played, a means to line his 
pockets. When, at the end of the day in his home, he is informed of the arrival of the 
tractor he says only: "Mein Dienst ist um. Der Bürgermeister kann mich."36 He then has 
his wife pull off his boots, banishes the refugee (the eponymous Umsiedlerin) from the 
kitchen, and orders his wife to go too with the arrival of Rammler who has news of their 
attempts at corruption. The old Landrat, who took bribes willingly from the likes of 
Rammler and Beutler, has been deposed and replaced by a more conscientious socialist 
who merely laughs at Rammler's complaints and shows him the door. Just such a
34 Trotsky, op. cit., p. 179.
35 Die Umsiedlerin, p. 22.
36 ibid., p. 30.
fellow-traveller as they were formerly used to dealing with then appears at the door, on 
the run from the authorities.
Im Amt bis gestern, von unten geschmiert, von oben traktiert, hoch im Kurs bei 
der Bevölkerung, mein Bauch der Beweis, mit der Regierung auch auf Du, der 
Schrecken der Vorzimmer im Kreismaßstab, politischer Flüchtling heute.37
Beutler appears not to want to come to the assistance of his old comrade in crime until it
is revealed that he has stolen the Gemeindekasse. Rammler pockets most of the money
claiming "Politik verdirbt den Acker". Beutler, who has until now only looked on,
seemingly content to allow the bribery but not dirty his own hands, then exercises his
power, replying to Rammler:
Und den Charakter. Daß ich euch nicht anzeig.
Er hält dem Flüchtling eine, Rammler die andre Hand hin. Beide zahlen."
He takes the runaway's last pfennig and watch, leaving only his false teeth and a bicycle
without tyres to flee on. When the news of Ketzer's death arrives, however, and Beutler
is faced with the responsibility of his death, his ruthlessness reaches new heights.
Der Tote macht mir einen Fleck aufs Vorhemd 
Ich brauch ein Fleckenwasser, und kann sein 
Wenn ich dich liquidieren laß, hab ich eins, 
s ist dialektisch: eins und eins macht null.”
He seeks advice in the statute book, which before he had sought only to use as fly swat, 
to rescue himself from his predicament. It is Rammler the kulak, however, who is able 
to show him the way to retain his power and protect his privilege. Just as Antaeus lost 
his power by being lifted from the ground ("Dann kam Herr Kules, nahm ihn bei den 
Gurgel/ Und hielt ihn in der Luft, bis die ihm ausging."), so must Beutler remain in 
contact with the masses. Rammler hopes thereby to keep control of the bureaucracy,
37 ibid., p. 31. 
3" ibid., p. 37. 
”  ibid., p. 39
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appointing only his cronies to positions of influence. It was the kulaks in the village 
who had brought Beutler out of the milk-shed to become Bürgermeister, and now 
Rammler hopes to extract the price. But Beutler has become too skilled in the ways of 
the opportunist and decides he must now play the radical in order to consolidate his 
position. To Rammler he bids farewell: "Auf Wiedersehn, Kulak, im Kommunismus"; 
similarly, the runaway has now outlived his usefulness:
Brandstifter, heb den Fuß von meiner Schwelle.
[...] ich zeig dich an.
[...] Die Stiefel! Laß den Flüchtling an den Herd
Schneid Speck. Vom Landrat. Mehr. Den Schlips. Den roten.40
Beutler's new political identity must include a more generous attitude to Niet, the 
refugee referred to here, and the Umsiedlerin of the title. The real attitude behind this 
behaviour is confirmed when his wife questions the reasons for his actions:
BEUTLERN Warum kriechst du dem Flüchtling in den Hintern?
BEUTLER Weil ich den Staat bescheißen muß. Die Nelke.41
That he associates the state with socialism ("die Nelke") corroborates only his greed for 
power and the accompanying material benefits, but also seems to suggest that he sees 
the state itself as protector of proletarian interests.
The contradiction of the various views of the East German state which are 
communicated in the play, not least the appearance of the new Landrat who resolves the 
problems of the village at the end of a play, is of course as much a result of the pressures 
of censorship under which Müller was working as a belief in the potential of the Party. I 
hope to show that it is precisely the appearance of the deus ex machina figure which
40 ibid., p. 40.
41 ibid.
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serves partly to underline the critique of state and Party power in Die Umsiedlerin as a
whole while never quite managing to escape their clutches.
Beutler sets out his stall in a long, eloquent speech at the end of the same scene.
He realises that if he were to make a false move now he would land once more in the
milk-shed, whose hard graft and degradation he has left far behind. He has to keep
continually one step ahead of social and economic developments:
Der Fortschritt sitzt mir auf den Fersen. Ein 
Stolpern jetzt und im Stallgang lieg ich wieder 
Abtritt für Rindvieh und Kulak. Die Hand 
Ist weich geworden, Macht macht weiche Hände.42
He resolves to become as "[r]ot wie die Sünde in der Heiligen Schrift", so as not to end
up in the same position as the ex-colleague whom he has just robbed. Even his previous
occupation would be preferable:
Und besser sitzt sichs unterm Euter noch 
Als überm Blechnapf, sagen die Experten 
Ein Kurort ist der Stall gegen den Schacht.43
The threat of hard labour in Bautzen is incentive enough to go over once more the 
commandments of the opportunist, in other words, of someone who sees advantage in 
the present moment for his own personal future. In this regard he differs from the Party 
official (such as Flint) who with integrity and honesty seeks to defer fulfilment of the 
present for a future moment in which the whole of the society will attain its reward. 
Whether this movement of delay is misguided will become the subject of this chapter, 
but it suffices to say for the moment that Müller seeks to draw the distinction between 
the bureaucrat, agitator and rebel (such as Fondrak) precisely at this junction of
42 ibid.
43 ibid., p. 41.
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temporality and subjectivity. Beutler seeks opportunity in power, even if each step up 
the ladder involves, by turns, obsequiousness and betrayal:
Nach jedem Wind aus Osten häng 
Den Überzieher. Auf dem Dienstweg kriech 
In jeden Hintern, der dir vorgesetzt wird.
Steig aus, eh er auf Grundeis geht. Und wenn du 
Noch einen Fußtritt landen kannst, land ihn.
Bedenk: du brauchst ein Sprungbrett in den nächsten.“
With every change of direction, the bureaucrat can accustom himself to the new
conditions (such as, for instance, the "de-Stalinisation" while the play was being
written). Thus Beutler finishes on a note of unparalleled cynicism which, however,
succeeds in laying bare the motivations of the self-serving state apparatus: "Als neuer
Adam steigst du aus der Taufe/ Und füllst die Backen an der alten Raufe".
The problem as to whether to regard Beutler as representative of a corrupt state
or simply as a rotten apple in the barrel runs through the play as a whole. Müller clearly
leaves it as undecided as possible, although Beutler's arrest at the end of the play seems
to resolve the matter, at least on a superficial level. It remains open whether blatant
corruption is the real obstacle to the successful administration of a socialist society or if
there is not a tendency to the oppressive in the notion of the administrative itself.
Beutler certainly regards himself as the personification of state power, and uses this to
defend himself against accusations o f misbehaviour. If I'etat, c'est lui, then any censure
of him is equally treasonable. The logic of democratic centralism is carried to its absurd,
but logical conclusion, each utterance is symbolic of a further symbolic stance, a
process which leads simply to the situation where the state becomes civil society, and
where any moment of autonomy, be it an act of free speech or work of art, becomes in
ibid.
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turn by definition asocial behaviour. There is no space for political debate either within 
civil society or within the state or Party itself (in contrast to Lenin's notion of 
democratic centralism). There is thus no greater contradiction to the idea of the state 
withering away than the logic of this speech of Beutler's and no greater testimony, not 
only to how the bureaucracy has been hijacked by the egoism of the opportunist, but 
also to the self-serving nature of the bureaucracy itself. It becomes finally an end in 
itself.
Also du hast geäußert, unser Staat schickt 
Was in den Knast gehört, zum Bürgermeister.
[...] Ihr habts gehört. Also du bist ein Staatsfeind.
Und weil der Frieden eins ist mit unserm Staat 
Bist du ein Friedensfeind. Und weil die Kinder 
Den Frieden brauchen vor der Muttermilch 
Bist du ein Kinderschlächter.45
Beutler mistakes Flint's violent reaction to his speech as support for himself. It is indeed 
one of Flint's chief frustrations that the party and state that he serves and believes in can 
countenance such a character as Beutler. He is consequently riven and paralysed by this 
and other contradictions, but perhaps because of these never succumbs to the blatant 
abuse of power which infects Beutler. Whether his accidental offences betray simply a 
weak socialist character or a problem which structures the Party hierarchy as such is a 
central theme of the play.
The Party - Macht macht Sorgen
Flint is the good Communist. Loyal to the Party, admiring of the Soviet Union, his 
dedication to the furtherance of the goals of the revolution has allowed him to neglect
45 ibid., p. 54.
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his private life and responsibilities. When some of the peasants complain about the
tardiness of assistance from their Soviet allies, Flint reacts angrily, distancing himself
from the crimes of German history: "Tanks habt ihr losgeschickt, Traktoren kriegt ihr."“
After their arrival, complaints then surface about there being only two. Flint is effusive
in his acclamation of what has been achieved:
Die haben auch so angefangen, mit 
Feldern von Tanks gewalzt, Dörfern zerschossen 
Hunger im Bauch, auch der und jener noch beim 
Kulaken in der Schraube, bloß im Kopf 
Das Licht, von Lenin ihnen aufgesteckt 
[...] und ihr wißt
Was draus geworden ist, und so wirds bei uns.47
However, elsewhere his loyalty to the Soviet model and belief in its applicability to
conditions in the more advanced German economy seems to have been shaken. Many of
Flint's problems are seen to be caused by the continual failure of the German proletariat
to carry out revolution, and Flint veers between wonder and pessimism at the strength of
counter-revolutionary forces and fury at the indiscipline of his class. The contradiction
of the necessary intervention of a foreign power whose reform models had previously
been based on a theory of "Socialism in One Country" is not lost on him:
Und so sieht er aus, unser Staat: zusammengeflickt mit eigenen Resten aus zwölf 
Jahren Heil und zwei Kriegen, nach einer Vorlage, die nicht auf unserm Mist 
gewachsen ist. Und wir haben ihn nicht selber demontiert, da haperts bei der 
Montage.48
That same pattem which encourages the continued existence of a kulak class does at 
least sharpen Flint's consciousness of his class and of the stmggle that is yet to come. 
He finds himself in continual battle with Rammler and Treiber, screaming once more at 
a peasant who doffs his cap at the offer of work from his class enemy. However, yet
“  ibid., p. 44.
again, Flint thus becomes embroiled in the contradictions of agitation and leadership, 
replacing one object of deference for another, namely, himself. The stage directions 
state simply "Henne gehorcht". The crux of Flint's problem becomes his inability to see 
how his life reflects those very same power structures which he is trying to abolish, be it 
in his personal life and relationship with women, or in his political work. The central 
contradiction lies in his idea o f a future society, the goal of Communism, and the 
everyday struggle and obstacles o f organisation. This manifests itself as the unforeseen 
dissension and bifurcation of Party and revolution and when they conflict, it is always 
the same one which must give way. In a later scene Flint is confronted by a priest who, 
like him, has a flock to tend to in three different villages. When asked if he could lend 
his bicycle, Flint at first protests "[E]s ist ein atheistisches Fahrrad", but is reminded of 
his Party's tolerance of the established churches. Flint grudgingly surrenders his only 
means of transport, muttering glumly, "Ich verrate die Revolution aus Parteidiziplin. 
Das Herz ist nicht dabei."47 *9
This frustration turns to incomprehension when he sees the obstacles to the 
revolution and his work towards it as being created by his own class. That his comrades 
are not able to see that the Party and state are acting in their interest is baffling for Flint, 
but he veers between encouraging them to take their future into their own hands and a 
desire to let the state accomplish what he demands of the proletariat - even if that 
involves totalitarian methods. On hearing the news of Ketzer's suicide he curses the 
peasant's weakness and impatience:
Hat er nicht warten können? [...] Der beste Staat
Ist machtlos auf die Länge, wenn das Volk
47 ibid., p. 45.
41 ibid., p. 70.
49 ibid., p. 81.
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Sich hinter seinem Rücken aufhängt und 
Die Hände hochnimmt vor der Reaktion [...].50
He complains to a Party secretary, however, about the lack of support in his village and
the same fragility in the face of class enemies:
Revolution ist eine Kleinigkeit mit Vollmacht. Wenn du ein Gesetz hast 
beispielsweise: Mit Zuchthaus wird bestraft, wer die Mütze abnimmt vor einem 
Kulaken. Oder kannst den Bürgermeister an die Wand stelln einfach, der nicht 
funktioniert.51
His doubts in his flock lead him to act in what he sees as their interest, even if they are 
to be lied to. The programme of land reform was only ever meant as a prelude to 
widespread collectivisation but, once again, the decision to bow to the power of the 
land-owning peasants and the distrust in those without such capital means that the real 
goal of agricultural policy has to be hidden. In order to reassure the kulaks Flint 
declares, "Kolchos ist Feindparole", propaganda from the West to de-stabilise rural 
social relations, but adds in an aside, "Bis auf weitres."52 Flint's tactics are to be 
compared with those of the Landrat who succeeds in solving the contradictions faced by 
the village by engineering a situation where the workers discover for themselves what is 
to their advantage. Flint, by contrast, is seen to rely too much on agitation and ideology, 
instead o f allowing the peasants to see how a change in the social conditions of 
production on the land is to their benefit. He seems to fall into the trap of attempting to 
change his environment by simply the strength of ideas, and if that fails by the 
enforcement of one ideology by the agencies of the state. His alienation from the 
material conditions of production is signified by his no longer working on the land. The 
battle for change, however, needs to be fought in these fields and by increasing the
50 ibid., p. 43.
51 ibid., p. 64.
52 ibid., p. 46.
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capacity of socialised production against the hidebound structures of the kulak farms. 
Flint, by contrast, is always on the move, shifting between villages and meetings, in 
comparison to a figure such as Niet, the refugee, whose role in the play is to stay where 
she is.
FLINT Ich lass mein Feld Feld sein, vom Pflug weg fahr ich 
Weils mir um mehr ist als um meinen Krautacker 
Mit einem Sack voll Sorgen zur Partei
Flint’s neglect of his field is compounded by his absence from home. As Party 
official he plays a particularly important and exemplary role in the establishment of a 
new socialised morality. He has, however, problems in being as rigorous in his private 
life as his comrades in their public political struggle. Beutler announces him at the 
village meeting as "Kommunist von Kopf bis Fuß. Die Mitte sperrt sich."54 He has left 
his first partner for a much younger woman, who is more able to satisfy his immediate 
needs, for which he is lightly chastised by the party hierarchy. Their admonishment 
however gestures towards one of the central problems of the play: the conflict that arises 
when the goal of Communism, which promises fulfilment of desire and an end to 
everyday worries, necessarily involves the deferral of satisfaction of desire in the 
present. If Communism is in the interest of the agricultural working classes, why, in the 
name of that same Communism are they obliged to delay that same interest? To put it 
another way: why does the present have to be deferred for the sake of the future when 
what the future offers is the privilege of the present? Flint's transgression of this 
morality of deferral takes place in sexual dalliance, the epitome, perhaps o f the ecstasy
51 ibid., p. 62.
54 ibid., p. 87.
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of the present, which brings the reputation of the Party and its programme into 
disrepute.
Die Massen sehn dir nicht bloß auf den Bauch und auf die Finger, dein Bett steht 
auf der Straße, du bist die herrschende Klasse, Flint, steig ab.55
His position as representative of the ruling class does put him in a position of power but
also one of responsibility whose load is almost too heavy to bear. As member of the
vanguard who is doing more than any other to bring about society's fulfilment, it is
precisely he who must abstain from the fruits of such development. Flint must struggle
Fürs bessre Leben, das vielleicht zu spät kommt 
Was mich betrifft, und immer morgen, morgen 
Und eh du deinen Fisch hast, hat der Wurm dich.54
Flint likens himself to Moses, the bearer of the law, whose role it was to lead his people
to the new land, to prevent the sacrifice of the promised land on the altar of self-
indulgence in the present. The contradiction already alluded to thus becomes that
between the New and the Now. Flint sees his occasional lapse into the latter as result of
the pressure that he has been placed under to produce the results of tomorrow today. His
excuse for his infidelity is based on his need for a woman who is "liberated" enough to
understand the issues he is involved in, but who with her youth is able to supply
distraction from that work. He berates his wife (Flinte 1) for not learning enough to
understand the reasons for the work that he does and yet it is she who has provided him
with enough time and opportunity to do precisely that himself. Once again, Flint
criticises the weakness o f those who work on the material conditions of the reproduction
of the environment, while not recognising that it is exactly this elemental work which
55 ibid., p. 65. 
54 ibid., p. 66.
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hgrounds the revolution of ideas in which he is engaged and from which he has 
progressively distanced himself.
Wer hat dir die Socken gestopft gegen Kapp und das Hemd gewaschen, Essen in 
den Roten Busch geschleppt vier Wochen, wie die SA dich gejagt haben, und die 
Zunge zerbissen im Sturmlokal und kein Wort?57
Flint's invocation to his partner to learn and understand what he sees as the wider social
context of her actions and his behaviour remains at the level of his agitational work. The
explanation for his infidelity is justified by the future even if it involves indulging in the
joys of the present. However, in order for Flinte to bask in the comfort of "knowledge"
and the excuses it provides Flint, she would have to neglect the labour that makes the
luxury of knowledge possible. This is impossible for her as woman, or rather as a
woman in this particular society:
Kinder austragen, in die Welt schrein, aufziehn
Bis mir die Brust vorm Bauch hing, auch für nichts. Ein altes Weib, [...]
abgeschoben für ein frisches
Fleisch jetzt, mit dem du deinen Spaß hast. Ich
Hab auch bezahlt, und mehr als ich herauskrieg.58
Woman cannot allow herself, when put in the position portrayed in Die Umsiedlerin, to
indulge in the present, nor to enter that pattem of sublimation and delay which is the
basis of Flint's political work. Her responsibility is the provision of the material
conditions for the possibility of the future and as such does not allow the same freedom
as utilising an idea of the future to shape those material conditions:
FLINT Ich laß dir deine Freiheit, laß mir meine.
FLINTE Sagte der Bräutigam nach dem zehnten Kind.”
Woman, at least with regard to those qualities which seem to be afforded her in this
play, is associated with the land. Her fecundity and identity as the primary means of
57 ib id ., pp. 69-70.
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reproduction of the environment goes some way to explain the juxtaposition in the title 
Die Umsiedlerin oder das Leben auf dem Lande. Niet's fleeting presence in the action of 
the play belies her importance as symbol in the relation of man and labour where there 
always remains an excess which provides the very conditions o f the relationship in the 
first place. The inability to account for this structuring remainder, be it in the politics of 
organisation or in the expulsion of the heterogeneous, haunts the play as a whole. 
Woman and the land could be seen as that material condition which remains exterior to 
this particular ideology and yet provides a point of resistance to that ideology's drive to 
create a single, undifferentiated future.
Flint's hypocrisy in this regard is made clear towards the end of the play when he 
seems to affirm the idea of festivity, not simply as a pause from the development of 
socialist society but as an integral part of that development.
denn jede Freude ist
Ein Vorgeschmack vom Kommunismus und 
Der Kommunismus ist, was Spaß macht, sonst 
Wozu den langen Weg mit Blut und Schweiß.60
However, when his new partner, Flinte 2, expresses her desire to participate in this
foretaste, she is ordered home on the basis of Flint's political responsibility:
FLINT Ich leb nicht zum Vergnügen. Komm. Packt sie.
FLINTE 2 In die Versammlung kann ich schon nicht, weil ich arbeiten muß für 
zwei, wenn du die Dörfer abfahrst für alle. Und mich noch dumm schimpfen 
lassen weil ich unpolitisch bin. Jetzt hab ich Zeit.
Flint ohrfeigt Flinte 2. Flinte 1 ohrfeigt Flint. Tauziehen um Flinte 2.61
The resistance of women to their instrumentalisation involves their autonomy and
assertion of their difference. Flinte 1 advises her "replacement" to cuckold Flint so that 5
5‘ ibid., p. 71.
59 ibid., p. 69.
60 ibid., p. 99.
61 ibid., pp. 99-100.
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he can finally learn the meaning of equal opportunities. However, that heterogeneity 
which the portrayal of women hints at in the play is seen finally to undergo repression, 
deferral and expulsion. The most striking representative of its transgressive power is not 
a woman, however, but the most self-centred and seemingly incorrigible character in the 
play, Fondrak.
Fondrak - auf den Boden scheiß ich.
Fondrak is not a character to elicit sympathy. He may provoke fear, loathing or laughter
but his behaviour seems almost entirely anti-social and destructive. On his first
appearance he sets the tone of his attitude towards his responsibilities. He has fathered a
child with Niet, the Umsiedlerin but demonstrates not the slightest paternal instinct. He
bemoans rather her loss of figure and his attention remains firmly fixed upon his next
moment of consumption.
Die Brust ist auch nicht, was sie war, wirds auch 
Nicht wieder hier, wo die Bonzen uns das Fleisch 
Wegschnappen, und jetzt wächst dir noch ein Fresser.
Schaumgummi, wenn der Busen nachläßt, gibts beim Amerikaner. [...] Hol 
Bier.62
His priority is always clear; he aims only to satisfy his own desires, primarily in 
intoxication and ecstasy. The consequences of this behaviour do not concern him. He 
characterises his situation as "”[e]in Kind zu viel, ein Bier zu wenig."63 He is not 
however so addled with alcohol that he cannot find the way to his next beer and is able 
to combine an uncanny assessment of the village dynamics with a welcome irreverence 
to those in positions of power or wealth. He blackmails the landlord into giving him a
150
beer simply by mentioning his black market activities, crowing to Flint after his reward, 
"Wissen ist Macht."
Flint thereafter spends a great deal of time trying to persuade Fondrak to accept 
the offer of a smallholding where he and Niet can settle down, work and build a secure 
future. Fondrak shows, however, not the slightest interest, even though it would give 
him the means to buy more beer. Flint's promises are merely the deferral of that revelry 
which Beutler silenced so brutally with the first words of the play: "Musik von morgen. 
Mein Durst ist von heute. Bier."64 He demands instead instant gratification and a social 
system whose primary quality will be the promotion of immediacy; the fungibility of all 
objects of desire; their co-existence with the desiring subjects in time and space; in other 
words the privilege of the present over the future, of consumption over deferral: "Kannst 
du den Kommunismus gleich machen? Wie wars mit einer Lage fur den Anfang?"65 
Fondrak likens his creed of consumption and pointless expenditure to a moral code and 
challenges Siegfried, an enthusiastic communist, to construct a better one. The only 
morality which this environment can offer is one of restriction and self-denial, a code 
which the most willing proletarians (Siegfried and Flint, for example) cannot obey when 
faced with the temptations of the flesh.
Fondrak regards this ethics of confinement, or incarceration in the future, by the 
demands of work itself, which in this social environment is directed toward a future 
satisfaction by someone else, as "ein Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit",66 using a 
passing crippled farmer as example. When the only reward at the end of a life of labour
“  ibid., p. 41.
63 ibid., p. 58.
64 ibid., p. 59.
65 ibid.
66 ibid., p. 79.
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is the grave and where "der Wurm hat den Oberbefehl."67 The ordinary labourer works 
him/herself literally to death ("das Sterben ist dem Menschen angebom"68) and thus the 
only response for s/he who seeks to escape such servitude and affirm his/her liberty is to 
withdraw from the project of work and from project itself. "Der Mensch ist zum Leben 
gebom, ich will mich in Freiheit besaufen, auf den Boden scheiß ich."69
The ambiguity of this line is striking, however. While Fondrak rejects in the 
most forceful and crude way Flint's offer of agricultural labour, and seemingly the land 
as condition of material production, such an action also has a beneficial and fertile 
effect. Later he advises Niet, with regard to her offer o f a smallholding: "Scheiß drauf, 
das düngt"70 - it is perhaps the scatological, elemental aspect of the figure of Fondrak 
which is most shocking, but in retrospect, that which will be most missed with his 
departure. He claims to be living the utopia which others are striving for in the future, 
but now, in the present. While Flint makes clear the cost of such behaviour for the other 
members of the village ("Die halbe Menschheit hat sich abgeschunden im Kollektiv flir 
deine individuelle Hand."71), it is Fondrak who offers traces of that liberty, exultation 
and joy which communism claims to have amongst its personal effects. Fondrak 
maintains he is simply living out the egalitarian creed: each according to their need, 
from each according to their ability. Flint tries to put him right, demonstrating once 
more his ethic of deferral:
FLINT Jeder nach seiner Leistung, das hast du vergessen, Die Bedürfnisse
kriegen wir später.
67 ibid., p. 72.
68 ibid.
69 ibid., p. 79.
10 ibid., p. 100.
71 ibid., p. 79.
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FONDRAK Ich bin meiner Zeit voraus, ich hab sie schon. [...] Was war zuerst: 
der Durst oder das Bier? Ich sage: das Bier, die Welt muB verbraucht werden.72
Fondrak brings the structuring contradiction of such a political programme into the
open. The future promised defines itself as future, it can never be present, for to be so
would be to endanger that future. This itself is an effect of gathering all subjects' futures
under one sign - that of a communist utopia. As the play makes clear through the mouth
of various characters, the only future they are sure of is their death and decay. While
Kaffka and Flint employ this realisation to work for a better future, although the latter
allows his idea of the goal to interrupt the material labour in which Kaffka is engaged,
Beutler and Fondrak regard the inevitable decay unto death as the reason to seize the
present moment. The huge difference between these two seeming egoists is that while
the former speculates on the opportunity of the present, that is, what it will bring him at
the cost of others, Fondrak expends in the present and exhausts this expenditure. The
defining difference between these characters is rather the degree to which they
accumulate rather than expend the resources which they have garnered. Such
accumulation is utterly foreign to Fondrak, while Kaffka seems interested only in
accumulation to satisfy basic material needs which will be the ground of social progress.
Flint, however, represents that belief in technical progress - coming about through the
accumulation of the means of production - which will allow full expenditure in a Utopia
dated beyond the deaths of those living. Beutler, despite the mockery of such belief
witnessed in his actions, amasses wealth and power for personal, private expenditure,
while professing a restrictive communist morality.
72 ibid
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Fondrak is right to be suspicious of the repression of such conspicuous 
consumption, not least because such suffocation brings with it a restricted understanding 
of how economies and structures organise and reproduce themselves. He remembers the 
consequences of such extreme Spießbürgertum:
Ein Verbesserungsvorschlag:
Bier aus der Wand. [...] Den Massen fehlt der Weitblick 
Hitler hats ausgenutzt. Ich wußte gleich 
Den blutigen Ausgang, weil der Mann kein Bier trank 
Und wer kein Bier trinkt, säuft bekanntlich Blut.73
Neither the village nor the GDR can find a place for such a figure as Fondrak. 
He simply cannot be held, tied down to a system of patient work and anticipation. Flint 
tells him frankly that he must work or die. Fondrak's refusal to do work is less a 
recommendation of sloth as a demonstration of what is lost by the employment of an 
ideology of progress and Aufliebung bom in Hegel and structuring the whole of Marx's 
thought, of a continual discovery of self-identity unfolding itself through stages of a 
dialectic culminating in an origin in the future. Such a process of social transformation 
can easily flip over into dictatorship, even if the "revolution" is being carried out in the 
name of freedom:
Dann wirst du zugeschnitten, was nicht in den Topf paßt, ab, und wenns der 
Kopf war. Zum Beispiel wenn du gern ein Bier zu viel trinkst oder zwanzig, oder 
du willst eine Fabrik aufmachen, eine Brauerei zum Beispiel. Gleich kommen sie 
mit IchbinBergmannweristmehr oder Bauauf Bauauf. Wenn du verhungern 
willst, fällt die Fürsorge über dich her. Diktatur.74
Flint replies, only confirming Fondrak's analysis: "Dir müßte man das Maul versiegeln,
Fondrak."75 Fondrak is silenced, he leaves the GDR for the West, vowing not to return
until socialism has developed enough to deliver what it has promised.
73 ibid., p. 90.
74 ibid., p. 80.
75 ibid.
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Ich bin
Für Arbeitsteilung. Ich besorg den Absatz.
Tut euer Teil, ich hab mein Teil getan.
Vorm Kommunismus seht ihr mich nicht wieder.
Ab. 76
His departure signals a decisive founding moment for this society. Fondrak goes to the 
West, aware that the economy of surplus value, overproduction and appropriation awaits 
him ("Gib [Geld] her. Wenn Inflation kommt, steh ich trocken/ Wenn ich ihn flüssig 
mach, ist er mir sicher"77), and that the breach between the two economic systems is 
about to be widened to dangerous levels. In a speech which was written in 1959 and yet 
proved to be eerily prophetic, Müller has Fondrak foresee the imminent future of 
Europe:
Kann sein, der Rasen zwischen uns wird Staatsgrenze plötzlich, man hat schon 
Pferde kalben sehn aus Politik, du stehst in Rußland ohne einen Schritt, ich in 
Amerika, und Kinder machen auf dem Grenzstrich ist Export und verboten, 
Einfuhr wird auch bestraft. Wenn ich bloß nach deiner Brust greif, wird schon 
geschossen.7®
Such a division, the defining moment of the second half of the century, is then 
expressed by the ability of the two sides to obliterate each other and themselves many 
times over. The promise of apocalypse, which served as umbrella to the Cold War, is 
once again foreseen by Fondrak, "Vielleicht sehn wir uns auf dem Mond wieder durch 
den/ Luftdruck von der Wunderwaffe im nächsten Krieg."79 It thus bears out his earlier 
justification for seizing the present: "Kann sein, mich trifft der Schlag eh ich hier 
aufsteh. Oder ein Stück von einem Stem, der vor dreitausend Jahren geplatzt ist, dich 
auch."80 The threat of apocalypse is an effect of the same expulsion of the heterogeneous
76 ibid., p. 98.
77 ibid., p. 101.
78 ibid., p. 71
79 ibid., p. 101.
80 ibid., p. 72.
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and suppression of play, and thus links the two sides of the Iron Curtain more closely 
than they would have imagined or liked.
Fondrak remains a cipher; he displays in his excess what the GDR lacks, namely 
excess itself. This might be said of any structure as such, but such over-expenditure was 
particularly dangerous for the ruling elites of the GDR bureaucracy. It undermined the 
solid self-representation of non-contradiction which the GDR state was seeking to 
establish, or rather of non-antagonistic contradictions which could be sublimated into a 
peaceful synthesis. Thus any indiscipline or play within the rigid structure could not be 
countenanced, as any heterogeneous element threatened the raison d'etre of the structure 
which was to allow a homogenous, universal goal of Communist society to develop. By 
definition, the centre of this structure, the Party and state, limited the play or autonomy 
generated within civil society, repressing or expelling such play or that which was seen 
as transgression of the self-imposed limits of socialist society. It might be objected that 
to regard the state or GDR as structure itself limits the play within the concept of 
structure81 and that this argument falls prey to the same movement of universalisation. 
However, the GDR saw itself as such a structure, that is, as something immune to the 
play and fluidity of time, in that it represented itself as an idea coming back to itself. It 
was not change that was on the agenda as much as self-realisation, a structure becoming 
progressively more real, more visible.
The GDR defined itself, therefore, by what it excluded. The transgression of 
self-representation gave the structure substance, a transgression that was already 
inscribed into the structure by its drawing of boundaries and limits to itself. By drawing
81 Cf. Derrida, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse o f the Human Sciences in Writing and 
Difference, pp. 278-294.
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a frontier, or limit of what constituted acceptable behaviour or economic action, the 
beyond of that acceptability was already established, indeed was the condition for what 
was proper to, and what constituted propriety in, the GDR. This was, of course, a logic 
that was not particular to the GDR and other command economies, but is at play in all 
societies, which by definition must include and exclude in order to define and represent 
themselves. What was particularly indicative of the totalitarian state - a structure where 
the state regards itself as universal and is able to act as such - was the energy that was 
expended on minimising transgression as far as possible. If such control is successful 
the result is simply a strengthening of the apparent immutability of the limits, as well as 
a decreasing interest in questioning those limits which define the structure. The fact that 
the GDR was, as argued above, already inhabited and conditioned by transgression 
allows such play to surface now and then, primarily in those practices (such as art, 
certain religious events and festival, for example) which resisted being put to work, 
being instrumentalised, by the state. Their importance, however, and their continual 
return, demonstrates only that these practices of transgression, of expenditure without 
return, were the condition for the self-representation of the GDR state. It is not 
surprising that they do not appear in the considerations of classical economics which 
focus primarily and restrictedly on the productive apparatus, but they do correspond to 
ideas of general economy (which have informed this first section) which seek to 
understand human, social and indeed all activity within the global economy as a whole 
(from the growth of plants to the deaths of animals) in terms of the constitutive 
necessity of an excess of resources, given primarily by the absolute expenditure of the 
sun. In so doing, it seeks to answer the problem of why unproductive expenditure and 
transgression is so vital to our society, indeed is the condition of it, a problem which the
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restricted economy of production can only gloss over by defining it as primitive, useless
and immoral.
General Economy
Georges Bataille's work could be characterised by an attempt to think away from God, 
that is, away from a transcendent, eternal space beyond the limited realm of human 
activity. This limited space has been regarded as incomplete when contrasted to the 
unlimited, indeed it is defined by the absence of transcendence, an existence limited to 
the earthly sphere. Bataille, in response to this historically powerful view, seeks to 
provide an irresolutely materialist response, which sees human existence as limited but 
not incomplete because of that. These limits can be transgressed, the limited space de­
constructed and then constructed again. The desire, however, to go beyond the bounds 
of our limited existence is so strong that it cannot be escaped, being in fact constitutive 
of our very nature. We seek to be at one, perhaps at rest again, with everything that is 
not ourselves, we seek to be everything, to be unlimited. This desire has been harnessed 
in various ways by the world's religions, for example, producing the illusion of never 
having to die, or being reborn into oneness with the whole or absolute. Bataille seeks to 
exploit this desire in a material way, to transgress the limits of human existence, finally 
defined by the irrecuperable limit of death, only in order to return to within those limits. 
For Bataille, there can be no permanent move into the beyond but only a momentary 
transgression which can only come about if there is a return to within the limits of social 
existence. Complete transgression is literally unthinkable, completely unrepresentable, 
for it is either the realm of the psychotic, whose existence, if absolutely psychotic, is
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purely in the grasp of the present moment or it is ceasing to exist, not being anymore. 
Complete transgression, or "pure sovereignty" simply is not, it is not a thing.
This constitutive desire which Bataille describes is at the basis of the 
understanding of general economy. There is always an excess of energy to be expended, 
so that the human subject will never be satisfied. However, this rule applies to all 
activity in the environment:
I will begin with a basic fact: The living organism, in a situation determined by 
the play of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy 
than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for 
the growth of a system (e.g. an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if 
the excess cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be 
lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or 
catastrophically.*2
A general view of economy starts with this fact. Any contradiction with contemporary
modem economies remains only apparent, the expenditure in loss takes place in any
case, merely taking on a more masked and yet more catastrophic form. Expenditure and
loss without profit drive all economy, the key to their understanding resides in the
surplus that always comes to pass and will always be spent. As soon as the organism
comes up against an obstacle or limit to the growth which had previously accounted for
the excess of energy received, a loss must take place, not in order for  another event to
happen - this loss has no use as such - but it is an inevitable effect of that first rule of
general economy quoted above. Growth, too, is an effect:
[Tjhere is generally no growth but only a luxurious squandering of energy in 
every form! The history of life on earth is mainly the effect of a wild 
exuberance; the dominant event is the development of luxury, the production of 
increasingly burdensome forms of life.’3 823
82 Bataille, The Accursed Share (AS I), p. 21.
83 ibid., p. 33.
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In the chilling extension to this logic, Bataille regards the expenditure of energy which 
all organisms and organisations indulge in as witnessed in modem society not by acts of 
festival (which have come to be regarded as primitive) but by war. That this need not 
necessarily be the case, that Bataille's ideas of general economy accomplishes a 
"Copemican transformation: a reversal of thinking -and of ethics" leads him to his 
critique of modem society, both capitalist and Socialist discussed below. This reversal 
finds no better expression than in the rejection of the point of departure for classical, 
restricted economy:
From the particular point of view, the problems are posed in the first instance by 
a deficiency of resources. They are posed in the first instance by an excess of 
resources if one starts from the general point of view.“
The masking of excess has been most successfully carried out by the modem 
economy which overturned feudal relations in order to install the new order of 
accumulation which characterises the modem era. The medieval economy in Europe85 
was defined by the interdependence of the clergy and nobility whose needs were 
satisfied by the production of the labouring classes. The former provide a form of 
protection, the latter, providing the moral law of the church was adhered to, offered a 
place beyond the short brutish life being enjoyed. Society was conceived along the lines 
of the human body, of component parts separate and distinct, that is, heterogeneous to 
each other. The economic world of business and transaction displayed no autonomy, 
trade was governed by the notion of a just price. The excess of wealth was expended in 
a non-productive manner in the form of festivals, the extravagance of the aristocracy 
and the grand devotional buildings of the church.
“  ibid., p. 39.
85 cf. Bataille, ibid., pp. 116-124.
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What differentiates the medieval economy from the capitalist economy is that to 
a very large extent the former, static economy made a non-productive 
consumption of the excess wealth, while the latter accumulates and determines a 
dynamic growth of the production apparatus.86
This development of accumulation of the means of production came about 
through the upheaval of the Reformation. While Luther is often credited with sowing 
the seeds of capitalism, Bataille follows Weber and Tawney87 in regarding the radical 
shift away from medieval organisation as being accomplished by Calvin. While Luther 
provoked only a "naive half-peasant revolt" the influence of Calvin could be seen to 
correspond to the initial growth areas of mercantile capitalism (Holland, America and 
Great Britain). The importance of Luther, however, was to formulate the idea of the 
meaninglessness of wealth as regards heavenly salvation. Any work engaged in here 
below had no other meaning than what its ends were on earth. Any accomplishment was 
in any case essentially futile, salvation could only be attained by grace and faith alone. 
Thus the only significance left to work became its productive value, but this was kept 
strictly in check by Luther's continued abhorrence of usury and an earned wealth that 
might have smacked of greed and extravagance.
Calvin rejected such scruples, seeing no difference in the earned income of the 
merchant and banker and the unearned accumulation enjoyed by the landowner. 
Furthermore, such industry served the glory of God, good works and hard labour could 
not attain salvation but were rather a demonstration that the successful merchant had 
been saved, and that a righteous life was to be found in salvation, rather than the other 
way around. Any luxurious expenditure was thus seen as pointless (as it could not bring 
about salvation) or rather, such outpourings were condemned because of their lack of
86 ibid., p. 116.
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utility. Value came to reside in utility itself, as such the value of an action or an object
was always deferred from the present moment to some point in the future; work became
compulsive repetition, the forever unsuccessful attempt to overcome the fmitude of
earthly existence which the opening of bourgeois subjectivity had emphasised. The
protestant had only a certain amount of time to achieve something. Hand in hand with
such developments arose the individualisation of property, the surrender to value
residing in things or a universal equivalent, now money, and most importantly the
marginalisation of glorious expenditure. While Bataille insists on its continued status,
the Reformation saw expenditure become that part of life that was taboo, an accursed
share. In its place, capitalism accumulates the means of production; wealth is not spent
but invested in the development and continual revolution of the means of production:
It is not the final purpose of any individual in particular, but collectively that of 
the society that an epoch has chosen. It gives precedence in the use of the 
available resources to the expansion of enterprises and the increase of capital 
equipment; in other words, it prefers an increase o f wealth to its immediate use.87 8 89
Production becomes an activity valid in itself, it attains the status of value generation. A
man is worth what he produces, where that value is determined not by what immediate
use the results and effects of his production have, but rather by what they can be
exchanged for:
Money serves to measure all work and makes man a function of measurable 
products. [...] [Ejach man is worth what he produces: in other words, he stops 
being an existence for itself, he is no more than a function, arranged within 
measurable limits, of collective production (which makes him an existence for 
something other than itself).*9
87 Bataille's reading was based on Weber's Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus and 
Tawney's Religion and the Rise o f Capitalism
88 Bataille. AS I. p. 119.
89 Bataille, The Psychological Structure o f Fascism in Visions of Excess, p. 138.
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The two lines of the epochal divide were thus drawn. The sovereign classes of the 
anciens régimes defined themselves by the useless consumption of wealth against the 
labouring classes of the bourgeois world who characterised themselves by the degree to 
which they were servile to the goals of production. They produced wealth, but not in 
order to consume. Even the most extravagant factory owner appropriated the produced 
wealth of his employees not to consume it profitlessly but invest for further gain. This 
investment was purely for himself however, it plays no role in cementing society as did 
the extravagance of the aristocracy. In this sense, the expenditure of the medieval 
sovereign and his/her descendants was not for him/herself but was an expression of the 
economy of society - the notion of individual wealth to be disposed of as individual was 
at this point not so virulent. The technological upheaval of the modem age did not solve 
the problem of expenditure for the capitalist, it simply allowed the amount of surplus 
energy produced to increase, thus amplifying also the measure of loss that was indulged 
in. To emphasise once more, the onset of a society of accumulation and technology did 
not obviate the need to expend. Bataille insists that if the economy is understood 
generally, profitless loss will remain the conditioning force, one must simply look for it 
away from the conspicuous extravagance of aristocracy and instead in the 
industriousness of the modem labourer, surplus value and a different form o f war.
Bataille focuses upon the replacement by labour of an intimacy o f the present 
moment which the sovereign figure would have enjoyed. The principle determinant of 
the economy changes from such concentration on the present moment to the motor of 
the subsequent result. Clearly such a change allows also for change itself, it allows for 
programmes and projects of liberation, but Bataille insists that the modem
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consciousness, in its dependence on labour and deferral, is essentially servile. The
sovereign consciousness remains "beyond utility".
[W]e may call sovereign the enjoyment of possibilities that utility doesn't justify 
(utility being that whose end is productive utility). Life beyond utility is the 
domain of sovereignty. [...] We may say, in other words, that it is servile to 
consider duration first, to employ the present time for the sake of the future, 
which is what we do when we work. [...] The worker does not personally have in 
view the sovereign pleasure of the future [...]. What is sovereign in fact is to 
enjoy the present time without having anything else in view but this present 
time. 90
In contrast to servile labour for the future, sovereign action in the present cannot 
become part of a project of work, it cannot be put to work, or commodified. It is not, 
unlike labour, negation of the environment, it does not get involved in a dialectic having 
synthesis as its goal, it can only remain different, particular, unique, useless. Sovereign 
action
can no longer collaborate with the continuous linking-up of meaning, concept, 
time and truth in discourse; because it literally can no longer labor and let itself 
be interrogated as the "work of the negative".91
Labour, on the contrary, must negate. It cannot help be swept up in the consideration of
the future that is the continual negation and re-negation of dialectics. Labour makes
things, it names them, conceptualises them, in order to use them for the future. An
object becomes through labour an instrument, merely a means to an end.
The fundamental difference in modernity lies in the shift in the characterisation
of labour. With industrialisation and the increase in the power of capital, labour must
sell itself as a thing (as a commodity) as the worker can no longer produce goods
efficiently enough to compete with mass production. The labourer thus has only his
90 Bataille, The Accursed Share Volumes II and III.tAS II & III), pp. 198-9.
91 Derrida, From Restricted to General Economy, in Writing and Difference, pp. 259-60.
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labour to sell and is himself reduced to the status of a thing.92 93What is most human - the 
reproduction of the environment - becomes commodified to an unheard of extent; 
almost everything can be exchanged for a universal equivalent, and primarily the 
activities o f the labourer are diminished to the exchange value of what he produces. The 
human being who has only his labour to sell is, in degrees, less a subject than s/he who 
expropriates the objects of his labour:
The share of this product that is not necessary to the subsistence of the object 
that the man who produces is for the time being, is the share of the subject that 
the sovereign is. The sovereign restores to the primacy of the present the surplus 
share of production acquired to the extent that men submitted to the primacy of 
the future.95
The intimacy of the human with his/her environment can never be expressed through the
thing for in and with it dwell always a consideration and devotion to the future rather
than the present moment. The only way of achieving this intimacy once more, of
attaining some experience of one's particular subjectivity, one's singularity, is through
practices where the deep structure of general economy is acknowledged once more:
Intimacy is not expressed by a thing except on one condition: that this thing be 
essentially the opposite of a thing, the opposite of a product, of a commodity - a 
consumption and sacrifice. Since intimate feeling is a consumption, it is 
consumption that expresses it, not a thing, which is its negation.94
The modem world, Bataille maintains, has been shaped by the attempt to solve the
problems raised by the dominance of the thing. Modernism, if thought of as generally as
a reaction against modernity, has sought to allow an underlying reality beneath the
world of things to speak out. Marxism, in spite of its claims to be the antidote to
capitalism, proclaims its modernity, not only by its emphasis on the development of the
92 cf. Bataille. AS I p. 129.
93 Bataille, AS II & III, pp. 240-1.
94 Bataille, ASI, p. 132.
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means of production as the means to the goal of communism, but also by its insistence
on this being achieved through the thing.
The fundamental proposition of Marxism is to free the world o f things (of the 
economy) entirely from every element that is extraneous to things (to the 
economy): It was by going to the limit of the possibilities implied in things [...,] 
by carrying to its ultimate consequences the movement that reduces man to the 
condition of a thing, that Marx was determined to reduce things to the condition 
of man, and man to the free disposition of himself.95
This emphasis on production of commodities, in order to free the world of the 
fetishism of commodities, places Marxism firmly within the modem doxa. Production, 
and the deferral of enjoyment which accompanies it, comes to define society for Bataille 
as homogenous. Production lies at the base of social homogeneity insofar as it 
conditions every act to be useful. Useless acts are not productive, they do not allow 
anything else to be produced. An object is produced, on the other hand, in order to be 
useful for another product and its production cannot be a valid activity in itself. The 
value of the activity of production is measured by a calculable equivalent - money - 
which "measures all work and makes man a function of measurable products."96 Seen as 
a whole, ideologically, production comes to be seen as useful, simply because it 
produces: production, in ideology, becomes an end in itself. The whole society becomes 
geared as one to the idea of the goal of production.
The middle ages, by contrast, displayed its degree of heterogeneity in its relative 
indifference to production for its own sake. Goods were produced to be consumed 
within a framework of social heterogeneity, with clearly defined roles of lordship and 
servitude. The labourer worked for the immediate consumption of his superiors. Clergy,
95 ibid., p. 135.
96 Bataille, The Psychological Structure o f Fascism, op. cit., p. 138.
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military aristocracy and labouring classes did not merge into each other and it was 
indeed this uncompromising distinction which could be said to define the society.
In the society of industry which followed on from this epoch, however, the 
owner of the means of production is distinguished from the producer. The former 
appropriates the product and becomes thereby a function of the product itself. He 
"founds" a social homogeneity which forces the producer to work, but excludes him/her 
from profit. The proletariat thus only truly fit into the homogenous framework of 
production when they are producing and earning their wage. Their activities outside of 
production, although they may be reduced to a bare minimum, display a degree of 
heterogeneity to the dictates of utility. This would explain bourgeois distaste of 
working-class culture, the pointlessness of spending a week's wages on Friday night, the 
refusal to "invest" in oneself. It is the degree to which the producer has incorporated the 
psychological homogeneity of the productive process into his life outside work which 
determines the heterogeneity which could be a signifier of the power of the producing 
classes. The power in such alterity from the norms of utility goes some way to 
explaining why transgression comes to be expelled from homogenous society. The 
solidity of the post-war Western world might thus be explained by the progressive 
inclusion of the producing classes and their ever-increasing distance from the 
possibilities of transgressive behaviour.
Heterogeneous activity can be defined by that which does not serve the function
of utility in homogenous society. Thus Bataille includes not only socially useless
activity (where the society in question is driven by the need to produce) but also:
everything rejected by homogenous society as waste or as superior transcendent 
value. Included are the waste products of the human body and certain analogous 
matter (trash, vermin etc.); the parts of the body; persons, words, or acts having a 
suggestive erotic value; the various unconscious processes such as dreams or
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neuroses; the numerous elements or social forms that homogenous society is 
powerless to assimilate: mobs, the warrior, aristocratic and impoverished classes, 
different types of violent individuals or at least those who refuse the rule 
(madmen, leaders, poets, etc.).97
Indulging in such acts outside of the space and time that has been allotted them 
constitutes some form of transgression of the homogenous norms of utilitarian society. 
Such transgression moves beyond the limits imposed on such behaviour (for example 
where and in what form sexual acts should take place) but its power resides only in its 
ability to return to within the limits, to become non-transgressive once more. Complete 
transgression, utter heterogeneity can, as in the case of the madman - simply be labelled, 
negated and used by society to strengthen its limits by expelling transgression that 
threatens its stability. The joyous surpassing of limits, which occurs exemplarily in 
erotic behaviour and the festival, is lacking in the productive apparatus of capitalism and 
modem society generally, as it serves no purpose, and indeed threatens the vary nature 
of purpose and rational teleology. Sexual activity which does not serve a purpose, in 
other words, which does not reproduce or itself produce a commodity (such as in 
pornography), stands out as a challenge to the principle of work and utility. It is an 
operation which is valid in itself and in its own time. Perhaps more than any other 
activity, erotic behaviour luxuriates in the present. In contrast, the festival has been 
turned into a theme park, the carnival has become commodified.
Whereas in pre-modem society such transgressive behaviour was a form of 
cohesion, typified by the chaos of a festival, it has since become subversive. When 
society becomes one body it cannot allow any part of it to become infected with 
otherness, or that part must be expelled and made completely other. The subversive
97 ibid., p. 142.
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power in transgressive behaviour resides, once more, in its ability to remain part of the 
body politic, to avoid banishment, in its capacity to return within the limits of that body. 
On the other hand it also resists assimilation into any speculative unity of the body; the 
processes and structures of homogeneity are not immanent to it.
Transgression and heterogeneous activity live with the threat of their expulsion 
from or recuperation into the body of society. In fact, their heterogeneity does not allow 
them to be thought within that society unless they are accorded a meaning which the 
discourse of society can grasp. If heterogeneous activity is by definition resistant to 
utility and to considerations of the future and is at the same time an eruption of the 
present as an end in itself, then it cannot be understood in discourse which unfolds over 
time.
[Knowledge is never given to us except by unfolding in time. It is not given in 
sudden illumination o f the mind but in a discourse, which is necessarily 
employed in duration. Knowledge, and the most profound knowledge, never 
appears to us in full except, finally, as the result of a calculated effort, an 
operation useful to some end.98
The present can only be known and communicated in discourse through representation, 
imbued with the anticipation, teleology and the future, and infected with memory, 
history and theory. The meaning of the sovereign moment in the present can only be 
given in the loss of that moment, a submission to future concerns: "As a manifestation 
of meaning, discourse is thus the loss of sovereignty itself. Servility is therefore only the 
desire for meaning."99 In his essay on Bataille's work on Hegel, Derrida goes onto 
characterise the former's attempt to escape the path of constant negation and increasing 
self-knowledge as the subversion of the dialectic itself. The speculative dialectic, which
98 Bataille, AS II &III. p. 202.
99 Derrida, J., From Restricted to General Economy, op. cit., p. 262.
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encloses itself in the circle of self-realisation, governs and determines what lies before 
and behind it in a closure of anticipation and memory. What is negated by the dialectic, 
then aufgehoben into the next stage is used for the coming-to-itself of consciousness in 
the Hegelian scheme. The speculation involved in the dialectic is engaged in for the 
profit of Geist, for the ever-increasing accumulation in knowledge. It is thus that 
Derrida can write: "Self-consciousness is servile."100
Bataille insists, however, that one o f the chief characteristics of heterogeneous or 
sacred activity is that it is communication. How can non-servility thus be communicated 
if discourse immediately betrays the ecstasy of the moment? Bataille maintains in 
response that an expenditure without reserve, indulging in glorious loss, communicates 
what is at stake in life, without expressing it in representation. Heterogeneous activity 
and expenditure without profit occur in sacred activities where the basic law of general 
economy is revealed. Indeed, they can only occur in sacred and heterogeneous activities 
for to do otherwise would be to turn them into profane activities expressed in discourse. 
In this sense it is meaningless to talk about heterogeneity, as by definition any analysis 
of it transforms it into an object of knowledge rather than the particular subjectivity 
which it expresses. However, we can still witness its effects, we can even try to inscribe 
traces of it into writing, but it remains other and utterly different.
The communication of non-servility to project and utility is expressed in an 
exemplary fashion by those who put themselves in question when faced with death. 
When confronted with the risk of death, the self is put at stake, it reaches its limit, 
beyond which is only nothingness. Reaching this limit in sacred activity (be it in the 
ecstasy of the erotic where control, self-governance and the boundaries of subjectivity
100 ib id ., p. 276.
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are breached or sacrifice where the death of the other is substituted for the onlooker) 
communicates that limit- death - which defines human existence. But the experience of 
the limit can only come about in heterogeneous activity, that is, in the instant, in a 
present that always eludes us, and which can never be re-presented. The sovereignty that 
such behaviour witnesses is not performed by a self-consciousness, but is a pure 
subjectivity:
[Sovereignty does not govern itself. And does not govern in general: it governs 
neither others nor things, nor discourses in order to produce meaning. [...] Once 
sovereignty has to attempt to make someone or something subordinate to itself, 
we know that it would be retaken by dialectics, would be subordinate to the 
slave, to the thing and to work.101
Sovereignty only takes place in operations of loss; in this expenditure without reserve
sovereignty is essentially the refusal to accept the limits that the fear of death 
would have us respect in order to ensure, in a general way, the laboriously 
peaceful life of individuals. [...] It also calls for the risk of death. Sovereignty 
always demands the liquidation through strength of character, of all the failings 
that are connected with death, and the control of one's deep tremors.102
Only traces of sovereignty are to be found within individuals, but where it
reveals itself it announces itself as a result of the refusal to commit oneself to work as
the only useful activity one can indulge in before one dies. The representation of death
that occurs in the world of project becomes finally the end of life, its fulfilment and
what gives life meaning. (Indeed, the idea of any complete project might itself be
regarded as the attempt to accomplish fullness and live to tell the tale.) In the moment of
sovereignty, by contrast, in that ecstasy of the present, a representation of death (which
by definition would mean making it an object) is impossible; instead one flirts,
playfully, with the experience of death, laughing at its inevitability.
101 ibid., pp. 264-5.
,0J Bataille, AS II & HI. pp. 221-2.
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The primacy of the present that is replayed in the event o f sovereignty subverts
therefore the temporality of work. While the labourer works for a future consumption by
another, the sovereign "restores to the primacy Qf the present the surplus share of
production, acquired to the extent that men submitted to the primacy of the future.'"03
While the lord or capitalist expropriates that share of subjectivity that the labourer has
lost by having to succumb to the future (in other words by becoming an object for the
expropriator), the human who seeks to assert his/her sovereignty at work does so by not
working. The sovereign individual does only useless things, s/he indulges in a senseless
loss. The sovereignty that such loss entails, because it is loss, cannot be said to be:
[Tjhere is no sovereignty itself. Sovereignty dissolves the values of meaning, 
truth and a grasp-of-the-thing-itself This is why the discourse that it opens 
above all is not true, truthful or "sincere". Sovereignty is the impossible, 
therefore it is not, it is - Bataille writes this word in italics - "this loss".104
It is consequently not a thing that can be exchanged, commodified, or put to work. It
cannot be used as a means toward an end as it is not an object that can be negated and
preserved in a dialectic. Rather, "sovereignty is never truly objective, [...] it refers rather
to deep subjectivity.'"05 It refuses employment and utility altogether, it declines to use
others as means for its own ends: it refuses power Accordingly, the only way for the
worker to act sovereignly is to refuse to work, to extract him/herself from the dialectic
of deferral and self-consciousness in the future by initiating this refusal in the present.
Such action is not only to be found in industrial strife. The privilege of the
sovereign moment is powerfully expressed in all useless activity, not least in a writing
of loss, a writing that sacrifices its meaning. Poetic speech is powerless, but sovereign in
that it is not significative:
103 ib id ., p. 241.
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The poetic or the ecstatic is that in every discourse which can open itself up to 
the absolute loss of its sense, to the (non-base) of the sacred, of non-meaning, of 
un-knowledge or of play [...]. What is poetic in sovereignty is announced in "the 
moment when poetry renounces theme and meaning."104 506 107
The expenditure of sense without profit in poetry can communicate not only a degree of
sovereign subjectivity in the experience of reading a poem, or hearing poetic language,
but it can call forth also a response that similarly sacrifices meaning and utility in a
sovereign manner. The great problem for criticism resides in the destruction of this
sovereign moment when it is turned into an object. For the sovereign moment consists
in mocking such utility, indeed, laughter, or perhaps a certain sort of laughter is its
language. If no meaning or use can be attached to it, if it cannot be made an object of
knowledge or negated in discourse, then it does truly "exceed dialectics and the
dialectician: it bursts out only on the basis of an absolute renunciation of meaning, an
absolute risking of death, what Hegel calls abstract negativity.'"07 Certain laughter,
therefore, is sovereign to death, in that it laughs it out, but cannot be included in any
system or programme which aims at self-realisation of an idea (be it Geist or communist
society) because it is no thing-, it is not an object that can be known and then employed.
If comedy produces a certain form of laughter, a laughter of the moment, of forgetting
the project and dialectic, it becomes as heterogeneous as ecstasy or the sacred. A certain
laughter transgresses, but only if its object is no thing, if the joke cannot be explained.
Laughter shows a sovereign moment only if it communicates sovereignty away from the
dialectics of discourse thereby remaining on the margin, transgressing the limit of the
104 Derrida, From Restricted to General Economy, op. cit., p. 270.
105 Bataille, AS II & III, p. 237.
106 Derrida, From Restricted to General Economy, op. cit., p. 261.
107 ibid., p. 256.
173
organisation of utility that cannot laugh at itself, for to do so would be to expend and
lose without reserve.
Comedy in the Kolchose
The attempt to write about comedy or to re-inscribe laughter immediately faces the 
problem that the object of its study has disappeared. When the joke is explained, it 
ceases to be funny, it does not make us laugh any more. In other words, the very event 
that provokes us to study does not and cannot present itself as an object of study. 
Laughter, as Derrida points out in his essay on Bataille, is no-thmg. It exemplifies the 
impossibility of representing the body adequately, or rather, the expenditure which the 
body indulges in cannot be represented without there remaining an excess which 
transcends the attempt to recapture it. The problem of discussing expenditure in 
academic discourse illustrates the general impossibility of the entry of the profane world 
of science and knowledge into the sacred arena which is characterised by loss. As soon 
as that entrance is made, the defining property of the sacred - loss - is lost. This would 
in turn, however, point toward that academic discourse which would prove most suited 
to the description of the sacred. This discourse would hope to show itself aware of what 
is lost in its accumulation of knowledge, in other words, that it is subject to the same 
laws of general economy as that no-thing which it attempts to objectify.
Die Umsiedlerin advertises itself as a comedy. It could be regarded as a 
chronicle of events past, a collection of amusing scenes focussing on the early years of 
the GDR. It might be performed as a fable where the events come to a conclusion, 
where the epoch portrayed is closed. In concrete terms, this would mean the
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representation o f the problems of modernisation and collectivisation of GDR agriculture 
as having been superceded and built upon by the present epoch, that is, by that era 
which the presence of the audience in the theatre represents. At the first performance of 
the play the GDR would have been in need of some reassurance as to the justice of its 
project as the Berlin Wall had just been erected. This immediate post-wall era would 
thus seem to provide a fertile ground for seeing the Gründerzeit as problems 
successfully overcome, as lying so far in the past that one can now laugh about them.
This would seem to correspond to those theories of comedy which, perhaps 
revealingly, though thin on the ground, sought to explain the workings of comedy and 
laughter in Marxist-Leninist terms. The very attempt to do so, and its extraordinary 
results, reveals as much about the nature of Marxist-Leninist as any other artistic theory. 
In its endeavour to explain laughter, to make it an object, it is re-inscribed in that 
teleology of totalitarianism which encapsulates the GDR most succinctly. Comic theory 
becomes an extreme example of such instrumentalisation because it attempts to restrict 
that which is most inimical to the work of the state - losing oneself in the laughter of the 
present.
Marxist-Leninist theory on comedy is based,10* in the most general sense, on the
comic, disjunctive effect of historical anachronism. The fact that earlier societies were
not so advanced as now, and that they displayed contradictions which have been
resolved by historical progress, is funny. As Keller accurately sums up
[D]ie anachronistischen Rückstände historisch überholter gesellschaftlicher 
Formationen gelten als bevorzugte Gegenstände der Komödie. Das 
Gesellschaftlich-Komische ergibt sich aus dem Widerspruch zwischen erstarrten 
politischen und sozialen Strukturen, die ihren Geltungsanspruch verloren haben 10
101 This summary is indebted to Andreas Keller's (op. cit.) discussion and bibliography of comic theory, 
pp. 154-171.
175
und deren endgültige Verabschiedung längst überfällig geworden ist, und den 
historisch notwendig sich vollziehenden Veränderungen, die sich letztlich gegen 
alle Widerstände durchsetzen werden.109 10*
This idea in tum comes originally from a passage in Marx which was evidently seized 
upon by Marxist-Leninist theorists who were desperately looking for some, for any 
reference to comedy in the canon which might allow them to formulate a suitably 
Marxist theory of comedy. In the end, despite their eagerness, these theorists had to 
settle for passages from Marx's Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, where the 
term is used in passing in the introduction. One shudders to think what they might have 
come up with had Marx not chosen to use in this context a metaphor of comedy and 
tragedy to describe both the last days of the ancien regime as well as the Vormärz years 
in Germany (those leading up to the revolution in 1848). Marx suggests that while the 
demise of the former was experienced by its adherents (that is, those living through and 
at the time of the events in question) as tragedy, "[a]us der Sicht der fortgeschrittenen 
Staaten, in denen die alte Ordnung schon durch eine neue ersetzt worden ist, erweist 
sich der Fortbestand des ancien regimes als lächerlich.'"10 Thus in Germany after 1848 
the Vormärz regime was seen simply as a historical anachronism, a laughable hotpotch 
of counts and dukes, of antiquated rituals and ceremonies which history had left behind. 
It was thus
mehr Komödiant einer Weltordnung, deren wirkliche Helden gestorben sind. Die 
Geschichte ist gründlich und macht viele Phasen durch, wenn sie eine alte 
Gestalt zu Grabe trägt. Die letzte Phase einer weltgeschichtlichen Gestalt ist ihre 
Komödie."1
109 Keller, op. eit., p. 154-55.
110 Marx, Karl, Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie (extract) in Marx, Engels, Lenin, Über
Kultur. Ästhetik und Literatur: Ausgewählte Texte, p. 375.
ibid.
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With nothing else to go on, the necessity of formulating a theory of comedy for real 
existierender Sozialismus (in order that it be performed at all) had to resort not to 
aesthetics or psychology but philosophy of history. Comedy thus became based on 
perceived historical development and progress and laughter came from the security of 
knowing that history will continue to develop to its logical conclusion. In other words, 
just as bourgeois society was destined to overcome its feudal predecessor, so would 
socialism live to see capitalism buried as well as any of its own outstanding 
contradictions resolved. As such, this theory o f comedy represented on the one hand as 
stark a form of Vergangenheitsbewältigung as can be imagined, married with the self- 
satisfied smile of the person who imagines him or herself the victor. The laughing 
member of the audience was, however, by definition not alone. In order to find anything 
funny, s/he was obliged to identify and align him or herself with the rest of the society 
because it was only as the next stage in social and economic history that anything was 
funny at all.
Nur die Übereinkunft der Zuschauer, gemeinsam fur die Sache des Fortschritts 
einzustehen, nur die parteiliche Grundstellung gegenüber anachronistischen 
Tendenzen in der Gegenwart ermöglicht ein gemeinschaftliches 
Überlegenheitslachen.112
Laughter, in this schema, is that of the mocking majority, ridiculing those who are not 
seen as part of the body politic; it is in its bare essentials little more than an ugly 
combination of mob mle and Siegerjustiz, an attempt to comfort oneself by assuring that 
one remains part of the crowd that is in power at that moment. Keller quotes Georgina 
Baum, author of Humor und Satire in der bürgerlichen Ästhetik: Zur Kritik Ihres 
apologetischen Charakters, whose book was written only a short time before the first
112 Keller, Andreas. Drama und Dramaturgie Heiner Müllers, p. 155.
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night of Die Umsiedlerin. She states with chilling simplicity: "Der Lachende [kann] im 
Sozialismus nur Repräsentant der sozialistischen Gesellschaft sein.""3 Laughter 
therefore ceases to be a singular bodily expression of a psychological reaction, and 
becomes only an admission or not of whether one subscribes to the dominant 
philosophy of history. This of course begs the question as to how this theory seeks to 
deal with bodily humour itself, be it slapstick, mime or fart jokes on the one hand; or on 
the other that form of wit where laughter comes from the skewed re-presentation of 
linguistic utterances."4 This problem and how it relates to Die Umsiedlerin will be 
discussed below, as socialist realist comic theory has no answer to it. Instead it 
emphasises far more the historical solidarity whose existence comedy, along with every 
other social and private act in the totalitarian state, is meant to ensure. Comedy merely 
serves two purposes:
[Einerseits werden die rückschrittlichen und hemmenden Faktoren des
Geschichtsprozesses entlarvt und durch Verlachen denunziert; auf der anderen
Seite wird das Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl der lachenden Zuschauer gestärkt."5
There were correspondingly, according to Keller, two forms of comedy which resulted 
from this standpoint. The first, satire, had as its principal object those situations which 
had been safely left behind or those figures who were representatives of anachronistic 
social scenarios. What was laughed at, therefore, was the past or those trying to 
reintroduce that past into the present. Laughter itself becomes a means of distancing 
oneself from that past and more poignantly, of brushing over the violence and victims of 13
113 Baum, quoted in Keller, ibid.
"4 To give one example: "What did the slug say to the snail? 'Copy of'The Big Issue' sir?" While the 
context of the joke clearly emanates from the serious problem of homelessness in the U.K., the humour, 
equally clearly, does not. Instead, the idea of a slug being "homeless", i.e. without a shell, is what makes 
one laugh (or not, as the case may be). As such, this humour is also based on figures and events being 
transported away from their usual context (in other words a form of anachronism), and this displacement
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the transformation of anachronistic past to relevant present because those victims were 
deemed necessary for the goal of society in the future.
The second form of comedy is described as Humor, a more gentle, seemingly 
more generous and yet patronising smile at those figures in any portrayed scene of 
contemporary society who represent "non-antagonistic" contradictions waiting to be 
ironed out by the course of history. This form of humour claims, according to Keller, to 
have regarded itself as an act of charity, involving a degree of "wesentliche 
Identification". Laughter is thus
genährt von dem im Publikum verbreiteten Wissen einer bereits erfolgten 
geschichtlichen Überwindung eines jahrhundertealten Antagonismus, dem keine 
weiteren gesellschaftlichen Antagonismus nachfolgen werden."6
Essential to this rather more relaxed position is a measure of political liberalisation
which might allow more sanguine reflection on the "contradictions" in the society of the
time. This is suggested by some commentators on GDR history as having set in after the
erection of the Berlin Wall, when the last opportunity of escape from the country was
sealed. Müller himself recollects the hope which permeated the circles of GDR
intelligentsia, including figures who were later to become prominent dissidents, that
however barbaric the Wall might be, it might at the same time promise the blooming of
a thousand flowers of thought.
[W]ir waren ungeheuer froh über die Mauer. Manfred Krug hat sofort einen Film 
gemacht, damals zur Mauer, wie ein Arbeiter einer Betriebskampfgruppe ein 
blondes Mädchen vor der Prostitution in West-Berlin rettet, indem er es noch 
rechtzeitig auf diese Seite der Mauer bringt. Ein ganz rührendes Werk. Wolf 
Biermann hat ein Stück geschrieben mit einer ganz ähnlichen Geschichte. Wir 
fanden alle, daß das das einzig Richtige ist und das einzig Mögliche. Und das 
war auch die einzige Möglichkeit, die ökonomische Ausblutung der DDR zu
is humorous, not what is displaced itself. Almost all of Monty Python or Gary Larson's work fits this 
pattern exactly.
115 Keller, Drama und Dramaturgic Heiner Miillers.op. cit., p. 155.
116 ibid., p. 156.
verhindern. Und wir dachten: Jetzt ist die Mauer da, jetzt kann man in der DDR 
über alles offen reden. Zur gleichen Zeit sagte der Sekretär von Ulbricht zu 
Stephan Hermlin, und das hat er mir später erzählt: Jetzt haben wir die Mauer, 
und daran werden wir jeden zerquetschen, der gegen uns ist."7
Certainly while a very moderate thaw is sometimes seen as setting in in the years after 
August 1961, although this in comparison was still less than the curmudgeonly 
liberalisation which followed Ulbrichts's death and Honecker's confirmation in power, 
the experience of Müller and his director Tragelehn succeeding the performance of Die 
Umsiedlerin seem to tell a different story."'
To recall Benjamin's division of the work of art into Sach- and Wahrheitsgehalt 
(discussed in Chapter One), and how their relationship determines the reception of the 
work in years to come, it could be suggested that two forms of humour are to be found 
in Die Umsiedlerin. The first corresponds to the officially sanctioned comedy of the 
time, where the object of amusement or satire is an easily criticised and detested figure 
or misguided practice, both o f which have no place in the GDR's contemporary self­
representation. It is an easy laugh, an obvious target of ridicule which confirms rather 
than challenges the dominant political ideology, and equally falls short of addressing the 
position of the subject and its material body within that ideology and the society it 
serves and reflects.
The second form of humour present in Die Umsiedlerin is far more dangerous, as 
witnessed by the fate of the play after its opening night. Exemplified by the figure of 
Fondrak, these jokes are coarse, dirty, insulting and transgressive. Often talcing the form 
of bodily humour on the stage, their aim is not to remain content with a self-satisfied 
review of the dialectic of history. They are, it will be argued, an eruption of the present 17
117 Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer 3. pp. 114-5.
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into a narrative: firstly into that story-narrative that makes up the play as a whole, but 
secondly and more significantly they fissure that narrative of history which sees itself as 
already written. The fact that this humour and attitude are banished in the play 
(Fondrak's desertion of the GDR) and that they also lead to the censorship of the play 
within the GDR after its performance must, I will argue, be seen as being the inevitable 
consequence of their congruence in Muller's work. Finally, if part of the material 
content of the play is its humour, then the first sort represents that which is lost over 
time, which weakens the play and which simply is not so funny anymore. This is not 
merely because jokes about Soviet tractors fail to achieve much resonance in late 
Nineties Britain, but also because the form of their humour attempts to foreground the 
present epoch by laughing at the past. That lightning flash of recognition of which 
laughter is the effect"9 is only with difficulty reproduced when any truth content which 
might shine through is dependent upon a material content which does its level best to 
prevent remembrance (as argued above). Preoccupation with the justification of the 
present thus prevents the jouissance of that present coming through.
The easy laugh of historical superiority1“ is most amply represented by the figure 
of Beutler, the milker turned bureaucrat whose opportunism finally leads to him 
receiving his just desserts at the end of the play. While on the one hand a portrayal of
See discussion below.
119 That the lightning flash of the dialectical image can be seen as analogous to the moment of laughter in 
Bataille (and Derrida) has, as far as I am aware, not been properly investigated. One could go further and 
suggest that laughter over a dated joke is dependent upon the then and now (anachronism again) 
appearing momentarily and simultaneously. As hard to define as truth content is, (indeed one would have 
to tell a joke, for example, to allow it to be shown) it would seem that those jokes, just like literature, 
where the truth content cannot be released into a dialectical image with the now (the precondition for the 
truth content in the first place) will not survive as jokes. By satisfying themselves with the inevitability 
and permanence of their present, they become lost to future generations.
120 It is, of course, all too easy to laugh at the humour of the GDR for representing an idea that has had its 
day (state socialism, or the idea of the historical telos itself). This would, however, be to repeat exactly
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such a rotten apple in heart of the local state apparatus might be seen as provocative and 
dangerous -  in that one would have to know the denouement of the play in order to be 
able to sit back, enjoy his downfall and laugh at the representative of long sublated 
social contradictions -  the presentation of the figure of Beutler as caricature (he is very 
much a one-dimensional figure in comparison to Flint, Niet, or even Fondrak) must 
have allowed the audience to laugh at him from the very beginning. It is because he is 
not accorded any role in narrative, be that in the story of the play as a whole (other than 
his switching back and forth between political positions) or in the sense of being 
allowed any history or development of character, that he comes to take on the 
appearance of a symbol. It is then vital that what he is a symbol o f is made immediately 
clear (through his alliances with kulaks and other reactionary elements left over from 
pre-GDR Germany), the temporality of his very flat symbolic character allows him to 
appear as anachronism.
Scene 3 provides a number of examples of the laughter which Beutler is 
expected to provoke. He comes home from a hard day's Machiavellianism, tells Siegfied 
(the FDJ activist), who brings the news of the arrival of the tractors, "Mein Dienst ist 
um. Der Bürgermeister kann mich."121 He orders his wife to pull off his boots and she 
out of spite immediately refuses Niet leave to use the stove. A typically symbolic scene 
follows:
BEUTLER Das Gesetzblatt
Beutler macht aus dem Gesetzblatt eine Fliegenklatsche und jagt Fliegen.
Auftritt Rammler [a kulak].
Ein Fliegenjahr. Verschwind, Frau. Politik.
RAMMLER Dein Speck.
BEUTLER Warst Du beim Landrat?
that historical self-satisfaction I am criticising in the GDR. As already argued above, such a view also 
prevents remembrance of the GDR, that is, in Benjaminian terms, an adequate historicisation itself.
121 Muller, Die Umsiedlerin, op. cit., p. 30.
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RAMMLER Ja.
BEUTLER Und bringst
Den Speck zurück? er hat ihn nicht genommen?
Wars ihm zu wenig?
RAMMLER Er sieht nicht so aus
Als ob er einen Speck von dir geschenkt nimmt.
BEUTLER Der Fleischwolf, der den ganzen Landkreis ausnimmt 
Mit sieben Kindern, jedes Jahr ein Wurf?
RAMMLER Ich red vom neuen Landrat. Deiner sitzt.
BEUTLER Du hast ihm doch den Speck nicht offeriert 
Etwa? Hat er gefragt, warum du kommst?
Was hast du ihm gesagt warum?
RAMMLER Ich will mich
Beschwem, hab ich gesagt. Der Bürgermeister 
Ist mir zu links, hab ich gesagt, und daß du 
Die Bündnispolitik mit Füßen trittst hier.
Ich hab ihm was erzählt von Repressalien 
Altbauemschinden und Neubauemvorziehn.
BEUTLER So? Das war gut. Und er?
RAMMLER Er hat gelacht.
BEUTLER Und dann?
RAMMLER Dann hab ich mich beschwert, weil er
Gelacht hat.122
The 1961 audience is expected to be amused by a number of events and references in 
this passage. Beutler's disrespect for the law is expressed obviously and clumsily and 
the sort of character that he is is immediately emphasised -  that sort around whom flies 
would swarm. The audience thus immediately can regard his transgressive behaviour as 
adhering to a character about whom they can feel secure. The treatment of his wife, 
which should equally have no place in the GDR (as is given considerable expression 
later in the play) and the desecration of the law can provoke the shocked cackle beloved 
of bourgeois audiences elsewhere, but which demonstrates that audience's security at 
being able to laugh at the breaking of such taboos. Only in the knowledge that 
behaviour such as Beutler's is generally not accepted and will be shown to be anti-social 
is that behaviour amusing. The laughter is thus based on the acceptance of a certain
183
implied doxa which might at other times have a quite different effect. One could 
imagine, for example, how such a scene could have been played, or what quite different 
effects it might have produced toward the end of the GDR's life.
Rammler's unsuccessful attempt to bribe the new Landrat represents a more 
obvious version of the humour which relies on the anachronistic character displaying 
itself as such. Already, the state and Party has been successful in replacing corrupt 
members of the bureaucracy, the contradiction of antiquated practices (bribery and 
favouritism) has been resolved by the rational reorganisation of the state apparatus. 
Indeed, the Landrat emphasises the inevitability of historical development by laughing 
himself. As will be seen when that same figure appears later in the play in order to 
resolve the contradictions which have arisen in the story, his laughter seems to represent 
an added dimension which is missing in some of the other comedy in the play and most 
certainly in the events surrounding the actual event of laughter during the play's first 
night. He does not react to Rammler's bribery attempt and reactionary politics other than 
to laugh. While this clearly also represents a firm belief in the strength of his own 
political position, the lack of any further action (such as arrest or castigation) betrays 
confidence that goes beyond simple belief in the progress of history. This will be seen 
on his entrance into the play later, and provides the subversive moment to a theatrical 
device which normally represents par excellence the ideology of absolutism -  the deus 
ex machina.
Much of the humour in the play is analogous to the scene quoted at length above. 
Throughout the play characters (including Beutler and Rammler) are presented as 
coming to terms with the new social and economic environment by trying to gain as
ibid.
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much personal advantage out of it as possible. They simply do not understand that such 
behaviour -  such as trying to bribe an incorruptible Party official -  is pointless and 
indeed counter-productive. An economy run along lines of the common good for all, or 
at least working toward that goal in common, works primarily through a devaluation of 
egoistic behaviour and as such those who still think they can get ahead by putting their 
own interests first instead of those of the collective will merely see themselves 
marginalised and defeated.
The farmers in the play are the best examples of this residual selfishness. While 
one might expect this from the landowners -  the kulaks -  it is perhaps more surprising 
to witness the stubbornness of the ordinary peasant farmer in refusing to understand that 
his interests lie in pooling his productive wealth with others. In the last scene of the play 
Simoneit, "Umsiedler/ Bauer durch Bodenreform'"23 declares that because the newly 
arrived tractors are Volkseigentum he has only part ownership. The concept of common 
ownership he finds difficult to understand:
wenn ich
Simoneit, Bauer und Volksgenosse, Mit- 
Besitzer also am Volkseigentum 
Jetzt meinen Anteil will von meinen Treckern 
Das Rad oder die Schraube, die mir zusteht 
Was krieg ich? Ein Gelächter. Wenn ich aber 
Mir heimlich meine Scheibe abschneid, was wird?
Emst wirds. Drum ist mein Vorschlag der: wir losen
Die Trecker aus, und jeder hat die Chance
Fleisch oder Fisch, wer kriegt, hat, und kein Streit mehr.124
It is this suggestion that proves to be the impulse to the satisfactory denouement of the
play, as the absurdity of sharing agricultural machinery when the land itself is not
shared becomes apparent. The eventual solution is simply collectivisation but at this 123
123 ibid., p. 91.
185
/
point the farmers have to grasp that all have access to the tractors and that a collective 
decision on their use has to be made, rather than having it made for them by the 
bureaucracy. The farmers learn this (through the intervention of the Landrat), are 
brought around to the contemporary way of thinking and thus leave their residual comic 
potential behind them. Not so the kulaks. Figures such as Treiber and Rammler will 
never fit willingly into the new order and either leave or have to be forced into the 
collective (where they will continue to exploit it). Müller sees this not merely as a 
simple historical anachronism, but rather as a result of the particular relationship 
between the land, those who labour and those who have access to capital. In a number of 
scenes in the play, for example Scene 1 (Rammler and Kaffka) and Scene 6 (Rammler, 
Treiber and Fondrak), kulaks attempt to buy labour with their surplus capital, presuming 
not entirely incorrectly that the peasant farmer will have nothing to trade for access to 
that capital apart from their labour itself. While the remaining exploitative relationship 
between labour and capital is seen to have appalling results at the beginning of the play 
(Ketzer's suicide), by Scene 6 the audience is well-informed enough about the progress 
in productive relations depicted in the play for Müller to able to present a highly comic 
scene.124 25 Rammler and Treiber, desperate for labour to work their holdings, now that the 
tables have been turned, attempt to bribe Fondrak with beer and engage in a tug-of-war 
to bring that most unproductive of figures to their field.
Since, therefore, most of the officially sanctioned humour in Die Umsiedlerin is 
intimately tied up with the development and progress of productive forces towards a 
collective and rational conclusion, the relation of those productive forces with its object
124 ibid.
125 ibid., pp. 60-1.
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-  the land -  ought equally, it would seem, to become an object of humour as well as be 
swept up into the synthesis of the new harmonious relationship of collective means of 
production and collectivised land. While the latter development should, according to the 
logic of Marxist-Leninist comic theory, mean that life on the land becomes less amusing 
as time goes on (that is, as the antagonistic relations on the land become sublated) in 
Muller's work the resistance of the land to such Aufliebung both in the present of the 
play as well as its putative future suggest quite another problem: that there will always 
be something to laugh (or cry) about and that the continued existence of this humour 
does not signify simply the yet-to-be synthesised relations of production on the land, but 
rather that laughter cannot be accounted for simply by the inevitability of historical 
progress. Müller sows the seeds in this early work of his critique of such an 
unproblematic view of history, suggesting that there will always be contradictions to be 
overcome (and thus thankfully always laughter in the Kolchose), but also hints that such 
a fundamental characteristic of human existence as laughter subverts the very idea of 
progress towards a historical telos in the first place. Any theory of social and economic 
development that failed to take this into account (a theory of restricted economy) will 
simply find itself and its works subverted by that which it seeks to exclude or overcome 
(its others), namely in Die Umsiedlerin laughter, land and women. Therefore, in the 
final analysis, a body of theory and philosophy such as that of Marxism-Leninism "can 
do or say nothing about this laughter, for it should have 'considered laughter first.""26
One character who has to wrestle with this problem within the play is the FDJ 
activist Siegfried. Like his forefather-namesake, he seems impregnable in the blue of his 126
126 Derrida, From Restricted to General Economy, op. cit., p. 256. Derrida quotes Bataille from 
Conférences sur le non-savoir, Tel Quel 10.
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uniform, (as opposed to the red of the dragon' blood) but has one chink in his moral 
armour. However, rather than having his weak spot between the shoulder blades, in the 
case of Miiller's Siegfried his weakness is to be found, like Flint, between his legs. In 
Scene 8 Siegfried tries to impress upon his love, Schmulka, in the evening meadow the 
passion of economic development where in the end work will cease and "Zeit ist 
umsonst.'"27 Schmulka, however, not unlike Fondrak, sees the possibility of the end of 
want as the fulfilment of desire and she as woman dreams of herself as object of male 
desire:
Abends geh ich zum Tanz im neuen Westkleid 
Wenn ich durchs Dorf geh, hängen alle Weiber 
Im Fenster, alt und junge, schwarz vor Neid 
Weil alle Männer mir nachlaufen, aber 
Ich geh mit keinem, der kein Auto hat.128
In response to Siegfried's protestations that she is not allowed to sleep with everybody 
who has a car, she replies, "Im Kommunismus darf man", to which Siegfried can only 
reply that if everything else will be unnecessary under communism, then morality will 
still go on. This of course contradicts precisely that which he had tried to teach 
Schmulka at the beginning o f the scene: "Im Kommunismus, wenn die Arbeit aufhört/ 
Zeit ist umsonst, Maschinen machen alles[.]'"29 It is of course just that which Siegfried 
would like to do with Schmulka which machines are least capable of doing, and the 
contradiction in his behaviour and argument is compounded by his adherence to a 
morality which asks him to wait for the fulfilment of his desire: "Erst müssen wir den 12*
121 Müller, Die Umsiedlerin, p. 66.
128 ibid., p. 67.
129 ibid., p. 66.
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Kommunismus aufbauen."110 is his response to Schmulka's demand for a declaration of 
his love, repeating later that, in contrast to life after communism, "[n]och ist Zeit".130 31 132
Schmulka, on the other hand, lives only for the moment: "Jetzt oder nie [,..]/Ich 
leb nur einmal, leicht wird keinmal draus.'"31 The contrast between the two characters 
(and there it seems to be no accident that the relationship is exemplified as that between 
man and woman)131 brings once more to mind the economy which seeks to marginalise 
the eruption of the present and laughter, portraying it instead as the archetype of that 
which can be sublated. For Siegfried morality consists of delay and displacement of 
satisfaction into the future, just as laughter within the same theory is robbed of its 
expression in the present and displaced merely as the means of comparison of the 
fulfilled future with the incomplete present. Similarly, just as laughter in Marxist- 
Leninist theory is based on an analogous delay -  that of anachronism -  the timelessness 
of communism about which Siegfried speaks so passionately, the idea of which governs 
action in the present no matter how far away that goal might be, must necessarily make 
laughter itself redundant. It is this notion of transcendence in the idea of communism 
which Müller seems to want to resist, putting in its place that finitude which governs 
human existence as a whole (and which structures all of Bataille's work).
Siegfried himself is forced to recognise this at the end of the scene. Frustrated by 
Schmulka's departure and despite her waywardness, he cannot simply dismiss her, much 
as his head would like to. His body resists and he succumbs to the temptations of the
130 ibid., p. 67.
131 ibid., p. 68.
132 ibid., p. 67.
133 See also Flint's relationship with his partners 
relationship of men to Niet, discussed below.
discussed above, but also the differently charged
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flesh. He wonders also how such facts, such as that of the body itself, can be included in
his supposedly all-encompassing theory:
Als Mitglied hab ich ein Bewußtsein, aber 
Der Mensch ist ein Ensemble, und als Mensch 
Der ein Ensemble ist, hab ich ein Mitglied 
Das kein Bewußtsein hat. Es ist spontan 
Springt von der Linie ab, versteift sich auf 
Den eignen Vorteil, stellt sich gegen die Leitung 
Stößt die Beschlüsse um. Ein Widerspruch.
Wo ist die Lösung?
Sucht in der Literatur. [...]
Im Kommunismus wird man weiter sehn 
Schmulka!
Rennt ab, ohne die Literatur.U4
The refusal by theory (for example, that of Marxism-Leninism) to consider the body and 
laughter as excess first of all represents most strongly the claims o f  this theory to 
transcendence. As such, it is hardly not surprising that it must dismiss that excess which 
undermines such transcendence as "Widerspruch", betrayal or exception that can be 
sublated, expelled or ignored.
This is, of course, exactly that fate which befalls Fondrak in the course of plot, 
as well as that which met the play as a whole after its first performance. Fondrak 
represents that body and laughter, itself representing the finitude that determines human 
existence, which the GDR must take into account first of all. Müller thereby suggests, as 
early as 1961, that there will always be laughter; there will thus always be excess; there 
will always be time. In contrast to those who would place Müller's early work as 
generally affirmative of the regime, it would seem that simply by writing the form of 
comedy that Die Umsiedlerin is, Müller distanced himself, consciously or not, from the 
dominant ideology of the rational progress of productive forces which lead inevitably to 134
134 Müller, Die Umsiedlerin, p. 68.
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a historical telos. While Müller remained in the GDR, enjoying his privileges but also in
the hope that the state could be reformed, from our viewpoint now we can see just how
inimical his politics and philosophy were to that of the socialist state.
Keller quotes Joachim Ritter's comments on the play which seem to suggest that
Müller himself seeks to include the laughable into the deathly seriousness of the GDR
everyday, that is, that the present is laughed at not simply because it will disappear in
deference to the transcendental future, but because the finite body demands it now:
in dem Spiel wird die Zugehörigkeit all dessen zur Lebensordnung erwiesen, 
was für den Emst als das Nichtige und Entgegenstehende außen vor bleiben 
muß. Das Lächerliche wäre in diesem Sinn am Entgegenstehenden das Moment, 
durch das diese seine Zugehörigkeit zur Lebensordnung sichtbar und positiv 
ergriffen werden kann.135
Müller thus in Richter's eyes goes further by suggesting that what is truly ridiculous and 
laughable is firstly the very fact that laughter is excluded and secondly that the 
laughable itself consists of its manifesting itself as what has been excluded as belonging 
to the everyday. The attempted exclusion itself would not only be ridiculous in 
retrospect, but funny at the moment of production of the play. The best example of such 
humour which transgresses the exclusion of excess by affirming its place in the 
everyday Lebensordnung is of course Fondrak.
The figure of Fondrak is funny primarily because he breaks taboos. He hauls the 
excessive into the heart of the community and affirms its constitutive importance. His 
elemental behaviour is presented not only in its own terms, but through it he often 
manages to get the better of those anachronistic figures (such as the kulaks) who hope to 
exploit him for their own ends. Through this very fact, therefore, it would seem that
1)5 Ritter, Joachim, Über das Lachen, in Subjektivität: Sechs Aufsätze, quoted in Keller, Drama und 
Dramaturgie Heiner Müllers, op. cit., p. 169.
191
Müller portrays him as belonging to the community now because he is the means by 
which the anachronistic is displayed as such. On the other hand, it becomes clear by the 
end of the play that the ideology of production and collectivism cannot support such a 
figure and the transgression per se of this ideology is either inadmissible or impossible. 
Fondrak thus leaves for the West, in effect externalised as the Entgegenstehende for 
good. The humour which is to be found, as Ritter suggests, in the momentary inclusion 
of the transgressive ends with the expulsion of Fondrak, for as totally excluded he can 
not bring about transgression. Accordingly any humour in the play after Fondrak's 
departure is based solely on the revelation of future productive powers which make the 
selfish or uninformed behaviour of some of the players laughable.
A number of examples of Fondrak's elemental humour were given earlier in the 
chapter. Two more are notable for the direct involvement of the audience in the moment 
of laughter, emphasising once more the difference in Fondrak's effect to that of the 
humour of historical anachronism. In the case of Fondrak, the audience is directly 
spoken to or gestured at, or is shown something rather than having an ideology 
reactivated to repeat what is essentially exactly the same point.
In Scene 11 Fondrak cheats a priest out of his motorbike (in direct contrast to 
Flint who has had his push-bike confiscated by the same priest immediately 
beforehand), repairs it and sells it on to a debt administrator (also earlier seen at the 
suicide of Ketzer) who wants to flee to the West. Fondrak can thus seemingly be 
productive when he so wishes, but we are left in no doubt as to what use he will put his 
winnings. In answer to the query as to how to stop the bike, Fondrak replies,
Such dir einen Baum aus oder eine Mauer. Was du willst. Es kann auch ein
Heuschober sein für den Anfang. Auf dem Mond wirst du damit nicht landen.
Erfasser ab.
Wasser in Wein verwandeln, das kann jeder
192
Doch die Verwandlung einer christlichen 
Vierhundertfünfziger BMW in Bier 
Verehrtes Publikum, sehn Sie nur hier.1“
A few moments later in Scene 13 Fondrak is once more the object of a bribery attempt
from Rammler and Treiber who want to make him Bürgermeister. He receives a cigar,
and is then asked whether he can write. He signs a piece of paper -  which is then
directly communicated to the audience -  "Schei-ße", thereby not only giving a suitable
response to the machinations of the kulaks, but indirectly signing his most memorable
attributes -  expulsion, expenditure, excess. He then immediately manages to turn the
tables on the landowners and is showered with more cigars to keep him quiet.
As argued above, the humour which emanates from the figure of Fondrak is of
two kinds -  while he partakes in the ridicule of those who represent reaction, he also
encourages in the audience an immediate response to what is happening on the stage
now, without reference to an idea which will find fulfilment in the future. It thus
represents an active forgetting of the future or of the present as means to that future, and
instead provokes the interruption of the present into the historical process. Certain
episodes of Fondrak's humour express themselves therefore as the sovereignty of the
present when it has no reference to anything but itself and thus immediately disappears.
The humour Fondrak might provoke in the audience is that of a sovereign laughter
which has no object which it negates and sublates; it rather just momentarily is. Bataille
writes of the sovereign moment with regard to the productive process, but the analogy to
laughter within the GDR is plain to see.
The sovereign restores to the primacy of the present the surplus share of 
production, acquired to the extent that men submitted to the primacy of the 
future. The sovereign, epitomizing the subject, is the one by whom and for 136
136 Müller, Die Umsiedlerin, p. 82.
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whom the moment, the miraculous moment is the ocean into which the streams 
of labor disappear.157
Sovereign laughter thus cannot be said to present itself at all to any discourse; it 
interrupts that discourse frustrating any attempt to capture it by knowledge or -  what is 
particularly relevant to the officially sanctioned form of humour to be found in Die 
Umsiedlerin -  any form of dialectics.
Laughter alone exceeds dialectics and the dialectician: it bursts out only on the 
basis of an absolute renunciation of meaning, an absolute risking of death, what 
Hegel calls abstract negativity. A negativity that never takes place, that never 
presents itself, because in doing so it would start to work again.137 38 13940
To put laughter to work, or at least to attempt to do so, would be to deny what laughter
is. It is merely a movement or moment of expenditure and of loss:
The general economy, in the first place, makes apparent that excesses of energy 
are produced, and that by definition, these excesses cannot be utilized. The 
excessive energy can only be lost without the slightest aim, consequently 
without any meaning. It is this useless, senseless loss that is sovereignty.159
Derrida confirms this idea of the sovereign moment without meaning to be witnessed in
laughter (and amongst other things in tears and the festival1*0) by describing it as the
"affirmation in the play outside meaning. Not a reserve or withdrawal [...], but a kind of
potlatch of signs that bums, consumes, and wastes words in the gay affirmation of
deathf.]'"41 Sovereign laughter is therefore not self-control -  the discipline of a body for
the benefit of a discourse expressed as morality or philosophy of history -  but instead
the laughing surrender to the risk of breakdown of bodily integrity and therefore by
extension to the essential disintegration of the body which ends in death. What is more,
137 Bataille, AS 11 & III, p. 241. Spelling is American.
138 Derrida, From Restricted to General Economy, op. cit., p. 256.
139 Bataille quoted in Derrida, ibid., p. 270.
140 Bataille, AS II & III, p. 242: "Subjectivity is never the object of discursive knowledge, except 
obliquely, but it is communicated from subject to subject through a sensible, emotional contact: it is 
communicated in this way in laughter, in tears, in the commotion of the festival...."
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the sovereign laughter which might occur in the production of Muller's work takes place
in a shared arena, or more pointedly a communal ritual, that of theatre. The sovereign
laughter of and at finitude communicates community itself, not merely because one
laughs with others at the same time, but because laughter itself communicates the
fmitude of the other. Furthermore Die Umsiedlerin discloses, partly through laughter,
partly through other means, the constitutive nature of particular alterities to homogenous
thought (excess itself, land and women) and how this thought is thereby pulled apart.
As argued above, the comedy discussed in Marxist-Leninist theory has a quite
different role. It seeks to negate the anachronism presented to the audience, in order to
sublate it into the social and productive synthesis that is communism. While this form of
humour seeks to persist for as long as contradictions appear in socialist society, the sort
of sovereign laughter which is nothing more than a hilarious affirmation of the finitude
of human existence cannot negate anything: "Laughter is not the negative because its
burst does not maintain itself, is neither linked up to itself nor summarized in a
discourse: laughs at the Aufhebung.'"*2 Laughter resists Aufhebung because it is a
momentary expression of subjectivity, and not an object which can be negated and used:
In laughter there is not one object that independently determines the same effects 
in the different laughters. The objective working of the mechanism can perhaps 
be grasped, but what is missing from it is the subjectivity of the laughter, which 
is not expressible discursively, but in which the laughers sense an unforeseen, 
astonishing transparency from one to the other[.]14 243
This makes the any attempt to use it through the activity of Aufhebung utterly ridiculous
and absurd:
What is laughable is the submission to the self-evidence of meaning, to the force 
of this imperative: that there must be meaning, that nothing must be definitely
141 Derrida, From Restricted to General Economy, op. cit., p.274.
142 ibid., note 11., p. 335.
143 Bataille, AS 11 & III, p. 242.
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lost in death, or further, that death should receive the signification of "abstract 
negativity", that a work must always be possible which, because it defers 
enjoyment, confers meaning, seriousness, and truth upon the "putting at stake." 
This submission is the essence and element of philosophy, of Hegelian 
ontologies.144
This brings us once again to the discussion on the problems of academic writing on 
laughter. That laughter and Fondrak's humour in particular is put to work in order to 
play a role in the argument of this chapter is undeniable. The laughter which Fondrak 
provokes, however, escapes even this employment by demonstrating the consequent 
ridiculous nature of any such argument. In other words, humour, the absurd and laughter 
return and subvert any attempt to put them to work. The only response can be a periodic 
surpassing or transgression of the limits in order to return within the confines of those 
limits (here of academic discourse) in order to facilitate their repeated transgression.
On the one hand therefore, one can only laugh and transgress in order to return 
to within the limits of discourse, be they of the university or the theatre, but on the other 
the manner of that return has to be carefully scrutinised. Derrida himself warns against 
the association of the "potlatch of signs" and the accumulation of the energy which is 
expended, while at the same time insisting that any social or communitarian benefit 
which might be communicated by laughter or other sovereign activity can only have any 
meaning, be organised or accounted for within the confines which laughter erupts 
through:
The consumption of the excess o f energy by a determined class is not the 
destructive consuming of meaning, but the significative reappropriation of a 
surplus value within the space o f restricted economy. From this point of view, 
sovereignty is absolutely revolutionary. But it is also revolutionary as concerns a 
revolution which would only reorganize the world of work and would 
redistribute values within the space of meaning, that is to say, still within
ibid., pp. 256-7. My emphasis.
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restricted economy. This last movement [...] is rigorously necessary, but as a 
phase within the strategy of general economy.'45
Sovereignty is revolutionary therefore not only in the context of a capitalist economy
which organises itself on the appropriation of excess value, but also, as we have seen in
the case of Die Umsiedlerin, where meaning is appropriated by a bureaucratic class in
order to justify a particular development of productive forces. Since a certain laughter is
aimed at the necessary ««productiveness in the human condition, the sovereignty
encapsulated momentarily in such laughter equally has no place in the "productive"
society that was real existing socialism.
Sovereignly in the Soviets
The lack of a successful proletarian uprising within Germany was a matter of constant
regret for Müller, but simultaneously a source of constant explanation. In a number of
interviews he sees the failure of the German left as the beginning of a process that came
back indirectly, via the Soviet Union, to haunt Germany again.
Und dann 1918 die Enthauptung der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, der Tod Rosa 
Luxemburgs und Karl Liebknechts. Damit war der Anschluß der deutschen 
Arbeiterbewegung an Moskau -  die Abhängigkeit von Lenin -  programmiert. 
Und die DDR war nur noch eine Grenzbefestigung von Stalin, nichts weiter, 
diese Volksdemokratien waren lauter Grenzbefestigungen.145 46
The socialist society in the DDR was thus not brought about by the risk of revolution,
but by the imposition of an imperial, military power. Bataille goes further to suggest
that there has never been a successful revolution by the proletariat against an established
bourgeois order. The great revolutions of the world have all been against a collapsing
145 Derrida, From Restricted to General Economy, op. cit., note 33, p. 337.
146 Müller, Gesammelte Irrtümer Hl. p. 91.
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feudal regime in an undeveloped, agricultural economy. These revolts were aimed in the 
first instance at the sovereignty of the aristocratic or clerical classes, that is, at the 
measure of their senseless consumption that was expended without reserve. Each 
revolution, for Bataille, prepared the way for the industrial economy of accumulation 
and as such the events in Russian in 1917 or in China in 1949 do not differ markedly 
from those upheavals which brought about the onset of the industrial revolution in 
Western Europe.
We are passing from the primacy of sovereign works, tied to agricultural 
predominance and the feudal order, to the primacy of accumulation. The basic 
determination, in the superstructure of a society, involves the use of the excess 
resources for the production of the means of production.'47
The difference between the accumulative production of the means of production in
socialist and capitalist countries lies in the importance in the latter of the profitability of
a particular sector, firm or enterprise determining its development. In other words, the
communal ownership of the means of production is supposed to insure that the primary
aim of the economy is to maintain growth in the means of production -  Stalin gives the
example of the continued support to "loss-making" heavy industry to the detriment of
the manufacture of consumer goods. Any release of the latter's potential would harm the
Soviet national economy, "because the national economy cannot be continuously
expanded without giving primacy to the production of the means of production."148 The
individual ownership of the means of production by the capitalist inhibits growth
because s/he is driven by the desire to generate the biggest possible profit, only part of
which will be re-invested in the means of production. The rest is creamed off by the
capitalist him/herself for personal expenditure, which although not on the same level of 147
147 Bataille, AS II & 111, p. 291.
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exuberance as that of the feudal aristocracy, still allows the possibility of luxury as 
opposed to the simple subsistence of the worker.
The difference between the necessary work performed by the labourer to produce 
a level of subsistence and the actual value s/he produces is, under capitalism, the surplus 
value which is extracted by the capitalist. Bataille notes that Soviet economic theory 
refuses to draw the distinction between surplus and necessary labour because the former 
goes to provide the means of supporting "necessary" products and services, such as 
health, education and the military as well as being used to expand the means of 
production. With this establishment of universal necessity within the economic arena, a 
realm of freedom is lost:
On the part of the bourgeois, accumulation was the result of a choice; the 
bourgeois were, and they remain, free to invest their resources in productive 
enterprises; they were free to indulge rather in extravagant spending. The 
workers, if they accumulate, emphasize the necessity that accumulation satisfies; 
by this very fact, they dismiss -  at least temporarily -  the possibility o f giving 
the present moment precedence over the future.149
It goes without saying that the necessary surplus produced by the workers in the
command economy did not go directly into the provision of the necessary services. It
was instead expropriated by the state or state-owned enterprises and reinvested in those
services or industries which the state regarded as most important, whereby the military
were particularly privileged.
The direction of the surplus of necessary labour into particular sectors of the 
economy (be it health, education, military or into the growth of the means of 
production) might be thought of as the end goal of production itself. Socialist 
production would thus serve as its end the satisfaction of needs of the population for a 148
148 Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, quoted in Bataille, ibid., p. 293.
good health service or education system. Bataille insists, however, that these can equally 
be seen as the means to reproduce the means of production, be it through a well- 
educated and skilled workforce, a workforce free from ill-health, injury or military 
threats from outside. Bataille goes on to find in the same essay by Stalin quoted earlier 
exactly what was seen by Soviet economists (at least those loyal to Stalin) as the real 
end of production. Criticising other Soviet economists (who presumably soon after 
experienced at first hand a rather harder form of labour) who sought to describe the end 
of production as production itself, Stalin insists that the aim and goal of production is 
man and the satisfaction of his needs.
If the satisfaction of the needs of man is the end of production, then this does not
mean the present needs of the population but those of the idea of man as complete and
whole in the future. The goal of communism thus comes to dictate the development of
the means of production not so much through a crude implementation of an idea of
Utopia, but rather through an ideology of the self-fulfilment over history of the idea of
man and his needs. Production seems therefore to serve his ends rather than the other
way around, and yet the idea of man, which reveals itself in communism as the goal of
production, is in fact that of man as producer.
Stalin arguing against Yaroschenko [Soviet economist], who paradoxically 
limits value to productivity, does not cite desire, but "man and his needs," which 
may be different from productivity, but not very different. For this man, cited by 
Stalin, is above all a producer and the satisfaction of his needs, far from harming 
production, serves to increase it.150
Thus while the unproductive expenditure described by Bataille as constitutive of human 
existence is a possibility in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, it can only be admitted if it
1,9 Bataille, AS II & 111, p 296. 
150 ibid., p. 314.
corresponds to those values that have been declared to be immanent in man as primarily 
a productive animal. Bataille reacts with severity to this conclusion, accusing 
communism of putting the needs of productive life in the place of "the desire that man 
passionately, capriciously is."151 152Man becomes therefore the sovereign end of labour, but 
only at the cost of sacrificing that sovereignty which the periodic transgression of the 
limits of existence brings about. The worker sacrifices his/her sovereignty not so much 
so another can enjoy the fruits of his/her labour (as in feudal times, or to a lesser extent 
in capitalism), but rather for the idea of fulfilled man "whose requirements are measured 
against the need to ensure and increase production.'"52 Renouncing one's sovereignty for 
an idea of oneself that will only be determined in the future therefore acts theoretically 
as a powerful boost to an economy of accumulation.
For man to be fulfilled, and for the progress toward this goal to be an expression 
of the idea coming to itself, a gradual erasure of differentiation within society must take 
place. As all members of society are representatives of "man", all have the same needs 
which will be satisfied by the accumulation of the means of production. The expression 
of the idea of man continues the desire to distance oneself from the animality of nature. 
Bataille argues that this movement was precisely the same one which set up the 
beginning of exploitation by human beings of each other, that is, by regarding one 
person or class as less worthy of respect, as more "animal" and thus as more distanced 
from the characteristics of what defined the human. In socialist society, however, the 
idea of man is employed in order to eliminate class distinction. This contradiction is laid 
bare by Bataille thus:
151 ibid., p. 315.
152 ibid., p. 322.
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If  the universal man of communism has a value so great that it is criminal to 
exploit him, he gets it from the ancient "curse of man by man." The man of 
"classless society" owes the value in the name of which he destroyed the classes 
to the very impulse that divided humanity into classes.153
In this sense, the desire that man "passionately and capriciously" is, and which becomes
manifested in moments of sovereign action still exists in a displaced form in a society
which has as its aim the eradication of all sovereign heterogeneity. By wanting to
eliminate the differences in access to capital, the practice of Marxism-Leninism sought
also to eliminate the sovereign expression of the human subject's relation to their own
finitude. Sovereignty is expressed, we might remind ourselves, in the momentary
transgression of the limits of human existence, primarily in social rituals which in turn
express the shared fmitude of human existence. This fmitude can only be shared if it is
particular, if the subject has its own particular finitude to contend with, even if that can
only be registered and understood through the finitude of others. By attempting to
sublate sovereignty by displacing the fruits of labour onto an idealised notion of
"productive man", communism sought to rob the human subject of what defined it most
strongly: a relationship to its death through the deaths of others, either through the
notion o f  sacrifice for the future goal o f unalientated, fully productive man or by
repressing acts of sovereignty which sought to express that same relationship to the
other and community. No-one can perhaps blame Marx or Lenin for seeking a remedy
to the iniquitous social conditions of feudal society or early industrial capitalism, but the
defining repressive moment of their work emanated from the desire to eliminate that
heterogeneity which had been expressed in the economic relationship of sovereign and
servant.
153 ibid., p. 337.
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Clearly, socialist societies had not attained complete undifferentiation between
classes and subjects. The very need for a state, the fact that it had not withered away and
indeed employed an army of bureaucrats to administer it, was demonstrative proof of
the still transformative nature of socialist society. The idea of communism and man had
not yet been fulfilled, and thus in the name of these ideas, social differentiation was still
necessary. The difference between this state of affairs and that of the capitalist world
was that such differentiation and privilege was enacted in the name of what was
regarded as an objective idea -  that of the fulfilment of productive man. Thus, as
Bataille argues, sovereignty is renounced with the aim of producing undifferentiated
equality, and "the objectivity of power takes its place.'"54
The necessary social heterogeneity and differentiation through which
sovereignty had come to be expressed are sacrificed; put in their place is a form of
social differentiation which manifests itself as an objective homogeneity. The power
which is wielded in socialist society is not an expression of the particular economic
relationship between lord and servant or capitalist and labourer, but instead the
necessary, objective expression of the production of the means of production for the
ends of "man". Those who were in positions of power would have been, ideally,
oblivious to the consequence of their personal standing and any material advantages that
they might have gained from their position were
the signs of a culminating effectiveness on the part of the power holders, but this 
effectiveness [was] collective: for each one it [was] a matter of participating as 
best as he [could] in the general effectiveness and, situated within an immense 
activity, of coming as close as possible to those who control it.155
,54ibid„ p. 351. 
155 ibid., p. 350-1
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It should not be forgotten, however, that one of the reasons the production of the
means of production took such precedence was because of the failure of revolutions in
industrialised Western Europe. Socialism in One Country found particular urgent
reasons to concentrate on the accumulation of the means of production and this, together
with the development of the objectivity o f  power relations within the country led to the
establishment of adherence to such a policy as a test of loyalty. If heterogeneous
subjectivity came to be expressed, and Bataille suggests that the nature of the finitude of
the human subject demanded such expression, then the differences which bourgeois
freedoms hold most dear could only be repressed.
Furthermore, Bataille suggests that the objective power that the state was obliged
to wield was, because of the failure o f friendly Communist parties (including most
importantly Germany) to establish themselves in other countries, expressed militarily.
Production and accumulation whose end was supposed to be man, found itself instead
manifested in military power and it was this constellation which was then imposed on
the GDR, by definition from the outside. Müller, in a short article written for Neues
Deutschland one month after the fall of the Wall, expresses it thus:
Die feudalsozialistische Variante der Aneignung des Mehrwerts, Ausbeutung mit 
anderen Mitteln, ist die Konsequenz aus der Stalinschen Fiktion des Sozialismus 
in einem Land, deren Realisierung zur Kolonisierung der eignen Bevölkerungen 
in den osteuropäischen Ländern geführt hat. Das Volk als Staatseigentum, eine 
Leibeigenschaft neuen Typs.156
In the final analysis, the repression of sovereignty and heterogeneity in favour of 
the objectivity of power and homogeneity might be seen to originate from the notion of 
how productive behaviour, which is the defining characteristic of man, comes to negate
156 Müller, Plädoyer für den Widerspruch, Neues Deutschland. 14.12.1989, also collected in Gesammelte 
Irrtümer III. pp. 34-5.
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that which is other and sublate it in the name of utility. In other words, what is other can 
always be negated and acquired, proscribing the possibility again of sovereign 
behaviour which by definition is a transgression of the limits of existence in order to 
reveal the other as other, be it death, the other person or the unassimilable in nature. Just 
such alterities come to the fore in Die Umsiedlerin, putting into question not only the 
relation of the subject to accumulation and production, but of that subject to the 
transgression of its limits (such as in laughter at Fondrak), to its sexual other and to the 
land.
Life on the Land
In Die Umsiedlerin the land is portrayed as elemental, as a source of productivity and 
thus as object. It has to be worked, or in terms of materialist dialectics, it must be 
"negated" in order for its productivity to become apparent. However, this does not take 
place in a neutral environment, but one, at least where Marxism-Leninism is concerned, 
where labour and its products are put to use in order further to produce the means of 
production. The fecundity of land is regarded principally as the result of the negating act 
of labour, that is, the land becomes subject to human organisation in such a manner as to 
bring it into the process of accumulation which serves the end of production -  that of 
"man". The very idea of negation in Marxism-Leninism, therefore, is dependent upon 
the goal towards which every negation gestures. The land has to be overcome, be it 
through improved technology or more progressive forms of social organisation in order 
for it to become more useful. As such, the productivity and fecundity of the land might 
be regarded as two different things. The ideology along whose lines agricultural work is
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organised in Die Umsiedlerin is less interested in the bare fact of whether the land can 
be tilled or not, but rather the end to which it can be put. Land is fecund (actually or 
potentially to greater and lesser degrees) but any judgement on its productivity brings a 
great many factors into play, principally in this context, how best the ends of man might 
be served.
Throughout Midler's play, however, the land is shown to offer up resistance. 
Those who live on it never manage to bring it fully under control for their own 
purposes. The land remains stubbornly heterogeneous to the planned economy of the 
GDR, to its project and even to the technology employed on their behalf. The problem 
comes therefore to be seen as the inadequacy of the notion of negation when faced with 
something as fundamental as the land which refuses to forgo its alterity, but which 
simultaneously proves itself to be constitutive of the human subject. Müller seeks to 
gesture towards this by demonstrating that the land is not simply a passive object 
waiting for human intervention, but it and the animals, which farmers similarly hope to 
exploit, consume also. In Scene 2, the ruined Ketzer, who has just murdered his horse 
rather than let it be confiscated by the kulak and his debt collector, bemoans his fate as 
peasant farmer.
Die Hauptsache am Bauern ist das Vieh 
Er ist kein Mensch ohne, er kann sich kopfstelln 
Sein Feld sein Grab, mit seinen Knochen düngt ers 
Und vor der Ernte erntet sein Feld ihn 
Er feiert Kirmes zwischen den sechs Brettern.
Ein Vieh macht keinen Bauern ohne Knecht 
Die Kuh melkt ihn, der Gaul legt ihm den Zaum an 
Der Staat macht ihn zur Sau und stopft ihn pfundweis 
Dem Volk ins Maul[.]157
157 Müller, Die Umsiedlerin, p. 29.
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Instead of being lord over the land he surveys, the peasant farmer becomes its serf, 
serving it even in death by fertilising it through the decay of the body. The land is 
simply more than, and in excess of, the peasant farmer; he may eke out an existence on 
it with his labour but it will always be a struggle. The only farmers who might find it 
easier are those with capital to spare and who can thus afford either the labour of others 
or a higher standard of technology and thus do not work on the land at all. The peasant 
farmer, as will become clear as the play goes on, has only one option: to join with others 
like him and work collectively on the land, for otherwise he will remain its victim.
Through the course of the play, therefore, the audience is invited to regard the 
struggle with the land and for the tools to work it as another site of struggle between the 
classes. Ketzer's death came about because he was not in a position of power over the 
kulak with working capital to spare and it is thus suggested that if the right forms of 
social organisation are found, then such exploitation of one farmer by another, and thus 
the exploitation of the farmer by the land he works, will come to an end. At the 
beginning of the play, however, the old social relations on the land still persist. When 
one kulak attempts to demonstrate his solidarity with the peasants, the response is harsh 
enough to indicate that change is coming:
KAFFKA Wir kommen aus verschiednen Müttern, Rammler
Und wenn mein Hund dich anpißt, sind wir quitt.
Mein erstes Bett war deine Ackerfurche
Hoferbe vor dem ersten Schiß warst du.
Mein Acker ist zu schad für deine Stiefel.
Geh mir vom Feld, Kulak.15'
On the other hand, the farmer on the land is also faced with the orders and regulations 
handed down from bureaucrats and intellectuals from the cities who have little or no
ibid., p. 24.
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idea as to the day-to-day existence of the farmers themselves. One such city-dweller is 
seen in Scene 5 to be cursing the dirt, dogs and general lack of co-operation from those 
he presumes to be helping.
Dreckbauem. Eine Schußwaffe werde ich beantragen zur Selbstverteidigung.
Oder ich schule um und geh in die Kultur. Zieht eine Wurst aus der Tasche, ißt.
Der Bauer kultiviert den Boden, wir kultivieren den Bauern. Das ist die
Kulturrevolution. Ich pflüge Hirne, wie der Dichter sagt.15’
These antagonistic relations between competing classes on the land or between city and 
land or finally intellectual and proletariat (agricultural or industrial) could be seen, 
however as merely temporary. Just as some of the humour of the play rests upon the 
inevitability of historical progress, so does a partial, restricted consideration of the 
relation between the classes presented in the play seem to promise the possibility of 
their reconciliation. Such harmony is, of course, only attainable through a development 
and accumulation of the means of production.
A fuller reading o f Die Umsiedlerin would seem to throw up far more problems, 
however, for in the play the primary points of friction are to be found between what is 
heterogeneous or other to labour and thus the process of accumulation. If that which is 
other cannot be negated within the system and carried forward to the next stage of 
history, then it has to be suppressed or expelled. While one example of such suppression 
would be that of the residual capitalists on the land, the attempt is made in the GDR 
depicted in the play, as has been argued a number of times in this chapter, to forbid any 
behaviour which results in useless expenditure and overcome any resistance which 
might be offered up by the processes of production. Die Umsiedlerin demonstrates, 
however, that the land can never be fully negated and that unproductive behaviour will 159
159 ibid., p. 42.
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always return. The very attempt to repress their otherness results instead in an 
impoverishment of the community, but far worse, the objectification of relations of 
power to the detriment of those who are supposed to gain from the new social forms.
Despite the forced collectivisation of land which the last scene portrays, the 
audience is not allowed to be left to ponder the successful completion of socialist 
agricultural policy. It is made perfectly clear by Flint that although social progress and 
technology might be thought to have turned the tables in the relationship of humans and 
nature, the work on the land will always leave something more, it will always produce 
an excess which "negation" cannot account for. As is also seen in the final scene, the 
"solution" of technology, if tied to an ideology of production and accumulation simply 
succeeds in stamping out that which is different or heterogeneous to the inevitable 
course of history -  in this case the farmer who resists collectivisation. The land itself 
will instead continue to outlive the farmer, provoking the melancholic last line of the 
play, itself echoing speeches by farmers throughout the piece as a whole.
Das Feld ging übern Bauern und der Pflug
Seit sich die Erde umdreht in der Welt.
Jetzt geht der Bauer über Pflug und Feld.
Die Erde deckt uns alle bald genug.160
Complete negation and sublation of the land simply never happens for Müller. If only 
because we will all end up as part of the land, swallowed up and sublated by it, rather 
than the other way around, it is facile to attempt to conceive it as part of the self- 
realisation of the idea of man. Throughout the play, the audience is faced with a quite 
different proposition; that precisely that which cannot be negated or put to use has a 
constitutive role, a different sort of fecundity, in the subjectivity of the human being.
160ibid.,p. 111.
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The important quality of the land, therefore, is precisely that it does offer up 
resistance, or to be more exact, that it escapes any attempt to categorise it or include it in 
a programme which would negate precisely that which we find so heterogeneous to our 
limited existence. The fecundity of the land lies in its consumption and exuberant 
expenditure which set it apart from the human existence lived within limits. In such 
fecundity it thus displays its alterity to human organisation, an alterity which is only 
experienced by human subjects in moments of bodily or communal expenditure. That 
the land is not us, that it is other to us, constitutes our very subjectivity, and yet the land 
becomes instead in industrial society simply yet another means to reproduce the means 
of production. It is thus no accident, for Bataille, that the agricultural pre-industrial 
world was that where "sovereign works" were dominant (in other words, where the 
feudal lord enjoyed the fruits of others' labour through sumptuous expenditure) for at 
this point work on the land was not tied up with an ideology of accumulation.161
In MUller's play, or at least to those reading or watching it now, it becomes 
gradually clear that the attempt to overcome the land and bring it under the control of 
"man" and for his ends justifies a political and economic regime which steadily erodes 
the freedom and capacity of the society's members to think and act differently. This 
itself stems from attempting to exclude moments of sovereign expenditure from the 
body of society, and it would seem from the evidence of Die Umsiedlerin that this then 
prevents the society from experiencing the land as other. The land will thus always be 
seen as something to be overcome, where complete subordination to the full 
development o f the means of production is the goal of economic activity.
161 That agricultural festivals mostly concern themselves with the celebration o f the exuberance of the 
earth is further confirmation of this point.
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There is, however, a danger inherent in any attempt to think of the constitutive 
role of any alterity in the subjectivity or forms of self-understanding of the human 
subject. If, for Bataille, this alterity can only be experienced in moments of 
transgression, then the return within the limits of restricted economy must not preface 
any attempt to think that one has done enough simply by labelling the land as other -  
this would be simply to accord the land a property like any other object which can be 
named and "negated", and thus it would not be other anymore. Instead, it is only in the 
periodic moments o f transgression that the general economy of human existence (in this 
case human intercourse with the land) can be experienced and, what is more, 
experienced as other. Trying to think about the constitutive alterity of the land within 
the terms of restricted economy leads us only into aporia, and it is there where 
responsible thought must remain. Other approaches to this problem, which indulge in 
the "piety of the other", run the risk of hypostasising what they laud as other, for 
example by mourning the separation of "man” from nature and encouraging a return of 
man to his roots in nature. However, living on the land and foregoing particular 
technology cannot by itself promise social reconciliation, as Die Umsiedlerin shows, 
and importantly Muller himself falls prey to the tendency to reify what is other in his 
portrayal of women in the play, as will be discussed below. Instead, the relations 
between the human subjects and their environment in the play, the struggle between the 
classes and the land which forms the centre of the action, need to be seen not as a class 
struggle which will achieve reconciliation at some point in the future, but a class 
struggle which takes place in the relations of power between those who reap the benefits 
of production and those whose power lies in their very alterity to an ideology of 
production and accumulation which serves the ends of "man". In other words, the power
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of the underprivileged producing classes lies in their not producing, in their moments of 
unproductive expenditure -  not only because it brings accumulation to a halt, but 
because it could bring about a general rather than a restricted understanding of the 
economy of human society. In Marxism-Leninism, of course, it is the producing power 
of the agricultural and industrial proletariat which will bring about their liberation, after 
this power has been realised through withdrawal of labour from the capitalist economy.
Women
If class struggle is thus to be seen as primarily a battle over the aim of 
production between those who reap the benefits of production and those who power lies 
in the transgression of the ideology of production, then certain figures, as the 
representatives of certain classes in Die Umsiedlerin exemplify such transgression. 
Fondrak manifests the characteristics of the Lumpenproletariat who illuminate the 
contradictions of the notion of utility, while the female characters in the play, notably 
Niet, Schmulka, and Flinte 1 and 2 serve to undermine the apparent self-evident nature 
of male dominance in the post war GDR. Towards the end of the play, Müller clearly 
attempts to right this bias: Niet turns down the patronising, if well-meaning, offer of 
marriage from a peasant farmer and gets a field of her own (albeit the one which was 
originally assigned to Fondrak, and which will of course be dissolved into the collective 
a few years later). Flinte 1, for so long the victim of Flint's dalliances, instead of 
enacting revenge, apparently chooses the more rational route of educating her successor, 
Flinte 2, on how to keep her man interested.
FLINTE 1 zu Flinte 2, die [Flint] nachlaufen will: Hier bleibst du. Willst du
dich wegschmeißen? Vielleicht blätterst du ihm noch die Seite um, wenn er die
Gleichberechtigung auswendig lernt. Setz ihm Hörner auf, dann weiß er, was er 
an dir hat.162
The play seems to demonstrate that women are on the way to achieving equality of
opportunity when even Flint, for so long committed, well-meaning and utterly
misogynist, accepts that his behaviour is unacceptable.
FLINTE 1 Was sich eine Frau vom Mann gefalln läßt, ist auch Staatsverrat hier. 
Hab ich recht, Bürgermeister?
FLINT [...] Sie hat Recht, was?'"
This equality of opportunity is restricted, if still hugely important. Women are
not only given the right to work, but are actively encouraged to become productive
members of society in a sense other than simply remaining child-minders. On the other
hand, that activity too is regarded as productive work, as not only the strength of Flinte's
arguments show in Scene 9, but also in the last scene by the reaction of the activists to
the kulak Treiber who continues to resist collectivisation.
Mein Leben lang hab ich mich abgeschunden 
Vier Liter Schweiß pro Tag auf jeden Hektar.
In meinem Stall steht kein Stück Vieh, das nicht 
Von mir wär. Über meine Zähne ist 
Kein Happen Fleisch gekommen, den ich nicht 
Mir von den Rippen erst hab schneiden müssen.
ARBEITER Und deiner Frau.164
The reference to the biblical myth of the creation of woman is clear, but here quite the 
opposite is being asserted. The idea that the man provides and is responsible for the 
woman, be it mythically or materially, is denied; from the very beginning woman 
laboured as much as man in providing the conditions for man to labour and produce 
outside the home. Under GDR socialism, therefore, women have their historical legacy 
recognised -  that they provided the conditions for production -  but they are also freed to
162 MUller, Die Umsiedlerin, p. 100
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become paid labourers themselves. The question that would remain would be whether 
the "man" to whose needs the development of the means of production is directed really 
does designate humankind, or just one privileged part of the population.
While the women in the agricultural community, by the end of Die Umsiedlerin, 
have attained equal employment opportunities, their sexual difference is characterised 
principally throughout the play by their ability to bear children. Fondrak in his typically 
ironic and yet observant manner sees himself as especially moral because he is 
promiscuous:
Ich hab die Moral: der Kommunismus braucht mehr Leute, daß er schnell geht, 
und aus einer Frau, wenns hochkommt, kommt im Jahr ein Kind, Zwillinge sind 
schon ein Glücksfall. Überall, steht in der Zeitung, steigern sie die Produktion 
jetzt. Da muß sich die Moral auch nach der Decke strecken.'65
The manner in which this property is recuperated in order to insist on the equality of the
sexes is to regard child-bearing as the reproduction of the means of production (that is, a
new labour force). Women thus automatically become associated with a form of
reproduction which differs from labour as the negation of the environment, and is more
akin to the fecundity of the land. It goes without saying that this need not be the case.
The act o f fecundity involves both sexes, but women in the GDR of Die Umsiedlerin as
well as elsewhere become regarded as symbols of fertility because childbirth and rearing
their offspring has not been paid labour. In this sense that fact that some cultures might
regard women as fecund is not merely because their bodies "give" the child; it is more
pertinent that the socio-economic organisation of child-rearing subsequent to the birth is
organised so that it is set apart from the reproduction of the environment that takes place
outside the home. The recognition that what has historically been women's labour in the 163
163 ibid.
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home has been devalued and that it is equally important in the process of production is a 
first step taken by the community portrayed in Die Umsiedlerin, but repercussions of the 
characterisation of women in the play show up the difficulties in maintaining such 
equity when the goal of production is seen simply as the satisfaction of human needs. 
The play demonstrates also, however, that despite Miiller's attempts to the contrary, his 
portrayal of women does very little to free them from male-imposed standards and 
characterisation and that such a portrayal seems to contradict his petition for more 
heterogeneity in GDR society.
Women are thus assigned a place of sexual difference whose primary attribute is 
that of fecundity, which itself can be sublated into the idea of producing the means of 
production. Müller is concerned to accord women an equal place in the productive 
process, but he also attempts in Die Umsiedlerin, as has been argued throughout this 
chapter, to point toward that heterogeneity which is constitutive of the liberated 
community. As such he points to the equality of women as being based on their alterity 
to men - their sexual difference - which as argued above still leaves them firmly 
characterised as productive beings. However, that which is heterogeneous as regards this 
restricted economy of production (and which he seems to regard as vital to any healthy 
community) finds no active place in the lives of the women in the play. They represent 
instead that which provokes transgression or which is the object of transgression from 
the male point of view, such as forgetting one's responsibilities as male party member 
(Flint and Siegfried), or forgetting the project of accumulation all together (Fondrak in 
his relationship with Niet). The other moments of unproductive expenditure which 1645
164 ibid., p. 106.
165 ibid., p. 59.
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Fondrak partakes in are committed almost exclusively in male environments such as the
pub or in the meeting of predominantly male farmers. Only when they are not the object
of sexual attention from their male counterparts -  that is, when the men are not being
distracted from their work -  are the women free to engage themselves with knowledge
and theory which the men take for granted. Flinte 1 starts visiting the library only when
her husband is philandering. A farmer comments on her borrowing Lenin, "Seit sie
allein schläft, legt sie sich auf Bücher.'"66
As they do not take part actively in transgressive behaviour, some of the women
in the play begin to take on the pall of the victim, a position from which they are freed
only when they become productive members of the community, directing their labours
towards the goal of communal utility. Niet, the Umsiedlerin is perhaps the best example
of this. She reacts passively to Fondrak's excuses for his behaviour, although the
audience is not given the opportunity to consider whether she took just an active a role
in the fateful act of intercourse which made her pregnant as Fondrak himself. Her fate
now is merely expressed in terms of male expenditure in the sovereign moment and its
inconsistency with the ideology of accumulation which elsewhere permeates day-to-day
life, a quandary in which Flint and Siegfried also find themselves later in the play:
Fondrak, mir paßt kein Kleid mehr, wie lang soll ich 
Spießruten laufen? Unterm Schiehstrauch nachts 
War ich dir gut genug fürs Leben, schön auch 
Mit Kirschenmund und Brust wie eine Gräfin.16 67
As the play progresses, however, she becomes increasingly independent and is given her
reward in the shape of the field which she can work on her own. Turning down the offer
166 ibid., p. 75.
167 ibid., p. 41.
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of marriage she makes a strong plea for autonomy and an end to the objectification of
women as man's sexual object.
Grad von den Knien aufgestanden und
Hervorgekrochen unter einem Mann
Der nicht der beste war, der schlimmste auch nicht
Soll ich mich auf den Rücken legen wieder
In Eile unter einen andern Mann
Wärs auch der beste, und Sie sinds vielleicht
Als wär kein andrer Platz, für den die Frau paßt.168
The position of liberation is, once more, not that of sovereignty. Although the figure
who encapsulated best the alterity of such sovereignty, Fondrak, is gone, the first duty
of those who had been portrayed as significant others to the dominant order - women -
move from having that alterity determined for them (as objects o f transgression) to
being part of the undifferentiated producing community.
What the portrayal of women in Die Umsiedlerin would seem to lack, therefore,
is otherness itself. Although this is due partly to Muller's wish to emphasise their
equality before both the law and needs of the means of production, women are either
seen as objects, and thus simply a reflection of the subject which can be negated, or as
part of the homogenous undifferentiated community where even sexual difference is
sublated into the ideology of accumulation. As the former, they can be identified with
the land as fecund, as the latter they come simply to be identified with men. Nowhere in
the play is their alterity given voice as alterity, a position which would see them as
unanswerable to the dominant discourse as Fondrak seems to be in his moments of
transgression. The sovereign enjoyment of the present moment, though often enacted
through women, is a male privilege. Fondrak's departure allows Müller to problematise
the GDR's inability to account for the structuring and constitutive role of that behaviour
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which transgresses homogeneity and utility, but women are only ever portrayed as a 
means to an end, as something to be used either for male transgression, or for the self- 
fulfilment of productive society.
The moments of transgression of utility, upon which there has been so much 
emphasis in this chapter, must therefore be brought into perspective. In this early piece 
Müller succeeds only in reintroducing an ideology of accumulation by another means 
because the alterity which he seeks to hold up in sexual difference and sovereign 
behaviour relies on their not treating the other as other. In Chapter Three it will be 
discussed how Müller came to recognise this problem and instead of providing a 
solution, experiments with a theatrical discourse to produced transgressive moments 
which leave the aporia of alterity intact. This is done by bringing attention to the history 
of theatrical discourse itself. Indeed, although only in embryonic form in Die 
Umsiedlerin, the obvious use of a theatrical device in the penultimate scene of the play 
prevents the piece as a whole of slipping into hubris. It was also ironically the inclusion 
of this device, the deus ex machina, which might have been thought to save the play 
from the censure o f the state and party. The reality was somewhat different. Although I 
have described the play, even its most transgressive moments, as partly recuperating 
itself within the ideology of accumulation, the authorities in 1961 saw otherwise. The 
Party instead initiated a flurry of inquisitions and retribution which makes Müller's 
momentary relapse look in comparison to be small beer indeed.
ibid., p. 102.
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The E xp u ls io n  o f  (the) P lay
The history of the Die Umsiedlerin itself, of its composition, performance and
subsequent suppression, reflects the concerns of the play itself, if only by accident.
Müller did not set out to be controversial, as his comments in his autobiography Krieg
Ohne Schlacht show. The play represents by Müller's own admission, however, an
exercise in expenditure without any thought of direct utility. His main concern was not
to produce a political play as such, but to produce a play politically, as the process of
production of the play in 1961 shows.169 Müller was able, after Walter Ulbricht's
criticism of overly didactic theatre in the late 1950's, to write with more freedom and
was finally in a position to write without reference to other concerns.170
Das Problem mit einer repressiven Kulturpolitik ist ja [...], daß keiner dazu 
kommt, sich "auszukotzen". Und das ist ja die Voraussetzung für ein 
dramatisches Œuvre, daß man wenigstens einmal die Gelegenheit hat, den 
ganzen "Glanz und Schmutz" seiner Seele von sich zu geben.171
Müller wrote scenes as the play was rehearsed with students of the Hochschule für
Ökonomie in a process which lasted some two years. Müller remembers the spirit in
which the play was being produced: "Wir waren ganz heiter, fanden das so richtig
sozialistisch, was wir da machten, die Studenten auch[.]"172
In retrospect, however, it seems incredible that the production of the play slipped
through the net of censorship that had been cast over the artistic community as a whole,
but Müller puts this fact down to chance and bad organisation on the part of the
169 Müller quotes Godard a number of times in interviews as well as in Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 183:"Es 
geht nicht dämm, politische Filme zu machen, sondern politisch Filme zu machen."
170 Müller had, just as importantly, received a grant from the Ministerium für Kultur, which had given 
him the financial independence to write. See also Chapter One, note 41. It is also amusing to note that 
Müller found himself only able to within the strictures of such patronage if he transgressed them: 
"Termine habe ich nie gehalten. Die einzige Möglichkeit, mich zu Terminen zu verhalten, war für mich 
immer, daß ich sie überschritt." Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 161.
171 ibid., p. 160.
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authorities as much as the slight relaxation in cultural politics inspired by Ulbricht. 
However, while this apparent thaw temporarily gave Müller the freedom to explore and 
experiment with form away from the dominant naturalistic theatre of the time, it was in 
the end the form of the play, and how that form became the political content for the 
play's critics which sealed the fate of Die Umsiedlerin. Nevertheless, periodic visits by 
party officials in the time running up to the performance always ended in their 
approving further rehearsal, not least because Die Umsiedlerin was to be presented as 
the opening night of the International Student Theatre Week at the beginning of 
September 1961.* 173
It is, however, another irony that a play such as Die Umsiedlerin which seems to
take a critical view of the Soviet influence on the GDR, at least as regards the
collectivisation of agriculture, passed the censorship of the domestic authorities because
of the mistaken belief that their Soviet counterparts approved of the production. One of
the players, a Russian author, Boris Djacenko,
war gerade beim Zahnarzt gewesen, hatte eine dicke Backe und dadurch noch 
mehr russischen Akzent als sonst, der sprach nun emphatisch mit russischem 
Akzent für diese Aufführung. Daraufhin waren die Genossen eingeschüchtert 
und dachten, wenn die Russen dafür sind, müssen wir vorsichtig sein.174
After the Berlin wall was erected, one month before the performance, the play suddenly
took on the form of a provocation, not least Fondrak's prophetic speech to Niet quoted
earlier in the chapter.175 176It was then decided to permit one performance of the play, but
only as "Versuchsaufführung [...], über die es verschiedene Meinungen gibt.'"76 The
177 ibid., p. 162.
173 Cf. Miiller's comments on the Party officials, ibid., p. 166: "Sie verstanden nichts, merkten aber da 
ging etwas vor, das sie selbst nicht mehr beurteilen konnten, etwas Gefährliches."
174 ibid., p. 163.
175 See above note 79.
176 Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 167.
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FDJ, possibly especially piqued at the presentation of some of their number in the play, 
even attempted to organise concerted cat-calls during the performance, but their plan 
failed because, Müller claims, the audience were laughing so much.177
The laughter stopped immediately afterward, however. The student actors were 
hauled out of their beds that same night and made to recite their lines until they had 
understood the "counter-revolutionary" elements in the play and it is these and Müller's 
acts o f self-criticism, as well as the condemnation from members of the artistic 
community and bureaucracy which reveal most clearly how transgressive Die 
Umsiedlerin was understood to be.
The criticisms of the play fall broadly into two categories: firstly, that the world 
depicted on the stage bore no relationship to the GDR, that it did not reflect the reality 
of the successfully evolving workers' and peasants' state; and secondly, that the manner 
of depiction, the theatrical form of the play, did not allow the audience to come away 
with a concrete understanding of the issues at stake. These two forms of criticism are, of 
course, closely linked -  the first follows immediately from the understanding of theatre 
implied in the second, demonstrating the failure of any style other than realism to win 
acceptance in the cultural bureaucracy of the GDR.
One student claims to have realised that the characters in the play are simply not 
typical for the GDR, thus disqualifying Die Umsiedlerin from any canon of socialist art:
Dieses Stück ist gekennzeichnet durch ein Zusammentragen von negativen
Figuren und Geschehnissen, die es wohl hin und wieder beim Aufbau unserer
Republik gegeben hat, die aber nicht typisch fllr unsere Entwicklung waren und
177 Manfred Krug, later dissident actor and 90's star of Liebling Kreuzberg was particularly prominent in 
this respect. "Er saß vom in der Mitte, ein Kleiderschrank, und lachte gröhlend über jeden Witz. Einige 
Genossen mußten dann auch lachen und haben nicht mehr protestiert, dadurch wurde es zur 
Katastrophe.''ibid., p. 168.
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sind ... Ich lehne das Stück als antikommunistisch, konterrevolutionär und 
antihumanistisch ab.17 *'
The problem is thus not so much that Die Umsiedlerin is too avant-garde, but indeed
quite the opposite -  it is too realistic in that it portrays figures who might have existed
but who are not seen as representative of the agricultural community as a whole.
Another student remembers with distaste that his discomfort with some of the more
colourful language in the play was met with an unsuitable response from the director
Tragelehn. The latter evidently seemed to insist that the realism of Die Umsiedlerin
consists precisely of the representation of the heterogeneity of any community, whether
the characters portrayed were symbolic citizens of the GDR or not.
The play is found wanting for the lack of positive symbolic examples of socialist
characters and this demand for symbolism finds further expression in some of the
students' self-criticisms, even when taken to the most absurd lengths. Not only did the
performance of Die Umsiedlerin rock the cultural boat somewhat at an uneasy period for
the GDR, it threatened, unbeknown to Müller, to provoke a Third World War:
Das Stück dient dem Gegner, unsere Republik von innen her aufzuweichen, 
leistet den militaristischen und revanchistischen Kreisen in Westdeutschland 
Vorschub, die Welt in die Katastrophe eines dritten Weltkrieges zu führen.'™
Müller was accused by others of holding up the state to ridicule by making it an
object of comedy (in that it is seen implicitly to acquiesce in the appointment of corrupt
officials such as Beutler). One Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter of the Stasi filed a report on the
performance, recounting with horror the reaction of well-known Berlin actors, whose
crime was, like Manfred Krug, simply to laugh.
I7'  Aus den Stellungnahmen der Studenten zu 'Umsiedlerin', ibid., p. 387.
'™ ibid.
2 2 2
Es ist interessant, daß eine Reihe von Schauspielern Berliner Bühnen, die 
anwesend waren [...], sich köstlich amüsiert haben unter lautem Lachen und auch 
im Saal von einer großen Anzahl von Freunden, [und, daß] die widerwärtigen 
Beschimpfungen unserer Staatsmacht, die hesslichen [sic] Szenen, die 
schmutzigen Szenen, die enthalten sind, mit Lachen quittiert wurden.179 80
The role of art in the GDR, according to some of those who were asked by the Ministry
of Culture to provide references for the play, was not to provide amusement, a critical
standpoint or even just entertainment. Socialist art had one goal, and one only: the
enhancement of the accumulation of the means of production through encouragement of
the spectator.
Sozialistische Kunst [soll] die Menschen zu wahren Erkenntnissen über die 
gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungsprozeße fuhren und sie für den Kampf zur 
Vollendung der sozialistischen Umwälzung begeistern.181
This goal was best achieved with particular artistic forms and narratives. Socialist
Realism, especially in the theatre, could not afford to be too realist (hence the horror at
the earthiness of the language in Die Umsiedlerin, as well as at the depiction of
distasteful characters), but instead had to demonstrate the development of the characters
towards a socialist self-understanding. This process would then be repeated by the
audience, spurred on not only by the uplifting content of the play, but by the manner in
which it was told -  in the form of the fable.
Matthias Braun (see note 179 above) sees the events of September 1961 and the
efforts of Müller and Tragelehn as the first attempts to break apart the strictures of
socialist realism which had always regarded the fable -  a narrative brought to a
179 ibid.
180 Bericht von 13-10-1961 von IM "Ökonom", in Braun, Drama um eine Komödie: Das Ensemble von 
SED und Staatsicherheit. FDJ und Ministerium ftir Kultur gegen Heiner Müllers "Die Umsiedlerin oder 
das Leben auf dem Lande" im Oktober 1961. p. 29. This fascinating study, commissioned by the Gauck 
Behörde suggests that the IM was probably a section head in the Staatssekretariat filr den Hoch und 
Fachschulwesen.
181 Gutachten von Wagner, Engelstädter, Köhler, ibid., p. 43.
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tconclusion involving typical human actions out of which an ethical or political lesson 
can be learned -  as the most appropriate form of theatre. The suitability of this form for 
teaching ethical and political standards is obvious, but its relevance in the debate on Die 
Umsiedlerin can also be seen from the criticisms voiced by members of the Berliner 
Ensemble (who were presumably among those "well-known Berlin actors" who laughed 
so ostentatiously):
Es gibt keine Entwicklung der Figuren, keine Fabel. Anscheinend hat Müller 
etwas "Überepisches" vorgeschwebt. Dabei hat die Regie Hilfestellung gegeben: 
unter anderem durchgehende Ironisierung fast aller Figuren machen alle Ansätze 
zur Entwicklung von Figuren zunichte.182
Another member of the company complains that the denouement of the play is 
presented not as the completion of a process by the characters within it, but rather as a 
situation -  collectivisation -  which because of the lack of any obvious link to those 
characters, appears as "antihumanistisch" and "wirklichkeitsfremd".183
It is particularly puzzling to read time after time that plot and character 
development is lacking in Die Umsiedlerin, for it is clear that those characters who do 
develop (Flint, Niet, the peasant farmers) are "rewarded" with the rational result of their 
efforts in collectivisation. Those who do not develop, who remain incorrigible, leave, 
are arrested or expelled. Nevertheless, the reaction of the cultural authorities to the play 
is summed up by Franz Fühmann, who was engaged to write an opinion for the 
literature section of the Ministry of Culture. Due to the lack of development in the plot 
and characterisation, he writes,
stellt sich der seltsame Effekt ein, daß nicht der Weg von 1946 bis 1960 sichtbar 
wird, sondern daß alles, auch Vorkommnisse, die eindeutig der Vergangenheit
182 Brief des Berliner Ensembles an das Kulturministerium in Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 391.
183 ibid.
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angehören wie die Verletzung der Gesetzlichkeit, in die Gegenwart projiziert 
erscheinen.1“
Given that development of plot and character indisputably does take place during 
the play, one is left only to conclude that the failings of Die Umsiedlerin were, for the 
authorities, to be found in the incomplete nature of the denouement rather than the 
course of the play itself. It is because not every single strand is resolved in the last scene 
of the play that the cultural authorities were uneasy. Indeed the sudden workshy attitude 
of the self-proclaimed industrious kulak Treiber points to further contradictions to be 
solved outside the framework of the play and thus in the world beyond the theatre. Thus 
while the fable would bring the environment back to an equilibrium, gesturing towards 
the reconciliation of all contradictions in the historical telos of communism, Müller 
seems to show historical progress at a cost. The heterogeneity in the agricultural 
community still visible at the end of the play is a reminder instead of what had to be 
expelled in order for the goal of collectivisation to be attained.
The fundamental difference between the fable and Müller's drama, therefore, 
even as early as 1961, lies in the temporality of the two different forms of performance. 
While the former has no meaning until it reaches its conclusion, the latter is more 
concerned with the actual finite experience that takes place in the theatre. For Müller, 
what happens in the course of the play to the spectator is as important as his/her reaction 
on seeing the curtain come down, so that the audience in Müller are encouraged to 
experience the passing of time within the theatre. In the fable on the other hand, the 
decisive moment is at and after the death of the performance when the lesson of the play 
can be encapsulated in the symbol of the final tableau. This difference is essentially that
Bemerkung zu Heiner Müllers Volksstück 'Die Umsiedlerinibid., p. 406.
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of symbolic and allegorical theatre which will be addressed in the next chapter, but it 
can already be seen in Die Umsiedlerin that Müller is interested in bringing about an 
experience of the finitude o f the human condition. This might happen primarily in his 
early work through the content of the work (the comedy in Die Umsiedlerin for 
example), but there is also the beginning of an understanding on Müller's part how the 
form of the work of art and its relation to the theatrical tradition can bring about a very 
different experience of theatre from that which was officially sanctioned.
Just such a moment occurs towards the end of Die Umsiedlerin with the 
appearance of the Landrat, whose credentials the audience has already heard about (he 
refused a bribe from Rammler), and who now enters the scene in order to bring the play 
to its close. As an external figure, untouched by the machinations in the environment in 
which the play is set, imported to resolve any outstanding contradictions in the play, and 
finally as a figure who does not share the same foibles and day-to-day concerns of other 
characters in the play, the Landrat serves a function akin to that of the deus ex machina. 
This is one god with a class consciousness, however. When a farmer strikes Beutler 
after having being insulted by him, Beutler turns to the Landrat for help, asking him if 
he had witnessed the assault. The Landrat, evidently already aware where the problem 
lies in the village, states with a curtness that is just as eloquent, "Nein."185
Müller uses the Landrat to exploit the theatrical tradition of the deus ex machina 
for his own ends, that is, the repetition of a classical trope or figure is used for the first 
time in Müller's work in order to show the nature of the theatrical tradition in which he 
is working. Furthermore, and also for the first time in Müller, one can glimpse the 
results of the repetition of tradition: the theatrical experience becomes an experience of
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allegory. The experience of the allegorisation of a figure as allegory (where the 
audience are made aware of the history and tradition of the repetition of a figure or 
trope) illuminates the fmitude of the theatrical experience by placing it firmly in its own 
historical context. Theatrical experience itself becomes a narrative that undergoes time. 
Müller thus aims to show that neither the figures on the stage, nor the nature of the 
theatrical experience are symbolic of the world outside. Neither a reconciliation in the 
plot which allows the curtain to fall, nor the theatrical experience itself being brought to 
a close can be used directly for ends outside the theatre.
Such considerations, of course, remain marginal in Die Umsiedlerin, where the 
primary concern of the play is with the problem of the general economy of the GDR in 
the early 1960's. It is only with the increasing experimentation with form in later years 
which aims to emphasise the theatrical nature of watching a play by Müller that the 
seed sown in this early play begins to bear fruit. It is, however, crucial to understand the 
nature and effect of this early employment of the tradition and how important the 
consequences (the banning of the play and Müller's subsequent marginalisation) prove 
to be in the development of Müller's work. The use of the deus ex machina proves to be 
the final and most important impediment which prevented the play from taking the 
shape of a fable, thus in turn making Die Umsiedlerin useless and therefore dangerous 
to the GDR authorities.
The deus ex machina was conventionally used in order to establish or confirm 
the ideology of absolutism which governed the work of art and its environment as a 
whole. Not only does the figure of the deus confirm who is in absolute power, but it 
confirms it absolutely. When one thinks of the gods of Greek tragedy, the kings in 185
185 Müller, Die Umsiedlerin, p. 88.
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Molière, and perhaps the commodity in Dickens, it is the manner o f  their appearance 
which brings order to mortal confusion once and for all by offering a frame of reference 
which is absolute, about which there can be no debate and which offers no more room 
for further narrative. In Müller, however, the figure of the Landrat throws up enough 
contradiction for him to act as a god who reflects on his godlike status, thus bringing the 
repetitive nature of the deus ex machina to the fore. The Landrat does not appear in 
order to resolve contradictions through the exercise of his absolute power, but to allow 
the farmers to find their own solution through the abdication o f  such power. The 
purpose of his entry into the play is therefore to undermine his own status as symbol of 
power in the land, returning the decision-making to the proletariat and he undertakes 
this task from his very first entrance.
Siegfried and Heinz, the FDJ activists have prepared a banner for the upcoming 
meeting, emblazoned with "Vorwärts zum Kommunismus". The concern of the still 
disguised Landrat, however, is not simply to praise their agitational zeal, but rather to 
discover whether this enthusiasm comes from the bottom up or the top down:
A uf den Text zeigend zu Heinz und Siegfried: Eure Erfindung?
SIEGFRIED Auftrag vom Bürgermeister. Erfindung von Karl Marx.
FREMDER Mit zwei Traktoren? Was sagt die Partei dazu?'86
The provocation of the Landrat, which has allowed him to have his fears confirmed, 
namely that the agitation and impulse to progress is coming from the bureaucracy rather 
than from the workers themselves, leads Siegfried in his eagerness to denounce him as a 
spy, to comic effect for the rest of the scene. The Landrat himself carries on with his 
tactic of provoking the workers to see that the answer to their problems, and the solution 
to the contradictions with which they are faced, lies with them taking the reins of power.
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Not surprisingly, few understand what he is about. Flint is horrified, Beutler turns this 
way and that in order to keep up with the apparent changes in policy, but finally the 
farmers themselves do not need either of these two figures to see what has to be done.
The central problem which faces the village is how to organise the employment 
of the newly arrived tractors. Although they are communal property, there are simply 
not enough to go around and thus one farmer suggests drawing lots to decide which 
single farmer gets to win the tractor for good. For once Beutler and Flint are united in 
their opposition to the plan, not only because it involves the surrender of state property, 
but also more importantly of state power. The Landrat, however, seems to regard the 
idea as a good one and orders Beutler to prepare the lots. While the latter readily agrees, 
concerned only to stay on the right side of the Landrat, it proves to be too much for 
Flint.
zu Siegfried: Beinah glaub ich jetzt, daß du recht hattst, Junge.
Zum Landrat:
Ich kann nicht zusehn, wie du unsre Macht 
Deine und meine, aus den Händen gibst.* 187
The tractors are won by Henne and Treiber, an opportunist and kulak respectively, and 
the consequences for the relations within the village are made immediately clear. Henne 
proposes the direct reestablishment of the conditions of production whose overthrow is 
the goal of communism.
Weil ich aber
Gut weiß, wie Armut schmeckt, erbiet ich mich 
Den Trecker notfalls, pflegliche Behandlung 
Vorausgesetzt, gegen entsprechende 
Vergütung, Hilfe bei der Rübenemte 
Zum Beispiel, an Bedürftige auszuleihn.188
ibid., p. 84.
187 ibid., p. 92.
188 ibid., p. 93.
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Naturally, those fanners who have lost out feel aggrieved and Flint is able to see 
immediately how successful the tactics of the Landrat has been. It becomes clear to the 
fanners that in order to prevent such conditions reappearing, it is imperative to hold the 
means of production in common: firstly the tractors and later, the fields themselves. The 
real importance of this realisation, however, is that the farmers have reached it on their 
own, rather than having the decision handed down to them by others.
Beutler, however, reacts in exactly the opposite way: thinking that he must now 
use the position to impose the solution of the Kolchose, he threatens the use of state 
power in order to achieve it, and thus retain his position of privilege within the 
bureaucracy.
Ich bin dafür, wir gehen auf ganze jetzt
Und schmeißen auch den Boden gleich zusammen.
[...] Der Kommunismus braucht den ganzen Menschen 
Und was der Kopf nicht faßt, begreift der Hintern 
Gott hat euch aus dem Paradies geprügelt 
Wir prügeln euch ins Paradies zurück.189
This proves too much for the Landrat, who finally intervenes to remove Beutler from his 
office.
Kollege Beutler hat sich hier gezeigt 
Als blind für die reale Lage, taub für 
Kritik, kalt gegen die Bevölkrung, also 
Unfähig seinen Posten zu bekleiden.190
Flint now suddenly finds himself installed in the position of mayor, but claims to realise 
also that the role of the state is to transfer power to the masses, rather than the other way 
around:
Mit Beutlers Hilfe hab ich umgelemt 
Die Macht im Staat ist nicht die ganze Macht
189 ibid., p. 94.
190 ibid., p. 95.
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Das Bajonett ersetzt nicht die Traktoren
Der Mensch hat seinen Kopf nicht für den Knüppel
Der Knüppel ist das letzte Argument.191
The aim of the Landrat is thus to demonstrate that the importance of power consists of 
its being given up in a sovereign manner for the benefit of the subjectivity of the 
masses, in contrast to Beutler's attempt to hold on to what he claims to be the objectivity 
of power (but which he can in fact use for its own ends), backed up by the monopoly of 
violence invested in the state.
It would not be surprising if some of the bureaucrats in the audience in 
Karlshorst in 1961 had not shifted somewhat uneasily in their seats at the actions of 
Beutler and the comments from the Landrat on the nature of their work. Müller hints at 
their distance from the reality of events by the Landrat's remarks on how the reports on 
his desk and in the daily papers bear no resemblance to the real existing conditions on 
the land.
Ich habe noch nichts gehört, was soll ich reden.
Was in der Zeitung steht? Die habt ihr selber.
Hier sitz ich, weil ich hörn will, was nicht drin steht.
Sonst kann ich mich im Schreibtisch schlafen legen 
Auf dem geduldigen Papier mit euren 
Schönfarbrischen Berichten.192
However, despite such implicit criticism and the Landrat's actions in apparently giving 
power back to the masses, what is renounced by the Landrat is not sovereignty, but 
power. The apparent transfer of power from state to farmer does not undermine that 
power's essential nature -  that in Bataille's terms, the producing classes renounce their 
sovereignty in order to concentrate on producing the means of production, accepting the 
neutral objectivity of power as the result. Indeed by transferring that power to the
191 ibid.
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farmers, the Landrat only goes to bolster the objectivity of its importance. In this scene 
from Die Umsiedlerin it is power which is regained by the masses in order objectively 
to provide the conditions for better production. In addition, this transfer of power is 
underwritten by the state in a number of ways, demonstrating that the real conditions of 
power have not changed at all. It is the Landrat who has the authority to relieve Beutler 
of his position, not the democratic will of the masses; it is the Landrat who installs Flint 
as Bürgermeister, finally, when the question arises as to who should have first use of the 
tractors, it is Flint, in his new position of power who decides to put them at Niet's 
disposal: "Gut, ich schick den Trecker/Auf dein Feld erst."”3
In spite of this deference to the synthesising character of state power, the manner 
in which the Landrat leaves decisions open for the farmers, thus preventing a second 
synthesis at the end of the play itself, meant that the conditions of production of the play 
are seen as incomplete. Since Miiller was then concerned to accord by extension the 
audience a degree of autonomy, the closed symbolic ending of the play fails to arrive. 
As a result the last scene, where the last stages of collectivisation are presented, only 
succeeded in raising hackles all the more because the development of the play up until 
that moment did not lead to the rational conclusion of collectivisation. Indeed, the idea 
of the Kolchose is criticised a number of times throughout the play, although the 
benefits of its communal nature are also mentioned.192 394 Finally, the contradictions still 
present in collectivised agriculture are also revealed, thus making clear once more that
192 ibid., p. 88.
193 ibid., p. 99, my emphasis.
194 Cf. ibid., p. 83, where a tractor driver recalls a Soviet farmer he confronted during the war: "Hier alles 
mein Feld. Wir: wo sein Feld war/ Eh alles kollektiv war. Der zeigt bloß/Wie ein Großgrundbesitzer ins 
Gelände/ Wo kilometerbreit brusthoch der Mais stand./ Der hatte wo sein Feld war glatt vergessen."
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there are still problems to be solved, not by the Party or bureaucracy but by the 
producing classes themselves.
As argued above, Midler's attempt to write a theatrical piece which in its content 
and performance emphasises the importance of power resting with the proletariat as a 
whole must be seen to fail. His recourse to state power in order to achieve such a goal is 
seen not only in the figure of the Landrat, but in the still immature theatrical structure of 
the play in contrast to his later work. The ambitious goals set in the writing of the play, 
which might be summed up in Bataillian terms as the communication of sovereign 
experience and its relevance in the general economy of the GDR, need, in order for them 
to find expression in the production of the play, an intercourse with the theatrical 
tradition. As will be seen in the next chapter, such an intercourse demands in addition 
the complete rejection o f any idea of unproblematic reflection between the outside 
world and the events on the stage. The residual belief and hope in the programme of the 
GDR state, despite the misgivings which would explode such a belief in later years, 
prevented Midler from distancing himself fully from the determination of the work of 
art by the hegemony of the state and of men.
Die Umsiedlerin witnesses therefore an attempt to address the relationship of 
Midler to his other, be it women or the other in the community, but in both cases he 
suppresses their heterogeneity by returning to the paternalist structures of well-meaning 
male dominance and state control. It is vital to regard this slippage back to the dominant 
discourses of GDR politics as determined not only by ideological pressure on the 
content of the play, but also as a result of the form of Die Umsiedlerin which displays 
that lack of intercourse with the theatrical tradition mentioned above. As Midler 
attempts to demonstrate in later works, the other cannot be addressed as an alterity
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within the theatre unless the traditional modes of representation of that other are 
repeated, reworked and allegorised. It is this repetition through a signed, allegorised 
discourse which becomes Miiller's most important way of addressing the tradition of the 
theatre in which he works.
The literary nature of Die Umsiedlerin, that is, wherein this signature of Müller 
and other participants can best be witnessed, is to be found in the story of the play's 
failed links to politics. This failure becomes thus the object of literary critique. The 
decay of the heterogeneous (laughter and sovereign expenditure) into the paternalism of 
misogyny and state power tells the story of Die Umsiedlerin as a work of art: the play 
slips back into the ideological conformity of the day (reinstating the GDR state as the 
bulwark of power) even though it attempted to teach a lesson to the audience on the 
necessity of giving power to the masses. However, this very attempt to forge the direct 
link of stage and politics was firstly another confirmation of state power (by conforming 
to dominant Socialist Realist aesthetics), and secondly turned out to be useless because 
the play was banned. Die Umsiedlerin, in its attempt to be useful, displays the 
uselessness which the comedy and heterogeneous behaviour of some of the characters 
pointed to in the first three-quarters o f the play. This uselessness survives any slippage 
back into the ideology of progress and instrumentality because the play bears most 
clearly the signature of Müller's authorship. It is because of the manner in which Die 
Umsiedlerin was written, signed by Müller, that the play still manages to keep its 
literary character and resist sublation into the idea of a process of history which turned 
out itself to be utterly anachronistic. The play survives also the post-production self- 
criticism of Müller which he was forced to write in December 1961.
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That self-criticism was written with the assistance of Helene Weigel, who
insisted that there was little point in Müller trying to justify what he had done: "Du
darfst nichts erklären, nicht entschuldigen. Du bist schuld, sonst hat es gar keinen
Zweck.'"95 Müller focuses in the short document firstly on the inadequacies of form. The
peculiar political situation of the GDR at the end of 1961 demanded a quite different
form of drama than Die Umsiedlerin. The latter was
ein Stück, das die Hauptfragen ausklammert und dadurch Nebenffagen zu 
Hauptfragen macht, das den Zuschauer allein läßt mit den Fragen und 
Verwirrungen, die es hervorruft, ohne deutlichen Hinweis auf mögliche 
Antworten und notwendige Lösungen [...,] das deprimiert, statt aktiv macht.195 96
Müller had isolated himself from the Party which might have been able to offer him
useful criticism and had insufficient understanding of the political environment of the
play to handle adequately such a sensitive issue. In the third section Müller sets out his
wishes:
Ich wollte ein Stück schreiben, das dem Sozialismus nützt. [...] Ich wollte der 
Partei mit meiner Arbeit helfen, selbst isoliert von ihr. Ich sehe das Ergebnis 
meiner Arbeit in der Isolierung: einen Schaden für die Partei. Ich sehe, daß ich 
ihre Hilfe brauche, wenn ich ihr nützen will, und nichts anderes will ich.197
Müller, forced into such extraordinary self-denial and cant was one of the victims of the
uselessness of his art and the failure of a link to politics, one of the victims of the fact
that his work carried the finite signature of writing itself. The reality of that failure and
its repercussions in the world outside of the theatre will on the one hand make his later
work so important as work made politically, but will on the other be achieved at the
price of a certain victimisation. Müller's primary concern then becomes the
195 quoted in Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 178.
196 "Selbstkritik Heiner Müllers (an die Abteilung Kultur beim Zentralkommittee der SED)", ibid., p. 401.
197 ibid., pp. 402-3.
remembrance of these victims through a form of theatre which, by refusing a direct link 
to political praxis, locates itself politically in a community.
The victims to be remembered in Die Umsiedlerin are not only those on the 
stage who suffer the heavy hand of expulsion or suppression in the GDR, be it Fondrak, 
Niet and the other women or the proletariat; the other victims and subjects of 
remembrance for literary critique are those who in the experience of the play and its 
consequences faced a similar fate. This would include those who laughed and were 
punished, those who had to repress their laughter, those who recanted -  in other words, 
those who suffered in the name of the signature of Heiner Muller.
In this context of the history and decay of a work of art, the history and decay of 
the signature and thus art as art, one image stands out in particular from the play. In 
Scene 11 Fondrak argues with Flint over the former's attitude to work:
FONDRAK Ein Bier und vor dir steht ein Kommunist, Flint.
FLINT Ein Parasit steht vor mir.
FONDRAK Du verkennst mich.
Zeig mir ein Mausloch und ich fick die Welt.|,>8
As microcosm of the play, these four lines provide as good an example of any other of 
the theme of heterogeneous expenditure and useless consumption (sex and beer) as well 
as the coarse language in which it is expressed. They also point toward the fact that this 
transgression is generally regarded as male within the play and that it is viewed by the 
state in the most unfavourable manner. All this could be communicated to the audience 
in the performance of the play, but the audience would not necessarily be aware of the 
origin of Fondrak's memorable and much quoted line, "Zeig mir ein Mausloch..." 
Literary critique, on the other hand, if it is to take the work's signature over time
1,8 Muller, Die Umsiedlerin, p. 79.
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seriously, and thus that which makes literature offer itself up as literature would be 
interested in just that origin however.
One such victim of the first performance of Die Umsiedlerin was the director 
B.K. Tragelehn. He was made far more of a scapegoat for the Karlshorst fiasco than 
Müller: right from the very beginning his part in the proceedings was singled out for 
special condemnation.199 Tragelehn was expelled from the Party, all contracts with 
theatres were cancelled and he was sentenced to hard labour in a Braunkohl quarry. 
Müller recounts that he was there doubly victimised because "er dort dann der einzige in 
seiner Brigade war, der für die DDR eintrat und für die Partei, und die Arbeiter meinten: 
so blöd darf man nicht sein, und haben ihn nach jeder Diskussion verprügelt."200 It was 
during his labour in the quarry that Tragelehn heard the phrase "Zeig mir ein Mausloch, 
ich fick die Welt" which Müller improved with a conjunction to make the line scan 
better as verse. The line was one of the few alterations in the 1964 re-write of the play.
Knowledge of the origin of this line draws the limit between a particular 
aesthetic experience of the play and literary critique on the one hand, and the possibility 
of the symbolic and allegorical theatrical experience. In both literary critique and 
allegorical experience Tragelehn's line stands forth as the moment of signature, history 
and finitude which offers up the work of art as art for critique and as drama within a 
tradition for allegorical theatre. The particular suitability of the allegory of this line for 
Müller's work is that it encourages the remembrance of the victims of the homogenous
199 Cf. the contributions from the Berliner Ensemble to the criticism of the play: "Das Stück wird nicht 
besser, aber die Regie kommt verschlechternd dazu. Sie ist nahezu verbrecherisch, denn sie hat aus 
Menschen Marionetten gemacht (auch in Beziehung auf die Stundenten)"; "Die Regie erweist Müller 
Bärendienste, indem sie alle Negativen unterstreicht. [...]Der Regisseur des Stücks, das einen so 
wichtigen Abschnitt unserer Entwicklung behandlen will, zeigt sich als völlig unreif und unfähig." in 
Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, pp. 390-1.
200 ibid., p. 171.
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utilitarian society against which Miiller's work seeks to operate, as well as the victims of 
the signature of theatre itself and its decision to remain useless and to be art. As such, 
such remembrance represents the possibility and potential of Miiller's early work, rather 
than its realisation in early the GDR of the 1960's. Die Umsiedlerin was not to see the 
footlights until 15 years later, and even then the production bore a great similarity to its 
controversial predecessor. Der Lohndriicker, premiered three years before Die 
Umsiedlerin (although the writing had begun later) had had a very different fate. 
Initially banned by the Berlin local authorities, even though it had already been 
performed in Leipzig, the censorship was then lifted by the Party Central Committee 
and went on to win the Heinrich-Mann-Preis, which then secured Müller a job and 
financial security until the Umsiedlerin debacle.201
Der Lohndriicker
If Die Umsiedlerin was concerned primarily on a thematic level with the problems of 
the production of the means of production on the land, then Der Lohndrückers milieu is 
most definitely urban and industrial. Indeed, the problems resulting from an economy of 
accumulation, whose effects are seen in the former play on the land, are almost by 
definition going to be heightened when transferred to the engine room of such 
accumulation -  the industrial factory. Der Lohndriicker portrays workers who are even 
more alienated from the end product of their labour than their peasant counterparts, even 
though they are supposed now, in the socialist society, to own that labour themselves.
201 Müller had hoped to win the FDGB (Freie Deutsche Gewerkschafts Bund) prize, "das waren 
mindestens 10,000 Mark mehr als der Heinrich-Mann-Preis. Aber dazu kam es nicht, weil kurz danach 
Ulbricht den Kampf gegen das sogenannte "didaktische Lehrtheater" eröffnet hatte, was auch schon als 
Formulierung eine Leistung war. Der muß wirklich schlechte Referenten gehabt haben." ibid., p. 151.
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The central conflict thrown up in the play is therefore that between the particular 
workers and their employment as labour, as a general category to be used in society's 
self-fulfilment. Such a homogenisation of the highly differentiated forms of labour and 
conditions of production is seen to come up against resistance in the shape of the 
fmitude of the human condition. Not only is the labouring community structured by 
such fmitude, as argued in Chapter One, but the play also deals with the issue of 
labourers working less hard than, or as hard as before. This "before" is not just any 
epoch, however, but that traumatic period of German history between 1933 and 1945.
If labour is the most important homogenising force in the GDR, in that the 
accumulation of the means of production is dependent upon material labour, then how 
can it also at the same time be regarded as a form of human activity which shows the 
heterogeneous nature of community? And, more importantly for Muller' work, how can 
such heterogeneity be witnessed in the work of art?
The play is based on the heroic efforts of one worker, Balke, to repair a furnace 
while still in operation so that it does not have to be shut down, a break in production 
which would have endangered the chances of meeting the pre-set norms and targets for 
the factory. Balke has already proven himself to be an exemplary worker, having 
overshot all other production norms and raising the general level of productivity of the 
factory. This has meant, however, that he has shown that higher norms are possible and 
the other workers now have to work harder than before in order to maintain the same 
income. Balke on the other hand has received premiums for his high productivity, thus 
alienating himself from his workmates who regard him as the eponymous scab. The 
situation is made more complicated when the audience finds out that Balke was just as 
productive under the Nazi regime, and compounded such reactionary behaviour by
denouncing a communist who had attempted to sabotage the Nazi wartime production. 
This same communist, Schom, is now the party official who has to oversee the factory 
where Balke works and the two are faced with an almost identical problem as before. 
Balke knows who has sabotaged his repair work and it is Schom, once the victim of 
denunciation, who must now persuade Balke to betray a fellow-worker once more. 
Similarly, just as Schom relinquishes his possibility of revenging himself on Balke, the 
latter must also put the interests of the collective before his own when he agrees to work 
with a colleague, Karras, who had recently beaten him up for betraying shop-floor 
solidarity.
Der Lohndrücker is thus similar to Die Umsiedlerin in that it discusses the
conflict of interest between the interests of the individual and those of the collective as a
whole, or between the subjective and objective. Writing in such vocabulary of the
central problem in Der Lohndrücker, Schulz comments:
Mit der Bedeutungslosigkeit von individueller Psychologie wird man 
unerbittlich auf das Feld der politischen Analyse verwiesen. Der Pluralisierung 
von Gründen für die individuellen Verhaltensweisen steht die Einhelligkeit ihrer 
objektiven politischen Bedeutung gegenüber.202
The problem is thus, in Bataillean terms, how a productive society comes to terms with
the heterogeneity of individual subjects actions, and more importantly for any analysis
of this play, how can the heterogeneous power of labour be thought, and, as mentioned
above, how can it be thought in the theatre? The treatment of the heterogeneous in art
202 Schulz, Heiner Müller, p. 24. Although Schulz, as ever, grasps the central problematic of Miiller's 
work, the vocabulary of subject and object betrays a residual attachment to that philosophical tradition 
which, I argue, Miiller's work does its best to undermine. For one could argue that to speak of subject and 
object, and individual and collective as oppositions whose conflict is resolved in a new synthesis is to 
ignore or repress the constitutive alterity of the subject which allows us to conceive the collective in the 
first place and which will continue to constitute that collective and undermine any putative absolute 
synthesis. More seriously, the relations of heterogeneity and alterity which are to be found between the 
human subject and his/her environment become totalised in the concepts of subject and object
has already been seen in Die Umsiedlerin to have important repercussions for the 
political effect of the play. By retreating to the attempt to regard the relationship 
between stage and outside world as directly political, as symbolic, Müller ended up in 
suffocating the possibility of the political itself. Accordingly in Der Lohndrücker, the 
manner in which labour is reflected upon aesthetically will determine whether it can 
allow an experience of its heterogeneous potential or whether it will be felt as a 
homogenising force, simply by treating labourers and labour on the stage as symbols of 
the world outside.
This danger of symbolisation is made all the more real by the direct connection 
of the play to real events in Berlin in the late 1940's. Balke is modelled very closely on 
the "DDR Held der Arbeit" Hans Garbe who had engaged in just such heroic acts as 
Balke, whereas the characters and events in Die Umsiedlerin on the other hand are based 
on a generalisation of the events surrounding land reform in the GDR. It was precisely 
this attempt to represent such an uplifting moment in the recent history of the GDR 
which no doubt allowed the play to be performed. As will be demonstrated, it is also 
this engagement with the past and with history which will prevent the play from falling 
into the ill-repute of Socialist Realism even while maintaining the right of the Party to 
rule, while simultaneously opening possibilities up for very different productions and 
interpretations of the play itself.
Labour is not itself a force which produces either a homogeneous or 
heterogeneous society, for as reproduction of the environment, that is, as expenditure on 
the environment in order to produce something for consumption it can be organised
themselves. The individual is not other to the collective in Marxism-Leninism, just as the object is not 
other to the subject; they are merely moments in the dialectic awaiting Aujhebung into the Same.
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either into a project as accumulation or system of sovereign expenditure. However as 
Bataille points out, industrial society was bound to turn labour into a means to an end 
when the development of productive forces dictated that the only thing which the 
labourer without access to capital could sell was his or her labour itself. Labour became 
the means to accumulation of the means o f production: in capitalism for the benefit of 
the capitalist who allowed himself a degree of luxury but primarily concentrated in 
building the business; in the socialist command economies for the benefit of an idea of 
"man" who would become realised at a later date.
Even as early as Der Lohndrücker, however, Müller is interested in the other 
forces that human activity -  and in particular labour — releases. In this early play, rather 
than introducing a figure such as Fondrak, such an embryonic interest takes the form of 
the presentation of the struggle or contradiction between the perceived interests of 
particular labourers and their supposed interests as a class. This struggle is not merely 
symbolic of the contradiction between general and restricted economy, but presented as 
one o f the defining problems of the early years of the GDR. How should the desires of 
workers be realised within the legacy of the tradition of labour within Germany? How 
could the GDR use the productive forces within labour when the labourers had 
previously used them to build up the Nazi war and terror machine?
Müller presents the essential conflict within labour in the play as between those 
who work according to or in excess of state imposed norms and those who do not. Both 
claim to be acting in the best interests of workers as a whole. The former insist that the 
means of production and thus labour belongs to the workers through the state, while the 
latter claim that this means that anything the workers do is in their own interest. Lerka, 
whose interest in working hard is based solely on the premium he will receive, ignores
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Balke's warning that his slapdash work will endanger the productivity of the whole 
factory. Lerka replies,
Tempo oder Qualität. Alles können sie nicht haben. [...] Wer hat mir was zu 
sagen? Der Laden hier ist volkseigen, stimmts? Ich bin das Volk, verstehst du. 
Balke schweigt.205
While Lerka's actions are irresponsible according to almost any yardstick, it is the Party
officials who give the workers ammunition for such assertions. They insist that the State
is not only acting in the interests of the workers, but also that what the state owns is
thereby property of the workers, even though there is no evidence that the workers
receive anything other than the exchange value of the labour.
GESCKE zu Schom: [...] In Amerika gibts keinen Sozialismus, aber Arbeiter, 
die im eignen Auto fahren. Im Sozialismus gibts Schuhe auf Bezugschein. Erklär 
mir das.
SCHORN Das Auto gehört dem Arbeiter. Aber wem gehören die Arbeiter?
Unsre Schuhe gibts auf Bezugschein. Aber die Autofabriken gehören uns.204
Therefore any industrial action or refusal to work to the raised norms is an attack on 
themselves. As Balke says when he is attacked: "Ihr schlagt euch selber ins Gesicht."205 
Similarly, those who do not work to the norms are described thus: "Ihr schneidet euch 
ins eigne Fleisch."206 The identification of proletariat and party is complete, it is the 
latter who plan the norms, away from the workplace: "Wir nehmen eure Interessen 
wahr, wenn wir die Norm hochsetzen."207
The sublation of individual or group interests and desires into the non­
contradictory identity of a totalised subject leads to the debate around the title of the 
play. Balke's motives for working are questioned at the very start of the play. Although
205 Der Lohndrücker in Geschichten aus der Produktion 1. p. 21.
204 ibid., p. 42.
205 ibid., p. 37.
206 ibid., p. 27
207 ibid., p. 42.
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he has discovered a new work technique that means "man schafft mehr", the immediate 
response is "Fragt sich für wen"208 *as Balke also received a premium for it, although it is 
recognised that he could not have achieved it without the aid of his comrades: "Der 
Aktivist kriegt eine Prämie. Die Steine haben wir geschleppt."200 This leads to the central 
problem o f the play: who is the 'Lohndrücker'? On the one hand it is clear that quite 
literally Balke fits the description in that his work raises the norms which depresses the 
wages of the others as they are unable or unwilling to work to the new norms. On the 
other, however, after the first case of sabotage, it is Balke who argues: "Es war kein 
Unfall. Das wißt ihr so gut wie ich. Pause. Wenn ihr von der neuen Norm nichts wissen 
wollt, wer drückt dann den Lohn, ihr oder ich?"210
As could also be seen in Die Umsiedlerin, the inevitable consequence of the 
homogenisation of the industry of labourers within an economy to a force called 
"labour", where the interests of workers are identical not only to each other but to the 
state as well, is a conflict between those who are productive and those who are not. 
Those who are unproductive, be they the representatives of the Lumpenproletariat such 
as Fondrak, or of the reactionary legacy of German history such as Zemke in Der 
Lohndrücker, put a brake on accumulation because they do not see the use of their 
labour. Whereas the Marxist striker in the capitalist economy slows accumulation 
because s/he does not regard the value of his/her labour as being adequately 
remunerated, the shirker in the command economy cannot identify with the subject who 
is deemed to be the goal of socialised labour, namely "man". The attempt to reify the 
conditions of production by describing the producing classes as producing for
208 ibid., p. 15.
200 ibid., p. 25
210 ibid., p. 27
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themselves (albeit an idea of themselves in the future) runs into difficulties because the 
actual reward for their labour is still expressed in terms of its exchange value. In the 
course of Der Lohndrücker this value is decreased by the raising of production norms. 
The reification of the conditions of labour by the dominance of exchange value in the 
capitalist economy is thus repeated in the command economy as the ideological 
reification of labour relations. Through the raising of norms, the same use-value is 
accorded a lesser value and justifies a decreased exchange value. In sum, the use-value 
of the product of the labourer’s efforts is not returned to the worker but to the idea of 
"man" who inhabits a future telos.
Such instrumentalisation of labour had, of course, an appalling history in 
Germany. Instead of submitting production to the goal of future man, the Nazi regime 
substituted the goal of returned archaic man. Without slipping into an obscene 
comparison of the GDR and Nazi Germany, it is clear that both goals were absolutely 
dependent upon the development of the accumulation of the means of production. The 
workers therefore, by being homogenised into a force directed by the state towards a 
single goal, ended up producing for an economy which actively sought to maintain that 
homogeneity on a social level -  with cataclysmic results in the case of Nazi Germany, 
with less horrifying but still repressive consequences in the GDR.
In Der Lohndrücker Müller points out the victims of the homogenisation of 
production, not so much in the GDR, but through the memory of the victims of the 
Nazi's. What is more, Müller seems to be saying, such remembrance would enable the 
GDR to realise the heterogeneous desires of the labourers in post-war Germany. At this 
stage Müller still maintains a certain amount of belief and hope in the party (as the deus 
ex machina of Die Umsiedlerin partly shows) but he does not shy away from portraying
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those in positions of power who have lost touch with the needs and desires of the
workers in whose name the GDR was set up. The boss of the factory, for example, while
showing little understanding of the situation in which his charge finds itself, does focus
on the problem of the historical legacy. His mistake, however, is to identify all
opposition to his plans as residual fascism:
Der Arbeiter hat kein Vertrauen zur Partei. Der Faschismus steckt ihm in den 
Knochen. Granaten haben sie gedreht mit allen Vieren, jetzt schreien sie 
"Akkord ist Mord". Wenn du mich fragst: ich trau keinem.2"
Indeed, there is a distinctly brown tinge to some of the workers in the factory, who see
no difference between the two regimes in power since 1933. Zemke, for example,
proclaims "Ich war rot wie keiner. Mit Faust und Stuhlbein für die Weltrevolution."212
He then joined the SA, and himself repeats his behaviour from that era by beating up the
defenceless Balke.
Schom, the incorruptible party official does not want to trust Balke because the 
latter also behaves as he did under the Nazi's, even though this repetition is for the 
benefit of the GDR state. Anyone who produced for the goals of that state must by 
definition be a questionable figure.
Es hängt viel von ihm ab. Zu viel. Pause. Ich habe mit ihm in der Rüstung 
gearbeitet. Handgranaten. Seine Handgranaten waren immer in Ordnung. Er war 
ein guter Arbeiter. Er hat die Aufrüstung nicht sabotiert. Ich frage mich: Wird er 
den Aufbau sabotieren?213
Thus while on the one hand Müller clearly wants to distinguish between the goals of the 
two German states, he also points out that one of the most important -  the goal of 
production — itself homogenised workers into a unified labour force who then, like 
Balke, produced simply for the sake of production. In order to differentiate itself fully 21
211 ibid., p. 25.
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from its predecessor, the GDR state must therefore make the goal o f  production a matter
for discussion in the present, that is, a subject of politics. This in turn means that the
goal of production cannot be completely displaced onto a futural telos, but the
productive apparatus and the society it serves must direct some energy to the
satisfaction of needs and desires in the present.21 314 However, in order to achieve this it
also has to be realised that such politicisation of the goal of production also brings with
it the attendant dangers of conflict, heterogeneity and expenditure in the present.
Moreover, labour itself could be seen as demanding to be treated in this manner as it is
the most profound expression of the heterogeneity of any community, expressing as it
does the action of singular, finite and different bodies on the environment.
In a number of places in Der Lohndrücker, emphasis is placed, just as in Die
Umsiedlerin, on the elemental nature of labour, on how the body works on the
environment. The work on the furnace is undertaken by labourers working until
exhaustion, sweating, drinking, expending energy. The play demonstrates two reactions
to this fact. One uses the body as a symbol of the utility of production, presenting it as a
necessary sacrifice for a worthwhile goal in the future; the other insists on the particular
finitude and particular history of each body. The first alternative is seen in the words of
the reporter who needs an uplifting story for the Sunday newspaper.
Während eine Kammer nach der andern stillgelegt, abgerissen und neu 
ausgemauert wird, brennt nebenan hinter einer dünnen Wand das Feuer weiter.
Es kommt vor, daß die Pantinen der Männer in Brand geraten. [...] Von den
212 ibid.,p. 36.
213 ibid., p. 37.
214 Cf Müller's comments on the contrasting temporalities of socialist and capitalist economies, 
Gesammelte Irrtümer II. p. 154: "Es gibt im Westen allgemein eine totale Besetzung mit Gegenwart. Das 
ganze ökonomische Potential geht auf Besetzung mit Gegenwart. Das heißt: Auslöschen von Erinnerung 
und Gegenwart. [...] Das ist eine absolut kunstfeindliche Situation. [...] Bei uns ist es noch nicht so. Die 
Regierenden möchten es vielleicht gern ändern. Aber das ökonomische Potential reicht nicht für die 
Besetzung der Gegenwart. So gibt es viel Erinnerung und auch immer noch Erwartung."
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nackten Oberkörpern rinnt der Schweiß, aus den Gesichtem sprechen
Entschlossenheit und Zuversicht.215
We also witness towards the end of the play the injured body of one of Balke's 
assistants, while another remarks that the heat near the furnace was in excess of his tank 
in the war, even though he had earlier boasted "Ich hab in einem Panzer gesessen, bis 
funfundvierzig. Das war auch kein Kühlschrank. Ich mach mit."216 In Müller's play the 
bodies are thus presented in their constitutive fmitude; the fact that they decay, lose 
strength or get exhausted is just as much a characteristic of the labouring body as 
producing. Müller emphasises in addition that these bodies and subjects have a history, 
a fact that is once again made possible by the fmitude of their existence. Balke's 
activities in the war are repeatedly discussed and the audience discovers, however 
briefly, the history of most of the characters in the play. Müller thus attempts to prevent 
the labouring, embodied subjects being caught up in a reification and homogenisation of 
their relations with the environment, or at least to offer some resistance to such a 
process of homogenisation.
The reason for such resistance is to be found in the manner in which the past is 
repeated. While figures such as Zemke may change sides, the motives for their 
behaviour, as well as the consequences, remain the same. When repetition occurs within 
an economy o f accumulation, it constitutes the return of the same structures of 
exploitation, expulsion and suffering. If, however, repetition occurs within the context 
of a heterogeneous community, this repetition becomes, for Müller, an opportunity. This
215 ibid., p. 32. Just such a fetishisation of the body as elemental force was reportedly the starting point a 
production of Der Lohndrücker in West Berlin in the mid-1970's, an interpretation of the play which 
sought to emphasise the "dignity" of labour in the face of insuperable odds. Müller was, however, not 
especially impressed. That his objections were also based on the form of the production is discussed 
below.
216 ibid., p. 31.
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opportunity consists of the chance to respect the constitutive nature of the other in the 
community. This is not to say that Zemke's behaviour when repeated within a more 
politically liberal society would be anything else than destructive, and Balke's 
industriousness might be seen in a different context as selfish. The point for Müller is 
rather that a society and economy displaying a desire not to homogenise labour into a 
single body lays the interpretation of behaviour and the repetition o f that behaviour open 
to debate. Similarly, the goal of production would not only be open to debate but allow 
the possibility of numerous aims and achievements. Finally, the community can only 
engage in such political discussion on the nature of the present if it remembers the past, 
and engages in particular remembrance of the particular victims of the progress from 
past to present. It is in the name of such remembrance that drastic action might be taken 
for the sake of the simple justice of preventing future victims.
In 1956, Müller evidently had enough faith in the young GDR to entertain the 
possibility that the democratic society which did not exclude, which was open for 
debate and which would provide an equitable environment for the labour of the German 
population could be ushered into the GDR by existing state apparatuses. Thus while the 
central message of the play remains the need for the processes of production to take 
advantage of the heterogeneity of the labour force instead of trying to repress it, it is the 
Party, purged of the opportunists and fellow-travellers which remains the guarantor of 
such generosity. Balke is made to denounce the saboteur by Schom, even though the 
latter had been denounced himself by Balke during the war. The repetition of his 
denunciation, however, offers the opportunity to put aside obstacles for a just and above 
all productive society. "Du mußt wissen, was du willst. Uns gehören die Fabriken und
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die Macht im Staat. Wir verlieren sie, wenn wir sie nicht gebrauchen. Schweigen."2'1 
Similarly, the refusal by both Balke and Schom not to indulge in personal revenge on 
those who have wronged them is not only done for the good of the productive process, 
but because it is the state which must mete out revenge (as we see in the case of Lerka 
and the saboteur). In Der Lohndriicker it is thus the state which underwrites the 
productive process and takes the lead in regulating the relations between workers by its 
rule of law.
There remains in Der Lohndriicker, therefore, a certain tension between on the 
one hand a degree of social heterogeneity through remembrance which becomes 
reflected in a more politicised attitude to production, and on the other, the necessity of 
this politicisation being grounded in the party. Müller engages in remembrance of the 
particular histories of German subjects in order to politicise their present, but the 
manner in which these subjects live their present demonstrates how it is sublated into 
the future goal of society. Thus when Müller remarks that the weak economic situation 
of the GDR provided the conditions for memory and expectation, in contrast to the 
West,218 he conflates two different attitudes to the future. The first waits in expectation 
of the futural telos to come, and engineers its productive processes for the realisation of 
that telos. The second, more akin to the heterogeneous society of Bataille, expects the 
future to surprise us and to lay the foundations for further interpretation and political 
debate.
It has been the argument of this chapter that such an attitude to the future, which 
would determine to a certain extent the degree of heterogeneity in the present, is
m  ibid., p. 40.
2,8 See note 214 above.
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difficult to realise within the aesthetics of Miiller's early work, be it Die Umsiedlerin or 
Der Lohndrücker. Not only in Miiller's retreat into the arms of the state do the plays 
betray a residual belief in the party programme, but more importantly perhaps, the 
realist re-presentation o f events outside the theatre on the stage undermines the aesthetic 
experience of labour as a potentially heterogeneous force in the community. In these 
early works, Müller finds himself in the deeply contradictory position of trying to write 
community -  as open, politicised, heterogeneous -  by reinstating that lost, unified, 
mythic community of interpretation which would agree with itself and come to more or 
less the same conclusion about itself. The restoration of such a community, especially 
one whose understanding of itself was underwritten or provided by the state would leave 
no room for precisely that interpretation and politicisation of the present for which 
Müller otherwise pleads.
Instead of this reliance on the state, interpretation of the plays would have to be 
premised upon the original difference in such interpretation; it would be consistently 
other to itself. Indeed, the work of art would attempt to elicit a response whereby 
interpretation was only possible if it was heterogeneous. The interpretation of one 
member of the audience would not only be opaque to another, but also most importantly 
opaque to the interpretation and interests of the state. But, as argued above, in Müller's 
early work it is precisely the state which grounds the events on the stage, their 
interpretation and the aesthetic and theatrical experience as a whole.
We thus arrive at the crux of the matter for Müller. If his work flashes up 
moments of heterogeneous expenditure, be it comedy, aesthetic experience of 
heterogeneous forces in the outside world, or remembrance of particular victims in the 
past, then such moments can only be interpreted in a manner which are always different
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from themselves. The form of the work of art must thus answer to this demand and we
will see in the next chapter how Miiller's dramatic and political interests combine to 
produce a gradual change, perhaps his own Kehre, in his writing. Part of this change 
will be the realisation that in order for theatre to encourage a heterogeneous experience 
of its expenditure, that is, a political experience of the present, then the possibility must 
be allowed of an interpretation which betrays the concerns of homogenous society or its 
agents. The theatre therefore becomes not just a site of the pious celebration of alterity 
but an arena of political struggle between the interests of heterogeneous and 
homogeneous expenditure. Furthermore, such a struggle will not end up by being 
resolved, but will simply always reappear to be reinterpreted in the future.
Returning to Der Lohndrücker, it would therefore be imperative for Miiller's 
interests in the political community for labour, as a potentially heterogeneous force, to 
be experienced aesthetically within the theatre. Were labour to be thus experienced, it 
would undermine the claims of homogenous society to instrumentalise everything it 
touches, providing the conditions for a possible interpretation of labour as 
heterogeneous and political expenditure. Thus the tension in the play referred to above 
is not resolved by art, but rather set free as tension, remaining at the level of the 
undecideable.
In addition, the form of memory which Müller calls upon in Der Lohndrücker, 
the remembrance of particular victims in the past whose reappearance is witness to the 
fmitude and heterogeneity which structures community, has to take place in art which 
acts as art, an art which seeks actively to demonstrate its distance from conventional 
realist aesthetics which have been sublated into a programme of accumulation. By 
remaining within the theatre and addressing the tradition of those theatrical aesthetics,
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Müller will address similarly the tradition of heterogeneous expenditure and remember 
the victims of that practice -  theatre -  which has set itself off from the normal day-to- 
day life of the population in modem society. In other words, two forms of victim have 
to be addressed by Müller if his interest in heterogeneous expenditure is to be 
consistent. Not only must he remember those victims who have suffered directly at the 
hands of homogeneous society, but also those who have been sacrificed by the theatre's 
refusal not to be sullied by direct involvement in politics.
As the next chapter will show, this latter remembrance will primarily take the 
form of how the bodies of figures on the stage are presented. For as Der Lohndrücker 
demonstrates clearly, the symbolisation of the body on stage ends up either in the 
presentation of the events depicted as an idealised history of the GDR, or (as with the 
example of the reporter's article or, allegedly in the case of the 1974 production in West 
Berlin) succeeds only in aestheticising those bodies outside of the theatre. Müller will 
instead take a different path, presenting the body not as symbol but as allegory, in an 
attempt not to end up with political theatre, but to write and produce politically by 
invoking a radical sense of finitude, interpretation, openness and surprise.
Just such a production took place in East Berlin in 1988, when Müller directed 
Der Lohndrücker before packed houses. This was no nostalgia for Socialist Realism, 
however, but a highly provocative, avant-garde interpretation of the play which sought 
to address the history and decay of the theatrical community over the 30 years between 
this and the first performance of the play. Judging by Marc Silberman's lucid and 
thorough essay on the production,219 Müller altered the staging of the piece radically, 
firmly replacing it in the avant-garde tradition of his works since the early 1970's. In the
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production the chronology of the play became more fractured whereby the juxtaposition 
of scenes was now exaggerated with the inscription of other texts, repetitions, omissions 
and tableaux. Most importantly the final scene, where Balke and Karras are reconciled 
for the good of continued production, was cut out. The production was characterised by 
discontinuity rather than by the smooth path of progress, be it of history or narrative, 
which corresponded to the official GDR state view of history.
This was also achieved through other effective means, most notably the 
relegation of the spoken word to an after-thought of the image. In this production, 
voices (not least that of Müller himself) were heard from off-stage, displacing the easy 
identification of speech and subject. In a technique that Müller had used increasingly 
since his collaboration with Robert Wilson, pieces of text are repeated over and over; 
for instance, the conversation between Balke and Lerka in scene 4. Certain scenes are 
turned, not into the next stage of a plot, but into tableaux, standing outside of the 
chronology o f theatrical development.
Silberman thus suggests that Müller was attempting to re-establish not so much a 
community o f interpretation, but rather one of memory, not only of the events which 
characterised the early years of the GDR, but also a memory of the tradition of theatre. 
This community, due to the opacity of the avant-garde theatrical performance, was 
almost bound to be riven by different interpretations, and thus Müller's aim seemed to 
have been the restoration of the heterogeneous community of memory which might 
address the history and tradition of labour, its subsumption under the economics of 
accumulation and possibilities of the transgression of that subsumption. Thus the Der 
Lohndrücker production of 1988 aimed to address the question of the legacy of labour 219
219 Marc Silberman, Heiner Müller's Der Lohndrücker, 1988, Theater. Summer/Fall 1988, p.28.
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in the GDR by reflecting on the aesthetic presentation of it on the stage, referring to the 
history of such presentation, or in other words, repeating it.
As we shall discover in the next chapter, the repetition of ideas and events, 
however much they reflect homogenous society, however mythic they might be, can for 
Müller offer up an opportunity if that repetition takes place as a practice heterogeneous 
to the restricted economy of accumulation. One example of such a practice might be 
theatre and the opportunity would take the form of allegory. When allegorical art such 
as Müller's theatre refers to and repeats its own past and own tradition it hopes to 
achieve far more than self-reflection. Müller himself attempts to reflect instead on the 
tradition of heterogeneous expenditure as a whole, precisely by remaining within the 
theatre. The theatrical experience itself, therefore, and not just the events on the stage, 
thus take on the status of an allegory, but this form only seemed to be open to Müller 
once he had ceased to write realistic drama and instead turned directly to the past. In the 
case of Philoktet, this is achieved through the repetition of particular drama, while 
Hamletmaschine represents a more ambitious concern with the theatrical tradition and
the nature of the theatre as such.

The D ra m a  o /P h i lo k t e t
The play1 is concerned with events on the island of Lemnos, where Philoktet, the master 
bowman and general of a vital part of the Greek army, was set ashore by Odysseus, the 
commander of the Greek forces some ten years previously. Philoktet had, through his 
bravery, enabled a sacrifice to be made at the altar of Poseidon, the sea god, which had 
allowed the fleet to embark from Greece. In so doing, however, he was bitten by the 
snake guarding the way to the altar and badly wounded in his foot, a wound so painful 
that he could not but help break the next condition of a safe voyage, the silence in 
respect of the victims of the events up until this point. Thus Philoktet is stranded on 
Lemnos to provide the means for the continuation of the voyage to Troy. Ten years 
later, the carnage of Troy shows no sign of abating, the siege no sign of breaking the 
Trojans defences; what is needed is the bow of Philoktet, presented to him by Hercules 
and which never fails to hit its target, but even more importantly the leadership of 
Philoktet himself whose men have grown restless and are demanding the return of their 
general. The despised Odysseus therefore travels to Lemnos to attempt to persuade 
Philoktet to save his hatred for the Trojans and return to the battle. He comes however 
not alone but with Neoptolemos, the son of Achilles, another victim of the Trojan 
slaughter, who has also been tricked by Odysseus and who hates him with scarcely less 
venom than Philoktet. In order to entice Neoptolemos to Troy, Odysseus had offered 
him the bait of his fallen father's armour, a trophy which he has still not received and 
which was promised him once again if he succeeds in tricking Philoktet to come aboard 
the ship bound back for Troy. Neoptolemos comes across Philoktet, manages to gain his
Philoktet, in Mauser, pp. 7 -42.
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trust and is on the point of persuading him of the necessity of the return to Troy when 
Odysseus appears, a shock that sends Philoktet back into the state of naked hatred in 
which he had lived the previous ten years. He manages to regain the precious bow that 
he had given Neoptolemos and is about to murder Odysseus when Neoptolemos runs 
Philoktet through with his sword, to protect Odysseus, but more importantly to ensure 
the success of the odyssey to Troy itself. Neoptolemos and Odysseus leave Lemnos, 
carrying the dead Philoktet, intending to concoct a story for Philoktet's troops which 
would encourage them to fight on: Philoktet was murdered by the Trojans on his arrival 
in Troy, the corpse the none-too living proof.
It is important at this stage to point out the differences between the Philoktet of 
Heiner Müller and the Philoctetes of Sophocles on which the former is based. In the 
latter, Philoktet survives the machinations of Odysseus, largely because Hercules, the 
presenter of the miraculous bow, appears. His arrival in the drama, semi-deus ex 
machina, serves the purpose of solving the seemingly intractable contradictions and 
problems of the situation on Lemnos. The mortals seem incapable of bringing the events 
to a conclusion, tied up as they are in their worldly concerns. Hercules presents what 
amounts to a transcendental synthesis of the politics o f the circumstances and thus 
manages to persuade Philoktet to return to Troy in peace with his soldier comrades.
Müller's version, written between 1958 and 1964 was not performed in the GDR 
until late 1977,2 receiving its first performance in Munich in 1968 at the 
Residenztheater. The mildly enthusiastic review3 interprets the play as "ein Stück über
2 13.12.77 at the Deutsches Theater, Berlin.
3 Rischbieter, H., "Ein finsteres Stück: Heiner Müllers Philoktet uraufgeführt am Residenztheater 
München" in Theater Heute. 8/1968, pp. 28-31.
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Lüge, Lügengewebe, Dialektik der Lüge, Lüge als Herrschaftsmittel",4 and as presenting 
the characters as being caught up in the web of deceit and corruption that transcends 
political systems but is rather the milieu of the human condition. Thus the performance 
and the play are linked to the philosophy that had swept through the Western European 
intelligentsia, and which was perhaps especially salient after the Ereignisse of that year: 
"Wenn Philosophie in diesem Text steckt, so ist es eine finstere Abart des 
Existentialismus, eine dialektische und eine skeptische."5
In the West, however, Philoktet has been more generally regarded as an allegory 
of Stalinism,6 and this has been seen to be confirmed by some statements of Müller 
himself although others, not least the notes to the director of the Munich production,7 
seem to have been worded to prevent a too hasty appropriation of the piece for Western 
concerns possibly hostile to the GDR. However, in an interview in 1982,8 Müller states 
explicitly:"I wrote the play about the stalemate situation of Soviet Socialism, and more 
generally about the Russian revolution in the context of world revolution."9 The 
necessity for the allegorisation of such a subject matter is obvious and is also addressed 
by Müller. "I wouldn't write another antique play or adaptation now. In the early sixties, 
however, you couldn't write a play on Stalinism. You needed this kind of model in order 
to confront the real questions."10 There was also a general return to mythic subject 
matter in much of the literature of the GDR at the time. Herbert Arnold and Roland
4 ibid., p. 29.
5 ibid.
6 See especially Schulz, Heiner Müller, pp. 71 - 83 and Wieghaus, Zwischen Auftrag und Verrat, pp. 115 
- 128.
7 In Rischbieter, op. cit.
8 Walls. An Interview with Sylfere Lotringer, in Müller, Rotwelsch, pp. 9 - 48.
9 ibid., p. 37.
10 ibid., p. 39.
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Heine" discuss the treatment of myth in Müller, as well as in Christa Wolf, Peter Hacks 
and Hartmut Lange and mention various explanations for the wide ranging investigation 
of mythic themes. On the one hand, and especially relevant in the case of Müller, the 
reaction to continual censorship and outright proscription of work leads to the necessity 
of allegorisation. Müller is interpreted as having found a particular niche, just as was 
supposedly the case in the wider GDR society as a whole, where work could be carried 
on undisturbed. On the other, a general disillusionment with the direction of real 
existierende Sozialismus results in an interest in more personal day-to-day concerns, 
such as the problem of lying, for example. Finally, the treatment of myth is seen to 
accompany the state-induced debate on the nature of the relation to the cultural and 
wider historical Erbe of the GDR.
Any allegory of Stalinism succeeding the demolition of the personality cult 
surrounding Stalin himself must inevitably address the problem that the whole 
population was lied to and therefore the possibility that it is still being spun a lie, simply 
a different one. It may just be the case that the lie is inevitable, not simply in the Soviet 
economies but in the structure of human communication itself. Language would thus 
seem to be necessary dissimulation. Philoktet, on seeing Neoptolemos for the first time 
expresses this universal dissimulation in all cultures, in language itself: "Mit welcher 
Sprache, Hund, lerntest du lügen",1 2 Odysseus points similarly towards the inevitability 
of lying; simply by telling the truth will Neoptolemos be forced to deceive:
In allem brauchst du nicht zu lügen.
Sei der du bist, [...]
Und weil du nicht zu lügen brauchst in dem
11 On Myth & Marxism - the Case o f Heiner Müller & Christa Wolf Colloquia Germanica 21, 1988, pp. 
58-69 and Mythenrezeption in den Dramen von Peter Hacks, Heiner Müller und Hartmut Lange Zum 
Versuch der Grundlegung einer 'sozialistischen Klassik, Colloauia Germanica 14, 1981, pp. 239-260.
12 Müller, Philoktet, op. cit., p. 15.
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Wählt ich zum Helfer dich für meinen Plan 
Denn glaublich wirst du lügen mit der Wahrheit13
The inevitability of language and its dissimulation represents the ineluctable nature of
culture, the subject in its intercourse with others will inextricably be caught up in its net.
Whilst Odysseus and Neoptolemos speak continually of the net that needs to be cast to
catch Philoktet, it is simultaneously a metaphor for the binding of Philoktet, the subject
who was cast outside of culture and history, within the confines of civilisation. At the
beginning of the play Odysseus orders Neoptolemos to be "das Netz, mit dem ich ihn
zurückfang"14 to which the latter replies, at this stage convinced of the idealism of truth,
that Odysseus who has been proven to be an inveterate liar will not succeed in his task if
he continues to lie. "Dein Wort hat weite Maschen"15 he says, unknowingly linking the
Word itself with the lie, forgetting that in order for the net to have its full effect, it must
have wide enough holes for the victim to intricate himself. A net without wide enough
holes is easily shrugged off, that one with the gaping rip surrenders its integrity as net,
as would a culture its consistency and identity if the dissimulation reached such a point
that it represented a return to a State of Nature as characterised by the excluded
Philoktet on the island.
After having tricked Philoktet out of his bow, Neoptolemos still suffers the guilt 
of the representative of culture who has exploited the innocence of nature for its own 
ends:
Ich wollt, ein andrer Weg wär aus dem Krieg[...]
Als der, den ich im Netz der Schande geh 
Zum Strand jetzt, den erlognen Sieg zu melden 
Die Schläfen rot mit Scham und auszuliefem
13 ibid., p. 12-13.
14 ibid., p. 8.
15 ibid.
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Mit schwarzen Händen den erlognen Fang[.]16
For the outcast Philoktet, however, the return to culture, even if it means the carnage of 
Troy, is a return to identity, of undergoing recognition, of becoming a part once more of 
the dialectics of needs, demands and desires.17
Beug deinen Nacken wieder, Gaul, ins Joch
Und lern das Leben neu, vor Troja schlachtend.
Steht auf.
Du wirst gebraucht, du bist ein Netz wert wieder.
Renn, Fisch, um deinen Platz in seinen Maschen.18
Language and society may lie but the subject needs them as much as Philoktet is 
needed now. His reaction to the re-appearance of the symbolic in his environment is one 
of remembrance and regret for having lost them (although the memory of how this 
happened will provoke his death), and a desire to enter again whatever the cost.
Laut, der mir lieb war. Sprache, lang entbehrt
Mit der das erste Wort aus meinem Mund ging [...]
Red, Grieche. Red von mir das Schlimmste, red
Von meinen Feinden Gutes. Was du willst.
Lüg, Grieche. Allzu lang hört ich nicht lügen.19
The lie becomes a necessity, not merely an ontological given, but vitally in 
Philoktet, the necessity is governed by the nature of the lie as means to an end. The end
16 ibid., p. 27.
17 The re-entrance of Philoktet into the symbolic order, the net of the law, would seem to encourage a 
Lacanian reading of the problematic of the play. Before the arrival of the other two Greeks, Philoktet 
lives in a realm analogous to the pre-Imaginary, where need is articulated by the drives, where there 
seems to be a re-sealing of the Spaltung constitutive of the subject, complete identification with the body 
and his wound. It is a state which exists before the gaze of recognition of the mirror stage produces a 
demand of the Other. In several places in the text, Philoktet, thrust out of the symbolic, and even more, 
deprived of the "mirror" of the Other, speaks of the lack of the gaze of the Other that has been the 
determining characteristic of his ten years on the island. This is interestingly enough expressed as the lack 
of the Other face, opening up the demands of culture that are here represented as being repressed by the 
stronger demands of instrumental reason. It is noticeable that Philoktet in the following quote speaks of 
his 'place' in the net of the symbolic order, the site where he can be gazed at, desired, a place before the 
Law which is his and his only. The problems that arise almost immediately demonstrate merely that the 
body can never be completely aufgehoben into the symbolic, it is always present as Rest, a theme that 
Müller was interested in throughout his productive life.
18 ibid., p. 28.
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for which all is forsaken in the play is, for Odysseus, clear: "Zum Dieb und Lügner bist 
du schlecht begabt/ Ich weiß es. Süß aber, Sohn Achills, ist der Sieg."19 20 Neoptolemos' 
attitude is that of the politically naive, or rather the non-politician. For him, the goal is 
contaminated if the means are not pure: "Aus faulem Grund wächst wohl ein Gutes 
nicht."21 He would rather retreat, to a position effectively analogous to that of Philoktet, 
his hands clean, his senses uncorrupted: "Hätt ich kein Ohr für dich und keine Sprache./ 
Sag mir die Lügen, die ich sagen muß."22 He thus abnegates all responsibility for his 
actions, preferring to slot in to the power structures of the receiving and giving of orders 
and tasks, rather than questioning the conditions and politics of the situation that he 
finds so repellent.
As Odysseus shows, on the other hand, the necessity of the lie is its justification, 
and that necessity is further more inevitable, at least if thought proceeds along those 
lines as portrayed in Philoktet. There will always be goals, there will thus always be a 
journey towards those goals. The tragedy of the play, the tragic moment that Müller 
insists was missing in Western productions, mostly through the one-dimensional 
characterisation of Odysseus,23 is the inability of the subject to see the need to intervene 
and involve oneself in what is at stake in the necessity itself. The retreat sounded at 
various points of the play, helplessly by the victim Philoktet, in a more dangerous way 
by the idealist Neoptolemos, is little less than the desire for a full presence of meaning, 
one untainted by the vagaries of symbolic practices. There is a vast difference, however, 
between the victim and the idealist. The one is placed in this position, the other enacts a
19 ibid., p. 16.
20 ibid., p. 11.
21 ibid.
22 ibid., p. 12.
25 see Müller, Krieg ohne Schlacht, p. 189-190.
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full scale withdrawal from politics. In his unreflected use of language in the retreat, 
Neoptolemos in turn cannot regard or consider the violence enacted upon the object, and 
even more wishes to compound this violence in its complete subsumption into an 
identity of full presence. However, as Odysseus shows, the world of the Macher, for all 
its blood and grime, is the arena of politics and the only possibility and hope for change.
Müller does not shirk from the presentation of the qualities of this world. Its 
brutality is naked, its continuance catastrophic. The unnegotiable victory over Troy 
justifies the necessity of a whole series of actions both within the timespan of the play 
as well as those which have brought the characters to this point. Troy needs every man 
without exception: "kein Leben ist / Auf Lemnos, das der Krieg nicht braucht vor 
Troja."24 While Neoptolemos retreats into the contemplation typical of the intellectual, 
more comrades are being sacrificed:
NEOPTOLEMOS
Nicht solchem Sieg will ich mein Leben danken.
ODYSSEUS
Und seins und andre hier und andern Orts.25
Odysseus had indeed made it explicitly clear a little earlier: "Und jeder Augenblick, 
versäumt hier, tötet / In der entfernten Schlacht uns einen Mann."26 and is later prepared 
to have a lie told about his possible murder by Philoktet if it will benefit the Greeks' 
cause. Neoptolemos is in contrast disturbed by duty's encroachment on truth rather than 
the necessity of duty and attempts to paint himself as victim rather than as someone 
whose detachment allows not only the catastrophe to continue, but also the thinking 
behind it to remain unchallenged.
ungern betrog ich
24 op. cit., p. 9.
25 ibid., p. 34.
26 ibid., p. 30.
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Den viel Betrognen, viel betrogen selber
Doch war kein andrer Weg, die Lüge Pflicht.”
Philoktet himself had been cast away from the fleet, because he was "[u]ns nicht 
mehr dienlich". His sacrifice was the means of the fleet sailing: "Der Weg nach Troja, 
unsrer, war dein Fuß".27 8
For the political and social conditions presented in the play, the journey had to 
be undertaken and Müller seems to suggest that once having set sail, once this history 
has been set in motion, the instrumentalisation of all thought is unavoidable; it is 
directed towards the goal of victory. As the victim of this pattem, Philoktet curses the 
first moves on the journey as well as him who was the prime mover himself.
Wie lang verflucht ich den, der damit anfing
Und ging den ersten Schritt, beschuht mit Schiffen
Erfinder meines Auslands[.]29
However, as he considers a return to history, he seems to have steeled himself for the 
consequences of such a restitution: "Leb fur den nächsten Fußtritt. Süßes Leben/ In der 
blutsaufenden Gemeinschaft wieder."30
Neoptolemos never shows such clarity, albeit not consciously. The price to be 
paid on such a journey is clear: he retreats instead into the impotence of nostalgia, into 
the quietism of the apolitical. "O wär ich keinen Schritt gegangen auf/ Dem Weg, der 
mit mir selber mich entzweit"31 Odysseus also reflects on the time that he wanted to stay
27 ibid., p. 24.
28 ibid., p. 36.
20 ibid., p. 22.
30 ibid., p. 29.
31 ibid., p. 23. See also note 17 above. It would be important to note that the Entzweiung, the Spaltung 
that the subject undergoes, once it has set off into the Symbolic as it were, has itself its particluar place 
and time in a particular subject. How the imaginary and Real play themselves out in the lives of the 
Symbolic is subject to a conflicting set of teleologies, all o f which may envisage an action for a particular 
goal (see also the next quote). This is reflected most strongly in the different teleologies towards death, as 
I hope to show in relation to Philoktet. The essential difference is between the existence of conflictual, 
always-already agonistic teleologies and the homogenisation of these into the one telos of Enlightenment,
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in the one place, the tactics he used "[um] mich zu behalten" but he too was forced into
service by the generals of his time and since then can see the hopelessness of the desire
to turn in and back on oneself.
So weit sind wir gegangen in der Sache 
Im Netz aus eignem und aus fremdem Schritt 
Daß uns kein Weg herausgeht als der weitre.32
The wrath of the gods was directed at the attempt "uns zu behalten" and the sacrifices
made to placate them (Philoktet, Odysseus' child) the necessary price to start history on
its development. This view would seem to regard the movement of history as an
inexorable course, but as will be discussed later, for Müller the catastrophic repetition of
the same conditions, the continuation of war and of the conditions o f its possibility open
up, in this repetition, a fissure and a site for politics.
The allegory to Stalinism is not difficult to recognise and has been commented 
on in previous chapters; the goal is communism, and the real existing socialism in the 
conditions of the GDR the manifestation of the development of history up until that 
point. The tragic course of events that makes up the history of the Soviet block do have 
for Müller a particular poignancy for Germany. As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
failure of the German revolution culminated in the doctrine of "socialism in one 
country", which, with mental and material powers directed towards the communist telos, 
led the Party to the colonisation of its own people, an ideology then set in place by the 
Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe after the Second World War. "Die Revolution 
konnte nur fü r  die Arbeiterklasse gemacht werden, nach der Dezimierung der Avant-
a one goal whose unrepresentability is not that of the sublime, like death's, but which sees itself as present 
in each stage, as a projection of its completion. It is thereby apolitical, suffocating any basis to praxis.
32 ibid.,p. 34 - 35.
Garde, ....nicht von ihr."3 45 Democracy thus became the rule for  the people rather than of, 
allowing the instrumentalisation of even those excluded by the process of the definition 
of identity that forbade any constitutive role to excess.34 The effect of this problem in 
relation to a post-revolutionary society is explored in other plays of Müller, notably 
Mauser and Zement. In Philoktet too, the unavoidable exploitation of individuals and 
groups in any class society (that is, in every society that has as yet existed) as means 
towards an end, and their emergence as victims in this process, becomes a determining 
point of contention. The play shows an unsurprising disquiet with this situation, but the 
answer is not seen as a retreat into the self-defining and solipsistic apolitical but rather a 
further radicalisation of the political process. Politics produces victims but the 
radicalisation of politics with the aim of producing fewer victims can only happen 
through the remembrance of past victims. That this is effected in the theatre itself, as 
well as coming over as the pedagogical impulse of the play is typical of Müller's work at 
this stage and it demonstrates the shift in Müller's work to a concern with the tradition 
of theatre as being the basis for making theatre politically.
Müller also expressed the same view in countless interviews, one noteworthy 
example being in Neues Deutschland on 10th October 1973, where he describes his task 
as being to show through "Erinnerung, was er [der Sozialismus] gekostet hat." This was 
interpreted as tribute to the victims of the revolution, the heroes for the struggle for 
socialism, as well as reminding the GDR population of how fortunate they were. 
Müller's aim was thus "die Gewöhnung an den Sozialismus und in den Sozialismus 
aufzubrechen."35 Such a praxis is one in which Müller wishes to indulge in a politicised
33 Müller, Fatzer +/- Keuner, in Rotwelsch, p. 145.
34 See Chapter Two and the discussion of Fondrak in Die Umsiedlerin.
35 Bernhardt, Rüdiger. Antikerezeption im Werk Heiner Müllers, Weimarer Beiträge 3, 1976, p. 115.
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remembrance of victims, not only of a revolution, not only of political opponents within 
a totalitarian society but most of all of the victims of any social structure, especially one 
based so starkly on a politics of Ausgrenzung, whose maintenance and development has 
proved necessarily to involve sacrifice. This problematic is demonstrated most 
forcefully in the figure of Philoktet himself.
Philoktet -  die Wonne des Getretnen
It is indeed Philoktet's exile from the journey to Troy, as well as from the history that 
was made there, which enables the first step to be taken. It is thus fitting that his foot 
was the price to be paid for the journey of others. He is unable to engage in 'Fort-schritt' 
and even when he feels able to do so ("Lauf, Einbein in den Schlamm, der alles heilt."36 *) 
his foot refuses to move, his body is in rebellion against the instrumentalisation of itself. 
He has been so long out of society that there is almost no conceivable way of a return. 
His remark on hearing Odysseus' approach - "Was für ein Schritt?"” - signifies the 
consequences of a possible return but finally disallows it: his exclusion can only bring 
about in him a hatred of any society based on Greek civilisation that can never be 
sublimated:
Denn Freund nenn ich dich, wenn von deiner Hand 
Ein Grieche starb und frag nach deinem Grund nicht 
Er war ein Grieche, keinen Grund brauchts weiter.38
His hate for Odysseus is such that he hopes that the latter has not been killed "[djurch
zufälliges Eisen" for he knows that he "fd]as tote nicht noch einmal töten kann",39 and
36 Müller, Philoktet, op. cit., p. 29.
”  ibid.
38 ibid., p. 15.
39 ibid., p. 20.
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yet later he wishes precisely this, when finally faced with Odysseus himself: "Wären wir 
unsterblich / Daß ich dich töten könnte jetzt und immer."40
The consequence of Philoktet's exclusion becomes the desire to return to pre- 
cultural state that is nothing short of psychotic, as evidenced by the extremity of the 
murderous lust mentioned above. More importantly this psychosis as a complete 
involvement in the present moment takes place by definition outside of a historical 
temporality41. Identification for Philoktet is thus only possible with himself and there 
seems to be no hope for this victim of history: "Ich der die Geier fraß unter dem 
Reißzahn / Wohnend der Jahre. Ich und Ich und Ich."42 The complete presence of 
identification, not displaced or deferred by the difference of the social environment 
leads thus to a return of the body, or rather to an undifferentiated relation of the subject 
to his own body: "Ich war die Wunde, ich das Fleisch, das schrie."43 Philoktet has 
become therefore little more than an animal which must be trapped in the "net", whose 
elemental nature has to be overcome and dominated in order for the journey to continue. 
The contrast between the human subject and Philoktet is made clear at the first sight of 
their appearance together on the stage. On seeing Neoptolemos, Philoktet remarks:
Ein Lebendes auf meinem toten Strand
Ein Ding, das aufrecht geht wie vordem ich
Auf anderm Boden mit zwei heilen Beinen.
Wer bist du Zweibein? Mensch, Tier oder Grieche?44
One of the outstanding features of Philoktet's expulsion out of the social realm is 
his relation to time, and his re-introduction to society is made impossible by the
40 ibid., p. 35.
41 As argued in Chapter Two this complete and never-ending transgression, this total immersion in the 
present is therefore not the sovereignty of a figure such as Fondrak, but rather psychosis.
42 Midler, Philoktet, op. cit., p. 28.
43 ibid.
44 ibid., p. 15.
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inability to take up the challenge of the conflicting temporalities that make up the 
political environment. Time is bearable only in sociality, it is otherwise experienced as 
constant death.
Grad gut genug mein Sterben zu verlängern 
Bis du mich aufhobst aus vieljährigem Tod 
Ins Leben, das den Tod nicht kennt vorm Ende.45
Death outside of the temporality of the social is constantly present and cannot be
displaced into something with which the subject can engage in a personal teleological
relationship. As Müller himself explains:
Das Entscheidende ist der Umgang mit Zeit; Zeit des Lebens, Zeit des Sterbens, 
Zeit des Todes. Die bewußte Wahrnehmung des Ablaufs der Zeit hält niemand 
aus - also muß Zeit "totgeschlagen" und das heißt nicht weniger als: Todesangst 
verdrängt werden zum Beispiel mit Arbeit.46
The 'primary repression' of time which thus defines the social environment is not, 
however, to be viewed negatively. Müller's comments are rather a recognition of the 
death of the other as constitutive of society. The social is defined by the limits between 
human subjects, otherwise life is experienced as constant death.47
Philoktet becomes acutely aware of the relation of time to the social, for he 
realises that the passing of the time of the task of Troy, that homogenous conception 
based upon the repression of the political, is undermined by different temporalities. If he 
were to stay on the margins of the social, to remain on the island and thus keep
45 ibid., p. 23.
46 Müller, Jenseits der Nation, p. 22.
47 One could, on the other hand, accuse Müller here of employing an absolute conception of time which 
necessitates the interpretation of work (or an ethical act) as the repression of the fear of death. An 
understanding of originally antagonistic temporalities which are recognised as such by the subject would 
allow different teleologies to death to overcome the homogenous social order’s 'Totschlag'. There would 
thus not be just one 'Umgang mit der Zeit', but many. This is further problematised in Philoktet by the 
insistence that the homogenisation of temporality is indeed violent but simultaneously the realm of 
politics.
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Odysseus and Neoptolemos there as well, then the time of the excluded, the time of
excess would threaten the whole existence of the project.
Behalt den Bogen, bessre Waffe ist 
Die Zeit mir. Keine Hand beweg ich und 
Ein Grieche stirbt. Und wieder stirbt ein Grieche 
Und keine Hand. Zeit, Mörderin, alterslose 
Zehn Jahr lang deinen Gang verflucht ich, der 
Mir keinen Schritt ausließ [...] und nicht 
Genug zu preisen jetzt [ist] dein Ablauf[.]48
One could therefore interpret Philoktet's actions as a brake on instrumentality, he lives 
the time of excess on the island and seeks to entrap those from the outside world of 
politics into the immediacy of animalistic hate: "Dein Gang ist mein Gang, dein Schritt 
ist mein Schritt."49 The danger of such an interpretation is, however, made clear in the 
actions of Neoptolemos, whose retreat into the self-presence of the immediacy of extra­
social temporality merely represses political practice. Philoktet (the play) thus 
demonstrates that the brake on 'progress', that is, on an idea of history that suffocates 
difference and politics, can only be applied by those in history or by those who 
recognise that the hegemonic idea of history has to be substituted by one which 
remembers its victims. The tragedy of the play is that Philoktet himself is the victim and 
as marginalised, is unable to effect a return to the possibility of political action. This re­
entrance into the demands of the symbolic arena would necessitate a different 
temporality to that of his life on Lemnos. At one point, he almost seems capable of it, 
moving on from the psychosis of desire discussed earlier to its sublimation, or more 
accurately its deferral.
Schluck deinen Haß, die Nahrung, lang gekaut [...]
Auf seinen Tod die Hoffnung war dein Leben
48 Müller, Philoktet, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
49 ibid., p. 31.
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Wart länger und mit bessrer Hoffnung jetzt.50
Here, the self-presence of absolute animalistic hate is mitigated and deferred to a goal in
the future. Philoktet never comes closer than this to a re-entry, but the audience is left in
no doubt that its price would be to re-establish the catastrophe of the continuity of
carnage. And yet on the other hand, it provides the only means to political action. This
aporia of political engagement is, however, then set out by Müller as providing the
means for further judgement and further political action itself. In contrast, hatred and the
desire for self-presence are thereby linked: both are politically solipsistic and both must
be deferred in order to enter the social realm (at the price of being caught within the net
of the political hegemony); one is exemplified by Philoktet, the other by Neoptolemos.
This necessary deferment of self-presence involved in sociality, in other words the fact
that identity is achieved through the difference from other members of society, finally
finds its expression in the attitude which the community takes to death.
Philoktet develops throughout the play before finally returning to the state from
whence he came. Each of the positions he takes in the play shows his status as victim,
each points to his being acted upon as the object of events rather than as an agent of
history. One important turning point comes after Neoptolemos takes his bow, expressing
regret for the trickery involved in the theft. This is then interpreted by Philoktet as the
intention to leave him behind once more:
Zum zweitenmal den Geiern geben willst du 
Mich, weil dir graut vor dem Gestank der Wunde 
Der mich den Geiern gab zum erstenmal.51
50 ibid., p. 28.
51 ibid., p. 23.
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He sees the events as a simple repetition, without being able to conceive what is exactly
at stake in the return of the same. The return to Lemnos and the return to the
instrumentalisation of Philoktet shows up the difference between the two events.
Philoktet is unable to grasp that a journey has been undertaken, that there has been
history in between. Once the reasons for the return are revealed to him, he retreats once
more into the desire for a complete schism from culture, a gap which is revealed in his
desire for a particular kind of death:
Und nicht eingraben sollt ihr meinen Leib
In fremden Grund oder in heimischen
Daß nicht mein Staub begegne eurem Staub [...]
Und nicht verbrennen sollt ihr mich und streun 
In augenscheinlich Leeres meine Asche 
Daß nicht die euerm aschnen Rest vermengt wird 
Von zufälligem Wind.”
He goes on to forbid his being fed to the vultures or the fish as well as his preservation 
in salt, all for the same reason, to retain the purity of his death, a death which must be 
utterly uninstrumental. Philoktet's stance, from our position within history and politics 
in the audience appears as the critique of that instrumentalism. In other words, his 
excessive and transgressive behaviour only offers the chance of criticising the idea of 
instrumental progress for those who are not transgressing fully. This dynamic is 
heightened by the audience's witnessing Philoktet's transgression in the theatre. They 
experience Philoktet as a politically autonomous work of art which stands on the limit 
of instrumentalism through the manner in which the play brings forth different 
interpretations, different teleologies and different temporalities in the autonomous work 
or art. As such, art repeats for Müller the political interpretation o f death in the 
community - the political act of burial that defines culture:
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Kunst aber stammt aus und wurzelt in der Kommunikation mit dem Tod und den 
Toten. Es geht darum, daß die Toten einen Platz bekommen. Das ist eigentlich 
Kultur.52 3
Thus Philoktet's wish to be thrown into the volcano, so that nothing remains of him, is
as powerful a rejection of culture as can be.
Furthermore, once Odysseus arrives and almost all hope of the return to the
social has gone, Philoktet offers Neoptolemos the chance of purity:
Wasch den Fleck von deinem Namen 
Mach ungetan, was du nicht gern getan hast. [...]
Wasch ab die fremde Farbe 
Gib mir den Bogen, dir den Namen wieder.54
Philoktet seems to suggest that Neoptolemos is only true to himself and able to retain
his name if he joins Philoktet in the psychosis of the extra-social. He forgets thereby the
irreducibly social nature of the name: that to have a name at all is to dissimulate oneself
in and through the other.
There is a vast difference, however, between the space which constitutes the 
tragedy of the piece, which is represented by Philoktet's rejection of culture and 
civilisation, and the cowardice of Neoptolemos' retreat from the political. The latter 
represents the intellectual class with which Müller has continually identified and 
concerned himself, thus lending the play once again the force of Heiner Müller's 
signature.
52 ibid., p. 26.
53 Jenseits der Nation, p. 23.
54 Müller, Philoktet op. cit., p. 30.
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Neoptolemos -  Ruhm und Schande
Writing about his own adaptation of the Oedipus myth, Müller describes the subtext of 
the play Oedipus Rex to be about "der Dualismus Praxis Theorie [...]. Seine (blutige) 
Geburt beschreibt das Stück, seine radikalste Formulierung ist der Atompilz über 
Hiroshima."55 Oedipus' act of blinding himself is a retreat into pure theory ("denn süß ist 
wohnen / Wo der Gedanke wohnt, entfernt von allem") which has become the model for 
the behaviour of the intellectual in history, not least in Germany. Just as Oedipus solves 
the riddle set by the oracle, so has the intellectual claimed to have solved the riddle of 
history, by positing an end to history which will allow the intellectual to shelve his/her 
responsibility for the events in that history. Neoptolemos sits full square in this 
tradition.
Neoptolemos [...] ist von dem Stoff aus dem die Denkmäler gebaut werden. Das 
Kapitel Philoktet beschreibt den ersten Schritt auf seinem Marsch in die 
Versteinerung, den ersten Arbeitsgang des Bildhauers, der die Geschichte ist, an 
der Skulpturf.]56
It becomes clear that Müller's own interpretation of the play is not so close to the 
dominant Western idea that Odysseus is the representation of the classical Stalinist 
bureaucrat and bogey man, but that instead Neoptolemos is the agent rather than the tool 
in the processes of the play. He repeatedly gestures to his wish to retreat from the 
responsibility of his actions ("Hätt ich kein Ohr für dich", "Ich wollt, ein andrer Weg 
wär aus dem Krieg"), adding usually that he does the particular action "ungem", but 
"Doch ist kein andrer Weg, dich zu befrein."57 It ought to be remembered that his reason
55 quoted in Schulz, p. 87.
56 MUller, Brief an den Regisseur der bulgarischen Erstaufführung von Philoktet am dramatichen Theater 
Sofia, in Herzstück, p. 105.
57 Müller, Philoktet, op. cit., p. 31.
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for coming to Lemnos can barely be described as duty; he wants simply that which is 
his property: his father's armour.
Philoktet thus describes for Müller:
den Abstieg des Neoptolemos [...] in den Ruhm des ersten Schlächters vor Troja 
[...], ein Wunschkonzert für den Intellektuellen, der kein Blut sehen kann und es 
doch saufen will.58 59
The running through of Philoktet from behind, so that he can avoid the eyes, the gaze 
and the face of the murdered victim corresponds neatly to his historical cowardice.
Neoptolemos, as the typical intellectual, would rather simply talk about the 
actions to be undertaken, involving himself and Odysseus in a complicated metaphorical 
argument on the nature of task ahead. Odysseus finishes the exchange, almost in 
exasperation:
Oder, den Grund umgrabend ganz, die Flut 
Am dritten stirbt das andere, was kommt geht 
Und weitres reden wir auf Trojas Trümmern.5’
Here, once more the essential difference between Philoktet and Neoptolemos becomes
clear: while the former ranges on the border of the symbolic, sometimes regressing into
a pre-symbolic psychosis, the latter remains firmly caught in the net of figure and trope
(inevitable in itself) but attempts to deny all responsibility for the consequences. He
seems to be intent on doing what is "right", without reference to what Odysseus regards
as the more important goal. Neoptolemos thus represents an ethical absolutism which at
first sight seems admirable but which reflects the priority of his concern about his being
58 Müller, Brief an den Regisseur..., op. cit., p. 105.
59 Müller, Philoktet, op. cit., p. 11-12. This dialogue is, in Müller's eyes at least reminiscent of the 
conversation between Polonius and Hamlet in Act III, Sc. ii over the shape of a cloud. Müller remarks in 
a number of places that he sees Polonius' comparison of the cloud's shape to a particular animal a retreat 
of the intellectual e.g. "Polonius... ist nicht meine Rolle, am wenigsten in seinem Dialog mit Hamlet über 
das Aussehen einer gewissen Wolke, der am Elend der Vergleichens das wirkliche Elend von 
Machtstrukturen demonstriert." (Das Schrecken die erste Erscheinung des Neuen in Rotwelsch, p. 95.)
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personally instrumentalised rather than about a politicisation of theory and practice as a 
whole.
Exactly how far removed from engagement in human affairs Neoptolemos wishes 
to be is revealed shortly before he murders Philoktet: "Nicht du bists der mich hindern 
wird am Rechten/ [...]Der Tod spart Götter, lügen muß kein Mann."60 Once again, a 
retreat into a deathless self-presence is signalled, unriven by the fissure of language and 
dissimulation of meaning and the self. The offer made earlier to Neoptolemos by 
Philoktet to become once more what he was, to regain his name, is stamped by the same 
metaphysical nostalgia as the preceeding quote. As argued above, there can for Müller 
be no possibility of naming out of the demands of the culture whose exigencies and 
responsibility Neoptolemos wants to evade, and so by remaining uninvolved, he simply 
becomes the butcher.
The turning point in Neoptolemos' fortunes comes when he allows himself to be 
impressed by the 'nobility' of Odysseus' speech at the end of the play when the latter 
seems ready to die for the goal ahead and to sacrifice his life for the return of Philoktet 
to Troy. Even though this means that a lie would have to be found for his death, 
Odysseus is willing to enter into the deception, even in his death, in order to maintain 
his troops' willingness to fight. Neoptolemos must therefore recognise that he is 
inextricably locked up in the death of one of the participants.
He chooses, of course, Philoktet but the motives for this murder can be variously 
interpreted and this ambiguity can be (and has been) used to project various 
characterisations into the performance of the play. Either Neoptolemos can be seen as
That Hamlet starts the conversation and Polonius only seems to be using the opportunity to gauge 
Hamlet's seeming slide into insanity hints at a possible misunderstanding.
60 ibid., p. 34.
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simply coming round to Odysseus' way of thinking, or the murder can be seen as a
calculating move to regain his father's armour, whereby the regret shown afterwards
compounds the cowardice that he has shown throughout the play. Or again, he could be
interpreted as succumbing once more to the power structures to which he has
demonstrated no effective opposition throughout the play. He steps in merely to protect
his general. Müller himself has described the constellation of figures in the play thus:
These are the three attitudes to history, to politics: Odysseus is the pragmatic one 
and Neoptolemos the innocent. He kills because he is the innocent. Philoktet is 
beyond history because he is the victim of politics.61
Neoptolemos kills not just because of his pre-lapsarian state, but because of his wish to
remain so, to retain a blemish-free life outside of the dirty hands demanded of a political
existence.
The continuation of the conditions where the play started is confirmed by the
tableau in the last scene. Neoptolemos has to carry Philoktet's corpse, relieving
Odysseus, corroborating his position as the latter's servant. He now needs Odysseus to
lie for him, to provide the alibi for the murder of Philoktet; his initial plan to murder
Odysseus as well cannot be carried out because of his hatred of him:
Ein guter Schild ist die geborgte Stierhaut 
Ein bessrer im Genick der Tote, ganz 
In Eisen kleidet mich dein Haß.“
Odysseus will teil Neoptolemos the lie that he has to tell on return to Troy:
Vor Troja werd ich dir die Lüge sagen 
Mit der du deine Hände waschen konntest 
Hättst du mein Blut vergossen jetzt und hier."
61 Müller, Walls, in Rotwelsch, op. cit. p. 36.
“  Müller, Philoktet, op. cit., p. 42.
“  ibid.
278
toft.
The confused temporality in the quote reflects the conflicting temporalities in the 
political on the one hand, on the other the final humiliation of Neoptolemos and his 
inexorable slide into the instrumental world of politics is confirmed by Odysseus 
promising to tell him the lie that he in effect had already acted out and which would 
have exonerated him from the blame of Odysseus' death. Neoptolemos has been acting 
the lie throughout the course of the play's events - his will to truth itself is dissimulation. 
Odysseus holds out therefore some hope that he will be able to instruct Neoptolemos in 
the ways not only of politics, the world of the Macher but also of the political, the 
condition of the always-already agonistic.
Odysseus — so weit sind wir gegangen
Müller bemoaned in a number of places the portrayal of Odysseus on the Western stage. 
The director of the Munich production
konnte schwer begreifen, warum für mich Odysseus die wichtigste, die tragische 
Figur in dem Stück ist. Odysseus war für ihn einfach der Böse, der Stalinist.64
Müller, however, sees the character as a "Grenzfall", one who cannot simply be
dismissed as a totalitarian henchman or a political realist. As mentioned above Odysseus
belongs to the world of the Macher, his actions are directed purely towards one goal,
that of victory over Troy, but done so with a glimmer of self-reflection which allows for
the possibility of intervention into the conditions of instrumental thought. When he
returns to the stage after the long self-indulgent monologues of Philoktet and
Neoptolemos, the change of gear in the dialogue is striking. Odysseus has no time,
literally, for the navel-gazing of the intellectual. He has a task to fulfil, and his principal
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means of doing so is to accelerate the actions of Neoptolemos. The last lines of the play 
confirm this: "Geh schneller, daß nicht deine Wut verraucht./ In Troja ist dein Tisch 
gedeckt, geh schneller."64 5 The degree, however, to which Odysseus is capable of 
reflection because of his position within the context of the political task is strengthened 
by his ability to reflect on his situation without allowing it to distract him from his task. 
He explains, for example, the impossibility of the complete deferral of meaning and thus 
of continually lying:
Kann sein, Odysseus ist so sehr ein Lügner 
Daß er sich glauben macht, er wär Odysseus 
Und lügt in dem auch und ist nicht er selber 
In Wahrheit, auch kein Lügner also und 
Wenn er dich Philoktet nennt, bist du der.66
Whilst subjectivity is a precarious disposition, prone to the duplicity of the signifying 
systems through which it is constructed, Odysseus calls upon Neoptolemos to "be 
himself', the son of Achilles in his encounter with Philoktet. That seemingly fixed 
subjectivity however, is one that deceives, simply by telling the truth; by stating "I am 
Neoptolemos", a deception is entered into. Odysseus thus provides the instructive 
comparison to Philoktet's plea to Neoptolemos that he should regain his name through 
purity of action. For Odysseus, any melancholic contemplation upon the lost self­
presence of identity which would rectify this state is pointless mourning:
Bewein die Fische, wenn du Tränen hast
Weil ihnen Flügel weigerte der Gott
Oder das Schiff, weil es kein Blatt mehr treibt[.]67
64 Müller, Krieg ohne Schlacht, p. 189-90.
65 Müller, Philoktet, op. cit p. 42.
66 ibid, p. 29.
67 ibid., p. 34.
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fett.
In contrast to Neoptolemos' wish to live the blameless life of the immortal, Odysseus is 
relentlessly diesseitig: "Frag nach den Göttern nicht, mit Menschen lebst du/ Bei 
Göttern, wenn die Zeit ist, lern es anders."68
Odysseus, in a reference to the Prometheus myth (and clearly to the Sophocles 
version of the Philoktet myth) declares that there can be no deus ex machina which will 
relieve Neoptolemos of his obligations. The social conditions can only be changed from 
within.
Und Herakles erscheint dir nicht wie dem 
Den der beraubte Gott an sein Gebirg schlug 
[...]Nicht von der Art die nachwächst ist dein Fleisch 
Dich werden ganz vom Stein die Geier pflücken.69
The human body decays, unlike those of the immortals in myth, and hence there will
always be a need for the burial that defines the culture from which Neoptolemos seeks
to escape.
Odysseus' uncompromising focus on the particular goal allows, however, little
freedom o f movement. He makes clear that the situation that they are in is not of their
own making but "the only way out is to go deeper in order to put it to an end."70 To
repeat once more a passage quoted earlier:
So weit sind wir gegangen in der Sache 
Im Netz aus eignem und aus fremdem Schritt 
Daß uns kein Weg herausgeht als der weitre.71
The characters in the play are thrown into their roles, the most important factor being
the conditioning of the inter-subjective relations through the class nature of the society.
Müller claims to have chosen mythic themes because they portray the move from clan to
68 ibid., p. 35.
69 ibid., p. 10.
70 Müller, Walls, op.cit., p. 37.
71 Muller, Philoktet, op. cit., p. 34 - 35.
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class; the model of the play is determined by "der Klassenstruktur der abgebildeten
Gesellschaft [...] und von der Eigentumsform."72 Odysseus is aware of the basis of his
power ("Mit tausend Speeren ist mein Speer begabt") and also its origin ("Vom Zufall
der Geburt”73). In this vital respect, he is unlike the Stalinist party apparatus that he has
been interpreted as representing. While his wish to take a further step towards the goal is
unrelenting and he is prepared to sacrifice anything to achieve it, he is also able to
explain the conditions o f this movement, and perhaps opens up the possibility for new
conditions which will present the gap in the return of the same. He is thus all too aware
of the costs of the journey and of its first steps:
Mich selber vorher fingen so die Fürsten 
In ihren Krieg [...]
Rissen sie von den Brüsten meines Weibs 
Den Sohn und warfen den mir vor den Pflug 
Kaum hielt ich das Gespann [...]
Eh mir das teure Blut den Boden düngte 
Den ich mit Salz verdarb, mich zu behalten,74
He had tried to avoid the necessity of the journey, of having to take the step forward, but
by the next occasion on which an attempt is made to hold up history, this time by the
Gods ("der Gott [,..]/hielt seinen Atem an, uns zu behalten"75), he is prepared to sacrifice
Philoktet. Such a sacrifice of victims is prevented by not moving, but in an always
already political environment other sacrifices will be being made in any case (in Troy,
for example) and the only chance of changing the conditions so that the victims'
suffering is not pointless is to move within history. History is mythic. Sacrifices will be
made. The idea that one can alter this process by stopping its movement from outside is
72 Müller, Drei Punkte, in Mauser, p. 73.
73 Müller, Philoktet, op. cit., p. 10.
74 ibid.., p. 13 (my italics).
75 ibid., p. 36.
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decadence itself6 and inevitably the position of the privileged. The only hope is to 
continue history and seek the possibility of political action when the same exploitative 
conditions repeat themselves. The subject would thus involve him/herself in politics 
while remembering its catastrophic nature. The subject's (and especially the 
intellectual's) position must be to the margin, a simultaneous approach and withdrawal 
from politics, but an unremitting commitment to the political and the aporia of 
community. For the Heiner Müller of the GDR, this position of commitment to the 
political community had to be within a theatre o f remembrance. Müller's comparative 
unproductivity after 1989 might therefore he seen as his insecurity as to the role of his 
theatre in the liberal capitalist economy.
The marginal about Odysseus, in this sense, is his reflection, not only mentally,
but historically. Odysseus remembers, and can therefore draw attention to the repetition
in the mythic which on the one hand forms the catastrophe of the never-changing
conditions of history, but which also opens up the possibility of intervention. The
murder of Philoktet is, of course, another barbarous repetition and Odysseus at the end
of the play finally seems to have had enough. It would seem that certain things cannot
be put to use. He resolves to give Philoktet a burial, keeping only his bow, in contrast to
Der Leiber, die den Grand begraben, der 
Sie zu begraben nicht mehr ausreicht, zu viele 
Getötet und zu schnell.76 7
But just as Odysseus returned to fetch and coerce Neoptolemos, so he now realises that 
he has returned to Lemnos to put Philoktet to use. The 'use-value' of Philoktet was his
76 Müller thus regards Faust's entreaty, "Verweile doch, du bist so schön", made from the ahistorical 
isolation of the intellectual, as the epitome of his decadence. This should, however, not be confused with 
Benjamin's notion that the task of the proletariat is to "put a brake" on progress. The latter achieve this 
cessation from a position within history.
77 Müller, Philoktet, op. cit., p. 40.
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expulsion, but now, even if he can only be reintroduced to cultural demands through his 
death, what is left of him will be exploited. He returns to the instrumentality of what has 
come to be called history only through his corpse. Thus the demands of culture - a 
decent burial - are replaced on the one hand by the exigencies of a barbarous history, but 
on the other, the use of Philoktet's body to persuade his troops to fight represents, in his 
obtaining a culturally sanctioned burial, the interpretation of his death by the 
community. Odysseus' refusal to retreat from this history is less a confirmation of the 
hegemony than a particular historical stance that calls into question the conditions of 
possibility of 'history' as normally conceived. For Müller, this is an irrevocably political 
stance precisely because it opens up the aporia of judgement which is simultaneously a 
consequence and condition o f community.
Philoktet might therefore be seen as a political piece not only as a work of art in 
the political community, but also thematically about the necessity of politics. The 
positing of a structure so uncompromisingly differentiated, of an unavoidable necessity 
of language and the social and the original agonistics configuring them made the play, 
like Die Umsiedlerin, unpresentable in the GDR until a way could be found to 
recuperate it into the totalitarian tradition and heritage.
The Reception in the GDR
Philoktet was not performed in the GDR until 1977, some 13 years after its being 
written, even though some o f the comments made by its author, not least in the notes 
from Müller to the director of the Munich production, seem calculated to prevent an 
unproblematic appropriation of the piece for anti-communist ends. As late as 1980, with
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the appearance of Der Auftrag, Müller states "es ging mir auch darum, wieder einmal zu 
betonen, daß ich doch in der DDR wohne und finde, daß da was dran ist."7* It would 
therefore be misleading to portray Müller as an outright opposition figure, at least in the 
sense of being anti-socialist. One should also, on the other hand, not be tempted to read 
interviews and statements at face value. The selective quoting of Müller by GDR critics 
or those sympathetic to the GDR regime often represses the dissimulation that was 
perhaps consciously built into his public pronouncements. The interview for Müller 
takes on the status of performance as much as the re-presentation of one of his texts. 
Wieghaus discusses the problem briefly79 in the context of his thesis that Philoktet is a 
de-historicised piece and understands the following comment in an interview as 
confirmation of his thesis of an original intention on Müller's behalf.
Frage: Und da [Interview in Sinn und Form, 1966] habe ich mit Verwunderung
gelesen, was sie über Philoktet sagen, weil ich das Stück ganz anders gelesen
habe.
Müller: Ich auch.80
This interview then appeared in the West under the title "Hat Heiner Müller bisher 
gelogen?" and Wieghaus goes on to consider the possible reasons for such 
untruthfulness. It could be interpreted as acting "entgegen eigener Absicht" in that 
Müller allowed the play to be read as only relevant to those societies displaying 
antagonistic contradictions, in contrast to those contradictions in the GDR which could 
be aufgehoben. This in turn was designed "um sich vor weiteren administrativen 
Repression zu schützen" after the problems with Die Umsiedlerin and the attack on 
Müller at the 11th plenum of the SED's Zentralkomitee a few months previously. 
Whether this problem can best be understood in a discourse of truth and lying is 78
78 Müller, Schreiben aus Lust an der Katastrophe. Gespräch mit Horst Laube, in Rotwelsch, p. 181.
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however open to debate. The dissimulation in all Miiller's texts, in this case in the 
interviews and Philoktet alike, would seem to point to the particular problem of the 
slippage of meaning in the site of totalitarianism, not just on the level of individual 
agency but on the very level of the political itself. A political space in totalitarianism is 
dissimulation.
It is perhaps then in a society, such as the GDR, where the degree of 
transparency of civil society to the state was so great, that the nature of the 
heterogeneous political community can best be seen simply because its appearance was 
so rare. For Miiller, one opportunity to allow such a community to appear was in the 
theatre. The dissimulation which can be witnessed in his interviews in the GDR 
represents an autonomous space, which also was to be found in the autonomy of 
theatrical discourse. This will prove to have important consequences for a historical and 
political aesthetics of remembrance which in turn becomes the art of making theatre 
politically.
Philoktet was for the authorities and theatrical institutions in the GDR simply not 
considered as relevant. The class structure presented in the piece was regarded as 
superseded, an interpretation readily confirmed from this viewpoint by the prologue and 
once more by an interview of Miiller's:
Die antike Tragödie ist entstanden eigentlich mit der Klassengesellschaft, und da
werden beschrieben die Konflikte bei der Entstehung der Klassengesellschaft.
Da es jetzt um die Aufhebung der Klassengesellschaft geht, bietet sich an, diese
Mythen neu zu sehen.79 801
79 Wieghaus, Zwischen Auftrag und Verrat pp. 125-6.
80 ibid., p. 125.
81 Dramatiker Studio am 24-11-75 im Fernsehen der DDR: Heiner Müller in Gespräch mit Rolf Rohmer 
und Horst Wandrey.
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A different interpretation of this statement and of what is at stake in the return of myth
will be discussed below. There can be no doubt however that East German critics
pounced eagerly on such comments in order to support their reading o f the piece. The
prologue was also seen as confirmation of their thesis:
Damen und Herren, aus der heutigen Zeit
Führt unser Spiel in die Vergangenheit
Als noch der Mensch des Menschen Todfeind war
Das Schlachten gewöhnlich, das Leben eine Gefahr82
The vital temporal context that was picked up on in a number of ways, is that of the 
present and the past, of today and yesterday, of Geschichte and Vorgeschichte. The 
dominant interpretation of history in the GDR was that of the pre-revolutionary pre­
history, enacted under exploitative social relations and its real post-revolutionary 
counterpart where the proletariat became for the first time the subject of history. The 
antagonistic contradictions of yesterday have been resolved to leave open a smoother 
path towards the already defined goal of communism. Any contradictions that do appear 
along the way are non-antagonistic in that they represent the stages o f the dialectic of 
social progress which draw everything, every manifestation of social and economic life 
into its ambit. The GDR was thus seen as the transitory stage, embodying real existing 
socialism as an hors d'oeuvre to full blown communism. Müller himself is interpreted as 
holding this view of the present "welche die der Übergangsgesellschaft DDR ist, und 
das heißt nicht mehr Vorgeschichte."83 The GDR represented an "Epochenkollision" 
which would allow a conscious process of self-enlightenment against the background of 
the barbarity of German history before 1949. "Die Aufhebung 'eiszeitlicher'
82 Müller, Philoktet, op. cit., p. 7.
83 Iversen & Servos, Sprengsätze, in Die Hamletmaschine. Heiner Müllers Endspiel, p. 130. 
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War and the social conditions that lead to the inevitability of war are regarded as 
being superseded. War is not a socialist event. As such Philoktet was interpreted as 
standing uneasily between affirmative socialist drama and the depiction of the result of 
capitalist social development which was now irrelevant east of the Wall. This involved 
regarding the material o f the play as a historical precedent - something that could be 
understood from the prologue - rather than as myth.
The pre-history of myth, however, is strikingly different from a pre­
revolutionary Vorgeschichte. The first results from an attempt to represent collective 
memory and narratives. The second claims a conscious mastery of the past whose form 
of thinking about that past is only possible with the project of demystification that 
characterised the Enlightenment whose goal was to produce a society where myth was 
no more, replaced instead by rational goal-directed thought. In the GDR however, or at 
least in the reception o f certain plays dealing with mythical characters and events, the 
myth as defined above is swallowed up by myth as pre-revolutionary pre-history. Myth 
is not treated as myth but rather as events in history displaying 'mythic' elements; that is 
those elements which have been surpassed by socialist society. Thus one critic describes 
the
Spannungsraum zwischen dem Mythischen, einem der menschlichen Bewußtheit 
weitgehend entzogenen Bereich, und dem historischen Subjekt, das mit seiner 
Bewußtheit die Geschichte der menschlichen Gesellschaft immer deutlicher 
bestimmt.” 845
V erhaltensm uster [...] b ed a rf eines h istorischen L e m - und Selbstaufk lärungsprozesses
der sozia listisch en  G esellschaft"84
84 ibid., p. 131.
85 Bernhardt, Rüdiger. Die 'antike' und die 'literarische' Bearbeitung. Antikerezeption im Werk Heiner 
Müllers in Schied, J., (ed.) Zum Drama in der DDR: Heiner Müller & Peter Hacks. p. 49.
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The further result of this will be an inability to recognise the return of myth in both 
senses - either as 'mythic' violence and repression or as the employment of specific 
narratives to represent historical processes. To repeat, the repression o f myth under the 
sign o f  history disallows the possibility o f  dealing with the return o f  myth. It is precisely 
this situation which Müller seems to want to tackle, not least in the relationship of the 
subject to those ontological questions which often form the backbone of myth, in 
particular the attitude of the subject to death. The difference of Müller from Homer lies 
in the original politicisation of these ontological questions.
As befits the thorough-going rationalist historiography in the GDR, the 
relationship of the present to the past is one of rational distance, reflected also in the 
attitude of theatrical spectator to the historical material. This explains the term 
Vorgeschichte, that is, something that has been left behind, which is perceptible and 
representable. Müller, at least in GDR or sympathetic Western literature on the subject, 
is seen as employing such a model:
Diese Absichten Müllers zielen auf das Verständlichmachen des historischen
Gesamtprozesses von der Herausbildung der Klassengesellschaft bis zur
Aufhebung der Klassengesellschaft.86
This is only possible in drama if the "Distanz zwischen Zuschauer und Figuren rational 
zu erfassen [vermag]".87 Müller is seen thereby as seeking "die Entwicklung des 
Sozialismus [zu] beschleunigen durch die beharrliche Auseinandersetzung mit der 
V orgeschichte. "88
Philoktet appeared at the same time as a debate was developing in the GDR 
about the nature of the relationship to the cultural heritage, das Erbe of socialist society.
86 Bernhardt, Rüdiger. Antikerezeption im Werk Heiner Müllers, Weimarer Beiträge 3, 1976,p. 88.
87 ibid., p. 89.
88 ibid., p. 61.
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Honecker himself defined the importance of the appropriation of this heritage: "Die
Aneignung der Schätze [...] dient der Entwicklung allseitig gebildeter und überzeugter
Erbauer des Sozialismus."*’ The establishment of a socialist character further serves to
bring about the completion of history:
Die massenhafte Aneignung des sozialistischen Erbes erscheint so als ein 
unentbehrliches Mittel zur Lösung jener ungleich schwierigeren und 
wesentlicheren Aufgaben, die der Arbeiterklasse und ihrem Vortrupp nach der 
Eroberung der Macht bis zum Aufbau bzw. der Vollendung des Kommunismus 
erwachsen.89 0
This act of appropriation is intended to establish firm lines of tradition between 
the present and the past, while recognising at the same time that what is past in the GDR 
is still present in the West, that is, exploitative social relations. The mention of the 
proletariat's avant-garde points toward what is at stake in the handing down of the 
society's heritage. It is centrally controlled, a revolutionary tradition which leads to that 
transparency of civil society to the state which can produce "gesellschaftliche 
Festigkeit", a phrase of Marx's which is taken to be "ein Element von Regel und 
Ordnung, das zwingend nötig ist, um gesellschaftliche Entwicklung von Zufälligkeit 
und Willkür zu befreien."91
The problem is therefore how any centrally controlled narrative can avoid taking 
on a mythic character, or rather what is more important is that the mythic explanatory 
nature of this narrative becomes mythic in the second sense outlined above - myth 
refuses to regard itself as myth, because its central tenet in the GDR was that it has 
superseded the mythic forms of social exploitation. Myth's overcoming of itself is
89 Honecker, Erich. Bericht des Politbüros an die 13 Tagung des ZK der SED, Berlin, 1974, p. 102, 
quoted in Koch, Hans. Aktuelle Fragen der Aneignung des Erbes, Weimarer Beträge, 3, 1976, p. 6.
90 Klein, Alfred. Tradition und Gegenwart. Zur Aktualität des sozialistischen Literatur und Kunsterbes, 
Weimarer Beiträge. 3, 1976, p. 28.
91 Koch, Aktuelle Fragen..., op. cit., p. 16
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inextricably tied up with the overcoming of the past ( Vergangenheitsbewältigung) in the
movement of both toward a futural telos. The past is appropriated in the same action as
myth attempts to supersede itself, through the discovery of objective laws of history
proceeding inexorably toward communism.
Interestingly enough it was precisely the objectivity of this process that allowed
GDR scholars to reject such charges of Party control.
Unlehrbar werden freilich diejenigen bleiben, denen die ihnen verpaßte 
antikommunistische Brille nicht einmal das Schielen nach wissenschaftlicher 
Objektivität erlaubt und die demzufolge in der künstlerischen Parteinahme für 
den Sozialismus eh und je nur die Befolgung von Partei und Staatsbefehlen 
sehen.92
Both Müller's texts and those of classical myth were seen as a heritage, part of a 
revolutionary tradition of completion. Tradition itself is seen in these GDR theoretical 
texts as a movement of structural growth and progress. Müller's own texts were of 
course seen as confirming also this idea. His declaration that his work consists of 
"einsame Stücke, die auf Geschichte warten"93 is taken to mean that they are waiting to 
be appropriated into the cultural heritage. Müller is seen as hoping "daß das 
Zusammenspiel von Theater und gesellschaftlicher Entwicklung irgendwann einmal - 
und nicht zu spät - nicht mehr Fragment bleibt, sondern sich vollendet."94
This waiting for history involves the appropriation of the barbaric pre-history 
which is only of use in that it is superseded. Müller is thus considered, along with GDR 
society as a whole, as standing at a point exterior to this history, the only point from 
where lessons from history can be drawn. "Die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Lernens
92 Klein, Tradition und Gegenwart, op. cit., p. 34
93 Müller, Verabschiedung des Lehrstück, in Mauser, p. 85.
94 Iversen & Servos, Sprengsätze, op. cit., p. 132.
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words, it is only when a new stage in the historical dialectic has been reached, where
history reveals itself as itself as free from myth, that one has the necessary distance to
learn from (mythical) history. But the model of history represented in Philoktet is one of
an antagonistic, mythic, social formation that was regarded as superseded in the GDR
thus making the play largely irrelevant to the east of the wall. Thus the learning from a
history that has been left behind is purely a process of self-justification of the status quo,
a deadening of raw political nerve ends, a history of progress disqualifying change.
Müller aims to break through this intellectual stagnation by politicising his
theatre. One way of regarding these efforts would be to suggest that he attempts to
politicise the sign in the tradition of earlier 20th century avant-garde theory:
[T]he community [...] is the totality of users of the same set of signs for 
ideological communication. Thus various different classes will use one and the 
same language. As a result differently orientated accents intersect in the every 
ideological sign. Sign becomes an arena of class struggle.96
This would be to underestimate what is at stake in Müller's plays, however. What
becomes clear time and time again in his work is not simply the struggle for linguistic
hegemony which will unleash the semiotic dictatorship of the proletariat but rather the
necessary dissimulation and excess in language and communal practices whose
repression would lead to the repression of the political itself. The community is not so
homogenous that it can ever use the "same set of signs", but rather is that heterogeneous
collection whose difference from itself allows the very possibility of community. This is
why Müller does not simply write 'symbolic' drama or parables. It should perhaps
instead be suggested that he engages in allegorical representation, that for example 95
[...] ist m it der realen D istanz zur kapitalistischen G ese llsch aft geglückt."95 In other
95 ibid., p. 131.
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Philoktet can be interpreted as an allegory for Stalinism, as it always has been outside of
the GDR. This would entail, however, examining what precisely is involved in the use
of allegory by Müller, and even more pertinently, in the return of myth as allegory.
Interestingly, Müller's adaptation of the Sophocles piece was itself a return of
issues that had concerned him for some time:
Ich hatte das Stück von Sophokles schon in Sachsen gelesen, Ende der 40er 
Jahre. Es hatte mich seitdem immer beschäftigt. Die Erfahrungen, die gerade 
hinter mir lagen, haben mir den Stoff ganz anders aktuell gemacht.96 7
Müller had just been expelled from the Deutscher Schriftstellerverband and had
undergone a gruelling process of censorship and self-criticism at the hands of the
cultural authorities.98 It was the very presence and possibility of a return to 'pre-history',
witnessed by the very events surrounding Müller himself, which made Philoktet such a
problematic play. It is the informative presence of mythic pre-history in the play which
sheds light on the possibility of the return of mythic qualities in the GDR itself, a state
which has supposedly overcome this exploitative stage in history. This informative
nature is not simply because of the content of the mythic events that are shown, but in
the very act of showing them, in their return. This return is the appearance of allegory,
linking the latter inextricably to a particular historical and temporal philosophy which
seeks to politicise not only theatre and the GDR community but history and temporality
itself. The return of myth as allegory is 'shot through' with history itself, not in a self-
sufficient present or a 'real' history beyond the caesura of a revolution, but with a history
that is constituted by that radical sense of finitude which conditions allegory itself.
96 Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p. 23.
97 Müller, Krieg ohne Schacht, p. 188.
98 See discussion in Chapter Two.
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Allegory
Throughout the neo-classicist epoch and after, allegory had been dismissed as the 
inferior mode of poetic expression, secondary to the presumed essence of poetry, the 
symbol. Goethe, in his now canonical definition defined allegory as that where the poet 
"zum Allgemeinen das Besondere sucht [...], wo das Besondere nur als Beispiel, als 
Exempel des Allgemeinen gilt,'"” in contrast to the symbol where the general is seen in 
the particular. Benjamin also discusses Schopenhauer's description of allegory as 
starting from the concept and working out, so that "ein Kunstwerk absichtlich und 
eingeständlich zum Ausdruck eines Begriffes bestimmt.'"“ Benjamin's criticism of these 
definitions is not so much drawn from their hierarchy of symbol and allegory in the 
structure of their argumentation but rather with the ”logizistische[n] Grundzug der 
Darstellung"101 of that argument which accepts the opposition of the expression of the 
idea on the one hand and o f the concept on the other. Allegory is therefore imprisoned 
in a structure that sees it as designation, where it can only be regarded as inferior, 
instead of a mode of expression in its own right.
The essential difference for Benjamin between symbol and allegory is 
established in a discussion o f Friedrich Kreuzer's Mythologie where their determining 
feature is seen to be a temporal one.
Es ist daher auch der Unterschied beider Arten in das Momentane zu setzen, 
dessen die Allegorie ermangelt...Dort [im Symbol] ist momentane Totalität; hier 
ist Fortschritt in einer Reihe von Momenten.102
Benjamin quotes Joseph von Görres, who in a satisfyingly no-nonsense way states:
”  in Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, Gesammelte Schriften. I, 1, p. 338.
100 ibid.
101 ibid.
102 ibid., p. 341.
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Wir können uns vollkommen begnügen mit der Erklärung, die das Eine [das 
Symbol] als in sich beschlossenes, gedrungenes, stetig in sich beharrendes 
Zeichen der Ideen nimmt, diese aber [die Allegorie] als ein successiv 
fortschreitendes, mit der Zeit selbst in Fluß gekommenes dramatisch 
bewegliches, strömendes Abbild derselben anerkennt.103
The informative contrast is between the world of "Berg- und Pflanzennatur"104 1056and the
course of human history. The essential difference can now be seen: allegory employs a
narrative temporality, one of the passing of events, their happening and successive
ruination. Time is the decisive category, not the differentiation of idea and concept. Just
as in the narrative one looks back to tell the story, so, in the case of the Baroque,
"[die...] weltliche[n] Exposition der Geschichte als Leidensgeschichte der Welt, [... die]
Stationen ihres Verfalls'"05 was regarded in "retrospective contemplation".'06 Allegory is
only possible in an epoch of decay, that is, where in some way a consciousness of this
decay is present. This was clearly the case in the Baroque in its ruminations on the
inescapability of ruination and disintegration, and Benjamin argues for a similar
understanding of commodity culture whose modernist dynamic inevitably produces the
superfluous, out-of-date debris of industrialism. But how can such a process of decay be
applied to the GDR, a state whose ideology, as argued throughout this thesis, was one of
inexorable progress? In order to discover the answer to this, we will have to investigate
more closely the argument of Benjamin's Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels.107
Benjamin is first of all concerned to differentiate between Trauerspiel and
tragedy, the latter being rooted in myth and where the hero is subject to a chain o f
103 ibid., p. 342.
104 ibid.
105 ibid., p. 343.
106 Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing, p. 168.
107 The translation of Trauerspiel has always caused some difficulties - one more recent suggestion has 
been to render it as 'mourning play' which has the advantage of distinguishing it from tragedy, just as 
Benjamin does himself.
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events that forces or enables him to act out a suitably heroic sacrifice. The Trauerspiel
on the other hand, not only in its subject matter of contemporary tyrants and martyrs,
but in its implicit temporal attitude to them, is grounded in history and it is this which
will make the allegorical attitude of the Baroque ripe for redemption in the modem era.
The events depicted on the stage are seen as worldly and devalued.
Wo das Mittelalter die Hinfälligkeit des Weltgeschehens und die 
Vergänglichkeit der Kreatur als Stationen des Heilwegs zur Schau stellt, vergräbt 
das deutsche Trauerspiel sich ganz in die Trostlosigkeit der irdischen 
Verfassung. Kennt es eine Erlösung, so liegt sie mehr in die Tiefe dieser 
Verhängnisse selbst als im Vollzüge eines göttlichen Heilsplans.108
There was no virtue to be had or found on earth, and this was reflected in the
constitution of the dramatic characters whose only response to the historical
responsibility thrust upon them by the Weltanschauung that they inhabit is to achieve
martyrdom. This will turn out to be Benjamin's main line of critique as regards the
potential of the allegorical mode which is sold short by the Baroque’s retreat into
metaphysics.
The Lutheran standpoint of the major Baroque German dramatists meant that the 
emphasis on faith through grace, and the rejection of the importance of 'good works' 
produced a sense of civic duty in the populace but in the socially important figures who 
were portrayed in the Trauerspiel the result was more likely to be melancholy. Whilst 
the Calvinist retreated into the comparative comfort of pre-destination, the Lutheran had 
to come to terms with the literal meaninglessness of human actions since salvation was 
to be achieved through faith and grace alone and one could not simply point out the 
charitable and successful as those pre-destined to be saved. Hence the origin in an 
upright way of living as a proof of faith is not in itself enough to guarantee salvation.
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Benjamin differentiates, however, between the ordinary citizen and those who had 
perhaps the time for the luxury of introspection: "Denn die tiefer Schürfenden sahen 
sich in das Dasein als in ein Trümmerfeld halber, unechter Handlungen hineingestellt"109 
It was this which produced a state of mourning from which the Trauerspiel takes its 
name:
Trauer ist die Gesinnung, in der das Gefühl die entleerte Welt maskenhaft 
neubelebt, um ein rätselhaftes Genügen an ihrem Anblick zu haben. [...] Die 
Theorie der Trauer [...] ist demnach nur in der Beschreibung jener Welt, die 
unterm Blick des Melancholischen sich auftut, zu entrollen.110
It is also here that the laws which concern the Trauerspiel are to be found:
Indem man dies Symptom der Depersonalisation als schweren Grad des 
Traurigseins erfaßte, trat der Begriff von dieser pathologischen Verfassung, in 
welcher jedes unscheinbarste Ding, weil die natürliche und schaffende 
Beziehung zu ihm fehlt, als Chiffer einer rätselhaften Weisheit auftritt, in einen 
unvergleichlich fruchtbaren Zusammenhang.1"
The other figure most often represented in the dramas, the intriguer, was seen not
only as too ensnared in the futility of politics, but thereby of a different class:
Die eitle Geschäftigkeit des Intriganten galt als das würdelose Gegenbild der 
leidenschaftlichen Kontemplation, der einzig und allein die Gabe zugebilligt 
wurde, den Hochgestellten der satanischen Verstrickung der Geschichte, in 
welcher das Barock nur Politik sah, zu entbinden."2
History itself is thus a Trauerspiel. It is not the endless cycle of the seasons which
determines the temporal attitude but "das unerbittliche Abrollen jedes Lebens zum
Tode.""’ Allegory is thus based on the finitude of the human subject or the recognition
of death as the founding event of community.
103 Benjamin, op. cit, p. 260.
109 ibid., p. 318.
110 ibid.
111 ibid., p. 319. Diirer's engraving Melancholia is seen as a precursor to the Baroque in this respect.
112 ibid., p. 320.
113 ibid., p. 329.
297
It was in transitory nature itself that the allegory for human history was seen "not 
as a divine plan or chain o f events on a 'road to salvation' but as death ruin and 
catastrophe.""* It was in the essence of nature itself, as forsaken since the Fall, that it 
had to be read emblematically, interpreted without any sure ground. Interpretation itself 
was thus a constant reminder of the guilt of the Fall, that separated humans from nature 
but in so doing gave them the power to name. Nature is brought down with humankind. 
Nature was then over-burdened with a multitude of meanings, the meaning of nature 
itself came to be seen as arbitrary, settled only by a shift to the order of spirit. This 
occurred in place of a movement to that realm where the paradoxes of meaning could 
have been played out for Benjamin - in the arena of politics. As Philoktet shows, this 
would be achieved by providing, through constant re-interpretation and judgement, the 
possibility of the future. The future as such is only guaranteed by the political nature of 
the present, whose character is achieved by the judgement and interpretation of death 
and the remembrance of the victims of the political community.
In the profane world of the allegorist, meaning could be substituted for meaning 
in an endless cycle that only served to emphasise the lack of importance of the detail of 
those meanings because they were in any case condemned to decay into each other. It 
was because of this that the baroque allegorists attempted to escape the profanity of the 
written word and moved toward the visual to approach the sacred, even if that in turn 
involved the worldly act o f interpretation again. Any meaning that came out of this 
process was thus a reminder of the process of decay and was liable to provoke mournful 
contemplation once more. There was no interpretative telos to be reached and so 
allegorical fragments could simply be piled up on one another, with no idea of direction.
114 Buck-Morss, op. cit., p. 174.
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In the transient characters presented on the stage o f the Trauerspiel the essence
of nature was displaced on human history:
Die allegorische Physiognomie der Natur-Geschichte, die auf der Bühne durch 
das Trauerspiel gestellt wird, ist wirklich gegenwärtig als Ruine. Mit ihr hat 
sinnlich die Geschichte in den Schauplatz sich verzogen. Und zwar prägt, so 
gestaltet, die Geschichte nicht als Prozeß eines ewigen Lebens, vielmehr als 
Vorgang unaufhaltsamen Verfalls sich aus."5
There is therefore no hope of gathering the past up into the present in an eschatological
moment, the past as ruin ruins the present and shows its hopes of enacting salvation to
be earthly vanity when the only hope of salvation is death. "[Der Tod] ist nicht Strafe
sondern Sühne, ein Ausdruck der Verfallenheit des verschuldeten Lebens an das Gesetz
des natürlichen.""6 In tragedy death "marks a moment of fulfilment; all the events of a
life gather significance from the anticipation of this moment""7; death in the tragic
schema is understood as individual destiny, whereas in the Trauerspiel it is experienced
more as a communal future. Those who die lose their "benannte Individualität und nicht
die Lebenskraft der Rolle [...]. Ungemindert lebt sie in der Geisterwelt auf.""8 As was
discussed in Chapter One, it is crucial to recognise this difference between the subject
who grasps his death 'authentically' and individually in tragedy and the character who
has the possibility of what I shall call for the moment a politicised relation to death,
even if this possibility is not fulfilled in the Baroque, as argued below. This will inform
the re-reading of Philoktet to follow which hopes to point toward the allegorical
portrayal of the relation to death in Müller, one which will not sublimate its problems
and paradoxes into the realm of spirit.
115 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, op. cit., p. 353.
116 ibid., p. 310.
117 Caygill, Howard, "Benjamin, Heidegger and Tradition" in Benjamin (ed.) Walter Beniamin's 
Philosophy... p p . 1-31
118 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, op. cit., p. 314-5.
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It is here precisely that Benjamin's critique of Baroque allegory becomes clear. 
He wishes not to repeat the practice of the German Trauerspiel but the practice of 
allegory itself, emphasising the fragmentary view of a world where the dominant 
temporal plane in the narrative behind the allegorical object is the process of decay 
rather than progress. Allegory possesses a temporality o f 'eternal passing', whereas the 
symbol captures the moment o f  'fleeting eternity'."9 The organic flowing quality of 
nature is frozen (and betrayed) in the instant of the symbol, whereas the narrative of 
degeneration is expressed in allegory. This idea of the forsakenness o f nature dominated 
the Baroque poets' thinking and produced the state of melancholy referred to earlier. 
Nothing could be done on this earth to alleviate this state of affairs and thus political 
action, as represented by the scheming courtier, was regarded as nothing more than vain 
intrigue. As Buck-Morss expresses it:
...this follows necessarily from the melancholic's politics of contemplation rather 
than intervention - allegory deserts both history and nature and (like the whole 
tradition of idealist philosophy that comes after it) takes refuge in the spirit.'20
The determining shift is from the arbitrary and ever-displaced subjectivity of allegory to
the pure I of the spirit. The decentered subjectivity of allegory, sublimated into
politically solipsistic idealism, is exemplified by the relationship to death portrayed in
the Trauerspiel.
The allegorical way of seeing the world views any object as an allegory for the 
natural state of things, that is, as the inevitable process of decay. The reaction to this can 
be to retreat into melancholic contemplation or to base a political practice upon this 
allegorical insight. Politics needs to be based first and foremost on the notion of decay
119 c.f. Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing, op. cit. p 19 and 166-8.
120 ibid., p. 175.
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and ruin. "The implacable progression of every life towards death" is a given, but any
relationship towards that death, however unrepresentable that death is, which is
homogenised, that denies the antagonistic, differentiated nature of that relationship, robs
the particular subject of its own relation and attitude to its own death. The subject is
furthermore robbed of its relation to the one end of a particular process of decay by
denying him/her the opportunity to interpret and judge the death of others. It is here that
allegory can become subject once more to myth.
Soviel Bedeutung, soviel Todverfallenheit, weil am tiefsten der Tod die zackige 
Demarkationslinie zwischen Physis und Bedeutung eingrabt. 1st aber die Natur 
von jeher todverfallen, so ist sie auch allegorisch von jeher. Bedeutung und Tod 
sind so gezeitigt in historischer Entfaltung wie sie im gnadenlosen Siindenstand 
der Kreatur als Keime enge ineinandergreifen.121
This is evidently a very opaque passage. One could interpret it in the following way,
however. The significance of events is lessened in the theft of the possibility of political
action; the contemplative melancholic would deny that any political deed had any
significance. Thus the subject who regards herself as committing politically significant
acts grasps more fully the nature of her/his existence is one of decay, in other words that
it is 'subject to death'. If  death is just one more event amongst others in one's own
existence, the decaying nature of one's earthly life is affirmed. Just as the existent is
subject to death so it is caught up in the allegorical world of nature, where the latter can
be forever differently interpreted, where subjectivity is constantly displaced onto a
shifting ground of meaning. In fact it is precisely the character of nature's subjection to
death which is the condition for this allegorical state. It is in "historischer Entfaltung"
(note not historical progress) that the allegorical nature of existence, producing
121 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, op.cit., p. 343.
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antagonistic political action which exemplifies the relationship of decay towards death 
is most fruitfully embodied.
There is also a vast difference between the relation to death being theorised here 
and that of the tragic hero who is often described as possessing an 'authentic' attitude to 
death.122 In the tragic death the last moment of life that is death is the culmination of the 
hero's actions. His life is rounded off, in order to give it its final meaning. The tragic 
death seeks to deny the "die zackige Demarkationslinie," the limit, between death and 
meaning. The 'political' death recognises on the other hand that one's own death is yet 
another allegory for the Other. It is only other political agents who can interpret one's 
life at the moment of one's death, and as an allegory it can and will be interpreted 
differently. The meaning of a death is only judged by a community, it is gauged in such 
practices as burial and cremation, that is, in those events which define civilisation as 
such, as was shown in Philoktet.
If then the subject is robbed of a meaningful relation to death, that is, if the other 
subjects are robbed of the allegorical nature of the former's death in the process of 
homogenisation of these relations, then how much more so is this the case in a context 
of implacable progress. The subject's death in Marxist-Leninism, at least as practised in 
the GDR, is symbolic, a fleeting moment of 'eternity' of the natural pre-determined 
progression towards the communist telos. In Müller such deaths are not to be found - the 
community's heterogeneous interpretation o f them always comes to the forefront, most 
potently in the understanding of the theatrical audience of the events on the stage. It 
would therefore be senseless for Müller to provide simply a different slant to events to 
that of the state, be it a more Westernised or more radical in the tradition of early 20th
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century German socialist movements, for this would undermine the allegorical nature of 
his theatre. When Philoktet is therefore described as an allegory of Stalinism, there is far 
more at stake than simply understanding Odysseus as party apparatchik, or Philoktet as 
the marginalised Müller himself. The allegorical status of the play is more importantly 
the attempt at the establishment of a political discourse within a particular 
understanding of the environment as not being characterised by irrevocable progress.
Allegory in the GDR
How though can one understand the GDR as undergoing decay and how is this to be 
related directly to the use of allegory? Firstly, in the difference of teleological thinking 
and the conditions of real existierende Sozialismus one can witness the myth of progress 
in its stations of decline. Clearly one can imagine the situation in the GDR where the 
propaganda declaring the onward and upward drive to communism rang hollow in the 
ears of those in the Marzahn Wohngebiet. Stasis, in comparison to the supposed 
progress, is experienced as decline.
There are, however, a number of other ways in which this problem can be 
understood - as the decay that is inherent in any law making process, not least where 
that decay and the violence that is involved in this process is denied; or as myth's loss of 
its position of hegemony, where its power to interpret the environment declines, leaving 
the way open for allegory, provoking in turn either political action or melancholic 
contemplation. Such a recurrence of allegory leads to an epistemological guilt; the 
signifying and theorising powers of the subject always leave an excess that cannot be 12
122 See also discussion in Chapter One.
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represented, unlike in the realist epistemological certainty of Marxist-Leninism. One can
see these analogies in the Baroque and GDR environments in the following:
Da dergestalt nicht Rebellion noch Unterwerfung religiös vollziehbar war, 
richtete sich die gesammelte Kraft der Epoche auf eine gänzliche Umwälzung 
des Lebensgestaltes unter orthodoxer Wahrung der kirchlichen Formen. Das 
mußte dahin fuhren, den eigentlichen, unmittelbaren Ausdruck den Menschen 
allerwege zu verlegen.123
This was true for certainly the majority o f the population in the GDR. Later Benjamin 
goes on to add:
Ihr geschichtsphilosophisches Ideal war die Akme: ein goldenes Zeitalter des 
Friedens und der Künste, dem alle apokalyptischen Züge fremd sind, verfaßt und 
in aetemum garantiert durchs Schwert der Kirche.124
The vital difference between the Baroque and the GDR is to be found, however, in the
role of art and aesthetic judgement. Indeed, it can be argued that it only makes sense to
speak of the latter after the separating of the spheres of truth, goodness and beauty that
was part of the Enlightenment project. The decay can only be sensed at the margin of
instrumental thought, which would otherwise be able to rationalise such degeneration,
relative or not, as the means to the goal. The allegorising of decline is possible only in
those spheres which transgress instrumental thought, which in other words, show their
autonomy from the ideas of progress that dominate the extra-theatrical world. The
Baroque Trauerspiel, holding a ideologically dependent position, reflected the accepted
notions of decline and decay that were part and parcel of the philosophy o f the period.
The relation of any allegorical work of art in the GDR to its environment, on the other
hand, was determined by the decay of interpretation and judgement and on the finite
nature of human existence and the community itself. The latter's essence was not to be
123 Benjamin, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels, op.cit., p. 258.
124 ibid., p. 259.
found in a goal in the future but simply in the re-interpretation and remembrance of the 
deaths of others, treating these deaths as allegorical. It was only in the aesthetic realm, 
within the theatre, that Müller found a space to present and re-present allegory and thus 
decay. Thus while the act o f declaring the nature of society to be one of decay was in 
itself a political one (in that it reacted against the ideology of progress), the political 
nature of Müller's theatre was in its very allegorical status. It provided an experience in 
allegory of the political community and could do so only by remaining in the theatre.
Müller's return to allegory is thus a reaction to the relative decay in human 
powers as the Utopia fails to be implemented, but it represents also the attempt to 
establish a practice of writing community in the performance of the theatrical work of 
art. History stays the same, the conditions are repeated in this catastrophic return of the 
same, where history is presented ever more emblematically. Just as interpretation after 
interpretation was piled up on nature in the Baroque, so as history fails to progress as 
promised it cannot avoid being seen as ever more enigmatic, and thus as a rich ground 
for allegory. For Müller, an opportunity is provided by the catastrophic return of the 
same but only as a marginal to instrumental thought, in other words in aesthetic 
practices such as theatre. It makes that remembrance and re-interpretation possible out 
of which the political community emerges. The repetition takes the form of 
remembrance, re-interpretation becomes allegory.
Both the degeneration of nature and of history in their ever more finite 
emblematic appearance produce the possibility of allegory. This in turn allows 
melancholic contemplation or political action. What happened in the Baroque and for 
the most part in the GDR, however, was the homogenisation of the relation to death 
central to any experience o f  decay and finitude which suppressed the always and already
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antagonistic temporalities toward death. Just as instrumental thought must not be in and 
of itself deleterious but only if gathered together under the sign of one futural telos, so 
must for Müller the heterogeneity of the temporalities of relations to deaths be upheld in 
order to resist homogenous instrumental thought. It is this antagonistic difference which 
in turn allows the allegorical interpretation of the Other's death by the community and 
which might open up the possibility of a heterogeneous rationality.
In this schema, each citizen must have a relationship to her/his own death 
through the death of the other. This relation includes acting as a political agent, that is as 
an agent who is characterised first and foremost through the difference to other agents. 
The teleologies inherent in such action must be disseminated in such a way so that they 
cannot be brought under one homogenous goal, or amounting to much the same thing, 
so that the multitude of teleologies are opaque to the interests of the state, a dominant 
ideology, or by extension the power of commodity fetishism. Burial or funeral rites are 
important in this regard in that they are a recognition of the importance of the surviving 
subjects' own relationship to the death of the other. Burial defines community in that it 
is an interpretation of the Other's death. The degree to which this death of the Other can 
be interpreted allegorically, rather than as a symbol of each subject's identical relation to 
death, demonstrates the degree of acceptance of original antagonism in the political 
make up of that community. In the tragic, symbolic, 'apolitical' death its meaning can be 
passed on and handed down in an unproblematic understanding of tradition. Where the 
death is interpreted allegorically, however, the "meaning changes according to the 
circumstances of its transmission and reception".125 There can be therefore little talk of 
an 'authentic' death in the Trauerspiel, contemporary allegorical theatre or the political
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community, where the past is gathered up into the present in a final definition (unless
authenticity is rethought as the recognition of radically heterogeneous relationship to
death). The same relation to death is repeated at the behest of catastrophe; the mass
burial of war is its sign.
So will ich säumen, bis der letzte Grieche 
Auf Leichenbergen, griechischen, gehäuft 
Auf was eine Stadt war.'26
Would it thus be justified to regard Philoktet, in this instance, as a re-worked 
form of Trauerspiel? The myth on which Philoktet is based has failed in its task of 
offering a final interpretation of the world and thus in repetition can only return as 
allegory. Myth itself is interpreted over and over again. Myth itself is thus also subject 
to the process of ruination that pervades or rather determines history, for in its process 
of being handed down to be re-interpreted it must betray itself. It must therefore 
inevitably return as allegory if it is to return at all and thereby provides its own curative. 
"Es ist in der Allegorie das Antidoton gegen den Mythos zu zeigen."125 627 128Furthermore, as 
return, as an event whose possibility lies in the finite nature o f time, allegory is 
irrevocably tied to history:
The Trauerspiel is not rooted in myth but history. Historicity, with every 
implication of political-social texture and reference, generates both content and 
style. Feeling himself dragged towards the abyss of damnation [...] the baroque 
dramatist [...] clings fervently to the world.121
There is, however, an important difference in the allegory being employed by Müller
and that of the Trauerspiel dramatists. In the latter, it is an effect of the authorial
intention and is ultimately completely arbitrary - the lack of a directed meaning is the
125 Caveill, o p . cit.. p. 11.
126 MUller, Philoktet, op. cit., p. 30.
— Benjamin, Zentralpark, Gesammelte Schriften, p. 677
128 Steiner, George, Introduction to Benjamin, Origin of German Tragic Drama (translation), p. 16.
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result of the metaphysics of contemplation discussed earlier. In Müller, however, in the 
return of allegory as political, the effects of the piece are designed to produce precisely 
this political reaction - not one meaning (that of meaninglessness), but the establishment 
of an antagonistic, political environment with a particular history. This political 
environment thus forms the centre of the subject matter of the play, producing a 
focussed allegory whose starting point is not simply a state of ruination which can only 
produce a humour of melancholy, but a particular manifestation of this process of decay 
which demands a political response. Starting with Philoktet, however, this response is 
not to be seen as the result of a representation of the world outside on the stage in the 
theatre. Instead the experience of allegory begins to display its theatricality, one might 
say its very allegorical nature as art. As a practice autonomous from society's other 
concerns, allegory in Müller is neither woefully contemplative nor wildly voluntaristic; 
it reflects instead how the latent narrative of degeneration is displaced and condensed 
into a manifest politically structured experience within the theatre.
There is also a difference in the treatment of that which we can name myth, in 
other words those narratives whose epoch of explanatory power has passed, and of those 
mythic structures whose potency resides in its still being hidden. One such example 
would be the myth of progress, which has reached a hegemonic position attaining the 
status of 'common sense'.129 The return of myth as allegory serves as an antidote for 
those mythic structures, which are unpolitical par excellence. Allegory seeks to explode 
the mythic narratives of hegemony simply by the allegorising of the particular political 
environment, defining it as based on the principle of ruination that is history. The 
mythic discourse that upholds the idea of progress is that of heritage and tradition. The
use of allegory explodes that precondition for the possibility of theorising any 'tradition 
of progress' in Western society. This is what I am arguing that Müller is gesturing 
towards in his comments in an interview in Sinn und Form.” Mein Interesse an der 
Wiederkehr des Gleichen ist ein Interesse an der Sprengung der Kontinuums, auch an 
Literatur als Sprengsatz und Potential von Revolution.'"30
When the same returns it allows a fissure to be opened, betraying itself in 
passing itself down. Thus when myth or the theatrical tradition return in Müller (they 
are, of course, very often the same thing), they return as allegorical experience in the 
attempt to explode the ideology of progress. Naturally this would be resisted by an idea 
or tradition that sees itself as unchanging over time, such as the notion of progress. It is 
a characteristic of the mythic that it sees itself as not subject to decay, its explanatory 
and legitimising powers being unaffected by the course of history. Benjamin wants to 
argue, however,129 3031 that there is no authentic relation to tradition within tradition. 
Tradition must necessarily destroy itself in handing itself down. Tradition is inhabited 
not only by its past but also by its fate in the future in becoming past. For the past, that 
was for itself the tradition in the present, to be handed down to what is now the present, 
it must destroy itself precisely in becoming past. This destruction is unavoidable, for 
without it it would not be possible to transmit anything over time. The consequence is 
that each present much face up to its destiny of becoming ruined, of being transformed 
into past. Thus community, which is based squarely on the handing down of tradition,
129 c.f. Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 323-33.
130 Gespnach mit Ulrich Dietzel, Sinn und Form. 37,2 (1985), p. 210. Müller comments once again in a 
later interview (Jetzt sind eher die infernalischen Aspekte bei Benjamin wichtig. Aber ein Sturm weht von 
Paradise her: Texte zu Walter Beniamin) "Dieses Gespräch war zum Teil eine taktische Sache.”, p. 354.
131 In Benjamin Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels op. cit., and Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner 
technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, in Benjamin, Geammelte Schriften I, 2, p. 471-508. My argument is 
based also on Caygill's explication, op. cit.
309
so that it need not invent itself completely from new at every moment (an unthinkable 
proposition), is not merely haunted by the possibility of its ruination and finitude but 
always and already is a ruin.
Community can be imagined then as a place of mourning or remembrance which 
can provoke, as in the Baroque, a melancholic attitude to a 'lost' heritage, whose 
recuperation dominates the social and political agenda; or alternatively mourning and 
remembrance can be the condition of politics. The world that is handed down, in 
destroying itself, always becomes other than itself. It gives and withdraws meaning, or 
put simply, cannot help but become a site o f interpretation. History is therefore 
allegorical, and just as in the Trauerspiel and in thinking about community, two paths 
are offered, one quietistic, the other interventionary.
The lack of reproducibility and the heterogeneity of performance can also be 
seen as emphasising the temporality of decay. The singular production of meaning and 
its exact irreproducability due to the difference from itself of the aesthetic object 
accentuates the degeneration of performance itself. The decay of performance is that 
which makes that performance possible; decay is the moment of excess of performance 
which is excluded to enable the momentary production of meaning (however long that 
moment lasts). Just as in the workings of excess in theatre (through bodily experience 
for example) its effects must be recuperated in order to represent any meaningful 
discourse, whose meaning, however, owes itself to precisely those effects of decay and 
excess that it cannot contemplate directly. This double action of exclusion and 
recuperation is in fact the same process. The recuperation takes the form of the 
exclusion of excess, for it is the only way in which the excessive can be represented. But 
the latter interrupts the discourse of interpretation through ruptures and fissures in which
the constitutive nature of excess can be witnessed. One would thus regard this return of 
excess as the condition of possibility for allegory. Allegory is made possible by the 
constant "return" of the finitude of human experience which can only be represented as 
aporia. The quote from Miiller above can therefore also be seen in this light; the return 
of the same becomes an opportunity for Muller because in returning it displays the 
fmitude of history and human experience, thereby laying the 'royal road' to the 
constitutive moment of aporia which structures the human conditon -  the experience of 
fmitude through the death of a particular other. The allegorisation of that which returns 
(as well as the event of return itself) can lead thereafter to the critique (or the explosion) 
of the dominant notions of tradition and temporality which stifle the heterogeneous 
political community.
Der Horatier
The return of a mythic event and its relation to the problem of aporia and excess is 
portrayed in Muller's Der Horatier,'11 a play widely interpreted in the GDR as defending 
the revolutionary act of violence and the state's right to act in defence of the revolution, 
if necessary through violence. That this can be seen as representing the return of mythic 
violence forms the contradiction that runs through the play. The events of the mythic 
narratives are consigned to pre-history whose return undermines the project of progress 
and emancipation. When that return occurs, therefore, the refusal to understand myth as 
anything other than a past historical stage that has been overcome becomes reflected in 
the inability of the state to regard its own mythic narratives at work.
in Miiller, Mauser, p. 45 - 54.
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The GDR state and its supportive critics saw in Der Horatier the representation
of "die historische Notwendigkeit proletarischer Gewalt",133 which recognised also how
the process of social development could not avoid the sacrifice of particular victims.
This clearly justified the use of revolutionary violence in the midst of revolution and the
sacrifice of those involved in the anti-fascist struggle was perpetually acknowledged by
the GDR state, indeed it became one of its primary means of legitimising itself. Müller
sees this as a positive aspect of the GDR, not least because it allows the possibility of
the allegorical relations to death argued for earlier:
In der kapitalistischen Welt gehen alle Energien dahin, die Toten 
auszuklammem, auszusondem. Das war in der DDR anders. [...] Die 
Legitimation durch den Antifaschismus ist die Legitimation durch die Toten.
Das ist nicht nur negativ, denn das legt auch den Grundstock für Kultur.134
The problem arises however when the permanent re-interpretation of those deaths is
excluded by an idea that the revolution has been accomplished and that therefore any
action by the state must be justified in defence of the memory of those who suffered in
the revolution. In another interview, Müller develops this idea:
Die einzige Legitimation der DDR kam aus dem Antifaschismus, aus den Toten, 
aus den Opfern. Das war eine Zeitlang ehrbar, aber an einem gewissen Punkt 
fing es an, zu Lasten der Lebenden zu gehen. Es kam zu einer Diktatur der Toten 
über die Lebenden - mit allen ökonomischen Konsequenzen.
Denn die Toten brauchen keine Jeans, keine Kiwis, keinen Walkman.
Was die DDR produzierte, waren im besten Fall Grabbeigaben.135
Müller was from early on concerned with the constant remembrance of "was der
Sozialismus gekostet hat" but this referred not only to the victims of the revolution but
also to those sacrificed in the name of the revolution afterwards.
133 Bernhardt, Antikerezeption im Werk Heiner Müllers, op. cit., p. 94.
134 Müller, Jenseits der Nation, p. 23.
133 ibid., p. 74
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Der Horatier was conceived as a Lehrstück, and indeed its first production was 
at the Billstedter Schiiler- und Lehrlingstheater in Hamburg in 1973. No performance of 
the play was ever put on in the GDR, other than as part of the 1988 production of Der 
Lohndrücker in the Deutsches Theater in Berlin.136 137The short ten side text portrays the 
cities o f  Alba and Rome who face a common enemy in the shape of the Etruscans. The 
first two cities need to join forces in order to defeat the latter, but before this a "Streit 
um Herrschaft" needs to be settled. In order not to weaken the ranks for the approaching 
battle, lots are drawn and a soldier from each city is chosen to fight and settle the 
argument. From the Roman side comes the eponymous Horatian, from the other a 
Kuratier who is engaged to the sister of his opponent. The Horatier wins the fight and 
despite pleas for mercy kills the Kuratier with the words "Meine Braut heißt Rom.'"57 
He returns to Rome in triumph but is met at the city gates by his sister who recognises 
the bloody battle dress of her fiance ("Gib mir wieder, was in diesem Kleid war."138 139), her 
screams of grief are then put to an end by her brother:
Und der Horatier [...]
Stieß das Schwert, auf dem das Blut der Beweinten
Noch nicht getrocknet war
In die Brust der Weinenden
Daß das Blut auf die Erde fiel. Er sagte:
Geh zu ihm, den du mehr liebst als Rom.13’
The adulation stops and the Horatier is put on trial for murder where the question is 
raised whether he should be honoured for his actions for Rome or executed for the 
murder of his sister. The answer is to do both and to recognise the actions of the whole 
man, both victor and murderer. The Horatier is thus paraded with laurels but thereafter
136 See discussion p. 252 ff. I am indebted to Georgina Paul for this reference.
137 Muller, Der Horatier, Mauser, p. 45.
138 ibid., p. 46.
139 ibid.
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executed. The question then arises as to how he should be remembered and the answer 
is once more given as the necessity o f remembering both. The severed head and body 
are placed on shields and paraded as would be the corpse of a hero, but this same corpse, 
this time that of the murderer "wurde vor die Hunde geworfen" his sword broken out of 
his hand to be used by another. The piece ends with the judgement of Rome that it must 
not shirk from its duty to portray events as they really happened, that they must be 
adequately represented : "Nämlich die Worte müssen rein bleiben.'"“
It is not difficult to read once again an allegory for Stalinism in Der Horatier, or 
rather for an attitude to the legacy of Stalinism in the GDR. One needs to recognise the 
mistakes of the past, to be truthful about the costs that have been paid. In this respect it 
could be seen as being not essentially out of line with the general process of de- 
Stalinisation that had been claimed to be underway since his death. The example that 
has been made of the Horatier is 
ein vorläufiges Beispiel
Reinlicher Scheidung, nicht verbergend den Rest 
Der nicht aufging im unaufhaltbaren Wandel[.]140 41
It would seem that what is being proposed therefore is a strongly materialist line that 
would be in tune with Müller's interest in the constitutive nature of excess. The line 
"Tödlich dem Menschen ist das Unkenntliche"142 could also be understood as the 
warning that those communities that attempt to exclude excess in their self­
interpretation do so with possible fatal and repressive results. In the case of Rome, 
however, the audience (and players) are constantly reminded that the actions of the
140 ibid., p. 53.
141 ibid.
142 ibid.
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Community are expressly directed towards one particular goal, that of victory in war 
over the Etruscans.
This construction of a united front is undermined however precisely by those 
figures of excess in the piece that can never be aufgehoben. As Hans-Thies Lehmann 
puts it
Ein Schlag zuviel ist die Tötung der Kuratiers. Eine Stimme zuviel ist es, die im 
Jubel nicht aufgeht: die Schwester. Einmal zu viel gebraucht Horatius gegen sie 
das Schwert. In der "einen Stimme" des Volks geht nicht auf das hörbare 
Schweigen des Vaters.143
Thus the sister stands out as the only one to mourn the death of the Kuratier; the father 
of the Horatier is the only one not to condemn his son for the murder of his daughter; 
finally, the death through execution stands out in excess of the praise which the Horatier 
received for victory in battle:
Und der Sieger sprang von den Schilden, im Jubel des Volks 
Entgegenzunehmen die Umarmung der Schwester.
Aber die Schwester erkannte das blutige Schlachtkleid 
Werk ihrer Hände, und schrie und löste ihr Haar auf.
Und das Volk antwortete mit einer Stimme 
(Aber der Vater des Horatiers schwieg):
Da ist der Sieger. Sein Name Horatius.
Da ist der Mörder. Sein Name: Horatius.
Einer hat gesiegt für Rom im Schwertkampf 
Ein andrer hat seine Schwester getötet 
Ohne Notwendigkeit. Jedem das Seine.
Dem Sieger den Lorbeer. Dem Mörder das Beil.144
That which can least be superseded or sublimated is death itself. There is thus, as
Lehmann also points out, an inherent imbalance between the praise on the one hand and
the punishment on the other. Death outweighs the laurel wreath. Praise is inadequate to
143 Lehmann, Hans-Thies, Der Horatier, in Schulz, Heiner Müller, op. cit., p. 96.
144 Müller, Der Horatier, op. cit., pp. 46, 49, 49-50.
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death. The meaning of this death cannot be represented as it is as such, for unlike praise 
the interpretation of death is defined by the knowledge of the inadequacy of that 
interpretation, leaving a space for further explication of the event in the future. The line 
"Tödlich dem Menschen ist das Unkenntliche" can therefore be understood in a 
different, more literal light.
The contact and acquaintance with this alterity which is most irredeemable -  a 
death which cannot be aufgehoben, be it of self or other -  forecloses the possibility of a 
semiotic or political synthesis around it. Death leads always to contradiction, to an 
interpretation that is never final, always to be disputed and hence finally, or rather 
always and already to allegory.
The inadequacy of representation is hinted at in another way in the play itself - 
one man from each city is drawn to represent the city on the one hand, but on the other 
the events that lead from this act prevent the substitution of one man for another. At the 
beginning, the decision is made:
Weil die Schlacht schwächt 
Sieger und Besiegte, laßt uns das Los werfen 
Damit ein Mann kämpfe für unsere Stadt.145
but later when the father of the Horatier pleads to let himself be executed for his son:
Und das Volk antwortete mit einer Stimme:
Kein Mann ist ein andrer Mann
Und der Horatier wurde gerichtet mit dem Beil
Daß das Blut auf die Erde fiel[.]146
The problem of the inadequacy of the signifier, of the impossibility of complete 
representation comes to haunt the play in the attempt by the Romans to sublate excess 
and alterity, to bring it under the complete order of their shared ritual and symbolic
145 ib id ., p. 45.
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practices. Merely in the attempt to equate the laurel wreath and the execution, the 
otherness of death is aufgehoben in its representation. The play thus debates whether it 
is the case that by equating death and praise the community depicted in the play enacts 
an impure and temporary political compromise (the "unreine Wahrheit" of the 
"vorläufigefn] Beispiel") which would involve a recognition of the limit and thus 
allegorisation of death, or whether on the other hand the compromise is re-conditioned 
to suit the instrumental needs of the state over and against the heterogeneous desires of 
the community.
The problem of honouring and condemning the Horatian can only be represented
in a contradictory way because of the original antagonism residing ontologically in the
community. However, Der Horatier seems to go some way towards declaring that this
necessitates all the more the taking of decisions, uttering them and judging further.
Whether the Roman community represented in the play then makes the right judgement
is up to the audience and players. The conclusion of the play seems to be based on a
desire to follow the logic of this Roman community where it leads, thus to the
honouring and death of the Horatian:
Länger als Rom über Alba herrschen wird 
Wird nicht zu vergessen sein Rom und das Beispiel 
Das er gegeben hat oder nicht gegeben [...]
Fürchtend die unreine Wahrheit oder nicht fürchtend 
Und das halbe Beispiel ist kein Beispiel[.]146 47
This then leads to the severity of the 'law' based on this example:
Wer aber seine Schuld nennt zu einer Zeit 
Und nennt sein Verdienst zu anderer Zeit 
Redend aus einem Mund zu verschiedner Zeit anders 
Oder für verschiedne Ohren anders
146 ibid., p. 51.
147 ibid., p. 52.
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Dem soll die Zunge ausgerissen werden.
Nämlich die Worte müssen rein bleiben.14'
But even this decision is caught up in the contradiction of death which outweighs all 
possible other judgements. To judge the deeds one must separate them from each other 
and the man, but to judge the man one cannot separate him from his deeds. The absolute 
judgement, such as is represented in the sentence of death, is utterly indifferent to this 
contradiction, and this is expressed starkly in the line: "Und der Horatier stand/ 
Zwischen Lorbeer und Beil."14’
The final decision is riddled therefore with its non-identity with itself and this is 
partly recognised in the "unreine Wahrheit [der] reinliche Scheidung". A decision has to 
be made, and this is better than a retreat into non-judgement, the end is purely 
temporary and can possibly be undermined in the future. This is simply in the nature of 
the political decision. As was seen in Philoktet, the attempt to retreat from such a 
decision is even more catastrophic than becoming immersed in the "blutsäufigen 
Gemeinschaft". No matter how abhorrent a particular state might be, no matter how 
drastically it homogenises the relations of its subjects to their deaths, there is no 
alternative to making political decisions. The manner in which those decisions are 
made, be it in the first instance in remembrance of the victims of previous decisions, or 
seeing those victims as necessary sacrifice, is what determines the nature and degree of 
heterogeneity of the community.
What must thereby be acknowledged, however, is the problem of representing 
the alterity of death as that which is in the interests of the law and state. It is emphasised
1 ibid., p. 53. 
1 ibid., p. 47.
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throughout Der Horatier that particular characters act for Rome; Rome is embodied in 
one man at the beginning of the play. He kills his sister for Rome:
Geh zu ihm, den du mehr liebst als Rom.
Das jeder Römerin
Die den Feind betrauert.
Und er zeigte das zweimal blutige Schwert allen Römern
Und der Jubel verstummte.150
Similarly, the crowd and the father and son are driven apart a number o f times by the 
guards "mit Rutenbündel und Beil". This expression returns a number of times as a 
refrain, and the reference to the fasces allows immediately connotations of the 
totalitarian state, albeit of a different order. The guards, those who employ the 
monopoly o f state violence, stand menacingly in the background, returning once more 
as a refrain, framing the events within a particular constitution which suppresses the 
voices of heterogeneity that rise up from time to time. Through the different refrains, 
through the very repetition of the same, the defining moment of community -  the 
recognition o f alterity of the community from itself so that the state cannot absolutely 
speak for the community with one voice -  is drowned. Yet on the other hand, the 
refrains also provide the possibility, through their quality of repetition, of remembrance. 
Rome, in this play however, prefers to carry out the execution "in reinlicher Scheidung" 
instead of facing up to the difficulties and aporia of the political community. Thus as the 
verdict is carried out, the Romans put away their swords to separate the last act of 
honouring the victor (where they held up their weapons in tribute) from the coming 
execution.
Aber die Wachen
An den vier Toren in Erwartung des Feinds
Bedeckten ihre Schwerte nicht
ibid., p. 46
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Und die Schneiden der Beile blieben unbedeckt[.]151
Later, the citizens cover their heads in mourning for the victor,
Aber die Wachen an den vier Toren 
In Erwartung des Feinds 
Verdeckten ihre Gesichter nicht.152
Through the repeatedly expressed omnipresence of the state, the audience and 
players are constantly reminded of the immediate goal which is before the gates of 
Rome: the defeat of the Etruscans. The citizens have to act on behalf of Rome, to do 
what is necessary for her. The Horatier, for example, killed the Kuratier while 
representing Rome, and it was thus a necessary and justifiable act. He is led to the 
scaffold however in the
Tuch in der Farbe der Nacht 
In die zu gehen er verurteilt war 
Weil er einen Menschen getötet hatte 
Ohne Notwendigkeit[.]153 154
thereby not representing the state and acting against its monopoly of violence.
The key to the iron-clad instrumentalism directed toward the future goal, which 
was witnessed also in Philoktet, is that homogenisation of temporalities which 
simultaneously produces the fear of the historical continuum's standing still. If the goal, 
as set by the state, is not attained, the result is a cessation of progress, itself dangerous to 
the abilty of the state to justify itself and its actions: "Was nicht getan wird ganz bis zum 
wirklichen Ende/ Kehrt ins Nichts am Zügel der Zeit im Krebsgang.’"54
There is thus a difference between, on the one hand, the political 'dis-position', 
where political judgement only regards itself as possible by the fact of its being
151 ibid., p. 50.
152 ibid., p. 51.
153 ibid., p. 50.
154 ibid., p. 52.
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compromised by repeated future interpretation in the community (thus providing the 
promise of that community and democracy, as argued in Chapter One); and on the other, 
that judgement where any political reaction to itself is repressed by the irrevocability of 
a law which does not see itself as subject to any process of ruination.
It is, however, precisely the way in which Der Horatier as play and as events 
within a play is experienced i f  performed as Lehrstück that such a ruination comes to 
show itself. Once more, we see how the presentation of politics in the theatre as theatre 
defines the profoundly political nature of the art. The idea behind the presentation of the 
play as Lehrstück would be for the actors to regard their own actions as allegorical, 
subject to their own and others' interpretation. The contradictions in the play are to be 
worked out, if never resolved, experienced and discussed. This happens, however, not 
only on the level of the critical language which might be employed outside of the 
performance but in the aesthetic discourse of the play itself. Lehmann sees the use of 
poetic language to be inextricably bound up with the theme of "[dem] Rest, der nicht 
aufgeht":
Eine Sprache [der Kunst], die den Rest nicht verleugnet, der in keinen Begriff 
paßt: den Schmerz der Opfer, darf nichts verheimlichen. Nur das Aussprechen 
der "unreinen Wahrheit" bis hin zum Paradox, das poetische Sprache, quer zum 
logischen Begriff, faßt, kann Geltung beanspruchen.155
The only discourse that can do justice to the problem of excess, the only one that can
shudder before the sublimity of death is the aesthetic. By being aesthetic and non-
interested, that is, by separating itself from the instrumental use of language, aesthetic
experience opens up the future of heterogeneous interpretation by concentrating on the
present. As argued in Chapter Two, by being more immersed in the present, aesthetic
155 L ehm ann , D er H ora tier , op. cit., p . 96-7
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experience can be sovereign, a moment of excessive expenditure which communicates 
the limits -  and thus the death -  of human existence. By contrast, the absolute claim to 
the interpretation of death which one sees the agents of the state employing in both Der 
Horatier and Philoktet is always instrumentalised into a homogenous telos. It sees for 
itself a transparent relation to the death of its subjects, the antithesis of the communal 
death argued for earlier. This transparency is also represented in the state's monopoly on 
violence where execution is the symbol of the law. By bringing about an experience of 
this instrumentality in the theatre, in a discourse of non-utility, Müller hopes to unveil 
its catastrophic brutality while insisting that the only politically responsible act (other 
than making theatre politically, of course) is to involve oneself in the dirty business of 
conflicting means, ends, interests and temporalities.
Political theatre and its victims
It has been argued that Müller was less concerned about producing art which fitted into 
the tradition of political theatre, but rather that he was interested in making theatre 
politically. As the years went by this was achieved through an allegorical theatre which, 
by means of the trope of repetition, provided the conditions for remembrance of victims 
past. In Philoktet this is accomplished through the concentration on the problem of 
Odysseus' and Neoptolemos' return to Lemnos to fetch their abandoned colleague. The 
central conflict of the play develops between Odysseus and Neoptolemos, whereby the 
former is concerned to stop the catastrophe and deaths at Troy continuing or being 
repeated. This he sees as only being possible through further political action, 
characterised by further instrumentalisation of heterogeneous subjects and thus their 
continuing victimisation. This, on the other hand, becomes the basis for his
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remembrance of the victims of his action which undermines the homogeneity of the
political goal for which so much was being sacrificed. Neoptolemos, however, sees the
whole process as horrific, but his refusal to involve himself in the killing fields of Troy
will only mean the continuance of the conditions which he finds so abhorrent.
Neoptolemos refrains from repetition and thus misses the opportunity of remembrance
which provides the conditions for future political action.
In Der Horatier such repetition comes most clearly to light through the use o f
refrains in the text. Although, as argued above, they illuminate on the one hand the
constant repression of alterity within the community and this repetition offers for Müller
the opportunity o f allegorisation. Thus the refrains of "daß das Blut auf die Erde fiel",156
"und das Volk antwortete mit einer Stimme",157 "weil er einen Menschen getötet hat[te]/
Ohne Notwendigkeit"158 and the repeated reference to the guards at the city gates provide
the conditions for remembrance through the allegorisation of the refrain. The refrain, by
being repeated, draws attention to itself and could be performed as allegorising itself in
this self-reflection. This stands in stark contrast to the community portrayed in the play
where the possibility of such future re-interpretation of the Horatian's death, which
would guarantee the democratic, political nature of that community, is denied. The
meaning of the deaths of the Kuratier, the Horatian's sister and the Horatian himself are
all set in stone. In the case of the latter:
Wie soll der Horatier genannt werden der Nachwelt?
Und das Volk antwortete mit einer Stimme:
Er soll genannt werden der Sieger über Alba 
Er soll genannt werden der Mörder seiner Schwester 
Mit einem Atem sein Verdienst und Schuld.159
156 Müller, Der Horatier, op. cit., pp. 45, 46 & 51.
157 pp. 19,51,52,53.
158 pp. 50, 52, 53.
159 ibid., p. 53.
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Any confusion through future interpretation threatens the pure use of language which 
Philoktet also found so necessary for his (psychotic) subjectivity. So while the Roman 
community refuses on the one hand in its judgement of the Horatian to omit any of his 
deeds which might be uncomfortable, it also refuses to acknowledge the possibility of 
the finitude of this judgement. This might be seen, as in Philoktet, as an understandable 
and indeed necessary action given the immediate threat of the enemy outside the gates 
of the city:
So stellten sie auf, nicht furchtend die unreine Wahrheit
In Erwartung des Feinds ein vorläufiges Beispiel
Reinlicher Scheidung[.]160
However, the claim that this acknowledges the excess ("den Rest") of death that cannot 
be sublated is fatally undermined by the inability to remember those who died at the 
hands of the agents of the state as victims. The Horatian cannot be regarded as a victim 
of the state nor of the conditions of war between the Romans and Etruscans because the 
necessity of his execution is justified by the fact that he killed without necessity. Thus 
necessary death is simply defined by the state; it is necessary for the state to insist on its 
claim to monopolise recourse to violence and its necessity. In this sense, state defines 
death and those who die at the hands of the state cannot by definition be victims or be 
remembered as such in the future because they had been necessarily sacrificed for the 
state. If this is the case that certain deaths cannot be re-interpreted as victimisation, then 
the finite nature of the interpretation of the other's death - which itself provides the 
space for the future of the community -  is denied in the strongest terms. While it is 
claimed that this is a temporary judgement, therefore, the simple fact that the state can
160 ibid.
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engage in execution shows who has first claim to the definition and interpretation of life 
and death in this state. Death outweighs the laurel wreath.
The use of repetition, allegory and remembrance is more than just a theme, 
however, in Philoktet and Der Horatier. Both of the plays demonstrate for the first time 
Miiller's interest in the repetition and allegorisation of theatrical tradition and discourse. 
Thus while Der Horatier exploits repetition within the timespan of the play by 
presenting itself as Lehrstück, Philoktet reintroduces and reuses the Sophoclean myth of 
Philoctetes to demonstrate the effects of the return, not only of myth, but of mythic 
theatre.
As has already been mentioned, the Müller version of the tale differs markedly
from the Sophoclean. In the latter, instead of being faced with the effects of
Neoptolemos' act of cowardice and treachery, Odysseus is able to call on the gods to
intervene. Thus at the end of the play Neoptolemos is about to take Philoctetes home,
instead of bringing him to Troy, when Hercules appears:
For your sake I  have come from the heavenly seats, to show you the purpose o f 
Zeus, and to stay the journey upon which you are departing. Give heed to my 
counsel.
[...B]e sure, the destiny is ordained that through these sufferings of yours you 
should glorify your life. [...] But of this be mindful when you lay waste the land: 
show reverence towards the gods. All things else are of less account in the sight 
of our father Zeus. Piety dies not with men; in their life and in their death it is 
immortal.“1
The human subjects in Sophocles' play have in the end no choice in what they do since 
they are guided by destiny: they simply need to be reminded from time to time what that 
entails. As such, their deaths, as events foreseen by the gods, become symbolic of their
Sophocles, Philoctetes. in The Complete Plays, p. 217-8.
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life and close off interpretation in the future. Piety, that is, the ability of subjects to 
regard their actions as the will of the gods, becomes the symbol of these heroes' actions.
Miiller's Philoktet, however, cannot not face his death at all. He is instead run 
through from behind, suddenly and unexpectedly. Through the non-fateful, non-heroic 
death, indeed precisely through a death which exemplifies that of the victim, Philoktet is 
used and judged for political ends. This Philoktet has the bad luck to be surrounded by 
unpious brethren who seek the solution for their conditions here below rather than 
through recourse to the gods. His death thus becomes automatically a point of conflict 
which simultaneously confirms the continuation of violence but also provides the 
conditions (simultaneously encouraging and unpalatable) for its cessation in the future. 
This is, for Müller, achieved through the future remembrance and re-interpretation such 
as will happen in Troy, albeit on the basis of a lie.
The crucial point for the audience, therefore, is not so much how sustainable 
such a lie is in any allegorisation of Philoktet's death on his return to Troy, but rather 
how that death is allegorised for the audience itself through the return of myth within 
the theatre. The character of Philoktet, spared in the myth, returns to become a victim in 
the allegory. The return of myth as the death of a victim provides then for Müller the 
means to write in remembrance of those who have been used, judged and victimised by 
the theatre itself. Through the conscious and obvious use and re-working of mythic 
theatrical tradition Müller turns Philoktet's death in his play into an allegory. This 
allegory consists of a process of representing the other's victimisation in Western 
theatrical discourse. To think that the theatre could avoid doing so is hubris, but allegory 
provides the means to remember and therefore re-interpret such victimisation and death. 
These deaths represented in the theatre would thus lose the status they have gained as
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being justified through representing the outside world on the stage, or through their 
necessity for the internal dynamics of theatrical discourse and tradition. The primary 
example of such victimisation becomes then for Müller the "justified" sacrifice of the 
gendered other in which theatre finds its roots. The allegorisation of such deaths in the 
theatrical tradition serves the purpose of providing the conditions for the remembrance 
of the death of the other in the community as a whole but Müller's intention goes further 
than this. As will be argued below, the allegorisation of victims' deaths serves to 
strengthen the autonomy of theatre from politics and instrumental thought, but in so 
doing Müller seeks to reveal the theatre's real political import. This import can, 
however, only be demonstrated through the remembrance of the manner in which 
victims were represented on the stage, but also in the memory of those who became 
victims because o f theatre's solipsism and powerlessness in autonomy, an autonomy 
which Müller seeks to prolong. Two more works by Müller, written in the 1970's 
explore in exhausting austerity these processes and their consequences: Todesanzeige 
and Hamletmaschine.
Todesanzeige and Hamletmaschine
Theatre for Müller is based on the sacrifice of individual subjectivity and the 
communication of community. In its oldest form it performs or enacts the mimesis of a 
sacrifice (originally ritualistic and religious) which communicates the death of the other, 
the origin of the community itself. This is enforced by the architecture and dynamics of 
the theatre which allow a representation of limits on stage -  of stage/audience, stage/off-
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stage, off-stage/theatre walls'“ -  which confine the experience of the sacrifice to a
restricted arena, building or amphitheatre. It is this tradition which Müller was
concerned to use and repeat. He sought simultaneously to investigate the theatre's
culpability in the continued representation of sacrifice when the link of theatre and
outside world had been turned into a symbolic one.
It was not until the 1970's that Müller began explicitly to deal with this problem.
In Todesanzeige (first published in 1975 under the title Wüsten der Liebe), Müller deals
with the suicide in 1966 of his wife, Inge. Although she had attempted suicide a number
of times over the previous eight years, each time Müller himself had been present. He
recalls in Krieg Ohne Schlacht that his work was beginning to suffer:
Das Zusammenleben mit ihr war fur mich inzwischen auch ein Arbeitsproblem 
geworden. Ich konnte in unserer Wohnung nicht mehr arbeiten. [...] Und dann 
habe ich noch lange auf einem U-Bahnsteig mit Adolf Dresen über die Zukunft 
oder Nicht-Zukunft des Marxismus diskutiert. Als ich nach Hause kam, war sie 
tot.1“
Todesanzeige links the death of Inge, however, in a dreamlike and yet explicit way to 
theatrical representation, where she is sacrificed (as Müller seems to hint at above) for 
the sake of theatre and writing.
Ich hatte sie schon oft wie tot daliegen sehen, wenn ich nach Hause kam, und 
aufgehoben mit Angst (Hoffnung), daß sie tot war und der schreckliche Laut 
klang beruhigend, eine Antwort.* 164
We thus return once more to the culpability not only of the theatre but of writing itself, 
for if theatre is guilty in any way, then the signature of Heiner Müller, of him who 
writes theatre, is equally so.
See Andre Green, The Tragic Effect. The instructive comparison, for which there is unfortunately no 
room to explore here, is between the off-stage of theatre, and the off-camera of film. Theatre, according 
to Green is defined by the limits of off-stage, whereas in film off-camera is by definition unlimited.
165 Müller, Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 209.
164 Müller, Todesanzeige, in Germania Tod in Berlin, p. 31.
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Sie war tot als ich nach Hause kam. Sie lag in der Küche auf dem Steinboden, 
halb auf dem Bauch, halb auf der Seite, ein Bein angewinkelt wie im Schlaf, der 
Kopf in der Nähe der Tür. Ich bückte mich, hob ihr Gesicht aus dem Profil und 
sagte das Wort, mit dem ich sie anredete, wenn wir allein waren. Ich hatte das 
Gefühl, daß ich Theater spielte.165 16
Inge had gassed herself in the oven. She had left no note which was then deemed to be 
enough reason to suspect Müller of a hand in her death; "WO IST DER BRIEF WAS 
FÜR EIN BRIEF HAT SIE KEINEN BRIEF HINTERLASSEN WO WAREN SIE 
VON WANN BIS WANN"'66
Todesanzeige is written in three sections: a narrative of the immediate aftermath 
of Inge’s death, a dreamlike sequence where the speaking subject murders three times a 
figure known only as 'Hühnergesicht', and the last section entitled 'Traum', a short 
presentation of a dream where the T, where Heiner Müller, approaches a naked, hanged 
female body, and is drawn ever closer and into the hanged woman's genitals. The second 
and third sections portray murder and rape committed in the first person, and the piece is 
written in such a way as to direct the reader directly back to Heiner himself in the first 
section.
The memory of an embankment he walked along as a child links Inge's death to 
the fantasised murder of "Hühnergesicht", while the exorcising experience of the dream 
provides the connection to the third section. Another narrative development throughout 
the piece is far more startling, however. Müller has the feeling that he "Theater spielte”, 
but the shift from the 3"1 person on the theatrical stage back to the writing and speaking 
subject in the first person is only effected by the identification of himself as murderer
165 ibid.
166 ibid., p., 32.
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and abuser. The identification of the three sections and their subjects, be they in the first
or third person, is made clear once more through repetition:
Ins Nebenzimmer gehen (dreimal), die Tote NOCH EINMAL ansehen (dreimal), 
sie ist nackt unter der Decke [...]
Er hat in meinen Träumen kein Platz mehr, seit ich ihn getötet habe (dreimal).
[.:•]Über mir die ungeheuren Schenkel, aufgeklappt wie eine Schere, in die ich mit 
jeder Stufe weiter hineingehej.]167
Inge's suicide provokes a memory of MUller’s first thoughts on his own mortality "in 
dem kleinen Haus in Sachsen, in der winzigen Schlafkammer, drei niedrige Stockwerke 
hoch, fünf oder sechs Jahre alt ich[.]"168 This then provides the link to the extended 
murder of "Hühnergesicht" where it becomes clear that one's own mortality is only to be 
grasped and understood through the death of a particular other. The figure is sacrificed 
for the subjectivity of the writer ("Er hat in meinen Träumen kein Platz mehr, seit ich 
ihn getötet habe (dreimal)"), and thus the possibility of subjectivity is for Müller to be 
found in the temporality of the murderer: "Die Unumkehrbarkeit der Zeit. Zeit des 
Mörders."169 Müller performs these sacrifices in fantasy or dream, he signs them by 
writing in the first person, but this stands in direct contrast to the theatrical presentation 
of Inge's suicide. By writing Inge's suicide as theatre, Müller is attempting less to evade 
responsibility for Inge's death than instead to display the manner in which theatrical 
discourse sacrifices the other as necessity in order to exist and thereby to include 
himself among those culpable.
The only possibility of coming to terms with this death, not just the presentation 
of the Idea of death but the suicide of his wife, is by representation of it as murder and 
rape later in the piece. By means of this he comes to see his own finitude through the
167 ibid., pp. 32 & 34.
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sacrifice of the victim, a sacrifice which he performs. The culpability of theatre thus 
finds itself in the manner in which it represents the death, the sacrifice of his wife, the 
manner in which it thinks it, in the very possibility of thinking it within theatre. The 
performance takes place only after the event; in this sense the death (understood as the 
death of the other) succeeds the suicide, and thus any culpability must reside in the 
theatre's performance of the other's death. For Müller, such performance or writing of 
the other's death, which makes theatre what it is, inhabits a space which is analogous to 
that of the murderer. As soon as the cultic and ritualistic link between theatre and the 
outside world is lost, that representation of murder and sacrifice runs the terrible risk of 
presenting murder and sacrifice symbolically. Müller seeks to redress this through the 
allegorisation of theatrical experience, which in turn is expressed through the enactment 
of the finite signature.
Performing the relation to the other, in particular the other gender, is thus no less 
terrible a responsibility. Müller seeks more and more from this point on to engage in 
remembrance of the performance of the murderer when the death of the other is written 
in theatre. He does so not simply to harangue the theatre for its past, but instead to re­
establish the possibility of theatre's representing the death of the other in a manner 
which would write community. This would involve communicating the sacrifice of 
solipsistic self-consciousness which is experienced by particular subjects (for example, 
Müller) through the death of a particular other (for example, Inge). Theatre can achieve 
this through the signed remembrance of the theatrical representation of particular 1689
168 ibid., p„ 32.
169 ibid.
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victims and through the allegorisation of their sacrifice as telling the story of theatre and
thereby the relation of community to death and its limits.
Theatre simulates the form of sacrifice that is made for community. An isolated
self-consciousness sacrifices itself in order to make community possible at all in the first
place, and the death of the other takes place in order to establish the limits of human
existence which community expresses. To quote Bataille once more:
If it sees its fellow-being die, a living being can subsist only outside itself ..It is 
for this reason that it is necesssary for communal life to maintain itself at a level 
equal to death.™
When the only possibility of representing my death is through the other, the possibility 
of self-presence and full self-consciousness is sacrificed. Each subject shares this fate, 
but that which the subject shares sunders him/her also. The other is sacrificed in theatre 
in order to mime that death of the self which would be the impossible experience in its 
fullest form. Murderer and victim meet in this theatre, in this region of subterfuge, only 
through the work of mimesis. Mimesis is the work of sacrifice, but the very mythical 
status of cubic theatre emphasises its ritual, transgressive, basis. Modem, autonomous 
theatre, on the other hand, attempts to symbolise the outside world on stage (thereby 
weakening its autonomy) and in so doing seeks to repress the very finitude of the hand 
that wrote it. In such symbolic theatre, the world is thus captured in its essence on stage.
Müller in contrast, as will be seen in Hamletmaschine, wants to link the 
signature of his writing to the possibility of producing a theatre that does not shy away 
from its representation of the sacrifice of the (gendered) other. This will result in a 
different relationship between theatre and outside world which, Müller hopes, will re­
establish theatre as an act of community by insisting on its autonomy. Such a
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relationship is achieved through an allegorical representation of remembrance which 
insists on its being performed on "a level equal to death." In this sense, theatre is 
culpable whatever it does. Either it continues to perform the sacrifice of the gendered 
other in order to exist; or it symbolises such sacrifice as capturing the role of that 
gendered other in the outside world; or finally it attempts to deny culpability altogether 
and then desists in performance or mimesis. The latter, however, represents a principle 
o f retreat which Müller regards as intellectual privilege. Theatre instead must continue 
to remember and re-present the guilt of the theatrical tradition in order to produce a 
form of theatre which precisely in such remembrance gives witness to the finite nature 
o f community and the necessity of forever remembering, re-interpreting and writing in 
the future. It is Hamletmaschine which addresses this impossible task.
Hamletmaschine was written in 1977 and has become one of Müller's most 
widely performed plays, even though it is without doubt one of his densest and most 
difficult. Although only eight sides, critics have spent much time and effort trying to 
decipher every hint and reference in the text and my purpose here is not to discuss the 
play as a whole, not least because this would be a thesis in itself. While in the most 
general sense, the play might be described as investigating the dilemma of the Marxist 
intellectual, it also does so in a manner where the signature of Heiner Müller comes 
through most strongly. In other words, the play investigates also the dilemma of the 
Marxist intellectual playwright, of Heiner Müller himself, working within a theatrical 
tradition of sacrifice o f the gendered other.
At the beginning of the play we find immediate reference to this problem: "Ich 
war Hamlet. Ich stand an der Küste und redete mit der Brandung BLABLA, im Rücken 170
170 Bataille, Oeuvre Complètes. 7:245-46, quoted in Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. 15.
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die Ruinen von Europa.'"71 This is Hamlet, one of the archetypal characters of the
European theatrical tradition, standing with nothing to say in front of that tradition
presented in its ruined form. It is this tradition and its ruin which the theatre must deal
with and take apart. Immediately, as example of the implied violence of that tradition,
Hamlet helps the murderer Claudius onto his mother, stretching her legs apart. Later, the
Hamlet figure itself commits rape of his mother:
Ich werde dich wieder zur Jungfrau machen, Mutter, damit dein König eine 
blutige Hochzeit hat. DER MUTTERSCHOSS IST KEINE 
EINBAHNSTRASSE. Jetzt binde ich dir die Hände auf den Rücken [...] Jetzt 
zerreiße ich das Brautkleid. Jetzt mußt du schreien. [...] Jetzt nehme ich dich, 
meine Mutter, in seiner, meines Vaters, unsichtbaren Spur.17 72
This rape of the mother in the steps of the father represents simultaneously a retreat into
the womb in order to escape both the natural time of decay and the fmitude of existence
as well as the fantasy of a world uncomplicated by the gendered other. Indeed the two
are intimately linked as Hamlet reveals when addressing the ghost.
Ich wollte, meine Mutter hätte [ein Loch] zu wenig gehabt, als du im Fleisch 
warst: ich wäre mir erspart geblieben. Man sollte die Weiber zunähn, eine Welt 
ohne Mütter. Wir könnten uns in Ruhe abschlachten.173
Ich legte mich auf den Boden und hörte die Welt ihre Runden drehn im 
Gleichschritt der Verwesung. [...] Die Hähne sind geschlachtet. Der Morgen 
findet nicht mehr statt.174
It is consistently emphasised in this first scene that the characters on stage come from 
the European theatrical tradition.
die reizende Ophelia, sie kommt auf ihr Stichwort, sieh wie sie den Hintern 
schwenkt, eine tragische Rolle [...] Hast du deinen Text verlernt Mutter. Ich 
souffliere WASCH DIR DEN MORD AUS DEM GESICHT MEIN PRINZ/ 
UND MACH DEM NEUEN DÄNMARK SCHÖNE AUGEN.175
171 Müller, Hamletmaschine, in Mauser, p. 89.
172 ibid., p. 91.
173 ibid., p. 90.
174 ibid., pp. 89-90.
1,5 ibid., p. 90-1.
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Hamletmaschine presents in a nutshell the catastrophe of theatre: the continued 
repetition of sacrifice as mimesis in the place of the performance of mimesis as 
sacrifice. In other words, European theatre has, for Müller, remained the same: in a 
catastrophic state of affairs where nothing has changed, theatre has presented the symbol 
of the sacrifice of a woman as capturing 'fleeting eternity'. The sacrifice of women has 
been understood as the mimesis of the essence of the real world and this has been 
repeated in all "innocence" in a symbolic way.
Müller's task is to write a quite different form of theatre. He sees mimesis itself 
as the sacrifice of self-consciousness in the community, providing the opportunity for 
the experience of that community. In performing the sacrifice of the gendered other, 
Müller does not wish to evade his responsibility and culpability in the tradition, but by 
repeating it he seeks also to engage in remembrance that will make that performance of 
sacrifice an allegory of the mimesis and the theatrical tradition. In Hamletmaschine this 
allegory of sacrifice's performance is achieved through the remembrance of Ophelia and 
Gertrude's abuse, of Inge Müller's "murder" and the exploitation of a number of other 
female figures in the play. In so doing Müller seeks to perform the subject's sacrifice of 
immanence in the community -  so that the community remains other -  but what is more 
he does so as "Heiner Müller" against the background of a community which must be 
understood as eternally passing, always in decay and always to come.
That Müller himself is inscribed explicitly in this text is not left to doubt by the 
second scene. In order not to leave any allegorisation at the level of characters, or at the 
level of the theatre in general, Müller extends it, to a rigorous and exhausting degree, to 
include the process of his writing himself. The aim of the allegorisation of the theatrical
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tradition — to provide the conditions for an experience of community and the radical
sense of singularity and fmitude which structures it -  is given extra impetus by the
emphasis on the signature in the theatrical text.
DAS EUROPA DER FRAU
Enormous room. Ophelia. Ihr Herz ist eine Uhr.
OPHELIA
Ich bin Ophelia. Die der Fluß nicht behalten hat. Die Frau am Strick Die Frau 
mit den aufgeschnittenen Pulsadern Die Frau mit der Überdosis AUF DEN 
LIPPEN SCHNEE Die Frau mit dem Kopf im Gasherd.176
The character of Hamlet in the play, on the other hand, seeks to evade his 
responsibility for the sacrifice in the "Europa der Frau" by re-enacting those same 
dreams of immanence which led to the rape of his mother through the abandonment of 
his gender:
SCHERZO
Universität der Toten. [...] Galerie (Ballett) der toten Frauen. Die Frau am 
Strick Die Frau mit den aufgeschnittenen Pulsadern usw. [...]
Striptease von Ophelia 
OPHELIA
Willst du mein Herz essen, Hamlet. Lacht.
HAMLET Hände vorm Gesicht 
Ich will eine Frau sein.177
Finally the character of Hamlet renounces his role completely. Mimesis, theatrical 
representation, words have nothing to say -  ("BLABLA") in the play or the stage of 
subjectivity. Nobody seems to be listening any more to the self-proclaimed grand 
designs of European theatre. Any claims to relevance it might have had to be the 
harbinger o f universal peace, humanism and the completion of the project of 
Enlightenment have been annulled by its utter failure to live up to its own ideal of itself 
as bearer of knowledge that could be applied in the outside world.
176 ibid., p. 91.
177 ibid., p. 92
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HAMLETDARSTELLER
Ich bin nicht Hamlet. Ich spiele keine Rolle mehr. Meine Worte haben mir nichts 
zu sagen. Meine Gedanken saugen den Bildern das Blut aus. Mein Drama findet 
nicht mehr statt. Hinter mir wird die Dekoration aufgebaut. Von Leuten, die 
mein Drama nicht interessiert, für Leute, die es nichts angeht. Mich interessiert 
es auch nicht mehr. Ich spiele nicht mehr mit.178
Instead this Hamlet figure seeks to enact a retreat to the "drama" o f uprising in the
street, the fantasy of revolution which is first and foremost a well-structured narrative,
which does not cause too much trouble, where the universal humanist outlook of
European theatre can find its counterpart.
Auf den Sturz des Denkmals folgt nach einer angemessenen Zeit der Aufstand. 
Mein Drama, wenn es noch stattfinden würde, fände in der Zeit des Aufstands 
statt. Der Aufstand beginnt als Spaziergang. Gegen die Verkehrsordnung 
während die Arbeitszeit.17’
The passage of events of a real uprising starts to take over, however. Violence is used, 
and lackeys of the secret police are hung up by their bootstraps. The reaction of the 
Hamlet figure, however, is to cling to the fantasies of the objective, universal and 
uniting relevance of theatre.
Mein Platz, wenn mein Drama noch stattfinden würde, wäre auf beiden Seiten 
der Front, zwischen der Fronten, darüber. Ich stehe im Schweißgeruch der 
Menge und werfe Steine auf Polizisten Soldaten Panzer Panzerglas. [...] Ich bin 
der Soldat im Panzerturm [....] Ich bin mein Gefangener.180
But this drama along the lines which the theatre had chosen has not taken place.
Economics, politics and revolution have remained stubbornly autonomous from the
entertainment value of a good script. The Hamlet character makes a further retreat into
complete solipsism and timelessness, an eternal symbol of European theatre,
characterising himself also as various machines ("Schreibmaschine", "Datenbank").
1,8 ibid., p. 93.
ibid., p. 93-4.
180 ibid., p. 94.
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Mein Drama hat nicht stattgefunden. Das Textbuch ist verlorengegangen. Die 
Schauspieler haben ihre Gesichter an den Nagel in der Garderobe gehängt. In 
seinem Kasten verfault der Souffleur. [...] Ich gehe nach Hause und schlage die 
Zeit tot, einig/Mit meinem ungeteilten Selbst.181
All that is left over for the theatrical intellectual is nausea, itself the most desperate
signifier of privilege. Hand in hand with this nausea comes the impotence of that
privilege:
Unsem Täglichen Mord gib uns heute
Denn Dein ist das Nichts Ekel
An den Lügen die geglaubt werden
Von den Lügnern und niemandem sonst Ekel
An den Lügnern die geglaubt werden Ekel
[...] In der Einsamkeit der Flughäfen
Atme ich auf Ich bin
Ein Privilegierter Mein Ekel
Ist ein Privileg
Beschirmt mit Mauer
Stacheldraht Gefängnis'82
This has now become a mime of Müller. The figure (who in some productions has been 
Müller's voice) wants, as a machine (Hamletmaschine -  HM -  Heiner Müller) to erase 
the signature of subjectivity and distance himself from the catastrophe in which his 
theatre is involved:
Ich will nicht mehr essen trinken atmen eine Frau lieben einen Mann ein Kind 
ein Tier. Ich will nicht mehr sterben. Ich will nicht mehr töten.
Zerreißung der Fotographie des Autors.'*'
The wish to remain immortal, to evade the death which defines human life is, at 
least as regards the theatre, closely tied up with the desire not to kill anymore. It 
represents a theatre without risk, without politics. The attempt to shelve all 
responsibility for theatre demands in turn a writing without signature or author, or an 
infinite, heroic representation which would stand for all time. Hence the tearing up of
ibid., p. 95.
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Müller's photograph is not a symbol of the "death of the author", as it is most often 
interpreted as being, but rather the allegorisation of theatre's attempt to repress the 
effects of finite time and signature.
Any retreat from that theatrical representation which engages in the sacrifice of 
the other is the action of the privileged intellectual (such as Hamlet and Neoptolemos) 
and would mean finally the end of theatre. Müller recognises that he cannot step outside 
of the theatrical tradition, he can only transgress it by personally writing and engaging 
in remembrance and thus allegorisation of its past victims who have been mimetically 
sacrificed. The alternative posted by the Hamlet character would mean the establishment 
of the theatre outside of the political agon which would seek to displace itself (literally 
in 1976) beyond the wall and barbed wire of the GDR. Müller would, like Hamlet, have 
had to turn his back to the mins of Europe and its theatre.
Müller, however stayed in the GDR and remained in the theatre. In both cases he 
was hemmed in by a wall that represented his privilege - on the one hand as intellectual 
dramatist, on the other as citizen who could at almost any time travel abroad. He 
continued to write the sacrifice that structures community inside the walls of the theatre 
and the GDR. Any transgression of those limits was also a sign of his privilege. As 
such, and as Hamletmaschine most clearly demonstrates, his writing was achieved 
behind an Iron Safety Curtain at the cost of the possibility of drama that never took 
place on the streets in the GDR. Any uprising on the streets always failed, other than 
that one in 1989 about which Müller was especially ambivalent.
1,2 ibid., pp. 95-6. 
185 ibid., p. 96.
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While the GDR still existed, however, the choice to remain within the four walls 
of the theatre allowed his writing and performances to dwell in the agon - the finite, 
never completed political community which always lies in, and guarantees, the future. 
By performing mimesis as sacrifice (a performance that consisted of the allegorisation 
of the tradition of mimesis through acts of remembrance), Müller enacted the non­
immanence of the theatre in the community, in other words the heterogeneity of the 
community to the theatre. Consequently he positioned theatre as opaque to the interests 
of the state.
In contrast the figure playing Hamlet can only retreat to the self-presence and the 
modem dream of immanence expressed in the technological Utopia of the machine:
Meine Gedanken sind Wunden in meinem Gehirn. Mein Gehirn ist eine Narbe.
Ich will eine Maschine sein. Arme zu greifen Beine zu gehn kein Schmerz kein
Gedanke.'“
Such a theatrical subject without signature repeats for Müller the sacrifice as mimesis 
that would break down the four walls of the theatre, with the aim of establishing a 
politics adequate to the theatre - an aestheticisation o f politics. Müller's theatre, on the 
other hand, remains as the excess or rest of a certain impossibility -  that of establishing 
community once and for all. The impossible nature o f this task demands therefore a 
never-ending theatre, the constant return of remembrance and re-interpretation which 
guarantees the future of community as impossible, finite and heterogeneous.
Müller attempts in the last scene of Hamletmaschine to strengthen the 
heterogeneous quality of his theatre by allowing the victims of theatrical representation 
to speak as victim. Given his, Heiner Müller's, culpability in the tradition of 
victimisation, such an attempt can only fail, for in the end it takes the form of Müller, as
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playwright, speaking for the victims once more. This failure and contradiction does, 
however, point once more towards the impossibility of such theatre, to the always 
returning demand to produce new texts, and the hope of new interpretations, perhaps 
from those who until now have been the victims. In this scene Ophelia, bound in a 
wheelchair, repeats Hamlet's desire to stop birth and reproduction. The return of the 
same in Müller, however, provides an opportunity for explosion. Simply by giving 
Ophelia/Elektra this speech, Müller points to the fearful power of heterogeneity which is 
expressed when different desires come from the mouth of the gendered other. Although 
the women in the play can only be represented as other -  because Müller is writing and 
signing as man -  the shock of the speech makes Ophelia so heterogeneous that she 
cannot be subsumed so easily under patriarchal theatrical discourse. Through the 
repetition and remembrance of Ophelia, Inge Müller, Ulrike Meinhoff and Sharon Tate 
as victims184 85 Müller does on the one hand point toward their sacrifice for European 
theatre, but on the other he recalls that they were sacrificed as other. Their heterogeneity 
can never be fully subsumed or repressed, it can always return again and again in 
moments of transgression and excess.
OPHELIA
während zwei Männer in Arztkitteln sie und den Rollstuhl von unten nach oben 
in Mullbinden schnüren.
Hier spricht Elektra. [...] Im Namen der Opfer. Ich stoße allen Samen aus, den 
ich empfangen habe. Ich verwandle die Milch meiner Brüste in tödliches Gift.
Ich nehme die Welt zurück, die ich geboren habe. Ich ersticke die Welt, die ich 
geboren habe zwischen meinen Schenkeln. Ich begrabe sie in meiner Scham.186
184 ibid.
185 Müller claimed Meinhoff to be represented by the "Frau am Strick", see also Krieg Ohne Schlacht, p. 
294. Tate, as victim of the Manson Family is brought to mind by the last line of the play, itself a quote 
from one of the arrested members speaking about Manson himself. Müller simply changed the "he" to 
"sie" in the translation.
186 Müller, Hamletmaschine, op. cit., p. 97,
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Bound and yet never fully suppressed, the simultaneous threat of the gendered other
when she is remembered is made clear in the last lines o f the play where she alone
remains on the stage. That this threat gains its strength from its transgressive character is
also emphasised in that the transgression remains within the discourse of the theatre,
which must return her to her silent, motionless state.
Nieder mit dem Glück der Unterwerfung. Es lebe der Haß, die Verachtung, der 
Aufstand, der Tod. Wenn sie mit Fleischermessen durch eure Schlafzimmer 
geht, werdet ihr die Wahrheit wissen.1*7
This is no symbol of woman in the theatre, however, but the allegory of the culpability 
of Heiner Müller, the singular subject, writing. Through the remembrance by him of 
particular women in the theatrical tradition (which he, among others wrote), Müller 
seeks to address the constitutive role of the gendered other for his theatre. This 
constitutive nature can only be addressed aporetically for two reasons: firstly because 
that which constitutes his text is other, and secondly because what is constituted is 
writing. In other words, what is constituted bears the characteristics of signature, it was 
written by a particular person at a particular time. As such a signed and dated text it is 
structured in the most profound way by fmitude. But finally, by being finite, singular 
and particular it is also iterable and repeatable, the text can be performed once again.
This is therefore the link between remembrance, the gendered other, signature 
and fmitude. Each, by being an expression of the impossible and aporetic nature of 
community, helps Müller in his attempt to provide for the future of theatre, to ensure 
that it never sees itself as having completed its job. Such a completion could be 
achieved by theatre in two ways. Firstly, it would succeed in symbolising once and for 
all the world in its essence on stage, or furthermore theatre, in such symbolisation,
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would enable society to reach its telos of development, thus making theatre superfluous. 
Muller seeks to resist both and he does so in order to maintain a degree of heterogeneity, 
social transgression and respect for the other -  in other words, community -  in the 
environment in which he writes. This, in turn, is not simply achieved by the political 
content of his work, but by dint of its having being written and performed politically. It 
is the nature of Muller's political community which this thesis has all along been 
attempting to address.
Conclusion
We have come along way from the comedy of Die Umsiedlerin to the avant-garde 
challenge of Hamletmaschine. The fundamental argument of this thesis has been that the 
issues Müller was interested in addressing (the never-to-be realised community, the 
constitutive nature of the other in it, the importance of transgressive and heterogeneous 
practices in order to express it, and the necessity of remembrance in order to guarantee 
its future) could not be done justice given the form of his early work. The reasons for 
the development of Muller's theatre are thus to be found in the failure of this early work 
and its partial recuperation into the GDR hegemonic structures. Die Umsiedlerin and 
Der Lohndrücker nevertheless represent the beginnings of an autonomous theatre which 
seeks to bring about the effects of community through both the issues it addresses and 
the manner in which it is performed.
These earlier plays demonstrate that community could not be written and 
experienced by attempting to reinstate a homogeneous community of interpretation.
" 7 ibid.
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Such homogeneity is expressed in the earlier texts by an implicit reliance on the state 
and the objectivity of its power. Philoktet represents a tum in Muller's writing. It is at 
this point that Midler seemed to recognise that the experience of community in the 
theatre (and thus the production of conditions which might be beneficial outside of the 
theatre itself) could only be effected by theatre showing its autonomy from outside 
concerns. Heterogeneous expenditure can only be experienced heterogeneously. By 
turning his theatre into allegory, Midler found a form of writing which allowed him to 
address the constitutive heterogeneity in community. Midler's allegory expresses 
finitude and singularity -  the fact that time passes -  and in so doing seeks to emphasise 
the importance of remembrance.
It is not only the victims of the political world outside who are caught up in this 
act of remembrance, however. Müller wants to remember those who have suffered 
either through the manner in which they have been represented in the theatrical tradition 
(in particular, women) or those who have suffered because of the necessity of theatre 
remaining autonomous. While on the one hand this autonomy allows theatre to effect an 
experience of community (by allowing the difference and heterogeneity which resides in 
community to come to expression in a heterogeneous manner), on the other, real 
political action and struggle to bring about the conditions of such heterogeneity in the 
society as a whole can only go on outside of the theatre. What is more, this political 
struggle necessitates succumbing to political goals and the instrumentality of more 
homogeneous discourses.
Müller's theatre remembers, therefore, not only the catastrophic nature of 
homogenous politics, but also its necessity. His theatre expresses in its transgressive and 
heterogeneous character (it is transgressive because heterogeneous) community, but also
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the impossible, never achieved nature of that community. Finally, Midler's theatre 
brings about an experience of finitude and singularity, but does so in order to guarantee 
the future through the very fact that his theatre is always in decay and always needs to 
be performed again.
The most fitting testament to Midler's writing and theatre is just such one 
particular expression of finitude; that is, that Müller himself died. This thesis has 
(especially in Chapter One) attempted to examine what this demand means for literary 
critique and furthermore how literary critique must respond when faced with a literature 
(such as Müller's) which deliberately addresses this demand.
Just as MUller's earlier writing and what he wrote about -  heterogeneity and 
transgression -  fell victim to a recuperation by the GDR state ideology, so does critique 
run the risk of recovering for its own ends the surprise, alterity and danger of MUller's 
work, thereby repressing or forgetting its alterity. There would be a fundamental 
contradiction inhabiting any thesis which did not recognise this problem, also discussed 
in relation to comedy in Chapter Two, of using literature -  that which is most singular -  
to make a point. And yet the singularity of literature's signature allows one to do just 
that. The response of the critic is thus analogous to that of Müller with regard to 
political intervention. S/he must retain the aporetic relation to the singular fmitude of 
Heiner Müller and to the qualities that make his writing just that - a signed text. This is 
why this thesis has attempted to emphasise the importance of the "story" of the plays, of 
a finite history of MUller's writing career which ended in December 1995, when he died. 
By addressing the fmitude and singularity of the author of Die Umsiedlerin, Der 
Lohndrücker, Philoktet and Hamletmaschine one approaches the problem of 
community, not only as theme in Müller’s work, but as experience of his writing.
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Müller himself chose to revisit his work and his signature, that is, to engage in 
remembrance of them and o f their portrayal of victims (most importantly the other as 
gendered). This thesis has suggested that such remembrance, when one considers it in 
the context of transgressive practices within a community structured by the other and 
the other's death, allows the aporia of alterity and community to remain more-or-less 
intact. This then represents the demand, political or ethical, of Müller's work on the 
future interpreter, critic or producer which can either be taken up, ignored or denied. 
This thesis has attempted to do the former.
Müller himself declared himself disappointed with the attitude of some directors 
to his work. Instead of experimenting with his texts, with the history of those texts and 
with theatrical discourse as such, what often came out instead was precisely that form of 
theatre which Müller was trying to escape from. This, of course, can be regarded as the 
director's prerogative, but it is most puzzling when it is undertaken for the sake of 
Müller's name or his signature.
"Only when a text cannot be done in the theatre as it is now," Müller remarked in 
1975, "can it be productive for the theatre, or interesting."
Müller considered his texts simply starting points for creation. "What 
often bores me in the productions [of my plays] is that they [the directors] 
simply illustrate what is already in the text, instead of using it as association 
material, as a kind o f supernova, which inspires directors with ideas."158
The critic of Müller might thus be regarded as facing the same task. In order to respond
seriously to Müller's work or, less polemically, to treat the works of literature by Heiner
Müller as works of literature by Heiner Müller, s/he would do well to maintain the
alterity of Müller and his work by addressing the signature which makes both possible.
This also might help to keep Müller's work open for critics in the future.
Friedman, Dan. Müller at Castillo, http://home.castillo.orE/castillo/mullerbio.html
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This thesis has also hoped to demonstrate that the demands made upon the critic 
by the literariness and thus the fmitude of the work of art might productively be 
answered by taking to heart that work of Walter Benjamin which concerns itself with 
this problem. The fact that both work o f art and of critique are equally signed and finite 
is as strong an expression of the dialectical image as is possible. The very fact that 
remembrance and the dialectical image are possible, that one can remember the 
particular fmitude of Heiner Müller and the decay of that which he wrote, demonstrates 
that any attempt to homogenise all lives and deaths under one sign can be undermined. 
It is not the case that the critic is thereby "faithful" to Müller, because these were his 
concerns as well. It is rather that the critic is thereby faithful to the work of literature as 
literature and not as anything else, and that Müller was concerned to produce literature 
and theatrical works which themselves resisted any attempt to suppress their literary, 
finite and signed nature. The critic can attempt, therefore, to enable them to resist any 
suppression of the fact that they were written by Heiner Müller himself.
Critique of Müller is thus the remembrance of his finitude and his signature, that 
is, of the possibility of iterability, the very possibility of literature itself, and finally, the 
very possibility of the argument of this thesis. It is precisely because Müller was able to 
revisit the theatrical tradition and engage in remembrance that I have described him as 
succeeding in producing a theatre which wrote community and effected its experience. 
The move from Die Umsiedlerin to Hamletmaschine represents the increasingly 
powerful expression of his signature and finitude and of the community in which he 
wrote.
It is because Müller's work is so clearly signed, I have argued, that the autonomy 
of the work comes equally clearly to the fore, thereby ultimately betraying and working
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against any intentions, be they progressive or reactionary, that Müller may have had. 
The fact that his work is signed means that it does not belong to him, be he dead or 
alive. Such autonomy raises the danger, of course, of Müller's text being used for other 
ends. I have examined the problem of making life and work a symbol of a heroic figure, 
as well as that of philosophical use of a text, both of which ignore the signature of the 
work of literature. While such usage cannot be avoided (not least within the context of 
the argument of an academic thesis) I only hope to have shown, both through theoretical 
discussion and textual analysis, how criticism might proceed, in order at least to 
remember how Müller lived, wrote and died.
Müller verraten, ohne ihn zu gebrauchen, ist Kritik
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